


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS  
FOR 1996

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HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

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**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS  
FOR 1996**

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**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS  
FOR 1996**

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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1995.

**COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC  
COMMAND**

**and**

**COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES, KOREA**

**WITNESSES**

**ADM. RICHARD C. MACKE, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES  
PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. NAVY**

**GEN. GARY E. LUCK, COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/COM-  
BINED FORCES COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA, U.S.  
ARMY**

**INTRODUCTION**

Mr. YOUNG. The Committee will come to order.

This afternoon we welcome Admiral Richard Macke, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, and General Gary Luck, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Commander in Chief U.S. Combined Forces Command and Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea.

Pursuant to a unanimous vote held yesterday, this hearing will be closed so that we might have the opportunity to discuss classified information. We will place your prepared statements in the record and ask that you summarize. After you have completed, we will then open the hearing for questions.

Thank you very much for giving us your time this afternoon. You have responsibilities for some very important parts of the world and we look forward to hearing your comments.

**SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL LUCK**

General LUCK. Sir, I will start. You do have my statement for the record.

I don't have much to add to that except that I think it is very appropriate, I personally thank you all for your support. It made a big difference over there. We went for a long time without military construction and this Committee has been the conduit to make things happen. A whole bunch of soldiers would like to thank you if they knew how to do it. So I guess that is my job to say thank you—to everybody who has put the money on the table. I can as-

sure you it is already going into troop barracks in 2-ID to get out of the Quonset huts they have been in for so long.

Thank you for that support and for all the other support we get from you. I appreciate it.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder, this is really a terrific item here. General Luck, I am sure you must have in the form of a chart you could put up?

General LUCK. I brought in all these charts. Mr. Murtha is not listening to me, Mr. Lewis is baiting me a bit. I brought all these charts today to show just because I could.

Mr. MURTHA. He also, Mr. Chairman, brought a lot of staff. Now he has a talk-and-answer questions team with all the staff to back him up. He used to come with one person.

General LUCK. I brought one. I brought the Marine. The staffers are to help him sir.

[The statement of General Luck follows:]



**STATEMENT OF**  
**GENERAL GARY E. LUCK, U.S. ARMY**  
**COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND**  
**COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ROK/U.S. COMBINED FORCES COMMAND**  
**COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES, KOREA**  
**BEFORE THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE**  
**SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY**  
**16 FEBRUARY 1995**

## **GENERAL GARY E. LUCK**

**COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND  
ROK-U.S. COMBINED FORCES COMMAND  
UNITED STATES FORCES, KOREA**



General Gary Luck was born in Alma, Michigan, on 5 August 1937, and grew up in Fort Scott, Kansas. He graduated from Kansas State University in 1960, was awarded a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering, designated a Distinguished Military Graduate in the ROTC program and commissioned a second lieutenant. He also holds an MBA from Florida State University and a Doctorate in Business Administration (ORSA) from George Washington University.

His military education includes the Armor Basic and Advanced Officer courses, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the United States Army War College.

General Luck has held a variety of important command and staff positions which include: Chief of Staff, 8th Infantry Division, Europe; Director, Force Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, D.C.; Assistant Division Commander, 101st Airborne Division; Commanding General, 2nd Infantry Division, Korea, Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command; Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command; and most recently, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg before assuming command in Korea on 15 June 1993.

Other major assignments include: Company Commander of a tank company; Special Forces "A" Team Commander in Vietnam; Troop Commander with the 3/17th Cavalry (Air) in Vietnam; assault and helicopter Company Commander with the 182nd Aviation Company, Fort Bragg; action officer in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); an Air Cavalry Squadron Commander and Division G-3, 101st Airborne Division; Chief of the Force Modernization Division for U.S. Army Europe; and Brigade commander, 8th Infantry Division in Europe.

His awards and decorations include: Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Distinguished Flying Cross (with two Oak leaf Clusters), Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Purple Heart, Republic of Korea, Order of National Security Merit, "Cheonsu Medal," King Faisal Award - Class Two, Republic of Vietnam Honor Medal - 1st Class, Officer de la Legion d' Honneur Award, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medals with "V" Device, Army Commendation Medal, Combat Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, Senior Army Aviation Badge, Air Assault Badge, Ranger Tab, Special Forces Tab, and the Army Staff Identification Badge.

General Luck is married to the former Leah Patrick. He has two children, Skip and Kim.

**Mister Chairman and members of the committee:**

**It is a distinct honor to present my views on the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. Our discussion today is most opportune since it addresses important security implications for the United States (US), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and our other friends in Asia. I share your concern that we need to fully understand the security environment, with all its challenges and opportunities. We must all have a clear vision of one of the most dynamic regions of the world.**

**Before we begin today's discussion, I wish to express my gratitude for the firm support that Congress has shown United States Forces Korea. You have always had the prudence to understand that the world is still a dangerous place, and much uncertainty and instability remain on the Korean peninsula. Your actions to resist abrupt troop and budget cuts in Asia have reassured our allies and also warned our potential adversaries of America's steadfast support and commitment to the region. Recent security events prove the wisdom of preserving a responsive American troop presence in Asia and having a deliberate strategy of strength and vigilance to deter aggression and promote regional stability. We have reached a critical juncture in this important theater. As you know, the current security climate mandates that we not merely think or talk tough, we must actually be strong and ready to handle any military situation that might suddenly arise.**



We must note from the outset that peace and stability in Northeast Asia are most important to the security and economic well being of the United States. Our history and geography make the United States a Pacific power with major political, military and economic interests in the region. These interests are especially critical to our future since the balance of economic power continues to rapidly shift toward Asia. The Asia-Pacific region is now our largest trading partner and a huge market for American exports. Future American economic growth and well-being will be derived from close interaction with Asia's powerhouses – China, Japan, and the ROK. United States security strategy in Asia must be guided by our own national interests and regional realities. The Asia-Pacific region will be the World's most dynamic and powerful region in the 21st Century. Therefore, the United States must continue to be an important player in regional security activities.

American military strength and commitment to Northeast Asia helps promote the region's notable economic growth. A credible forward-deployed military presence provides for the peace and stability essential to the formation and expansion of healthy economic markets and democratic institutions, while permitting us to share in important regional security decisions. Moreover, our military presence helps to deter a war that could destroy the viability of the region as a major market for American products and services. Since successfully stopping Communist aggression on the Peninsula in the early 1950's, we have maintained a strong defensive military posture in the ROK to prevent a renewed military attack from North Korea (NK). Combined Forces Command (CFC), United Nations Command (UNC) and United States Forces Korea (USFK) constitute a strong military force – a

combined defensive force characterized by readiness, professionalism, discipline and vigilance. I am pleased to report that our security relationship with the ROK, which has successfully served both nation's vital national interests for over forty years, is still actively focused on clear mutual security objectives: deterring the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula and not allowing NK to intimidate its progressive neighbors in Northeast Asia. However, if deterrence should ever fail, ROK and US forces are ready and able to defeat NK aggression and achieve favorable war termination objectives.

North Korea still poses a serious threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. North Korean military forces are organized and deployed to accomplish their long-standing strategic objective of reunifying the Peninsula under NK rule. Regrettably, NK remains an isolated, overly distrustful state that has demonstrated in the past that it is prepared to attempt to use military power to intimidate its peaceful neighbors. The dramatic changes sweeping the world over the past few years have deprived NK of most of its former allies, weakened its economy, and discredited its ideology. North Korea is now run by a failing communist regime that is in a period of hazardous uncertainty as it faces a complex dilemma: its ailing economy is headed for collapse if it does not accept significant reform and opening to the outside world, but such change may ultimately spell doom to a regime based upon a closed, tightly controlled society. Although NK has stated that it prefers peaceful reunification, its actions indicate that it intends to possess a viable military option in case it cannot negotiate reunification on

what it considers acceptable terms. For this reason, we must keep the ROK - US bilateral relationship strong and prepared for any eventuality.

The security situation in Korea remains quietly tense and dangerous. The build-up and forward deployment of NK conventional military forces along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) continues despite notable recent events: the sudden death of NK's long-time dictator Kim Il-Sung, the dynastic succession of Kim Jong-Il, and the Agreed Nuclear Framework reached between NK and the United States. North Korea still masks most of its internal activities from outside observation. However, there is convincing evidence that NK continues to promote military strength over basic economic, political and social development. As a result, NK remains one of the most militarized countries in the world.

The North has heavily fortified the DMZ and deployed the majority of its active ground forces within close striking distance of the ROK capital of Seoul. Despite a deteriorating economy and several years of poor harvests, NK still continues to protect and give the highest priority to its military. In addition to an expensive quest for nuclear weapons, NK stubbornly expends its dwindling national resources to mechanize its ground forces, expand its artillery formations, enhance the world's largest special operations force, and enlarge its ballistic missile arsenal. This massive, forward deployed force goes well beyond legitimate defensive needs. Moreover, NK has continued over the past two decades to assume a hostile offensive posture toward the ROK by gradually shifting military forces south. Forward-deployed NK forces



have gradually increased from about 40 percent of active duty combat forces to around 65 percent.

Today, as in the past, a ROK-US combined defense team stands ready to successfully counter any offensive military or terrorist action by North Korea. A close security relationship between the US and the ROK proved essential to the overall defense effort during increased tensions last summer and it remains the central focus of Korea's deterrence posture. Our complex security environment demands mutual understanding and frequent, in-depth consultations between the ROK and US military and government staffs on the Peninsula. We continue to work very hard at all levels to build upon a record of close personal and professional relationships that are key to making the defense system work effectively. These relationships serve as the linchpin between the defense establishments and executive agencies of our two separate nations. The recent security crisis illustrated once again the importance of maintaining a clear understanding of the support actions each nation must accomplish. We reconfirmed a number of substantial security relations' imperatives: political and economic events must move forward in close concert with military planning activities; advance warning and substantial prior planning is invaluable when coordinating a military reinforcement of the Korean Peninsula; and close relationships amongst senior ROK and US military officers and with the civilian leadership are needed to "grease the wheels" of a complex and slow moving security apparatus.

North Korea's strategy continues to focus on trying to drive a wedge between the US and the Republic of Korea, to obtain two of their long standing goals: the withdrawal of US forces and an end to the ROK-US security alliance. Until NK completes a wide-range of substantial political, economic and military confidence-building measures, and quits its confrontational posture towards the ROK, the ROK-US alliance must remain highly energized and clearly focused on the North's potent military capability.

I am pleased to report that the ROK continues to be a superb military ally. The ROK fields a large, well-trained, relatively well-equipped, and professionally-led military force and steadily invests significant sums to increase its overall war-fighting capability. An active and strong combined ROK-US defense team is focused on the NK threat and working closely on improvement in defense plans and warfighting strategy, tactics, and support procedures. The morale and spirit of ROK and US forces in Korea remain high, and the joint and combined military planning staffs have effective working relationships. ROK force improvement plans also continue at a steady pace. The ROK is modernizing and improving its forces with the addition of more powerful and mobile tanks, long-range and self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket launchers, armored personnel carriers, advanced aircraft and helicopters and coastal defense ships. ROK ground force capabilities continue to improve with the formation of more mechanized and armored units, and all ROK military services continue to conduct more combat-driven training and exercise scenarios.

Republic of Korea defense spending remains substantial. Defense spending over the past five years has represented between 22% and 26.3% of the ROK national budget or between 3.3% to 3.8% of ROK gross national product (GNP)(US Embassy figures). Historically, the ROK has ranked near the top of all US allies in its share of GNP allocated to defense. The ROK defense budget is growing due to an expanding economy and future defense budgets will most likely outpace inflation. The ROK has also habitually devoted a significant portion of its population to defense with universal conscription and a strong reserve training program. The ROK has more than 650,000 personnel in uniform (roughly one-third of US levels, with a population less than one-sixth of the US) and has reserve forces much larger than our own. The ROK also buys a considerable amount of US weapon systems and spare parts – over 3.5 billion dollars in the past five years or about 83% of all foreign military spending by the ROK. Although the ROK military budget totals \$12.6 billion for CY94, we must remember that ROK GNP measures only \$360 billion, only slightly more than the US defense budget.

Republic of Korea cost sharing contributions are impressive. The ROK continues to rank near the top of all US allies in regards to overall cost sharing support. The ROK has made substantial progress in assuming a greater portion of the costs associated with maintaining US forces in Korea. The ROK recently pledged \$360 million in direct cost sharing support or close to one-third of USFK's stationing costs for 1995. This vital support is applied to construction, logistics, and local national labor requirements. The ROK also provides a substantial amount of indirect support through tax

exemptions, the provision of rent-free land and facilities, and reduced rates for utilities. A conservative estimate of ROK indirect support would place its value at over \$1 billion. The overall level of ROK cost sharing support has grown steadily over the years and we are working to reach an agreement this year that will provide for an even greater contribution in the future.

#### Total ROK Direct Cost Sharing Support

1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
\$45M	\$70M	\$150M	\$180M	\$220M	\$260M	\$300M

In view of the continuing threat posed by NK, there is a continuing need for major US-funded construction programs for facilities and infrastructure in Korea. Morale and readiness are both negatively impacted when military personnel have to live in inadequate housing, eat in substandard dining facilities and work on expensive equipment in temporary facilities. Unfortunately, over a third of USFK facilities are over 25 years old and our infrastructure has deteriorated and is subject to failure. The ROK has done a great deal to assist us in this vital area, but additional US funding is needed to maintain morale and readiness. This is especially true given the fact that approximately 50 percent of American forces in Korea have inadequate living, dining and work facilities. The US military construction funds we received in fiscal year 1995 were greatly appreciated and put to immediate use on an array of badly needed projects. Continued US military construction funding is a prudent investment in our readiness, our military personnel and our overall security commitment to the ROK. Funds for Patriot and Apache fielding in

fiscal year 1995 were also appreciated. Full support for our operating accounts, including OPTEMPO and facilities/barracks maintenance and repair, is also essential.

The Korean Peninsula is still troubled by many serious security problems, but an opening now exists for NK to set aside its isolationism, take concrete steps to reduce regional tensions, and eventually join the community of nations. Unfortunately, there is no quick or easy fix to the substantial security issues that divide us. However, NK does have another opportunity to restart dialogue with the ROK and to undertake some meaningful confidence-building measures to help reduce tensions. Implementation of the Agreed Framework is a long process with a number of critical milestones. It is not based on trust, and we will continue to monitor closely North Korean compliance with the terms of the Agreed Framework. If NK abandons its commitments, the world should consider appropriate measures to reverse NK noncompliance, including the possibility of sanctions.

While carefully measured diplomatic and commercial initiatives are pursued in the region, military strength and vigilance are vital prerequisites. The stakes are just too high to risk doing otherwise. Although we would certainly prevail during any war in the region, the price in human lives and monetary costs would be staggering. That is why we must carefully weigh and fully appreciate the grim consequences of nuclear or conventional conflict in the region – enormous death and destruction, the wreckage of a vibrant economy, floods of refugees, and huge reconstruction costs. The



cost of deterrence through strength and vigilance is a great bargain by comparison.

The foundation is laid for careful optimism about the future in Northeast Asia. However, a variety of complex, long-standing security issues still remain. A good plan of action is being implemented to deal with these issues, one that emphasizes engagement and deterrence. Our goal is peace and stability in the region. The key to reducing tensions and building mutual trust and understanding is dialogue coupled with positive action. We certainly hope that NK will live up to its obligations and that diplomatic and economic initiatives succeed, but our hope must also be coupled with a determined resolve to watch, verify and place more value on NK action than rhetoric.

The ROK-US security relationship, one of our oldest policy cornerstones in Asia, remains vitally important. Regardless of what relationship might evolve between Washington and Pyongyang in the near future, the US must remain fully committed to this mutually beneficial alliance. Thankfully, the ROK-US security alliance remains stronger and more capable than ever during these fluid and uncertain times.

Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We will be back to you or with some very specific questions.

Now let me ask Admiral Macke if you would be willing to present to us anything that you would like us to hear.

#### SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MACKE

Admiral MACKE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

I want to double on what General Luck said concerning the military construction, not only in Korea but throughout the Pacific arena, the quality of life things that you and also I had the opportunity to testify before your military construction Subcommittee yesterday and through all of your help, we are making a difference with regard to quality of life for our forces out there and they much appreciate that.

#### WARFIGHTING AND PEOPLE

It is an honor to be here representing the over 300,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines and Coast Guardsmen of the Pacific Command. The graphic that Mr. Lewis referred to is the framework from which I would like to make a few comments.

Starting with my bottom line, my priorities are warfighting and people. At the end of the international economic analysis and military considerations and strategic military planning, the fundamental business of the Pacific Command is warfighting, and warfighting to me is readiness. That is my constant focus. But people are an inextricable part of that focus. It wasn't the technology, it wasn't our weapon system, it wasn't our doctrine that won the Cold War and won Desert Storm. It was our wonderful people that like that edge that gives us an overwhelming capability. So if it weren't for the excellence of them, we wouldn't have it. Warfighting relies on readiness and my people priority relies on quality of life. We must keep going the programs that ensure our quality of life.

#### THEATER MILITARY STRATEGY

The Asian Pacific area has undergone what many call an economic miracle. I do not deny that but I say that the basis for it was a security miracle because that economic growth has sprung from a foundation of regional stability and security throughout that area. That stability is underwritten by the forward presence of capable American forces.

We have a comprehensive theater military strategy called cooperative engagement. That is described in my written statement, but one point I would like to emphasize is the forward presence side of it.

#### FOREIGN MILITARY PROGRAMS

I have traveled extensively throughout my area of responsibility and the first question I get from virtually every leader in the theater is, "Will you stay engaged?" They want us to remain in the Asian Pacific region. I have not visited North Korea and I can't speak for them. They may not want us to. But I will speak for the rest of the countries. They want our forces out there.

One of the most effective ways that we provide that military presence is through an extensive program of foreign military interactions. The Asian Pacific region is marked by a lot of diversity, different cultures, different values, but military professionals share a professional bond that allows effective communications.

I have found that in personal experience from talking with Chinese military leaders, and from my visit to Hanoi where I talked to former adversaries. We gain a lot of leverage from the low-cost, high-payoff military programs that employ our key strategic advantage, our people. I don't view these contacts just as nice-to-have, but critical to the strategic long-term payback that we expect to get.

#### IMET PROGRAM

One of the best of these is a program called International Military Education and Training or IMET. I know you are familiar with that. Funding for that program is not within the jurisdiction of this Committee. The impact, however, is related to what you all do.

IMET is the training of young foreign military and civilian leaders in the United States and it is impossible to overstate the strategic leverage that we gain from this low cost program; \$12 million last year, just under \$40 million in the budget this year.

I recently met with General Borhahn, the Chief of the Defense Force in Malaysia, and he spent 20 minutes describing to me how much fun he had and what a great time he had going through Fort Bragg and told me the first thing he wants to do on retirement is to go back and retrace his footsteps in those pine forests around Fort Bragg. I sat with General Wimol, the Chief of Staff of the Royal Thai Army, and he had seven senior generals in the Royal Thai Army sitting next to him, every one of whom is an IMET graduate.

When you meet President Ramos of the Philippines and find out that he is a West Point graduate, especially if you meet him after the Army-Navy football game, you know that he has a good understanding of what goes on in the United States. You go to northeast Asia: the former minister of defense in South Korea, Mr. Rhee, and the current chairman of the Japanese Joint Staff Council, General Nishimoto, were classmates at the Army War College. General Glen Marsh, our I Corps Commander, whose area includes Japan now, is also a classmate of theirs from Carlisle. These IMET students return home, ascend to positions of prominence in their own militaries and you can't buy for any amount of money the understanding and the influence that is generated.

The IMET program has been closed to Indonesia for the last 29 months. That means that in a couple of years there will be a two-year gap where the leadership in the Indonesian military will not have a firsthand understanding of our country. They won't know how we use our military forces as instruments of democracy under civilian control and they won't have been exposed to our sense of human rights.

In my opinion, it is a mistake to use IMET as a punishment for some past behavior. We need to use it to positively influence future behavior. As you may tell, I feel very strongly about this program,

it is one of the most effective tools we have to create future friends in my area of responsibility.

#### READINESS

Let me talk about readiness because that has received a lot of attention and I think rightfully so. Early in my career, I had the privilege of being a test pilot and I remember the phrase, "Testing the edge of the envelope," where you take an airplane up and you explore the margins to try and define what that envelope is. If you go outside that envelope, you may be okay, you may run into some minor problems which you can fly out of, or you may end up in a catastrophic failure.

The problem with the edge of the envelope is that engineers can only tell you where they think it is. Until you take the airplane up and test it, you don't know where it is, and I think that is an analogy that we have with regard to readiness today. People ask, "Where is the edge of that envelope?" I don't know, but I think we have been close to it. We have felt the buffeting of some perturbations over the last year. However, we have been able to fly out of those problems, and today, Pacific forces are ready.

A bigger question to me is, "What can I tell you a year from today?" If we can maintain the integrity and the budgeted amounts in our operations and maintenance accounts, if we can get timely action with regard to the Supplemental that is here now, and if we could take action to develop the readiness authority that Secretary Perry has asked for, if those three things happen, I think I can come back here a year from today and tell you again that Pacific forces are ready.

I cannot overemphasize the quality, the caliber and the wonderful performance of our people out there and that we need to do everything we can to keep those kind of people.

I appreciate the support you have given to us and look forward to working with you in the future to continue that support for our people.

Thank you very much.

[The statement of Admiral Macke follows:]

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL RICHARD C. MACKE, U.S. NAVY

COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY  
POSTURE HEARING  
FEBRUARY 16, 1995

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY




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# BIOGRAPHY

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## **ADMIRAL RICHARD C. MACKE** **Commander In Chief, U.S. Pacific Command**

Admiral Richard C. Macke is the 16th U.S. Naval Officer to hold the position of Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. As the senior U.S. military commander in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, he leads the largest of the unified commands and directs Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force operations across more than 100 million square miles – more than 50 percent of the earth's surface. He is responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is the U.S. Military representative for collective defense arrangements in the Pacific.



Admiral Macke was born in Freeport, Illinois. A graduate of Kirkland High School in Kirkland, Illinois, he graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with a Bachelor of Science degree in 1960. After graduation, he reported to flight training in Pensacola, Florida, and was designated a Naval Aviator in August 1961. He then reported to VA-23 in Lemoore, California, and flew A-4 Skyhawks on USS MIDWAY (CV-41).

In 1965, Admiral Macke attended Navy Test Pilot School and then served in the Weapons System Test Directorate participating in trials for the A-7A aircraft. He next went to VA-27, flying more than 150 combat missions in Southeast Asia from USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64).

Admiral Macke reported to U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in February 1970, where he graduated with distinction with a Master of Science degree in Operations Research and Systems Analysis. In March 1971, he reported to VA-66 at Cecil Field, Florida, as Executive Officer and later served as Commanding Officer of the A-7E squadron assigned to USS INDEPENDENCE (CV-62).

He was assigned to the Navy Office of Legislative Affairs in the Pentagon in January 1975, where he was involved in presenting the Naval Aviation Program budget to members of Congress and their staffs. Following completion of nuclear propulsion training, Admiral Macke served as Executive Officer of USS NIMITZ (CVN-68). He then took command of USS CAMDEN (AOE-2), successfully completing a 14-month complex overhaul.

Admiral Macke served as executive assistant to the director of Command and Control (OP-94) prior to reporting to the USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69) as Commanding Officer in July 1984. During his tour on the IKE, the ship won the COMNAVAIRLANT Battle "E".

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**Public Affairs Office**  
USCINCPAC STAFF BOX 64031 CAMP H. M. SMITH, HI 96861-4031  
TELEPHONE: (808) 477-6376

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

**Warfighting and People.** My priorities are *Warfighting* and *People*. At the end of all the international economic analyses, the careful political-military considerations, the strategic military planning -- the fundamental business of Pacific Command is warfighting. *Warfighting is readiness* -- our constant focus. But *people* are an inextricable part of that focus. It wasn't just our technology, our equipment, or our doctrine that won the Cold War and Desert Storm. It was the excellence of our people. Just as my *warfighting* priority drives *readiness*, the *people* priority demands *quality of life*. We must sustain the programs that ensure an adequate *quality of life* for our extraordinary men and women. It's not only compassion -- it's a strategic imperative.

**The Real Asia-Pacific Miracle.** The remarkable economic growth we see in the Asia-Pacific region is often characterized as an "economic miracle." I don't deny that -- but it is also a "security miracle." The extraordinary economic performance of the countries in my Area of Responsibility (AOR) rests on a foundation of stability and regional security underwritten by the visible forward presence of capable American forces and our credible security assurances. This is not merely my personal opinion -- it's the opinion of virtually every senior military and civilian leader I meet in the PACOM AOR. They are all concerned that we stay engaged in the Asia-Pacific.

**The True Nature of Stability.** The stability that underlies this security miracle is not simply "the absence of war." That type of stability is fragile and can only support short-term development: low-wage, labor-intensive economies which offer few export opportunities for the United States. We seek a long-term

stability founded on shared regional confidence. Such confidence fosters market maturation -- and the demand for advanced technical services. This is a trade sector where the United States has exceptional strengths -- and it is a huge market in the Asia-Pacific region. The Asian Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation members plan to invest \$1.1 trillion in infrastructure over the next six years. In "concrete" terms, this is the equivalent of 15 Santa Monica freeways every day. Again, this is an area in which American business can compete very effectively.

**The Stability Security Requirement.**

- Military forces must be prepared for more than "making people not do things" -- the deterrence of "threats" that characterized the Cold War.
- Military forces must be prepared for more than "making people do things" -- such as "leave Kuwait," a function we can call "compellence."
- Military forces must be able to directly reinforce the regional confidence essential for long-term stability. This function is "reassurance." Pacific Command executes all these security roles through the theater military strategy we call "Cooperative Engagement."

**Cooperative Engagement.** Cooperative Engagement is a well-established, winning, military strategy. It's a comprehensive approach that guides the employment of the entire range of military resources provided to me by the American people.

- In peacetime, we pursue reassurance through the forward stationing and deployment of our military forces, as well as a broad range of military activities. The scope and depth of this effort is remarkable. In 1994, we conducted:

- 18 multilateral conferences with participants from 36 nations

- 411 staff talks in over 28 countries
- 192 joint/combined exercises in 20 countries
- 77 humanitarian / civic action programs in 23 countries
- 606 port visits in 23 countries

Our presence and our peacetime military activities reinforce our relationships with friends and allies, reassuring them with respect to our long-term commitment, the effectiveness of our warfighting capability, and the values and quality of our people.

- In crisis, we work to deter aggression and encourage cooperation with our friends and allies. We work hard in Pacific Command to develop innovative approaches to joint and combined warfighting. We continue to train our people and our warfighting forces for effective crisis response, from minor contingencies to humanitarian efforts or disaster relief such as Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh in 1991.

- In conflict, we remain ready for decisive "compellence" -- victory -- in combat. We are prepared to win unilaterally if necessary -- but we prefer to act together with allies and coalition partners who have a common stake in regional security. It's better, of course, to deter conflict through effective crisis response. And it's best to prevent a crisis from even arising by a broad and sustained program of reassurance that reinforces a shared regional transparency essential for long-term security and stability. But if necessary, we are prepared to win in conflict.

**Cooperative Engagement: Progress.** Since assuming my duties as USCINCPAC in July of 1994, I have traveled well over 100,000 miles to assess the progress of our Cooperative Engagement strategy and seek ways to enhance it. The following

snapshots show this strategy is working. Through your continued support it will work in the future.

- Korea. U.S. military presence in and cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK) is the single most visible reassurance of U.S. commitment to the security of the ROK and the long-term stability of Northeast Asia. The Agreed Framework with North Korea is a significant achievement that addresses a serious proliferation threat, not only for the region, but for the entire world. It caps the North Korean nuclear program and should reduce overall tensions, permitting the North-South rapprochement to resume. The Agreed Framework is based on reciprocal performance -- a step by step approach, so we can ensure North Korean compliance.

So far, North Korea has complied with the agreement. But our experience with North Korea tells us to always "expect the unexpected." Even though their nuclear program is currently capped, the North remains a dangerous conventional threat, with over a million individuals under arms, and 65-70% of those forces within 100 km of the DMZ. They have deployed a tremendous artillery capability along the DMZ and within range of Seoul.

North Korea faces a faltering economy, international isolation, and is undergoing the first hereditary transfer of communist power. The North Korean leadership remains isolated and unpredictable. Their economy continues to deteriorate. The greatest concern of the North Koreans is survival of the regime. We must be careful not to give them the perception that their survival is threatened -- if that happens -- they might lash out. We have to deter North Korea, and if necessary, be ready to *compel* it. If we can improve our relations, maybe over the long term we can move to reassurance. Certainly it is unwise to do anything that would undercut our current deterrent posture. We must maintain our forces in Korea for the foreseeable future.

Meantime, the Republic of Korea is an active player in the world. They have improved relations with Russia, China, and Japan. I can't emphasize enough the care we take to ensure total coordination with our close friend and ally, the Republic of Korea.

- Japan. Our 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan remains a key factor to the broad sense of shared regional confidence we seek throughout the AOR. U.S. forces in Japan visibly demonstrate our commitment to the stability of the entire region, and they are available for short-notice deployment throughout the theater. They reinforce our deterrence of North Korea's conventional threat. Frequent combined U.S. and Japanese military exercises enhance professional interaction and interoperability between our militaries. The benefit of this cooperation was demonstrated in our readiness to respond to Japanese humanitarian needs during the recent tragedy in the Kobe earthquake.

Japan is our largest overseas trading partner -- together we comprise about 40% of the global domestic product. In every respect, this is a global partnership and a remarkable demonstration of successful reassurance, in which the number one and number two economic powers in the world enjoy one of the closest treaty alliances in history. Japan pays approximately two-thirds of the non-personnel costs of stationing U.S. forces in their nation; Tokyo's support for the presence of U.S. forces will be about \$18 billion in the 1992-96 period. Japan contributes to overseas security through their overseas development assistance programs and we support their increasing role in peacekeeping operations such as Cambodia, Mozambique and Rwanda.

- China. With one-fifth of the world's population, strategic nuclear weapons, veto power on the United Nation's Security Council, and a dynamic economy, China is already a world power. I see our relationship with China as

one of the most important considerations for our strategy of Cooperative Engagement.

China and the U.S. have many areas of complementary interest. We also face some important differences on issues ranging from trade and human rights to security. An approach that emphasizes dialogue rather than isolation or confrontation offers the greatest promise for maintaining stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

Although the Chinese say their military is not their central priority, the Peoples Liberation Army is clearly central to all their goals: internal stability, economic progress, and external respect. That is why our growing program of reassuring military contacts with the Chinese military is so important. As China's future unfolds, the PLA will play a pivotal role. China continues to increase the pace and scope of its military modernization program, and we fully recognize the concerns of many regional nations as China's power projection capability grows. But I do not see China's military as a near-term threat to the U.S. or to our interests in Asia.

My assessment will change, however, if we choose to isolate, rather than engage and reassure China. I believe the best approach to be a coordinated engagement in the political, economic, and military arenas. PACOM is ready to play a major role in the security piece of that dialogue.

- **Russia.** Russia is no longer our adversary, but the outcomes of Russian political, economic, and social reforms are uncertain. Unquestionably, the failure of Russia's nascent democracy would have an enormous impact on the region and on overall U.S. defense plans and programs. Russian reforms hinge on the military. The United States encourages reform through assisting Russia to safely reduce its nuclear arsenal, help prevent the spread of nuclear technology and materials, and through military-to-military cooperation and contacts that further

professional military attitudes of subordination to democratic government. The goal is a "pragmatic partnership" which addresses U.S. and Russian security -- concerns that coincide, rather than conflict, and serve as a basis for reassurance and cooperation.

Over the last two years, we have pursued frequent military-to-military contacts with our Russian counterparts. Key to this effort is our USPACOM-Russian Far East Colonel-level Working Group. Comprised of officers drawn from PACOM staff and components, and from the Russian General Staff and Far East commands, the Group has developed annual military contact programs that include exchanges and exercises involving personnel from all four services in activities like amphibious operations (with a disaster relief scenario) or search and rescue operations. These programs have enhanced interoperability and operational awareness, and demonstrated how a military functions within a democracy -- a quiet success story. Plans are in place for 1995 and 1996; we look forward to continuing our program of cooperation and reassurance.

- Vietnam. The focus of our relationship with Vietnam has been the effort to achieve a full accounting for POW/MIA from the war in Southeast Asia. It is really quite a moving experience to go to Vietnam and see Americans and Vietnamese working tirelessly -- shoulder to shoulder -- to solve this problem. My assessment from talking with leaders at every level, and by going out to the field, is that progress remains satisfactory. I cannot predict the future, but I have seen nothing that would indicate cooperation will decrease when the decision is made to normalize our relations.

Regional stability will be increased by integrating the Socialist Republic of Vietnam into the family of nations. The majority of Vietnamese today were born after the war. They have no recollection of it. We can put the war behind

us, without putting behind the need to achieve a full accounting for American POW/MIA.

- **Cambodia.** After 12 years of civil war, and arguably the greatest peacekeeping success in UN history, daunting challenges remain. The UN effort has produced a democracy and a military force loyal and subordinate to civilian control. This loyalty was demonstrated in the Royal Cambodian Armed Force's supportive role in quelling the coup attempt in July 1994. It is important that we sustain our efforts to ensure Cambodia is able to carry out their 1998 elections. The Khmer Rouge threat to the government remains low, but the level of assistance required for RCAF reform and reorganization remains large and beyond the capabilities of one nation. We are working in concert with other countries to provide assistance such as demining, road building, and English language training.

- **Thailand.** Our relations with this long-standing ally have been complicated over the last year. Concerns were voiced over alleged Thai assistance to the Khmer Rouge -- in fact, the Thai government has emphatically forbidden such support. We currently see no evidence of sanctioned official Thai support to the KR. More recently, the Thai government declined our request to position Equipment Afloat Ships off their shores. This was disappointing but vivid proof of the complexities of regional sensitivities. Even with all this, our treaty relationship is sound and important. Cobra Gold is my premier combined exercise in Asia. Thailand hosted the first trilateral air exercise in Southeast Asia this January, involving Singapore, U.S., and Thai air forces. The Thai offer to provide a medical unit for service in Haiti is a demonstration of the close relationship we share.

- **Indonesia.** Indonesia is the largest Muslim nation in the world. The current leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, they have important resources and



geographic position astride major international sea lanes. Our military forces enjoy solid professional relations, although the cancellation of IMET for Indonesia has been an impediment to that relationship. Reassurance activities like IMET should not be used as short-term retroactive punishment. We should remove this irritant to our military relationship by reinstating in FY96 and beyond our IMET program for Indonesia.

**The Region Overall.** This statement can not address every nation that is important to us in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia, for example, is a critical ally and traditional friend that shares our values, interests, and world view. Australia's participation in combined exercises, operation of joint defense facilities, and granting of access to U.S. ships and aircraft is absolutely essential to our forward presence. We are beginning an important dialogue with India, a country of enormous significance for the peace and stability of the region. We have recently concluded a defense agreement with Brunei, and we maintain successful periodic defense consultations with Malaysia. In the Philippines, we have put our continuing treaty relationship on a solid, mutually supportive basis. Singapore continues to provide excellent naval and air facilities, while strongly supporting U.S. forward presence. Throughout the region, the Cooperative Engagement strategy is effectively advancing U.S. interests.

**Cooperative Engagement: Prospects.**

- **Forward Presence.** We need more than "forward presence." We require a forward capability. No diplomatic note, no political mission, no economic commission conveys the same clear message of commitment as a visible U.S. military capability. Capable forward forces send a reassuring signal to regional leaders and provide a stabilizing force among markets and along trade routes.

Because of the tyranny of distance imposed by the size of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, any claim to be a legitimate Asia-Pacific power would ring hollow in the absence of a visible, tangible, and capable military presence.

Recognizing our indispensable role in the region, the ASEAN nations have stepped forward to offer access to ship repair and logistics facilities. We do not seek or need new bases to maintain long-term regional confidence and stability. Through a "Places, not Bases" pursuit of access to facilities such as ports, airfields, training areas, we can demonstrate capable forward presence without attempting to replicate our former bases in the Philippines.

- **Foreign Military Interaction.** We gain tremendous strategic leverage from low-cost, high-payoff military-to-military programs employing our key strategic advantage: our people. From airshow participation to multilateral conferences to high-level visits, we will continue to maintain an adequate level of reassurance through direct interaction and exchange. I do not view these contacts as "nice-to-have," but rather as critical activities that are strategic, long-term investments of extraordinary potential.

- **International Military Education and Training.** One of our most effective, yet inexpensive, Cooperative Engagement reassurance activities is the training of young military leaders from the USPACOM AOR in the United States. The exposure to American values is an invaluable individual contribution to the goal of a more democratic world. The long-lasting friendships formed between international classmates creates an unsurpassed opportunity for future professional communication. As these students return home, and ascend to positions of prominence in military and government positions, the positive value and influence expands to an even greater scope. In FY94, seventeen Asia-Pacific countries received grant funds under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, totaling \$2.935M and providing U.S. training and

education for over 300 students. An additional 3200 students received U.S. training and education purchased by their countries under Foreign Military Sales (FMS). This tremendously cost-effective program should not be subjected to harmful restrictions. If we do not make the personal contacts now with the region's future military leadership, we forgo irretrievable opportunities for future cooperation and influence.

- **Multilateral Military Activities.** We are the most trusted nation in the region. Only the U.S. has both the capability and the credibility to play the "honest broker" between nervous neighbors and historic antagonists -- establishing a solid foundation for regional stability. Our challenge for the future is to further develop confidence among nations within the region. I have lent personal emphasis, therefore, to reinforcing the emerging multilateral security contacts in the AOR through steady encouragement of expanded multilateral military activities. Multilateral exercises and training events will allow us to advance trust and transparency, intensifying our engagement efforts. PACOM resource savings are an important by-product.

The conventional wisdom has been that the Asia-Pacific region offers poor potential for multilateral activities. But I look to the future. As a result of my visits throughout the AOR, I am encouraged that by moving carefully, at the pace our allies and friends in the region are comfortable with, multilateral military activities will supplement (but not supplant) our extensive bilateral engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.

**Readiness: Warfighting and People.** The issue of readiness has dominated the defense debate over the past several months. The military functions of *reassurance, deterrence, and compellence* can not be met without ready forces.

Effective warfighting capability is the enabling factor for our Cooperative Engagement strategy.

But the readiness we guard so carefully will rapidly erode without able, well trained people who are satisfied with their quality of life. Quality of life is more than a free towel at the base gymnasium. It's a comprehensive sense of personal satisfaction derived from knowing you are doing an appreciated mission, that you are well trained for that mission, and that your family can live in reasonable comfort and dignity. Full funding of requested housing replacement/revitalization projects, future pay raises, and initiatives to expand child care services are examples of actions that tell our troops that they count and will be taken care of. Other readiness "enablers" include adequate base infrastructure for training and support; strong, well funded maintenance capabilities; and, in the long term, force modernization -- the foundation of tomorrow's readiness.

I had the privilege of being a test pilot early in my career. I recall the phrase "testing the edge of the envelope" -- taking an aircraft right up to the margin of its design parameters. If you go outside the envelope, you don't know what will happen:

- you may be OK,
- you may have a minor problem you can fly out of,
- you may have a catastrophic failure.

The real challenge with the "edge of the envelope" is that the aeronautical engineers can only calculate where they think it is. Until you've thoroughly tested the aircraft, you don't know where the precise limits are.

This is really the problem we face today. Everyone wants to know where the edge is: *where do you break readiness?* To be honest, I can't tell you. But I think we are near the edge of the envelope. I believe that because we have been

buffeted by some major perturbations over the last year. When you get several unscheduled contingency missions and have to forego training and significantly reprogram resources, you are on the edge of the readiness envelope. Fortunately, we've been able to "fly out of" these problems to this point. We've enjoyed historically unprecedented success in maintaining readiness through the downsizing. Pacific Command forces are ready today.

Our national resource realities mean that we will stay on the edge of the envelope for some time. One promising control mechanism is the DOD proposal for a Readiness Preservation Authority to provide timely supplemental funds for unplanned contingencies. This will enable us to stop shifting funds out of today's readiness accounts and avoid disrupting programs which affect longer term readiness. It will be especially appreciated by our field commanders, who can then focus on operational training, rather than on making hard choices on unanticipated resource reallocations. A more immediate matter is timely approval of reprogramming actions and the FY 95 supplemental request.

Two joint initiatives also promise to pay readiness dividends: assessment of joint readiness; and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). Joint readiness reporting processes now under development will identify key factors affecting our ability to operate in a JTF environment. Long range readiness will be served by better definition of requirements for new or upgraded weapon systems, C4I, and other critical warfighting and support areas. Both initiatives highlight the complexity of the readiness issue, and our determination to avoid catastrophe.

Our success in that effort to date is a tribute to our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to our Secretary of Defense, and to our entire Defense establishment. But most importantly, it is a tribute to the extraordinary men and women in our Armed Services. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are

our strategic advantage. We succeed because of their hard work, intelligence, and courage. We can never repay them for all they do. But we can do our best to support them. I am determined to do that, and I appreciate your support in that effort.

## IMPACT OF SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST ON READINESS

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much.

I would like to go directly to the issue of the Supplemental that you mentioned. I have an idea that you are fairly familiar with what the Supplemental includes, what it rescinds. But tell the Committee where we would stand on the subject of readiness or your ability to meet your responsibilities in the Pacific region if this Supplemental is not passed and not passed in a timely fashion.

Admiral MACKE. Mr. Chairman, if we don't get the Supplemental within three months, I will see the impact on readiness. I will have to be taking units down in readiness because of a lack of operating funds.

Mr. YOUNG. Could you give examples of the type of units you would take down?

Admiral MACKE. I would work with my components, and I have not discussed that with them so I can't give you a precise answer, but I know what I think will probably happen is that we would take selected units who weren't scheduled for near-term deployments or near-term need to go somewhere else and we would start with those and reduce their operating time, flying hours, tank maneuvering hours, et cetera, to make up for the loss of dollars.

Mr. YOUNG. If that were to happen, would it be safe to say that the next time that a contingency developed and we had to send a deployment, that you would either have to redeploy trained troops or you would have to deploy these troops that had a lack of training?

Admiral MACKE. Or I would have to say I cannot support the deployment. One of those three things.

Mr. YOUNG. So it tends to get pretty serious. We have had a lot of examples given to us by the Pentagon as to the types of training that would be "degraded." That is a word that General Shalikashvili used when he testified before the Committee.

If a flying unit or whatever type is stood down from training in the last quarter, I have two questions. One, do you ever recapture that training? And number two, take a flying unit—if it is stood down for two or three weeks, what does it take to get you back to a ready flying status?

Admiral MACKE. No, sir. You never can recapture training lost, which means you put off whatever you are going to do to the end of the year so you hopefully will get a Supplemental and can make up for the training you have given up earlier, because by quarter expenditure the money was going to do something else.

If a flying unit stands down, it will probably take one-and-a-half times the normal operating level to bring them back up to the step again. It isn't a one-for-one trade. I can't stand a unit down for three months and then expect a normal rate of operation in the next three months to bring them back up on the step again. It takes more than that.

Mr. YOUNG. The date that I was given early on when I began a series of meetings with commanders, officers and civilians at the Pentagon was that March 31st was pretty much the agreed-upon date, but if the money was not replaced, spent by the contingencies

by that date, that fourth quarter training would have to be cancelled. Is that a fair date?

Admiral MACKE. Yes, sir, it is. I say within three months I will see the effect of decreased readiness by not being able to do something, and I think those dates describe that fairly well.

#### GPS FOR HELICOPTERS IN SOUTH KOREA

Mr. YOUNG. General Luck, I would like to ask a question about a rather sensitive subject. Bobby Hall and Dave Hilemon flying that part of the world where it is very, very sensitive. Last time I was there, the terrain was difficult to fly by the seat of your pants or by dead reckoning, but their helicopter was not equipped with the Global Positioning System.

I understand that is being corrected, the helicopters are being equipped and the crews are being trained. Is that correct?

General LUCK. That is correct. We were about two weeks from having GPS installed in all the helicopters. That particular helicopter had the kit in it, the electronics and the support mechanism to put the GPS in, but it was just two weeks away from that.

To answer the other part of your question, the GPS with the procedures instituted on its use will preclude any potential of that happening again.

Mr. YOUNG. Was there a financial reason or lack of funding that the GPS hadn't been installed sooner?

General LUCK. I am not sure what the audit trail on that would be. We found in the Desert what a valuable tool the global positioning system was and the entire military kind of discovered that all at once. Each service I think is in the process of installing, purchasing, distributing and putting GPS in.

I am not sure whether that would trail to a dollar cost or trail back and find the production capacity. I could check what I know about it and answer for the record. I can't give an answer right now.

[The information follows:]

No, there was no financial reason for the global positioning system not being installed in the helicopter. They were requisitioned and had been received. We were in the process of installation when the incident occurred.

#### PURCHASE OF OFF-THE-SHELF GPS SYSTEMS

Mr. YOUNG. That would be fine.

A friend of ours in the other body who served in the House until this last election talked to me one day about GPS and said that he bought a GPS for his airplane off-the-shelf for about a third of what the military is having to pay for their systems. Is it easy to make that kind of comparison? There must be a reason why the Army helicopter, for example, would require more than what is available off-the-shelf in the area of GPS.

General LUCK. I am not sure that was a GPS that he was talking about. We used those in the Desert and they have a different name—they use a microwave antenna. We had those installed in our helicopters and they are a lot cheaper, but they work off of towers for intersection and resection.



There aren't any of those in Korea. It would work in the United States. They work in Saudi Arabia because they had the microwave antenna. But it wouldn't work in Korea.

Mr. YOUNG. The systems are not the same?

Admiral MACKE. The one that he is talking about is a GPS system on the civilian market which can be bought for less than the military set can be bought for. You can't take that set and mount it in a helicopter or in an F-16 as you get a hold of it. You can hold it in your hands but you can't mount it.

So there is a difference in cost there. The biggest is the GPS has an encrypted mode. ———. The encrypted mode will give our sets that have ability to decrypt the signal for that additional accuracy. That is the major difference.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you.

I would like to yield to Mr. Murtha.

#### COLD WEATHER BOOTS

Mr. MURTHA. You mentioned the additional military construction money. As you know, we looked at barracks when we were over there and when we came back the Committee recommended it. We worked hard on that. We are pleased that we got good results.

The other thing was boots. They had 13 kinds of cold-weather boots. Do they now have cold-weather boots in Korea that are all the same?

General LUCK. The issue boots are all the same. You know soldiers may buy their own, sir, but we, through the chain of command, ensure the boot they may purchase now is the same standard or higher.

Mr. MURTHA. At any rate, you can get a cold-weather boot now. There is an adequate cold-weather boot that they can get issued to them?

General LUCK. Yes.

#### ATTACK ON SOUTH KOREA

Mr. MURTHA. I read about South Korea not having the ability to withstand an attack. We went to Korea at the request of the Secretary to see what was going on. You gave us a briefing and I think we shook things up a bit and got them moving.

Is the situation better now? Do you have confidence in this agreement, and can we rest assured that they are not going to come south now?

General LUCK. No, sir. We cannot rest assured that they won't come south. It is still a very dangerous area of the world because of the preponderance of the military force in the North.

Having said that, the answer to the first question you gave is, yes, we are much better prepared because of the support we have gotten and because of the work that we did last May and June against a scenario that is still applicable. We came a long way in how we were going to do that—from bringing just people over that weren't noticeable all the way up to having alerted for deployment those kinds of systems that could have been provocative.

So we are further down the road, but it would be dishonest of me to tell you that it is not a tense situation should they decide to come.

## PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT

Mr. MURTHA. We talked about prepositioning. Is there any additional prepositioning?

General LUCK. We are in the process of—buildings are going up, they are almost completed. They will be completed March of this year, part of them, and that will begin the flow of the prepositioned equipment and we are going to get a two by one brigade set to come there. Some of the afloat gear is up and available that wasn't when you were there.

Mr. MURTHA. There was logistics shortage, ammunition shortage and you need prepositioning and hospital shortage. Is that being corrected?

General LUCK. The hospital problem is being corrected. ———.

Mr. MURTHA. ——— days of supply of artillery ammunition?

General LUCK. Yes, sir. ———.

## AMMUNITION SHORTFALLS

Mr. MURTHA. Staff reminds me that the Army had no request for ammunition and we added, I think, \$400 million in the bill last year for ammunition. You are saying there is a shortage, you could probably get something in there, but right now there is a shortage of ammunition for sustainability. I assume that is what you are talking about?

General LUCK. The U.S. is in pretty good shape. ———.

## BOMBER FORCE STRUCTURE

Mr. MURTHA. Seems like we were concerned about the bombers, too. I don't remember exactly, but we went to Japan and met with the Air Force Commander there, and I forget the number he said, but it seemed like we could have had problems getting——

Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman would yield—I think the problem was if they had gone down to the levels of B-52's that they would—in the Administration's budget last year we would have been down to a number below what we were told was enough to do the job. But fortunately, Congress I think stepped in and said you can't lower the bomber force so that we still, I think, do have an adequate number of B-52's.

General LUCK. Yes, sir. We feel comfortable with the bomber figures now. ———.

Admiral MACKE. We are okay on that.

## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Mr. MURTHA. We added back B-52's in the budget last year because of that visit. IMET, every CINC that ever talked to us said this money is for helping these foreign countries. It is not a lot of money but it is very helpful.

I know the training program and there is other money where you have very limited amounts. We have tried over the years to take control of that money, and have never been able to do it.

I don't know if the Chairman will have better success than I had because it is a jurisdictional problem. I understand how important it is and the Chairman understands, and I hope we will be able to

put a pot of that money in for the CINCs so you will have a little flexibility.

General LUCK. If you had it, that would mean DOD had it and that would put it in the right spot because we don't have political feelings about whether you should help a country or not help a country that you find in the Department of State.

Admiral MACKE. There are two programs that I would like to see moved. I say I, because this is a personal thing. One is the mil-to-mil program taken last year from Defense and moved to the Foreign Operations side, and the other one is the IMET program, which has existed on the foreign operations side for several years. We would like to see them both come back.

For IMET, the administration of that program should still be done by the ambassadors. It is important for them to be able to use it as a positive incentive.

I would continue to look to the ambassador and country team for input as to how we should distribute the monies. With the mil-to-mil dollars in the future budgeting, we will handle that in a different fashion, but in both cases, those are extremely beneficial. It is the future influence that you buy from those programs that is way beyond any value you spend on them.

Mr. YOUNG. Admiral, we have noted your interest in both of the programs and we will set about to see if we can have some jurisdictional lines amended slightly. I have an idea, though, that one of the reasons that IMET has stayed in foreign operations and why they got the mil-to-mil last year is because those are one of the two acceptable programs that they used to help pass the Foreign Aid bill. We will see if we can't work this out and this would be an appropriate home for both items.

Mr. Dicks.

#### NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to welcome General Luck and Admiral Macke. General, I have been working on my pool game since I last saw you. You always have to keep training.

General LUCK. Mr. Murtha brought that up today.

Mr. DICKS. He said you brought it up. I knew it was probably him. Welcome, and we appreciate the great job you are doing out there.

Let me ask you both, this nuclear agreement with North Korea, can you give us the major components of this agreement and whether you see any problems associated with it?

General LUCK. Sir, the agreed framework and its interworkings I can provide for the record.

Mr. DICKS. Right.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Classified insert removed.]

General LUCK. Because there are a lot of details. I have them in my book here and I can provide this for the record.

It is time phased. You got to put a mark in this block system from start to finish, which is, if this, then that, as I understand it, operation from beginning to end. If the North Koreans do this, we will do that, in response, and will not go the next step until their next step is taken. That is my understanding of it.

It is a very well-thought-out agreement that has from my aspect lowered tensions on the peninsula. It hasn't changed the military balance, it hasn't changed the military danger, but it has lowered the diplomatic and political rhetoric and tensions on the peninsula.

Mr. DICKS. So you think it has been worthy?

Mr. MURTHA. You would have no discomfort—

General LUCK. I am told by Mr. Gallucci that you can monitor it step-by-step.

Admiral MACKE. Each step is verifiable independently. There is no trust built into the framework agreement.

Mr. DICKS. You generally think it is okay?

General LUCK. I think it is better than okay, if it works.

#### TRAINING AND READINESS

Mr. DICKS. Did we have to give up certain exercises and training because of this agreement?

General LUCK. The TEAM SPIRIT issue has been tied to a lot of different things and continues to be tied to a lot of different things. ———.

Admiral MACKE. It is not tied as a part of the framework agreement. TEAM SPIRIT isn't.

Mr. DICKS. I notice from time to time we say we won't do it this year. You assured us when we were there that the essential training would be done regardless; that that was not going to undermine our readiness?

General LUCK. It is not a part of the agreed framework, but it does get tied to it by this continual brinksmanship that goes on over there. So in effect, it does get tied to it at least from the view that you get in the media.

#### CONTRIBUTIONS BY OUR ALLIES

Mr. DICKS. ———?

General LUCK. I think so.

Admiral MACKE. ——— so we are bringing together the monies to help pay for this light water reactor.

General LUCK. One issue that popped up is the North Korean statement that they will not accept South Korean light water reactors.

Mr. DICKS. Is that a major stumbling block?

General LUCK. I have heard in various quarters of the government since I have been back that it is a major stumbling block.

Admiral MACKE. Assistant Secretary Lord has stated that if that is in the agreement, it is in writing that they will take the South Korean reactor. If they back down on that, then the framework agreement is broken.

General LUCK. So we are back to May-June again.

Admiral MACKE. It is a problem we don't want to see.

#### EXERCISES IN THE PACIFIC

Mr. DICKS. Do we do major exercises in the Pacific like we do in the Atlantic?

General LUCK. Probably more.

Admiral **MACKE**. I conduct over 200 exercises a year—not all major—but the major exercises, **COBRA GOLD** with Thailand, **COPE TIGER**—with Thailand, and Air Force exercises with Singapore. The **KINGFISHER** exercise with Australia, **TANDEM THRUST**, **RIMPAC**, which is a multinational exercise conducted on an annual basis and I could provide a list.

[The information follows:]

## EXERCISES

Exercises done in the area of responsibility for Pacific Command are divided into Part I-IV exercises. Part I exercises require a Significant Exercise Brief and National Security Council approval. Part II exercises receive Joint Chiefs of Staff airlift and sealift funding for exercise deployment and redeployment. Part III exercises are deemed significant exercises by component or subordinate unified commanders but do not receive Joint Chiefs of Staff funding. Part IV exercises are less significant.

## PART I EXERCISES

ANNUALEX 06G	JAPAN
ARCTIC SAREX 1995	CANADA (COLD LAKE)
BAKER CARABAO II	CAMBODIA
BAKER TAILULU	TONGATAPU, TONGA
BALANCE CANOE 1995-1	CAMBODIA
BALANCE IROQUOIS 1995-1	INDIA
BALANCE IROQUOIS 1995-2	INDIA
BALANCE STYLE 95-1	SRI LANKA
BALANCE STYLE 95-2	SRI LANKA
BALIKATAN 1994	PHILIPPINES
COBRA GOLD 1995	THAILAND
COPE NORTH 95-2	MISAWA, JAPAN
ELIGIBLE RECEIVER 1995-1	HOME STATIONS
FLASH IROQUOIS 1995-3	INDIA
FOAL EAGLE 1994	KOREA
FREEDOM BANNER 1995	KOREA
KANGAROO 1995	AUSTRALIA
KEEN EDGE 1995	JAPAN
POSITIVE FORCE 1995	WORLDWIDE
RECEPTION STAGING ONWARD MOVEMENT & INTEGRATION 1995	KOREA
TANDEM THRUST 1995	WESTERN PACIFIC
TEAK IROQUOIS 1995-4	INDIA
TEAM SPIRIT	KOREA
TURBO CADS 95	WESTERN PACIFIC
ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 1995	KOREA

## Part II Exercises

COMMANDO SLING 1995-1	SINGAPORE
COMMANDO SLING 1995-2	SINGAPORE
COMMANDO SLING 1995-3	SINGAPORE
COMMANDO SLING 1995-4	SINGAPORE
COMMANDO SLING 1995-5	SINGAPORE
COMMANDO SLING 1995-6	SINGAPORE
COPE TIGER 1995	THAILAND
COPE TIGER 95-2	THAILAND
COPE TIGER 96-1	SINGAPORE
ELLIPSE CHARLIE 1995-1	CLASSIFIED
FORTIFY FREEDOM 1995	To Be Determined
FREQUENT STORM 95-1	MALAYSIA
FREQUENT STORM 95-2	THAILAND
HONG KONG SAREX 1994	HONG KONG
NORTHERN EDGE 95	ALASKA
POSITIVE RESPONSE 95-1	PENTAGON

POSITIVE RESPONSE 95-2	PENTAGON
POSITIVE RESPONSE 95-3	PENTAGON
TEMPEST EXPRESS 1995-1	OKINAWA
TEMPEST EXPRESS 1995-2	OKINAWA
VIGILANT BLADE 95	AUSTRALIA
PART III EXERCISES	
13 MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT DEPLOYMENT	PACIFIC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION (25 ID) (LIGHT) EMERGENCY DEPLOYMENT TRAINING EXERCISE 2	OAHU
25ID(L) BATTALION EXERCISE EVALUATION 1-95	OAHU
25ID(L) BATTALION FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE	HAWAII
25ID(L) DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND EXERCISE EVALUATION	OAHU
25ID(L) EMERGENCY DEPLOYMENT READINESS EXERCISE 1	OAHU
95-3L	LAOS
AIR DEFENSE EXERCISE 95	JAPAN
AMALGAM WARRIOR 95-2	ALASKA
ASSEM BAGUS 95	INDONESIA
ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE EXERCISE (ASWEX) 95-1	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (SOCAL)
ASWEX 95-1JA	EAST CHINA SEA
ASWEX 95-1US/1K	KOREA
ASWEX 95-2JA	JAPAN
ATTACK GUNNERY	HAWAII
AVIATION GUNNERY	HAWAII
AVIATION GUNNERY 95	HAWAII
BAKER BANNER III	BANGLADESH
BAKER CAMEL	PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA
BAKER CARABAO II	CAMBODIA (PHNOM PENH)
BAKER LADDER II	LAOS
BAKER MONGOOSE II	MONGOLIA (ULANBATOR)
BAKER TOOL	TUVALU (FUNAFUTI)
BALANCE FIDDLE 95-1	FIJI
BALANCE IRON 95-1	INDONESIA
BALANCE IRON 95-1A	INDONESIA
BALANCE IRON 95-2	INDONESIA
BALANCE IRON 95-3	INDONESIA
BALANCE IRON 95-4	INDONESIA
BALANCE MINT 95-2	MALAYSIA
BALANCE PASSION 95-1	PAPUA NEW GUINEA
BALANCE PISTON 95-2	PHILIPPINES
BALANCE PISTON 95-4	PHILIPPINES
BALANCE SCALE 95-1	SEYCHELLES
BALANCE SOLO 95-1	SOLOMON ISLANDS
BALANCE TORCH 95-1	THAILAND
BALANCE TORCH 95-3	THAILAND
BEACH CREST 95	OKINAWA, JAPAN
BLUE FLAG 95-2	FLORIDA
COMBINED ARMED EXERCISE (CAX) 1/2 95	CALIFORNIA (29 PALMS)
CAX 5/6 95	29 PALMS CA
CAX 9-95	29 PALMS CA
CERTAIN SUPPORT 95	VIRGINIA (FORT PICKETT)
COMMANDER FLEET CONTROL FORCE (CFCF) EXERCISE 94-2	JAPAN

CFCF EX 95-1	JAPAN
CIVIC ACTION	PONPAGI
CIVIC ACTION TEAM 84-47	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
COPE JADE 95-1	KOREA
COPE JADE 95-3	KOREA
COPE NORTH 95-1	JAPAN
COPE NORTH 95-2	JAPAN
COPE NORTH 95-3	JAPAN
COPE SOUTH 95	BANGLADESH
COPE THUNDER 95-1	ALASKA
COPE THUNDER 95-2	ALASKA
COPE THUNDER 95-3	ALASKA
COPE THUNDER 95-4	ALASKA
COPE WEST 95-1	MALAYSIA
COPE WEST 95-2	INDONESIA
DESSERT FIRE EXERCISE	
(DESFIREX) 1-96	
DESIFIREX 2-95	CALIFORNIA (29 PALMS)
EMERALD EXPRESS 95-1	CALIFORNIA (29 PALMS)
EMERALD EXPRESS 95-2	SOCAL
ENGINEERING TRAINING 95-1	CAMP PENDLETON
EXPLOSIVE ORDINANCE DISPOSAL	JAPAN (CAMP FUJI)
EXERCISE (EODEX) DUGONG 95-1	
EODEX REPUBLIC OF KOREA 95-3	AUSTRALIA
EODEX REPUBLIC OF	KOREA
THE PHILIPPINES 95	
EODEX THAILAND 95-2	PHILIPPINES
EODEX TRICRAB 95	THAILAND
EODEX/MINING EXERCISE/SALVAGE	GUAM
EXERCISE THAILAND 95-1	
EVERGREEN 95	THAILAND
FLEET EXERCISE (FLEETEX) 95-1	JAPAN
FLEETEX 95-1C	SOCAL
FLEETEX 95-1M1	SOCAL
FLEETEX 95-1M2	SOCAL
FLEETEX 95-2A	SOCAL
FLEETEX 95-2B	SOCAL
FLEETEX 95-2C	SOCAL
FLEETEX 95-2M1	SOCAL
FLEETEX 95-2M2	SOCAL
FOREST LIGHT 95-2	JAPAN
FUJI TRAINING 95-1	JAPAN (CAMP FUJI)
FUJI TRAINING 95-2	CAMP FUJI, JAPAN
FUJI TRAINING 95-3	JAPAN (CAMP FUJI)
GOLD EAGLE 95	HAWAII/ AUSTRALIA
HONG KONG BILATERAL 95	HONG KONG
IJI BUTAI 95	JAPAN
INDONESIAN USA (INDUSA) 20	INDONESIA
INDUSA 21	INDONESIA
INDUSA SALVAGE EXERCISE 95	INDONESIA
JOINT READINESS TRAINING	
CENTER 95-10	LOUISIANA
JRTC 95-9	LOUISIANA
JOINT TRAINING FORCE EXERCISE 95-1	SOCAL
KENNEL BEAR 95-1	GUAM
KENNEL BEAR 95-2	GUAM
KENNEL BEAR 95-3	GUAM
KERNEL BLITZ 95	SOCAL
KINGFISHER 95	BRUNEI
KOREAN INCREMENTAL TRAINING	



PROGRAM (KITP) 95-1	KOREA (POHANG)
KITP 95-2	KOREA (POHANG)
LUNGFISH 94	AUSTRALIA
MARINE AIR GROUP EXERCISE 95-1	MID PACIFIC
MALABAR 95	INDIAN OCEAN
MALAYSIA TRAINING 95-1	MALAYSIA
MALDIVES SEARCH AND RESCUE EXERCISE 95	MALDIVES
MINE COUNTERMEASURES EXERCISE (MCMEX) 95-1K	KOREA
MCMEX 95-2J	OKINAWA
MEKAR 95	MALAYSIA
MERCUB 95	SINGAPORE
MERGATE 95-1	SINGAPORE
MERGATE 95-2	SINGAPORE
MERGATE 95-3	SINGAPORE
MERGATE 95-4	SINGAPORE
MERLYNX 95	SINGAPORE
MINEX 95-1M	MALAYSIA
MINEX INDUSIA 95	INDONESIA
MINEX THAILAND 95-1	THAILAND
MINEX/EODEX 95-1JA	JAPAN
MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATION TRAINING 95-2	GUAM, SAIPAN
MISSION 23/01	KWAJALIEN
MARINE STAFF TRAINING PROGRAM	OKINAWA, JAPAN
NORTHWIND 95	JAPAN
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE (NSW)/SPECIAL AIR SERVICES (SAS) CROSS TRAINING 95-1	AUSTRALIA
NSW/SAS REGIMENT CROSS TRAINING 94	AUSTRALIA
NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER (NTC) 95-02 US ARMY ALASKA (USARAK)	CALIFORNIA
NTC 95-03 (USARAK)	CALIFORNIA
NTC 95-04 (USARAK)	CALIFORNIA
NTC 95-10	CALIFORNIA
NTC 95-2	CALIFORNIA
NTC 95-3	CALIFORNIA
NTC 95-6	CALIFORNIA
NTC 95-7	CALIFORNIA
NTC OPPOSING FORCES ROTATION 95-02	CALIFORNIA
NTC OPPOSING FORCES ROTATION 95-03	CALIFORNIA
NTC-ROTATION 95-05	CALIFORNIA
ORIENT SHIELD 95	JAPAN
PALAH 95-2	PHILIPPINES
PASIR PUTIH 95	INDONESIA
PASKAL 95-1	MALAYSIA
PASKAL 95-2	MALAYSIA
PENYU TRIDENT 95	MALAYSIA
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE (RAAF) EXTENDEX 95-1	GUAM
RAAF EXTENDEX 95-2	GUAM
RAAF EXTENDEX 95-3	GUAM
RAAF EXTENDEX 95-4	To Be Determined
RECONNAISSANCE EXERCISE (RECONEX) 95-1	OKINAWA, JAPAN
RECONEX 95-2	JAPAN
RUSSIAN PASSING EXERCISE 004/94	NORTHERN WESTPAC
SALVAGE EXERCISE (SALVEX) 94-2K	KOREA
SALVEX 95-1K	KOREA

SALVEX 95-2K	KOREA
SALVEX/EODEX THAI 95-1	THAILAND
SANDGROPER 94	AUSTRALIA
SAREX 95-1	VIC LA REUNION ISLAND
SAREX 95-2	VIC LA REUNION ISLAND
SCORPION WIND 1-95	YUMA, ARIZONA
SCORPION WIND 2-95	NAS FALLON NEVADA
SEA BAT 94-2	BANGLADESH
SEA BAT 95-1	BANGLADESH
SEA BAT 95-2	BANGLADESH
SEA EAGLE 95	THAILAND
SEA AIR LAND (SEAL) EXERCISE 95-1	SOUTH KOREA
SEALEX 95-2	SOUTH KOREA
SEA SURVEILLANCE EXERCISE	
(SEASURVEX) 95-1T/LINKING	
EXERCISE 95-1T	THAILAND
SEASURVEX 95-3T	THAILAND
SEASURVEX 95-4T	THAILAND
SEASURVEX/LINKEX 95-2T	THAILAND
SHIP ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE	
READINESS AND EFFECTIVENESS	
MEASURE (SHAREM) 112/ASWEX 95-2K	KOREA
SHAREM XXX/ASWEX 95-2JA	EAST CHINA SEA
SHIN KAME 95-1	JAPAN
SHIN KAME 95-2	JAPAN
SHIN KAME 95-3	JAPAN
SHIN KAME 95-4	JAPAN
SPECWAR/SUBEX 95-A	AUSTRALIA
SPRING TRAINING 95	AUSTRALIA
SRV-32 (FULL ACCOUNTING)	VIETNAM
SRV-33	VIETNAM
SRV-34	VIETNAM
SRV-35	VIETNAM
SRV-36	VIETNAM
SRV-37	VIETNAM
SUBMARINE COMPETENCY 95	JAPAN
TACTICAL MARITIME EXERCISE (TAMEX)	
95-2	AUSTRALIA
TAMEX 95-3	AUSTRALIA
THUNDEREX 2-95	HAWAII
THUNDEREX 3-95	HAWAII
THUNDEREX 4-95	HAWAII
TROPIC LIGHTNING EXERCISE 1-95	HAWAII (OAHU)
TOWER EXERCISE 95-1	ETA JIMA, JAPAN
UNDERSEAL 95-1	THAILAND
UNDERSEAL 95-2	THAILAND
USARAK NTC OFFOR	FORT IRWIN, CA
US NAVY-MEXICAN EODEX	MEXICO
VALIANT MARK 95	SINGAPORE
VALIANT USHER 95-2	AUSTRALIA
VALIANT USHER 95-4	KOREA
VECTOR BALANCE KNIFE 95-7	KOREA
VECTOR BALANCE SABRE 95-1	SINGAPORE
VECTOR BALANCE TORCH 95-2	THAILAND
VECTOR FLASH BAG 95-1	BRUNEI
VECTOR FLASH HORN 95-2	HONG KONG
VECTOR FLASH SABRE 95-3	SINGAPORE
VIGILANT OVERVIEW 95	ALASKA
YAMA SAKURA XXVII	JAPAN

## PART IV EXERCISES

25ID JRTC 94-1  
 25ID NTC 94-2 OPFOR  
 ACES NORTH  
 AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY CREW  
 CERTIFICATION  
 AIR WARRIOR II 94-4  
 ANTI SURFACE WARFARE EXERCISE  
 (USAF) 94-1 JA  
 ASUWEX (USAF) 94-2  
 ASUWEX (USAF) 94-4  
 ASUWEX (USAF) 95-1  
 ASUWEX (USAF) 95-2  
 ASUWEX (USAF) 95-3  
 ASUWEX (USAF) 95-4  
 ASUWEX (USMC) 94-1  
 ASUWEX (USMC) 95-1  
 ASUWEX (USMC) 95-2  
 BAKER INCISION III  
 BAKER MONGOOSE II  
 BAKER SEASHELL  
 BALANCE BUFFALO 95-1  
 BALANCE HORN 94-1  
 BALANCE IRON 94-1  
 BALANCE IRON 94-2  
 BALANCE IRON 94-4  
 BALANCE KNIFE 94-1  
 BALANCE KNIFE 95-1  
 BALANCE KNIFE 95-3  
 BALANCE PASSION 94-1  
 BALANCE TIGER 94-1  
 BALANCE TIGER 95-1  
 BALANCE VELVET 94-1  
 BASIC COMBAT TEAM PROGRAM (BCTP)  
 95-5  
 BCTP 95-9  
 BCTP-25ID(L)  
 BF HONG KONG PALEX 94  
 BLUE GREEN WORKUPS 95-1  
 CIVIC ACTION TEAM 47-04  
 CIVIC ACTION  
 CIVIC ACTION TEAM 23-01  
 CIVIC ACTION TEAM 84-46  
 COLD WEATHER TRAINING 95-1  
 COMBAT ARCHER 95-1  
 COMBAT ARCHER 95-2  
 COMBAT SURVIVAL COURSE  
 COMPOSITE TACTICAL UNIT EXERCISE  
 (COMPTUEX) 94-1  
 COMPTUEX 94-12  
 COMPTUEX 94-13T  
 COMPTUEX 94-14T  
 COMPTUEX 94-17M  
 COMPTUEX 94-18M  
 COMPTUEX 94-19M  
 COMPTUEX 94-20M  
 COMPTUEX 94-22M  
 COMPTUEX 94-23T  
 COMPTUEX 94-25M  
 COMPTUEX 94-3A  
 LOUISIANA  
 FORT IRWIN, CALIFORNIA  
 AUSTRALIA (DARWIN)  
 FORT LEWIS, WASHINGTON  
 LOUISIANA  
 JAPAN  
 JAPAN  
 JAPAN  
 JAPAN  
 JAPAN  
 JAPAN  
 JAPAN  
 JAPAN  
 JAPAN  
 JAPAN  
 INDIA  
 MONGOLIA  
 SEYCHELLES  
 BANGLADESH  
 HONG KONG  
 INDONESIA  
 INDONESIA  
 INDONESIA  
 KOREA  
 KOREA  
 KOREA  
 KOREA  
 PAPUA NEW GUINEA  
 TONGA  
 TONGA  
 VANUATU  
 FORT DRUM NEW YORK  
 FORT HOOD TEXAS  
 OAHU, HIWAI  
 HONG KONG  
 JAPAN (OKINAWA)  
 POHNPEI  
 VIETNAM (PONPAGI)  
 Federated States of MICRONESIA  
 Federated States of MICRONESIA  
 JAPAN  
 FLORIDA  
 FLORIDA  
 MALAYSIA  
 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA  
 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA  
 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA  
 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA  
 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA  
 MID PACIFIC  
 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA  
 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA  
 MID PACIFIC  
 MID PACIFIC  
 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA  
 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

COMPTUEX 94-4M	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
COMPTUEX 94-5M	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
COMPTUEX 94-7T	MID PACIFIC
COMPTUEX 95-10M	MID PACIFIC
COMPTUEX 95-1A/ITA	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
COMPTUEX 95-3T	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
COMPTUEX 95-4T	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
COMPTUEX 95-7M TRUE	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
COMPTUEX 95-9T	MID PACIFIC
CONUS BALANCE IRON 95-5	FORT LEWIS, WASHINGTON
COPE BENGAL 94	MALAYSIA
COPE CAGE 94-2	HAWAII
COPE CAGE 95-2	HAWAII
DISSIMILAR AIRCRAFT COMBAT TRAINING	NEW MEXICO
DESIFIREX 1-96	29 PALMS CALIFORNIA
DESIFIREX 2-95	29 PALMS CALIFORNIA
DIESELEX 94-3	JAPAN
DIESELEX 95-1	JAPAN
DIESELEX 95-2	SOUTHWEST OF KYUSHU
DIESELEX 95-3	SOUTHWEST OF KYUSHU
DIESELEX 95-4	SOUTHWEST OF KYUSHU
ENGR TRNG 95-2	KOREA
FLASH KNIFE 94-11	KOREA
FLASH KNIFE 94-3	KOREA
FLASH KNIFE 95-2	KOREA
FLASH KNIFE 95-4	KOREA
FLEETEX 94-2M1	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
FLEETEX 94-2M2	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
FORCE EMPLOYMENT	NEVADA
FORECON DD/FF 94-2	OKINAWA, JAPAN
FORECON SUBEX 94-3	OKINAWA
FORECON SUBEX 95-2	OKINAWA, JAPAN
FUJI 95-2	CAMP FUJI JAPAN
FUJI 95-3	CAMP FUJI JAPAN
FUJI 95-4	CAMP FUJI JAPAN
FUJI 95-5	CAMP FUJI JAPAN
FUJI 95-6	CAMP FUJI JAPAN
FUJI ENGR OPS 95	CAMP FUJI JAPAN
FUJI TRNG 94-1	JAPAN
FUJI TRNG 95-4	CAMP FUJI, JAPAN
FUJI TRNG 95-5	CAMP FUJI, JAPAN
FUJI TRNG 95-6	CAMP FUJI, JAPAN
GREEN FLAG	CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES
HABU SAKUSEN 94	OKINAWA, JAPAN
HABU SAKUSEN 95	OKINAWA, JAPAN
IJI BUTAI 95	SAGAMI DEPOT, JAPAN
INDONESIAN EXCHANGE/CONFERENCE	OKLAHOMA
JAPAN/USATRADC STAFF TALKS	JAPAN
JOINT VBSS TRAINING 95-1	KOREA
JOINT TASK FORCE EXERCISE 95-1	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
JUNGLE OPERATIONS	MALAYSIA
JUNGLE WARFARE INSTRUCTOR COURSE	BRUNEI
JUNIOR COMMAND COURSE	INDIA
KENNEL BEAR 95-4	OKINAWA JAPAN
KILAT STRIKE	MALAYSIA
LONG RANGE PATROL COURSE	BRUNEI
MAG-12 YECHON DEPLOYMENT	YECHON, KOREA
MATSU YAMA 95	JAPAN
MEC/P ENGR OPS 95	KOREA
MIDDLE EAST FORCE EXERCISE (MEFEX)	



READINESS AND EFFECTIVENESS	
MEASURE (SHAREM) 107 PHASE 1/	
ASWEX 94-1US	JAPAN
SINGAPORE AVIATION PALEX	HAWAII/SINGAPORE
SPECIAL WARFARE SUBMARINE EXERCISE\	
FLASH GLOBE 95-1	GUAM
SPECWAR/SUBEX 95-2	GUAM
SUPPORT BATTALION FIELD EXERCISE	
(SPTBN) 1-95	JAPAN (CAMP FUJI)
SPTBN FEX 2-95	CAMP FUJI JAPAN
SPTBN FEX 3-95	CAMP FUJI JAPAN
SPTBN FEX 4-95	CAMP FUJI JAPAN
TAHITI EXCHANGE	TAHITI
TEAK ACTION 94-3	AUSTRALIA
TEAK ACTION 95-1	AUSTRALIA
TIGER BALM 95	SINGAPORE
TROPIC LIGHTNING EXERCISE + 40	AUSTRALIA
TOWER EXERCISE 95-1 (USMC)	ETA JIMA, JAPAN
TOWER EXERCISE 95-2	OKINAWA
TROPIC PRELUDE 95	AUSTRALIA
TRUE TRAINING 95-2	GUAM
TRUE TRAINING 95-3	GUAM
TRUE TRAINING 95-4	GUAM
UNION PACIFIC 95	OAHU
USAF WEAPONS CENTER SUPPORT	NEVADA
VALIANT USHER/SPECIAL OPERATIONS	
CAPABLE CERTIFICATION EXERCISE	
95-1	OKINAWA, JAPAN
VALOR GECKO	GUAM
VALOR GURKIN 2-94	GUAM
VALOR JOYCE	JAPAN
VALOR KEPLER	KOREA
VALOR KILL	KOREA
VARSITY PLAYER 94	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
VARSITY SWIMMER 95	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
VECTOR BALANCE HORN 95-3	HONG KONG
VECTOR BALANCE SABRE 94-2	SINGAPORE AND GUAM
VECTOR BALANCE TORCH 94-1	THAILAND
VECTOR FLASH HORN 94-2	HONG KONG
WILLIAM TELL 94	FLORIDA
WEAPONS AND TACTICS (WTI) 1-96	YUMA, ARIZONA
WTI 2-95	YUMA, ARIZONA
YAMA SAKURA XXVII	JAPAN
YAMA SAKURA XXVIII (CPX)	FORT DERUSSY, HAWAII

General LUCK. He does four major exercises with me.

Mr. DICKS. So there is no shortage of major exercises in the Pacific? Some people have suggested that.

General LUCK. ———.

Mr. DICKS. That is not a problem?

General LUCK. That is a myth.

#### CONDUCTING TWO MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES

Mr. DICKS. Is mobility, airlift, sealift, those things a major concern to both of you?

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Classified discussion removed.]

Mr. DICKS. What do you think of the plan? We have repositioning, we have 25 container ships.

Admiral MACKE. Good and getting better. If I could take a minute to talk about what we did at the CINCs conference, the results of the two Nimble Dancer games in a macro-sense, the decisions that we looked at.

General Luck and General Peay and I have worked this out fairly well ahead of time. What we did was say instead of looking at each MRC in isolation, what do you want to fight your MRC, if you are the only game in town.

From the standpoint of if you are the second MRC, what are the forces you absolutely have to have, what are the critical forces for you. ———. Very macro.

As a generality, that is the sort of thing we looked at, instead of the old assumption of we will take forces from one MRC, this Marine regiment or this Army brigade, and swing it to the other MRC when we finish this one. ———.

Mr. DICKS. Hold back some forces for the potential of a second contingency.

Admiral MACKE. ———.

Mr. DICKS. My time is short. I think Colin Powell had it right when he said that if you want to get one of these things over with fast, you have got to bring maximum force to bear. If you go to this kind of a plan do you risk not being able to have enough of strength, enough troops to commit to get the first one done quickly?

Admiral MACKE. ———.

General LUCK. Beware the ORSAE, the operations research systems analysis expert. He will tell you the most efficient way to take the hill is for the last man to die at the top. I would prefer to go up with a whole bunch and all of us get there.

Mr. DICKS. My view is we might have one MRC, something else might happen, but two majors at the same time is hard for me to conceive of.

I wonder whether we have gotten ourselves so committed to this—I would hate to see us under commit to the first MRC and not be able to get it done because we are holding back for something that might not happen.

Admiral MACKE. I agree, but there was a period of time last year where we had serious questions about whether we could do two MRCs or not.

Mr. DICKS. We appreciate the great job you are doing.

General LUCK. One of the things we can be sure of is we can't be sure where the next fight will be.

Admiral MACKE. Again, I think it is fair to reiterate that the statement has been made by our government that either they accept, as they said they would, the South Korean reactor, or the framework is broken.

#### NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA

Mr. YOUNG. I understand that while I was voting, Mr. Murtha had asked you questions about that accord and you both said you thought it could be verified, the agreements, because there are quite a few people in the capital area who aren't fond of that agreement.

Admiral MACKE. Through IAEA inspections, through national technical means, we have the capability to monitor, to ensure that is complied with. \_\_\_\_\_.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Bonilla.

#### FACILITIES FOR U.S. FORCES IN KOREA

Mr. BONILLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon General, Admiral. General, in looking at your testimony before today, you mention that 50 percent of U.S. forces in Korea have inadequate living, dining and work facilities.

Can you tell us what is being done about that or what we could do to help alleviate that problem?

General LUCK. Sir, you are really doing it. We went without any military construction for five years, but this body came over and visited last year, came back and turned the staff loose and we are now getting a good share of money.

We were hoping for \$50 million to get us going and get it back on a glide slope, but we have \$34.6 million, I think it ended up. I had already expressed my appreciation for what you have done to get this thing balanced because of that five-year deficit, which at the time was the right thing to do because then EASI was looking good, the Nunn-Warner amendment and the drawdown was looking good, and against that backdrop decisions were made.

When we turned and saw that we couldn't continue on that glide slope because of the critical situation that evolved through the nuclear business, we froze the forces. So we froze the forces but we still had our fiscal glide slope on a decline. So the initial fix to that we believe is about \$200 million over a five-year period, but—so it has bottomed out and started up.

So thank you for that. That is where we are. I would tell you that we want our troops to live better but they are doing fine. That doesn't mean we should say, okay, don't worry about them.

#### CHINA

Mr. BONILLA. That is good to hear. Any time there is any worry about our troops not having what they need, I think it is the highest priority, even higher than concerns we have about weapon systems.

Admiral, I would like to ask about the increasing bilateral cooperation with the Chinese Army. While it is a good idea to share simulations and war gaming techniques, I wanted to have assur-



ances that this isn't going to come back to haunt us down the road because of what may or may not occur in that country.

Admiral **MACKE**. First off, in my view at least, China is the key to the future of the Pacific region. China is a world power today, has one-fifth of the world population and one of the largest armies, a veto power in the U.N., and nuclear weapons; she is a power.

China will become a superpower. She will gain a blue water naval capability, a power projection capability. She is, I believe, committed to doing that. Those statements have been made by the Chinese. So she is one that we are going to have to deal with in one way or another in the future.

In my view, the best way to do that is to deal with her as a partner in helping to maintain stability in the Pacific region as opposed to as an adversary. So the dialogue that we have with her, I think, is critical.

At the same time, I am not ready to start providing American technology to China. Her weapon systems and her capabilities, though she has 3.2 million people under uniform, aren't that great because she has old technology.

The initial things that Dr. Perry set up with Secretary Warner are to try to build some transparency, to explain strategic objectives, where we are trying to go, to explain the bottom-up review, the two MRC strategy and ask them to explain to us what their strategies are, to gain a transparency, if you will, in intentions.

We have pretty good information on capability, but little transparency on intentions. I think that will help.

The military-to-military dialogue, I think, is moving along in good shape. I hope to visit there soon. My predecessor visited China. We will have a ship visit China in the fairly near term. Those sorts of things are to start building a professional relationship that helps to open up again the transparency issue, but just as importantly, allows our forces to be able to work with each other in a peacekeeping or disaster relief or situation such as that, not necessarily in a war-fighting scenario.

I think a continuing dialogue across the full spectrum of military, economic, and political issues with China is necessary if we want to bring her into the next century as a contributing member of the community of nations.

Mr. **BONILLA**. Chinese Army leaders and the politicians who run the country, in non-defense areas, we have had disputes with them recently about trade. Does that affect the Chinese Army attitude or their willingness to work with us?

Admiral **MACKE**. The Chinese Army is probably the largest industry in China. They do a lot of things with regard to manufacturing and profit-making. They are definitely intertwined throughout the military and well into the economic sector.

As to whether they are involved in any of the current issues that are under discussion in the intellectual property rights, I don't know. If we have that information, I will be happy to provide it for the record, but I don't know whether they are or not. They are involved in a lot of industry and are in the process of trying to cut back on that.

[The information follows:]

We have no specific evidence of direct Chinese military involvement with projects or companies engaged in intellectual property rights violations.

#### VIETNAM POW'S AND MIA'S

**Mr. BONILLA.** Regarding cooperation of the Vietnamese in accounting for POW's and MIA's, could you elaborate further on the status? Are you convinced they are doing all they can?

**Admiral MACKE.** I think the Vietnamese are being extremely cooperative. It is as good as or better than the other two countries that we work with in the region.

We have the cases which were brought from 135 down to 55. That was a major contention issue. There was an issue of working with Laotians to get Vietnamese refugees that could identify sites. That problem has been solved.

In my visit to Hanoi a couple of months ago, I was very impressed with their openness, their ability to help. We have been able to go to some previously restricted areas to pursue investigations and/or excavations, and at the government level, I see good help. At the civilian level, I see tremendous help.

When you go to an excavation site, you see how hard the villagers work that come from that area, which is the work force, 80 to 100 of them digging through the dirt, sifting it to find things as small as a fingernail, and they do a fantastic job of it and they work hard.

**Mr. BONILLA.** Admiral, General, I appreciate your being here today and I look forward to working with you as a new Member of this Committee.

**Mr. YOUNG.** Thank you.

**Mr. Nethercutt** another new Member of the Committee already deeply engaged in the effort to provide for a strong national defense.

**Mr. NETHERCUTT.** I am sorry I arrived so late. I am a new Member of the Committee from the eastern district of Washington, a coastal State with strong ties to the Pacific region, I look forward to working with you in the future and I appreciate your being here today, and I have no questions.

**Mr. YOUNG.** Thank you very much.

**Admiral, General,** if you have anything additional you would like to add, now would be a good time to do it.

**General LUCK.** There are a couple of things I wanted to tell you about Mr. Murtha and Mr. Dicks, but maybe I should do that in double-closed session.

**Mr. YOUNG.** We can do that. Maybe we will have a chance to visit you in Korea again and have an opportunity to get some of those stories.

We appreciate the meetings we had with you and our hearings and the opportunity to meet one-on-one when those occasions occur.

I have a couple of questions in writing that I would like to submit to you and ask that you answer for my purposes. In addition, we will have questions for the record. We would like you to respond to those in writing also, if you will.

Feel free to keep in touch. When there is a problem that we can help with let us know.

The Committee is adjourned. There will be no meeting of the Committee next week because we will be on the Floor with the Supplemental bill. The week after that we will be back with hearings.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto follow:]

#### FY 1995 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

*Question:* I am advised that if the Emergency Supplemental is not enacted before March 31, 1995 the following will occur during the fourth quarter of the year: 126,000 flying hours will be lost. 24,000 men and women will not transfer to their next assignment during the fourth quarter as planned. Half of the joint exercises like Red Flag and Bright Star will be canceled.

Now those sound like pretty drastic measures. General Joulwan had some interesting comments this morning about this program and we would be interested in both your comments.

*Answer:* Should the supplemental funding measure not be passed, the necessary action required of the Pacific Command would be for the United States Pacific Air Force to reduce all combat coded aircraft flying hours by 25 percent (includes fighters, bombers, airlifters, and tankers) defer approximately 50 percent of real property maintenance contracts, delay depot purchased equipment maintenance schedules, cancel United States Pacific Air Force participation in 6 joint exercises, and freeze permanent change of station order moves for personnel.

*Question:* While the Committee was preparing for the supplemental, we found some additional readiness problems that we have addressed by adding \$670 million to the supplemental package.

One of those is particularly troublesome to me. We found that the Navy flying hour shortfall, even with the supplemental, is 53,000 hours, due to increased costs that have built up over several years in the engines of the F-18, F-14, AV-8B and the EA-6B. That shortfall is almost twice the shortfall created by the contingency deployments.

We are advised that if this problem is not fixed, the following would occur:

Three carrier airwings would have to stand-down upon return from deployment in April, May and June respectively.

Another carrier airwing would have to stand-down in September 1995, which would impact a scheduled fiscal year 1996 deployment.

Topgun and Strike University would shutdown in May.

Non-deployed fleet air support would stand-down in May.

Three Anti-Submarine Warfare helicopter squadrons would stand-down beginning in June.

Eight Anti-Submarine Warfare fixed wing squadrons would stand-down in April.

What impact would these developments have on your operations, your planning, your training? With the volatile situation in Korea can we afford to let these events occur?

*Answer:* There would be negligible effect on our current forward deployed force's operations. These forces would retain their high combat readiness. However, this shortfall in flight hours would affect United States based units, resulting in loss of aircrew qualifications and overall decreased readiness. The increased cost of getting those aircrews re-qualified exacerbates the operations and maintenance account shortfalls.

We cannot afford the negative impact this would have on response time to any theater contingency.

*Question:* Specifically on Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to keep twelve F-16s and ten C-130s in the Pacific force instead of drawing them down in the reductions in force structure this year.

We have been advised that these aircraft are important to your training exercises with the Koreans. General Luck, can you confirm this and tell us how important they might be to you?

In the additional supplemental appropriations we specifically restored \$22 million to cover the flying hour costs of these aircraft. If you don't receive those funds from the Congress, do you have any idea where you might be able to get them?

*Answer:* We received the \$22 million in this fiscal year funding.

*Question:* Admiral Macke, during a 100 day period, beginning on October 4th of last year, we lost 7 naval aircraft and 4 pilots in the Pacific region. We are concerned, as I know you are, about those accidents and whether anything could have been done to avoid them. We are very aware of the particular dangers associated

with flying onto and off carriers, where 4 of those accidents occurred. We are also aware of the increased pace of deployments the Navy has been asked to undertake recently.

Are we overly concerned about the impact of the loss of flying hours that will occur if we don't act soon with the emergency supplemental?

Answer: If the supplemental is not passed, the proposed stand-downs to cover the flying hour shortfall will significantly affect training. This disrupts operations/maintenance training and exercise plans, exacerbates maintenance shortfalls, and impacts morale. There is always concern for increased training mishaps once qualifications are lost and training cycles compressed to meet operational commitments. We cannot afford to let these events occur.

Question: We call all of these actions emergencies. Some only consider the ones that will reimburse you for the contingency operations an emergency. Would the loss of 53,000 flying hours this year be an emergency?

Answer: The supplemental funding will help avoid the loss of flying hours. We cannot afford to lose that many Navy flight hours world wide due to the negative impact it would have on readiness and our ability to meet contingency operations.

#### PREPOSITIONING OF EQUIPMENT

Question: How important is prepositioning equipment to achieving your readiness in your area of responsibility?

PACOM Answer: Prepositioning is extremely important to our ability to project combat forces. Our readiness is improved by positioning equipment and sustainment close to where it will be needed. Prepositioning saves strategic lift and improves force closure time.

Korea Answer: The prepositioning of equipment on the Korean peninsula is extremely important to U.S. Forces Korea. Infantry and Armor Battalions along with their supporting Combat Support and Combat Service Support packages are excellent prepositioned forces. Large quantities of equipment are required to bring the heavy force to a "wartime" ready condition. The more heavy equipment that is prepositioned allows a quicker response during crisis at all levels. The airlift and sealift strain during the early critical stages of any conflict are lessened by prepositioned equipment and would allow a faster force buildup than would otherwise be possible.

Question: Briefly discuss the plan to station prepositioned ships in the Pacific theater.

Answer: Currently prepositioning ships are stationed at Diego Garcia and in Guam/Saipan.

As additional ships are purchased and brought on-line in the 1997-2001 time frame, we will position them in anchorages that are feasible from an operational and political viewpoint.

We are looking at several options in the Pacific theater for prepositioning ships, however, no decision will be made until all options are thoroughly studied and coordinated with the appropriate agencies.

#### WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Question: Which countries have capabilities in producing weapons of mass destruction?

Answer: ———. No other country in the USPACOM AOR has admitted to having an offensive chemical or biological warfare capability. ———. Biological warfare agent production capability is very difficult to assess as the countries involved have the proclivity to hide it in legitimate medical and pharmaceutical endeavors. ———.

Question: Do you believe we have adequate intelligence assets in place to assess the development of these weapons and the threat that would arise from the development of these weapons?

Answer: ———.

#### CHINA

Question: Admiral Macke, can you briefly discuss China's modernization program? In your prepared statement you say that you do not see China's military as a near-term threat to the U.S. or to our interests in Asia. What do you see as a long-term threat to the U.S. or to our allies in the region? Can you comment on China's recent actions concerning the Spratley Islands?

In your opinion, what would provoke China to invade Taiwan?

I understand that recent exercises have focused on the extensive use of amphibious landing and logistics support capabilities. Additionally, China's joint exercises have increased seven-fold. What do you make of this?

Will you comment on the close ties between Burma and China?

Answer. ———.

#### INDIA AND PAKISTAN

*Question.* Admiral Macke, we have serious concerns regarding India and Pakistan. Describe the status of weapons of mass destruction in both countries. If you would, specifically address nuclear weapons, missile delivery systems and chemical and biological weapons.

Please provide your assessment of what conditions would cause for either country to use their weapons of mass destruction.

Who controls these weapons, military or civilian?

How do you assess the likelihood of war between the two countries?

How will the U.S. deal with the use of nuclear weapons? Can you assess the damage: number of casualties and property?

What contingency plans or arrangements do you have to deal with either country's use of nuclear weapons?

In particular, are these plans coordinated with CENTCOM whose AOR includes Pakistan?

Answer. ———.

#### INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO WARFIGHTERS

*Question.* In the aftermath of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, questions were raised about shortfalls in Intelligence Community support for the military efforts specific to that conflict, as well as for military planning and deployment requirements in other areas.

In your opinion, have steps been taken to improve cooperation and provide better intelligence support for your operational missions? What changes have been made to improve on-scene intelligence support to forward deployed forces in your area of responsibility (AOR)?

PACOM Answer. Many steps taken by the Intelligence Directorate have improved intelligence support to the warfighter.

Communications support for passing intelligence information to operational forces has improved by continued consolidation of theater intelligence ADP resources into four regional nodes (the USPACOM Automated Data Processing (ADP) Server Site, or PASS concept) closer to warfighters. More direct access to intelligence information is also enhanced by providing new intelligence computer systems (linked by a common architecture) to over 150 operational locations.

Intelligence augmentation teams were created that deploy with joint task force and component level forces to directly help the warfighters tie in to more substantial intelligence resources at higher headquarters facilities.

Theater intelligence production responsibilities were consolidated at one organization, the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific, instead of producing intelligence documents across numerous organizations throughout the theater. Limited production partnerships allow solid warfighter production support despite the resource drawdown.

Creation of a tactics, techniques, and procedures manual focused on intelligence support to joint task forces serves as a warfighter's handbook for obtaining intelligence support in the Pacific theater.

The recently created Joint Intelligence Training Activities, Pacific (JITAP) organization trains theater intelligence personnel serving in joint environments to specifically support the joint warfighter.

Korea Answer. ———. Cooperation and support indeed improved for U.S. Forces Korea's operational missions. We must strive to continue this coordination effort from all parties. ———. PACOM ADP Server Site-Korea (PASS-K), the theater intelligence systems, links all warfighting headquarters throughout the forward area and the Communication Zone.

*Question.* In your view, has the Defense Intelligence Community fully adjusted to the changes in the environment associated with today's operational requirements?

PACOM Answer. Yes. The Defense Intelligence Community has implemented an aggressive, comprehensive program to provide timely, quality support to today's operational forces and missions. This program capitalizes on:

"Leading edge" technology.

Functional expertise at all levels, national, service, and theater, through a production strategy designed to maximize limited resources by preventing duplication.

Synergism between production and dissemination programs and architectures; more flexibility in production and dissemination.

The program is dynamic; it continues to mature and evolve to respond to changes in operational requirements. Examples of evolution and adjustments include:

New approach to production responsibilities—"lanes in the road."

Prioritization modifications—moved away from Russia; focus on operations other than war.

New dissemination approaches focused on support to joint task forces.

Incorporation of new data sources (e.g. open source intelligence).

**Korea Answer.** Director DIA's management of the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) and his overall orchestration of the Defense Intelligence Community has produced synergies heretofore absent. On the peninsula we have been augmented by permanent DIA and NPIC representatives. Operationally the community has supported with surges by national imagery and SIGINT assets. The DIA functional alignment, designed to better manage support at the national level despite dwindling resources, has created some difficulties for this command in managing and coordinating intelligence activities across a large number of production nodes. DIA has recognized this problem and fixes are underway.

**Question.** As part of the Command's Intelligence Architecture program, a "CINCs theater intelligence priority list" is prepared and submitted to Pentagon budget planners.

What are your top intelligence priorities contained in your intelligence priority list? Elaborate on how well the Service Headquarters, OSD intelligence activities, and the Military Intelligence Board dealt with them and what action has been taken to fill your identified intelligence priorities. Has any item submitted on your most recent lists been fixed?

**Answer.** \_\_\_\_\_

**Question.** Are there any intelligence products or support that you requested but failed to receive for any reason, including problems caused by classification? Do you receive timely and responsive answers to requirements you levy on the Intelligence Community?

**PACOM Answer.** No problems with intelligence support at our level. We are working to resolve classification and foreign disclosure issues associated with coalition warfare. We are receiving timely responses to requirements levied upon higher headquarters.

**Korea Answer.** Generally, no. We do, however, continuously experience a problem with over classification and releasability. U.S. Forces Korea is part of a combined command. Intelligence products from the national intelligence community routinely classify documents NOFORN. Although there are times when the NOFORN caveat should be used, most products are, in fact, releasable to the Republic of Korea. Correcting this problem would save countless administrative hours and improve the dissemination of intelligence products to our ally.

**Question.** Have you been contacted by various Intelligence Community activities, such as the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, Central Imagery Office, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Defense Mapping Agency, to obtain your approval and certification that the advanced development projects they are undertaking meet your requirements?

**PACOM Answer.** Yes. These organizations/agencies contact USCINCPAC staff, both formally and informally, concerning future programs, plans, and initiatives. Discussions have ranged from fielding prototype equipment and pilot training programs to the testing and evaluation of advanced concepts. These contacts are typically agency-initiated and focus on a particular topic of agency interest at that time.

**Korea Answer.** No. Only the Central Imagery Office has coordinated with us on the Imagery Product Archive (IPA), a worldwide imagery dissemination system.

**Question.** Field commanders have at times complained of not receiving useful and timely intelligence support. This problem has been attributed in part to the lack of interoperability between and among a number of service and agency communications and intelligence systems. Are there interoperability issues or communications shortfalls standing in the way of your receiving the necessary intelligence support?

In your opinion, does the current intelligence communications architecture allow for the smooth flow of intelligence information between allied, coalition and service components assigned to Joint Task Force(s)?

What improvements in intelligence dissemination are required?

**PACOM Answer.** There have been many recent success stories demonstrating better intelligence dissemination. However, some interoperability issues and commu-

nications shortfalls remain which impede complete and timely intelligence dissemination to and from national to tactical levels, between services and between the US and our allies. In the Pacific Command, we have built a Department of defense Intelligence Information Systems (DODIIS) compliant architecture. As migration systems become available, we are expanding this theater-wide client server computing environment which allows all theater elements to freely exchange information. As multi-level security applications become available, we are adding them to the environment. ———. We need to continue the new and rapid progress in alignment of service intelligence systems to the national and theater community. Current service systems rely primarily on a service specific information flow rather than a joint flow which will be required when deployed operationally. A construct should be formed to bring the service Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities systems, the Department of Defense intelligence community systems, the theater battle management systems and the Global Command and Control Systems communities together under a common development umbrella. While multi-level security systems are beginning to emerge, until they become widely available allied users require redundant and duplicative systems to be built which is both fiscally and manpower expensive. Once these difficulties are overcome, a single worldwide network carrying computer data to workstations at various classification or releasability levels can be built.

Korea Answer. ———. Each service has their own unique intelligence processing and dissemination systems. While some improvements in interoperability and compatibility have been made within each service ———. No, the current intelligence communications architecture does not allow for the smooth flow of intelligence information between allied, coalition and service components assigned to Joint Task Force(s). ———. When it comes to architecture more than just the technical architecture must be addressed. The organizational/procedural architecture must match the technical/application architecture. The application must “look and feel” the way we do business. Normally, difficult in a joint environment, this is especially challenging when dealing with allied and coalition forces, since we have little or no administrative control over them.

“Stovepipe” applications development should be eliminated and geared toward Open Client-Server Environments. In addition, we need to realize greater efficiency in using limited bandwidth and increased reliability of communications circuits.

*Question.* Do you provide intelligence support to U.N. peacekeeping operations?

Additionally, who would release authority to give U.S. intelligence to U.N. peacekeepers? Is it you as the CINC, the Joint Task Force Commander, the CINC, or who? Who would have the tasking authority?

PACOM Answer. ———.

Korea Answer. ———. The National Disclosure Policy Manual, 1 October 1988, Section II, Policy, Paragraph 4f, states: “Classified military information through TOP SECRET may be disclosed by any U.S. commander to any actively participating allied force when such military information is urgently required for the support of combined combat operations.” Per NDP definition, the answer is, any U.S. commander, including the CINC may act as release authority to give U.S. intelligence to U.N. peacekeepers.

If the U.S. decides to support a peacekeeping operation with intelligence assets in this theater, tasking authority would be successively delegated from DOD to JCS to USCINCPAC and then to Commander, U.S. Forces Korea. Each echelon tasks those assets for which they have specific authority to task.

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1995.

**COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN  
COMMAND**

**WITNESS**

**GEN. GEORGE A. JOULWAN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES  
EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. ARMY**

**INTRODUCTION**

Mr. YOUNG. The Committee will come to order. Today's hearing will be closed pursuant to the unanimous vote yesterday, to close the hearing because of the potential discussion of classified information.

Today, we welcome General George Joulwan, the Commander in Chief of the United States European Command. The European Command's area of responsibility spans 83 countries and 13 million square miles, including Europe, parts of the Middle East, the North Africa littoral and sub-Saharan Africa.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the threat has changed from a single predictable threat to numerous volatile threats. Conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda and Iraq are just a few of the contingencies that U.S. forces in Europe have responded to since the demise of the Cold War. Since 1990, U.S. forces in Europe have been deployed 19 times for a number of diverse missions. For example, in 1994 U.S. forces were deployed to:

Macedonia for peacekeeping efforts;

Rwanda for noncombatant evacuation and humanitarian efforts; and

The Persian Gulf region for crisis response.

General Joulwan, please submit your statement for the record, and then present your oral statement in any way that you like. We look forward to hearing your testimony today and ask that you proceed.

**SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOULWAN**

General JOULWAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Murtha and distinguished Members of the House Committee on Appropriations, National Security Subcommittee. It is a privilege to appear today to discuss the United States European Command—EUCOM, and I welcome the opportunity to provide my perspective on the EUCOM theater of operations.

At the outset, let me thank this Committee and you, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the men and women of EUCOM and their families for your support of our efforts in Europe, and NATO, as well as in our area of responsibilities in Africa and the Middle East.



I have submitted a prepared statement and, Mr. Chairman, if you concur, I would like to enter that into the record and summarize.

Mr. YOUNG. General, that is a good plan, and without objection, the entire statement will be presented for the record, and we will hear your statement.

#### U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPE

General JOULWAN. The first point is to make clear that a United States forward deployed force in Europe is clearly in the vital interests of the United States. Twice in this century we have fought wars in Europe. Millions of people were killed and trillions of dollars spent in the prosecution and aftermath of these wars. What has kept the peace and prevented another war in Europe for the past 50 years has been the strength of the NATO Alliance and the leadership of the United States of America. The tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain and the collapse of communism in 1989 and 1990 were tremendous accomplishments, but did not eliminate the need for U.S. involvement in Europe. It was the end of one phase and then the beginning of another. We have not yet—to use an old infantryman's term—consolidated on the objective.

The challenge now is to define a strategy that can protect the United States and allied interests in Europe and consolidate the gains for democracy. In my opinion, the consolidation for democracy in Europe will take a strategy of engagement every bit as important as the one that led to the historic events of 1989 and 1990.

#### THEATER IN CONFLICT AND TRANSITION

The second point is related to the first, that the world is still a dangerous place as events in Bosnia and Chechnya remind us. As I said to you last year, and confirm again today, the EUCOM area of responsibility is a theater in conflict as well as a theater in transition. At one point last year we were engaged in five lesser regional contingencies and preparing for two more. We are even engaged with our allies who bear much of the burden. I don't need to tell this Committee that all contingency operations place troops in harms way. Equally important, these contingencies need to be properly resourced or else we take it out of hide and the readiness and quality of life for the troops. Let me be more specific about these ongoing operations.

PROVIDE COMFORT is a humanitarian relief operation and a no-fly zone enforcement for the people of northern Iraq. In April, we will celebrate four years of operations. PROVIDE COMFORT is in support of United Nations Security Resolution 688 and based out of Incirlik, Turkey. The United States is joined by the United Kingdom, France and Turkey, who provide aircraft and materiel support. Most important, thousands of lives have been saved over the past four years of PROVIDE COMFORT operations.

In the former Yugoslavia, we are engaged in several operations in support of the U.N. While there is no unity of command, we achieve unity of purpose.

DENY FLIGHT and SHARP GUARD are NATO-led operations in support of U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Over 200 NATO com-

bat aircraft are committed to DENY FLIGHT with a mission to protect the citizens of Bosnia from air attack. Over 50,000 sorties have been flown. NATO also provides close air support and air strikes when requested by U.N. forces on the ground in Bosnia.

SHARP GUARD is a NATO/Western European Union operation in the Adriatic, enforcing a U.N. embargo against the former Yugoslavia. Nearly 50,000 ships have been challenged and approximately 3,800 boarded with about 1,000 ships diverted. The point is that NATO is operational and is out of area; and most important, the European nations provide the bulk of the forces for both operations

ABLE SENTRY is a contingent of 500 American army troops in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. These U.S. troops join U.N. forces from the Nordic countries and are a clear signal of U.S. resolve to contain the conflict in Bosnia.

PROVIDE PROMISE is a United States operation supported by a multinational coalition that provides medicine and supplies to the people of Bosnia. These troops face great danger as they carry out their airland and airdrop operations. Again, thousands of lives have been saved by PROVIDE PROMISE humanitarian operations.

While no decision has yet been made by the U.N., NATO is preparing for the possible withdrawal of U.N. forces from the former Yugoslavia. This is prudent planning and essential if NATO is to be successful and credible if called upon.

Last summer, Mr. Chairman, the European Command conducted a short notice emergency deployment to Rwanda and Goma, Zaire, called Operation SUPPORT HOPE. Within 72 hours of the execute order from the President, EUCOM troops had established a logistics and communications network in Europe and Central Africa. Water purification units, engineers, and medics stationed in Germany deployed 3,600 miles and immediately provided fresh water and sanitation to the Rwandan refugees. Within a week, the death toll went from 6,000 a day to less than 500, and in 30 days to less than 200. By their quick action and because of their high state of training and readiness, these units stopped the dying and saved a generation of Rwandans.

Equally important, when the emergency was over, EUCOM smoothly transferred the operation to the U.N. and nongovernmental organizations and in 60 days redeployed out of the area. There was not one U.S. troop fatality during Operation SUPPORT HOPE. I believe much can be learned from this operation and can be applied if and when we work again with the U.N.

#### EUROPEAN COMMAND ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

The third point I want to make is the historic opportunity we have to create a Europe whole and free from the Atlantic to the Urals. In 1994, we went from theory to practice in an engagement strategy with former adversaries. Under the military cooperation programs—both bilateral and multinational—great progress has been made. Bilaterally, last year we had an exercise in Russia with Russian troops and participated in three NATO-sponsored Partnership For Peace exercises. This year, there will be at least 20 exercises with our new partners. The number of partners continues to grow. The total is now 25, to include the nonaligned nations of

Sweden, Finland and Austria. We graduated the first class of 73 midlevel officers, to include Russians and those in the former Soviet republics, from the George C. Marshall Center located in Germany.

Mr. Chairman, this is an engagement strategy with the intended outcome of achieving stability in Europe with progress towards democracy, and your continued support of the Marshall Center and the Partnership for Peace program is greatly appreciated. The payoff is high. We also need to stay involved in NATO as Europe and the United States adjust to the post-Cold War period. Not only with U.S. resources, but primarily with U.S. leadership and involvement as NATO adapts its structure and functions. NATO has served us well in the past, and it is vital for stability and security in the future. We need to stay engaged.

#### U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE

My final point is that given the myriad of missions facing the European Command, the morale and readiness of the force remains high. We now train across the entire conflict spectrum—from peace support operations like Rwanda to mid-intensity warfare such as Desert Storm. This year's budget fixes several deficiencies from last year, as will the much-needed supplemental. We will continue to stabilize the force in Europe towards a goal of 109,000 down from 314,000 just five years ago, and we have conducted this unprecedented drawdown with the most active OPTEMPO, operations tempo, since World War II.

I also need to state for the record the enormous role being played in EUCOM's area of responsibility by the Guard and Reserve. Air Guard units supplement air crews in Operations DENY FLIGHT, PROVIDE PROMISE and PROVIDE COMFORT. Army reservists participated in Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda. Marine reservists will take part in an operation in Albania this summer. State reservists are aligned with our new partner countries and are establishing links of mutual trust and confidence. For example, Pennsylvania is aligned with Lithuania, Ohio with Hungary, and Texas with the Czech Republic. Clearly, we are a total force in EUCOM and I am proud of the great role being played by the Reserve components. It truly is one team-one fight.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we must maintain quality as we reduce the force. Strategic lift and the C-17 and fast sealift are essential for rapid deployment and agility. Given the uncertainty and instability in my theater, we must focus on Strategic Arms Reductions Talks—START and the nonproliferation treaty as well as on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Theater missile defense with our allies is both prudent and necessary. As we stabilize the U.S. force in Europe, quality of life is my top priority and an essential component of readiness. As you know, we enlist soldiers, but we retain families. We have always appreciated the sacrifices of the troops and supported an adequate quality of life for the GIs and their families, and I urge you to continue to do so.

#### SUMMARY

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying I am excited about the future. We have an unprecedented opportunity to develop a

world where democratic values and respect for the rule of law and for the dignity and worth of the individual are shared and developed. Now is not the time to retrench. We, as a nation, must stay involved not as the world's policeman but rather as a great power that understands the potential as well as the limits of that power. On this, the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, we have demonstrated that the United States, with its allies, can win a world war, and we have also demonstrated we can tear down a wall and defeat an ideology. Now the question is, can we win the peace? And if we do so, and I know we can, we will enter the 21st century with great hope for peace, freedom and prosperity for our children and our grandchildren.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.

[The statement of General Joulwan follows:]

Statement of  
GEN GEORGE A. JOULWAN  
Commander in Chief  
United States European Command  
before the  
House Appropriations Committee  
National Security Subcommittee

February 16, 1995

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## United States European Command

### GENERAL GEORGE A. JOULWAN Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command

General George A. Joulwan (Jahl'win), United States Army, is Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. He assumed this position on 21 October 1993.

General Joulwan was born in Pottsville, Pennsylvania, on November 16, 1939. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1961 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Infantry. He received a Master of Arts degree in political science from Loyola University in Chicago. General Joulwan's military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic Course, the Armor Officer Advance Course, the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. He was an ROTC instructor at Loyola University, a tactical officer in the Department of Tactics at the U.S. Military Academy, and director of Political and Economical Studies at the Army War College.

He has held a variety of command and staff positions during four tours in Europe, two combat tours in Vietnam and several tours in Washington, D.C.

During his fourteen years in Germany, he served as a platoon leader, company commander, battalion commander, brigade commander, division chief of staff, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations for U.S. Army, Europe. He also served in a joint assignment as special assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, and commanded the 3d Armored Division from March 1988 to August 1989.

In Vietnam, he served as a company commander and the S-3 in the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, and as a brigade S-3 and deputy G-3 of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

In Washington, D.C., after an assignment as assistant executive officer to the Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, he served in joint assignments as special assistant to the President of the United States in the Office of the President, and executive to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was next assigned as Director, Force Requirements (Combat Support Systems) in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army.

From August 1989 to November 1990, General Joulwan was commanding general of V Corps under U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army. He was promoted to his present rank of general on November 9, 1990.

General Joulwan became Commander in Chief of the United States Southern Command on November 21, 1990. As such, he was responsible for all U.S. military activities in Latin America (except Mexico and the Caribbean) and for implementing U.S. national security policy and strategy in the region.

*Protocol Office, HQ USEUCOM, Patch Barracks, APO New York 09128*

Military awards and decorations which General Joulwan has received include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star with oak leaf cluster, Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, Bronze Star Medal with V device and two oak leaf clusters, several Air Medals, Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster, Combat Infantryman Badge, Parachutist Badge, Ranger Tab, and Expert Infantry Badge. He holds the Presidential Service Badge, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge and the Army Staff Identification Badge.

General Joulwan is married to the former Karen E. Jones. They have three daughters: Jennifer, Christon, and Jessica.

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*Protocol Office, HQ USEUCOM, Patch Barracks, APO New York 09128*

## Introduction

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, it is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss the United States European Command. I welcome this opportunity to provide my perspective on this busy theater -- a theater that spans Europe, parts of the Near and Middle East, the Northern African littoral, and sub-Saharan Africa: 83 countries and 13 million square miles. I would like to articulate the vital importance of this theater to U.S. interests, describe the strategic environment and emerging opportunities and threats to U.S. interests, define my strategy to meet these challenges, and finally, prioritize the programs and resources necessary to ensure success.

## Overview

As I survey the vast USEUCOM area of responsibility, I am impressed by the extent of the positive accomplishments over the past year. While peace still eludes us in Bosnia, we need to recognize that since I last came before you, there has been fundamental and positive change in the security environment in EUCOM's area of responsibility. We have gone from a reactive to a proactive strategy. We have taken theory and put it into practice. Indeed we are consolidating the gains for democracy brought about by the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the demise of communism. Let me be more specific.

EUCOM has maintained a high state of readiness in the force. Even as we drew down the size of the forward deployed force from 314,000 to approximately 100,000, EUCOM demonstrated it can still react to crisis across the conflict spectrum. This past year EUCOM was engaged in numerous lesser regional operations and the troops performed superbly. However, as the force declines, there is concern about personnel turbulence as well as resources matching requirements. Both indicators impact on readiness.

Today, EUCOM forces are part of NATO operations enforcing UN Security Council Resolutions in the Adriatic and in the skies over Bosnia; multinational operations conducting airland and airdrop flights to feed the hungry in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and multinational operations protecting the people of Northern Iraq from the brutality of Saddam Hussein.

When tragedy struck last summer in Rwanda, EUCOM within hours began moving forward deployed forces 6,000 kilometers to Central Africa. Once there, a joint force of water purification teams, engineers, medics, logisticians, airborne troops, and airlift specialists stopped the dying of thousands of Rwandans. In one week the death toll dropped from 6,000 per day to 500, and within 30 days, it had fallen to less than 200. Equally important the EUCOM force worked with UN relief organizations and non-governmental organizations in a constructive way and within 60 days turned the operation over to the UNHCR and all U.S. forces were withdrawn. Not one soldier, airman, sailor, or marine was lost during Operation SUPPORT HOPE.

EUCOM's Military Cooperation Program achieved great results last year and the potential for the future is high. The Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) brought Americans and American ideals and values to the countries of the Former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union. The teams plan bilateral programs in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and are cost effective and productive. A particularly noteworthy aspect of this program is the role played by reserve forces. Reservists, the epitome of the citizen soldier's role in a democracy, comprise one



third of the JCTP's program personnel. Furthermore, twelve states have actually adopted the participating nations under the State Partnership Program. In addition, the George C. Marshall Center located in Germany graduated its first class last December and was a clear success. Seventy-three mid-level military and civilian officers from 23 former Warsaw Pact countries including Russia and Ukraine attended.

NATO's Partnership for Peace became a reality in 1994. Twenty-four nations -- mostly former Warsaw Pact countries -- have signed the framework document. There is a Partnership Coordination Cell operational and representatives are there from 11 partnership nations. EUCOM fully supports this program and in addition, U.S. forces participated in all three P&P exercises last year. EUCOM also conducted a bilateral exercise with Russian troops in Russia. This engagement strategy promotes mutual trust and confidence among former adversaries and an opportunity to develop common procedures, doctrine, and standards among all nations of Europe and the Former Soviet Union.

The list of achievements could go on. But the point is that EUCOM and NATO have changed and are adapting to the challenges of the Post Cold War period. NATO and its member nations achieved a great success five years ago with the collapse of a wall and the Iron Curtain. But that event was not the end of our nation's nor NATO's mission. It was only the end of one phase and the beginning of another. How we as a nation and as an Alliance respond in the remainder of this decade will determine the true security of the United States in the 21st Century. Indeed the United States can be justifiably proud of its role in bringing about this revolution for democracy. It truly was brought about by the constancy and character of the American commitment. But it is not good enough to just bring about the revolution -- it is what you do afterward that is equally important in consolidating the gains for democracy. We as a nation and as a command must stay engaged in Europe -- albeit at reduced levels -- if we do not want to repeat the mistakes made twice in this century.

And we could not have realized the great events of five years ago without the continuing support of Congress, and on behalf of all those who have served and are serving in the European Command, I thank you for that support. It is in that same spirit of cooperation and understanding that I ask for your support in today's new EUCOM as part of a new NATO. The struggle is not yet over, the need for vigilance still exists, the mission continues.

#### Theater in Conflict and Transition

Indeed the EUCOM theater is still a theater in conflict as well as a theater in transition. Ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia are painful reminders that man's inhumanity to man continues. Recent events in Chechnya exposed the fragile democracy in Russia as well as a deep concern by Russia's neighbors. There are still more than 20,000 nuclear warheads in the former Soviet republics. Instability and uncertainty are the norm not the exception. Stability is not assured. Institutions that make democracy work -- economic, political, judicial, social, and military -- take time to evolve. Terrorism and fanaticism still are prevalent in the Middle East and the Northern littoral of Africa and threaten the fragile peace between Israel and its neighbors. Disease and starvation are rampant in sub-Saharan Africa and pose a long-term danger to the stability of that troubled continent. Indeed the world is still a dangerous place. Clearly the United States military and in particular the US European Command are not and should not be the world's

policeman. But US leadership is required in creating the conditions which will reinforce our ideals and values and assure our security and that of our allies into the 21st Century. How we engage is important. The EUCOM strategy has been developed to take advantage of the opportunity brought about by the successes of the past 50 years. And 50 years after the end of World War II, we celebrate not just victory in World War II, but also victory in the Cold War. The challenges and opportunities we face today are similar to those we faced following World War II. EUCOM's strategy seizes upon this unique period in history. It is designed to promote stability, thwart aggression, develop multinationalism with our allies, and trust and confidence with former adversaries while maintaining ready forces to protect our vital interests in the region.

### U.S. National Interests

The USEUCOM AOR remains critically important to U.S. security interests for both geo-strategic and economic reasons, and because we share common values and a common culture with much of this region.

Access to this region is strategically critical. Many of the world's vital lines of communication traverse this region. A majority of the world's shipping, both in numbers and tonnage, transits the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal. Western Europe and the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union contain a large portion of, or provide essential access to, the world's resources.

The economic interests of the nations in this AOR complement the economy of the U.S. The European Union has the largest gross domestic product of any region in the world. Open markets and free trade, unimpeded access to trade routes, and the free flow of resources contribute to our prosperity, and therefore to our security. Stability is a precondition for economic prosperity.

Consider the following:

- Europe accounts for 34% of the world-wide total of gross domestic product – more than any other region.
- Europe accounts for 26% of U.S. merchandise trade exports and 31% of total U.S. exports.
- One and a half million American workers are supported by U.S. exports to Europe.
- U.S. generally has a trade surplus with Europe.
- Fifty percent of U.S. direct foreign investment is in Europe.
- Europe accounts for more than 60% of direct foreign investment in the U.S.
- Of all foreign owned manufacturing establishments in the U.S., 60-67% are European owned (measured in terms of establishments, economic value, and value of shipments). These establishments employ nearly 3 million Americans.


Beyond our economic relationship, we share a common cultural foundation rooted in our political systems, heritage, and religions. Our common values and ideas form the very foundation of our relationship. The 1990 census showed that 92% of all Americans claim European or African heritage. That heritage includes our arts, literature, music, religions, and

even our science and technology. Cultural bonds make our relationship with the people of this region unique and truly lasting.

### **USEUCOM Strategic Environment**

We are in a new era. Let me describe the significant challenges and to some extent the dangers we face in the coming year. Last September, the remaining U.S., French, British and Russian occupation troops departed Berlin -- now a free and reunited city. After 45 years of Cold War, U.S. and Russian soldiers train side-by-side in cooperative military exercises. I could list many similarly astonishing facts. But the one big fact is that in this new environment the U.S. is without peer. Our pre-eminence gives us great privileges, but it brings great responsibilities as well. Nowhere is that clearer than in USEUCOM. Our leadership is sought on every security issue of significance. That means that our vision and our commitment mobilize the contributions of a whole community of powerful nations.

Unfortunately, it also means that in the absence of our leadership, coherent international response to dangerous conditions develops slowly at best. Those conditions, left to themselves, ultimately can impinge upon the vital interests of our nation.



**Figure 1**

USEUCOM's area of responsibility is full of dangerous conditions (Figure 1). Another year has passed with no end to the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. Iraq remains hostile toward its Kurdish minorities in Northern Iraq. Religious hatreds are renewing violence in the

Middle East, the largest nation in North Africa is on the verge of chaos, and civil war in Africa is commonplace. Immediately adjacent to our area of responsibility, Russia remains involved in conflicts on its southwestern border and faces the prospect of a prolonged conflict in Chechnya.

USEUCOM, along with our friends and allies, actively engages in operations designed to control and, ultimately, to eliminate these dangers. The actions required drive our operations and personnel tempo higher than ever before. USEUCOM and NATO participated in more missions in the last five years than in the previous 45 years. On any given day, USEUCOM is participating in no fewer than four "lesser regional conflicts," sometimes simultaneously supporting other nearby combatant commands.

#### USEUCOM Troop Deployments 1990-1994

• 1990	Liberia	3,800	NEO
• 1990-1	Persian Gulf	86,000	Desert Shield/Storm
• 1990-1	Turkey	9,000	Combat
• 1990-4	Cyprus	240	Peacekeeping
• 1991	Israel	800	Air Defense
• 1991	Zaire	64	NEO
• 1991-4	Turkey/Iraq	18,905	Humanitarian
• 1992	Sierra Leone	154	NEO
• 1992	Angola	92	Election monitoring
• 1992-4	Croatia	450	Humanitarian
• 1992-3	CIS	427	Humanitarian
• 1992-4	Somalia	218	Humanitarian
• 1992-3	Kenya	25	Security Operations
• 1992-93	Baharain/Kuwait	275	Peacekeeping
• 1992-4	Yugo, Italy	1,784	Humanitarian
• 1994	Macedonia	500	Peacekeeping
• 1994	Rwanda	125	NEO
• 1994	Rwanda	2,200	Humanitarian
• 1994	Saudi/Arabian Gulf	7,045	Crisis Response

Since August 1993, USEUCOM planned 32 operations and actually executed 13 of those, everything from non-combatant evacuation operations in Rwanda to our operations in the Balkans. The number and scope of these operations are indicative of the diverse national security challenges we face in this theater: regional conflict, weapons of mass destruction, transnational dangers, and failure of democratic reform.

#### Regional Conflict

You need only pick up a newspaper to see the effects of regional tensions throughout this theater. Ethnic and religious strife, resurging nationalism, and territorial disputes prevail throughout the former Warsaw Pact countries. The regional "fault lines" penetrating throughout this AOR involve historic disputes that transcend traditional nation-state boundaries — disputes whose terrible outcomes could potentially exceed the most pessimistic intelligence estimates.

These problems are not limited to Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Those living in sub-Saharan Africa are not only threatened by conflicts among states, but by the disintegration of the states themselves. The struggle for democratic reform throughout the region has had mixed results and faces an even more uncertain future. As of late 1994, fourteen of USEUCOM's thirty-five sub-Saharan countries were in various stages of transition and turmoil. Those problems are compounded by environmental disaster, disease, and economic decline — problems that have no short term solution.

A similar situation exists in the Middle East and the North Africa littoral. Here, vast quantities of advanced weaponry make the combination of ancient animosities and radical political forces approach critical mass. While recent peace agreements offer new hope, extremist factions counter their implementation with terror. Additionally, the possibility that radicals may obtain weapons of mass destruction adds a new dimension of danger to this volatile region.

### Weapons Of Mass Destruction

Weapons of mass destruction pose the greatest potential for disaster. There are still more than 20,000 nuclear weapons in the hands of our former adversaries. Considering the political and economic instability in the Former Soviet Union, many in Congress have expressed concern over the numbers, location, and control of these weapons.

Of great concern is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ability to deliver them. The dramatic rise in the smuggling of nuclear material and technology is alarming. Since 1990, there were more than 580 known incidents of nuclear smuggling in the USEUCOM AOR. More than 200 of these incidents occurred in the last year alone.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents the potential for a nightmare scenario. Nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons can cause mass casualties with little or no warning. Today's technology makes these weapons easier to produce, conceal and deliver — making this threat more unpredictable and harder to counter. Even a credible threat to use such weapons is an effective tool of political terror, as demonstrated by Iraqi SCUD missile attacks during the Gulf War.

### Transnational Dangers

In the past decade, dangers such as international crime, drugs, and terrorism have intensified to the point that they threaten the stability of the international community. Turmoil has exponentially increased the flow of refugees throughout the USEUCOM AOR. For example, more than one and a half million people were displaced due to the Balkan conflict and more than two million were displaced due to the conflict in Rwanda. Stagnant economies

and a widening disparity between the haves and have-nots aggravate unemployment and stimulate extreme political views, increasing transnational dangers. This drains resources and undermines respect for law and civil authority. Although their effect escapes simple formulation, they nevertheless increase regional instability.

### Failure of Reform

Failure of political and economic reform in the Former Soviet Union would cause grave problems for the international community and threaten U.S. interests in the USEUCOM AOR. We encourage and strengthen reform through our active engagement programs, creating apolitical militaries that are less likely to use force toward their sovereign neighbors to resolve problems. But it will take active economic and political programs to assist in the reform process. It is clearly to our benefit to foster a smooth transition to democracy, thereby reducing the risk of future conflicts.

### USEUCOM Strategy

We have just completed work on a theater strategy entitled *Active Engagement and Preparedness*, which provides a comprehensive plan for meeting the challenges facing us in the AOR (Figure 2). This strategy, which is derived from the President's National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' National Military Strategy (NMS), achieves the dual national military objectives of promoting stability and thwarting aggression by:

*engaging in peacetime.....*  
*responding to crisis.....*  
*and fighting to win.*




Figure 2

Briefly, *engage in peacetime* is a forward looking strategy that shapes the security environment by creating conditions for success and reducing the likelihood of armed conflict. This approach utilizes non-lethal mechanisms to foster a transition to democracy and civilian control of the military. *Respond to crisis* serves both overarching strategic objectives: it promotes stability and it thwarts aggression. It takes on many different forms in the AOR; it drives our OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO, and it daily puts Americans in harm's way. These operations -- the gray zone between peace and war -- make up a vast majority of this theater's ongoing activities. *Fight to win* is the traditional military role and our most important purpose. Our ability to do this is a necessary foundation for all other activities. USEUCOM forces devote most of their training and resources to being able to fight to win with the decisiveness the American people expect of their armed forces.

Before discussing these strategies further, there are two key factors that have long played a major role in our strategy -- our forward presence and NATO. Today, these factors are as relevant as ever. They achieve a unique economy of force that cannot be effectively or efficiently achieved from the continental United States.

Forward presence in this AOR enables us to take part in a wide range of operations on a daily basis. U.S. presence helps bring peace and stability to Western Europe and provides the foundation for extending that stability to Central and Eastern Europe. As stated in the Chairman's National Military Strategy, forward presence is key to our influence and engagement.

The force structure in our AOR, which is near the end of its 68% reduction from Cold War levels, provides the minimum elements necessary to support our strategies in this theater in conflict. In this large and highly volatile AOR, it is critical to maintain the capability to respond and resolve crises before they gain momentum and mature into major conflicts. Our forward deployed forces provide us the opportunity to train at the international level, the ability to reinforce quickly, and a degree of unilateral combat capability. This force structure also provides significant in-theater capabilities not readily available in the U.S., such as intelligence and surveillance, communications, theater missile defense and other vital capabilities.

Forward presence gives us access to basing and infrastructure necessary for force projection both here and in Central Command's area of responsibility. This proved critical during Desert Shield/Desert Storm where 95% of the strategic airlift, 90% of the combat aircraft, and 85% of the naval vessels were staged from or through USEUCOM's AOR. This would have been practically impossible without USEUCOM basing and infrastructure, to include equipment prepositioned in theater to supply reinforcing forces.

Our presence also underwrites U.S. leadership of NATO and allows us to maintain, support, and contribute to the integrity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is U.S. leadership of this premier alliance that provides the critical stabilizing mechanism of European security. U.S. leadership and forward presence reinforces our strong commitment to the trans-Atlantic link and makes us a European power, even though we do not have, nor desire, any European territory. Our unique role as the "honest broker" gives credibility to the NATO

Alliance unseen in any other security alliance. Our leadership is especially important now as NATO grows from a defensive alliance to a mutual security organization. Its importance in this role, as Central and Eastern Europe transition toward democracies which act together to solve mutual problems and help resolve conflicts in adjacent regions, cannot be overstated.

U.S. influence in NATO leverages allied force contributions and infrastructure investment. NATO provides a force multiplier with a robust integrated command and control structure built on more than 40 years of planning, training, and exercising with a standard doctrine. NATO gives us this economy of force in the daily operations throughout the AOR. For example, while the U.S. contributes approximately 500 troops in neighboring Macedonia, NATO countries provide more than 23,000 UNPROFOR troops within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Forward deployed U.S. forces in other regions of the world would welcome a similar relationship that encourages sharing risks and burdens of protecting common interests. NATO proved that it can adapt to the new security environment and remain cost effective by sharing responsibilities across a broad spectrum of operations. The New NATO, born out of the 1991 Rome Declaration's new Alliance Strategic Concept, not only provides an organization capable of defending the territory of its member states, but also fosters the emergence of a safer and more stable Europe.

### Engage in Peacetime

Our strategy to *engage in peacetime* is proactive and far reaching (Figure 3). It uses military resources in unconventional ways to mold the security environment in our AOR by creating conditions for a successful transition to democracy, thus preventing armed conflict and promoting stability. We aim to promote stability, democratization and military professionalism in Central and Eastern Europe, and to assist host nations in Africa in democratization and when possible relief of human suffering.




Figure 3



USEUCOM employs several avenues to promote stability, democratization and military professionalism, such as military cooperation programs, the Security Assistance Program, the George C. Marshall Center, and conventional and nuclear arms control. These unilateral programs also provide a foundation for multilateral programs, such as Partnership for Peace.

USEUCOM engages in two types of military cooperation programs: the first program takes the form of combined bilateral and multilateral military exercises, while our second program provides the model of an apolitical military under civilian control. Combined exercises are building trust and confidence with our former adversaries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. USEUCOM participated in every Partnership for Peace Exercise last year, and completed a peacekeeping exercise with Russian forces in Russia. Exercises also allow us to train with countries in Africa where our resources are limited and the security environment is different from Europe. These valuable exercises lay the groundwork for more complex multilateral exercises and encourage regional cooperation. Combined exercises focus on opportunities to train at a relatively low cost.

The Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) invests in the long term relationship between a country's military and its governing body. It extends a hand of friendship to countries of Central and Eastern Europe and has been successful beyond all expectations. The in-country Military Liaison Teams help facilitate the assistance that host nations need to implement democratic reforms such as human rights guarantees, a military legal code based on the rights of a citizen soldier, chaplain and non-commissioned officer corps, and a governmental structure that makes the militaries subordinate to civilian control in democratic societies. A small investment in the JCTP significantly increases trust between East and West, and accelerates the East's transition to apolitical militaries, thus enhancing stability for the entire region. JCTP also provides the building blocks needed for Central and Eastern Europe to participate in the Partnership for Peace Program.

The JCTP is a uniquely American program. I don't believe any other nation could do it the way we have done it, or as well. To begin with, we are welcome in Eastern Europe because we bear no historical baggage. Furthermore, as a nation with very significant military forces but not territory on the continent we can help solve what has historically been a nearly unsolvable security problem without endangering the sovereignty of smaller nations. These facts make us welcome.

When our servicemembers arrive on the ground the fact that they are citizens of the United States gives them special capabilities. Because they come from a nation of federated states, they understand instinctively the advantages and the challenges of many governments working together. Coming from a nation which is full of ethnic diversity, but which on the whole has made this diversity a strength rather than a weakness, they understand the complexity of the situation in Central and Eastern Europe without being resigned to the problems which currently go along with it. A third of them are reservists--American reservists are a unique group, and as citizen soldiers they represent in their persons the concept of a military subordinate to civilian authority. Many of them are members of the National Guard; they thus know first hand how militaries less vast than the armed forces of the United States can serve a government whose interests are less global than our own. Taking a good idea one step further, 12 state national guards have "adopted" these JCTP countries under the State

Partnership Program, further encouraging the development of long-term institutional and personal relationships between military and civic leaders and allowing more Americans to become involved directly in helping countries transition to democracy (Figure 4).



**Figure 4**

Security Assistance is made up of a number of components to include Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). Foreign Military Financing enables selected friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities by financing acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and training. As FMF helps countries provide for their legitimate defense needs, it promotes U.S. national security interests by strengthening coalitions and cementing strong military-to-military relationships. FMF also supports our regional security cooperation with key allies such as Greece, Israel, and Turkey by rectifying shortcomings in their defense capabilities. Except for funds earmarked for Israel, almost all FMF is spent in the United States—this translates to U.S. jobs. Direct Commercial Sales, and Foreign Military Sales also promote interoperability with U.S. forces, while contributing to a strong U.S. defense industrial base. This industrial base constitutes part of DoD's mobilization base in the event the U.S. must respond quickly to a military conflict. For FY 93, the most current year for which we have available figures, Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales in the USEUCOM AOR alone accounted for more than \$8 billion. This translates to 320,000 U.S. jobs.

A premier component within the Security Assistance program is the IMET program. IMET promotes military-to-military relations and exposes international military and civilian officials to U.S. values and democratic processes. In FY 94 we sent 876 international students to the U.S. from the European Command and paid for seven English language laboratories in

Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, all at a cost of only \$11.6 million. Twenty percent of all flag officers in Turkey are IMET trained. Eighty percent of the senior leadership in Portugal are IMET graduates. More than 500 senior civilian and military leaders throughout the USEUCOM AOR are IMET trained. Over the years, this familiarity with U.S. doctrine and equipment leads to repeat equipment orders and favorable base rights negotiations. Several instances of immediate support during Desert Shield/Storm were directly attributed to relations fostered through IMET. Simply put, IMET is the centerpiece of Security Assistance.

Another program designed to train foreign leaders in democratic processes and ideals is the Marshall Center. In December, the Marshall Center graduated its first class of 73 mid- to senior-level officers and civilians from 23 Central/Eastern European and Former Soviet Union countries. The Marshall Center's mission is to assist these countries in the development of military institutions compatible with democratic processes and civilian control. The Center offers courses, holds conferences, and sponsors research on defense procedures and organizations appropriate to democratic states with free market economies. Special emphasis is placed on human rights and civilian control of the military. This is a very cost effective means of influencing the future generation of regional defense leaders.

While these unilateral activities are of long term benefit to the U.S., they also provide the foundation needed to build the new security architecture of a reunited Europe. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program has been one of the most dramatic developments this past year. Since January of 1994, 24 nations have signed the basic PfP agreement; 15 have submitted their list of proposed activities, called presentation documents; and eleven have already sent liaison officers to the NATO Headquarters in Mons, Belgium, to work on the program. In fact, at the Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons, partner liaison officers are planning, training, developing common operational procedures, and becoming friends. One need only visit the Partnership Conference Center to capture the spirit of PfP. The building's foyer now contains the flags of 39 partner and NATO nations arranged in alphabetical order -- Albania to Uzbekistan -- not NATO on one side and partners on the other, but flags side-by-side. This is PfP, the New Europe and the New NATO.

You would have sensed the same spirit of partnership at the opening ceremony of the first PfP exercise near Poznan, Poland. There, more than 600 soldiers from 13 countries -- 6 NATO and 7 partner states -- trained together. Organized in five international companies with national platoons, these soldiers practiced observation, patrolling, and escorting tasks common to peacekeeping operations. They are the vanguards of partnership, opening a whole new chapter in the history of NATO and Europe. The tempo of similar and even more ambitious exercises will continue over the coming year.

While cooperation with our former adversaries is important, the cooperative reduction of the overall military arms inventory is key to building mutual trust and reducing the potential for future conflict. USEUCOM is actively involved in the arms control effort. Nowhere in the world does the level or spectrum of activity in the arms control arena match what is taking place in the USEUCOM theater of operations. Our daily efforts to comply with the protocols and confidence building measures of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, Conventional Forces Europe Treaty, and Vienna Document 1994 set the highest example for the

international community on how to responsibly comply with and participate in the post-Cold War European security process.

The Conventional Forces Europe Treaty represents the most comprehensive conventional arms control treaty since World War II. As the Secretary of Defense's Executive Agent responsible for ensuring the U.S. Government's compliance with that treaty, I am proud to report that our forces completed their required equipment reductions and destruction, a full two years ahead of schedule. In addition, their direct participation in Vienna Document 1994's confidence and security building measures, such as unit inspections, exercise observations, base visits, and military equipment demonstrations, continues to help reduce military tensions and suspicions, improves upon a record of confidence and stability, and shapes the European security environment.


As USEUCOM looks toward future arms control agreements, I consider reducing strategic nuclear weapons and controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to be endeavors that are vital to U.S. and European security. I support the full implementation of both START I and START II, and the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. These agreements not only reduce the stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and the potential for accidents or incidents, but allow newly emerging democracies the opportunity to demonstrate cooperative intentions to the world community. I intend to remain fully engaged and supportive of several arms control initiatives that are on the horizon, including the Open Skies Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. I will monitor these developments closely, and their effect on my combat capabilities.

Turning south toward Africa, our resources and interests are more limited. USEUCOM's strategy provides a means for assisting African host nations in democratization and, when possible, relief of human suffering. The focus is on humanitarian national assistance activities of a non-lethal nature. Some of our key initiatives include senior officer visits, medical training exercises, training cruises, civil affairs training and IMET. Nowhere in the AOR is IMET so important. In African militaries, IMET is the most well known and sought after U.S. program. And from the U.S. perspective, IMET is our most cost effective program in this part of the AOR. Through professional interaction between U.S. and host nation forces, forward presence operations contribute to the promotion of democracy and a professional military ethic. These actions, if continued, should help reduce the likelihood for U.S. military response. Should contingency operations to protect U.S. interests become necessary, the exposure of U.S. forces to Africa will increase their effectiveness.

#### Respond to Crisis

In crisis situations, early intervention can avoid conflict. Forward deployed forces are capable of responding quickly and effectively across an extensive spectrum of crises. Because *respond to crisis* covers such a broad area, from humanitarian operations, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), and sanctions enforcement, to the whole spectrum of peace support operations, it is the prime cause of USEUCOM's high operational and personnel tempo (Figure 5). Though crisis response often supports the objectives of promoting stability, it sometimes is intended to thwart aggression by threatening or using U.S. military power to

protect our vital interests. It may also be structured as a prelude to our third strategy, *fight to win*.



**Figure 5**

In the case of humanitarian operations, the objective is to relieve human suffering. Often USEUCOM forces are committed when significant loss of life threatens to happen so quickly that no other agency can respond in time. We primarily use our logistics capability to conduct these missions and use it to stave off great loss of life until other government agencies and non-governmental organizations can be mobilized.


Operation SUPPORT HOPE demonstrated the key role forward presence plays in responding to a humanitarian crisis. Our primary goal, to stop the dying, was accomplished quickly and effectively. Our unique lift capability, logistics support and overseas bases helped make this operation a success. As the name of this mission implies, we *supported* other agencies by providing these unique capabilities. We ensured our mission statement was clear and concise, which prevented "mission creep" and provided an orderly and expeditious exit strategy. In short, we responded quickly, accomplished our mission, turned over our responsibilities as soon as other agencies were prepared to assume them, and exited. There is no residual U.S. military footprint in the Rwanda Area of Operations.

NEOs, similar to the Rwanda NEO prior to Operation SUPPORT HOPE, are a special kind of humanitarian mission because they are conducted in an unfriendly environment, possibly requiring the use of military force. Speed, planning, organization, and a high degree of flexibility are all required to accomplish NEOs successfully. Although they can be very demanding, they are of short duration and do not tie up critical resources for a long time.

Unlike NEOs, peace operations do tie up critical resources for a long time. Often, the desired political end state requires time and is opposed by actors deeply committed against it. Furthermore, it is hard to define a military objective that supports the desired political goal.

The peace operations in the Former Yugoslavia, by which we aim to help achieve a negotiated peace settlement, are examples of military involvement in a conflict that requires a long-term political solution. While this solution will not occur overnight, our forces are

containing the conflict, supporting sanctions imposed by United Nations resolutions, and meeting humanitarian assistance needs on a daily basis. U.S. forces, in concert with NATO forces, have not only saved lives and relieved the suffering of thousands of people, but have been directly responsible for preventing this conflict from escalating. For example, in February and April of 1994, in response to a UN request, and to relieve the senseless bombardment of Sarajevo and other safe areas, the North Atlantic Council declared **exclusion zones** to protect the people of that region.



**Figure 6**

Operation PROVIDE PROMISE involves daytime airlift missions to Sarajevo and nighttime airdrops to exclusion zones over Bosnia-Herzegovina. As of 12 January 95 the U.S. had flown 4,131 sorties into Sarajevo (36% of the 11,321 total sorties) and delivered 50,920 metric tons (MTONS) of cargo. By that same date the U.S. had airdropped 17,480 MTONS of food and 200 MTONS of medicine to needy people in Bosnia (Figure 6). PROVIDE PROMISE is a prime example of sharing risks, roles, and responsibilities among our Allies. U.S. aircraft and crews participate in the Sarajevo airlift with those of four other countries (Germany, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom) and in humanitarian airdrops with two other countries (Germany and France).

In the Adriatic, two U.S. surface ships are enforcing economic sanctions with 18 other Allied surface ships from 13 countries in the NATO Operation SHARP GUARD (Figure 7). U.S. participation in this operation changed from enforcing the UN embargo to enforcing sanctions as of November 15, 1994. As of 12 January 1995, the Allied ships had challenged a total of 45,114 ships, actually stopping or boarding 3,479 of those.





Figure 7

Operation DENY FLIGHT is another example of the concept of shared contributions for common security interests. NATO is executing this operation in support of the UN Security Council Resolutions calling for the protection of airspace over Bosnia as well as UN forces on the ground. Our aircrews have flown close air support for embattled UN troops, saved thousands of lives in Sarajevo by enforcing the exclusion zone, and shot down four Serb aircraft caught in the act of bombing a Bosnian village. The many missions NATO has accomplished recently illustrate how the past 40 years of harmonizing and streamlining NATO tactical procedures paid off. The U.S. currently contributes 76 of the more than 167 NATO tactical aircraft involved in the No-Fly-Zone enforcement operation over Bosnia-Herzegovina. A total of 21,500 sorties have been flown as of 12 January 1995.

We also have people involved in many other aspects of the humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts in the Former Yugoslavia, including medical teams to support UNPROFOR personnel and approximately 500 personnel in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of Task Force ABLE SENTRY. Of the peacekeeping troops in the Former Yugoslavia, however, U.S. personnel make up only about 3% of the total (Figure 1).

Another long-term humanitarian relief effort is Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, which is operating under a UN mandate to assist the Kurds in northern Iraq (Figure 8). Since Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT's contributions to the relief effort began in April 1991, large quantities of relief supplies have been delivered—food, medical supplies, fuel, and shelter materials. Coalition fighters have flown 31,210 sorties in support of PROVIDE COMFORT since October 1991.



**Figure 8**

We also supported operations in the CENTCOM AOR. On 26 January 1994, we deployed the four ship Inchon Amphibious Ready Group into the CENTCOM AOR to support operations in Somalia. We again dispatched forces to aid the withdrawal of UNOSOM forces as the U.S. disengaged from Somalia. USEUCOM also took quick action by sending troops, again to the CENTCOM AOR, to reinforce Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and send Saddam Hussein a clear message of U.S. commitment and resolve.

USEUCOM's experiences in current operations throughout this theater have taught us some important lessons for the future. Specifically, they have demonstrated that to obtain maximum leverage from combined military forces, deployable, trained and flexible headquarters are needed for contingency operations. Under this approach, NATO will train and organize a headquarters adaptable to a wide variety of possible situations and be capable of leading both NATO and non-NATO units. Such a headquarters would use the military capabilities of nations both in and out of NATO and would take full advantage of the more than 40 years of NATO training in controlling multinational operations. This is the Combined/Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters concept.

The CJTF headquarters could draw under its control groups from NATO's streamlined military structure as well as non-NATO units provided by the PFP partner countries. This concept holds great promise in the area of future crisis response. With these forces, a CJTF could exercise command and control over peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, or other missions. In doing so, it could serve either NATO or another security institution; because it could draw from so many nations, it would reduce U.S. commitments. This is the kind of leverage the U.S. and the Alliance need for future challenges.

### Fight to Win



Maintaining a high state of readiness, EUCOM forces are prepared to *fight to win* ultimately guaranteeing our vital national interests (Figure 9). The fact that we demonstrate the capability and the resolve to implement it is the key to our influence in every region in the AOR. Our efforts to promote democracy and stability peacefully are and should be the cornerstone of our strategy, because deterring a war is infinitely preferable to fighting one. But if deterrence fails, we must be prepared to *fight to win*.




Figure 9

USEUCOM's fight to win strategy includes: maintaining ready forces, enhancing our interoperability with our friends and allies, maintaining adequate infrastructure and basing, and supporting modernization.

Maintaining ready forces is the foundation of the fight to win strategy. Given the diversity of this AOR, and the high OPTEMPO it imposes, maintaining readiness requires intense involvement by CINCEUR. I must stay involved by designating the kinds of missions EUCOM forces must be ready to accomplish; making sure that units meet the necessary standards in order to be certified as ready; and maintaining oversight of the training process to keep our training resources focused on the proficiencies we need. Only with this kind of clarity and precision have we succeeded in maintaining both our readiness and our OPTEMPO.

Part of doing this right is taking care of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Providing an acceptable quality of life for our servicemembers and their families is not only a long term investment in readiness, but our obligation. Our troops expect nothing more – we must demand nothing less. Maintaining an acceptable quality of life for our troops is my number one priority.

Treating our servicemembers as they deserve, and maintaining a high standard of training is not enough. An adequate force structure must be in place for us to be effective.

USEUCOM's end strength of approximately 100,000 troops provides the force levels needed for crisis response in or near the USEUCOM AOR, meets our alliance commitments, and maintains the infrastructure necessary to reinforce our forces or provide throughput to neighboring regions. U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), is structured around a two division corps. Each division is rounded out by a brigade dual-based in the U.S. This corps is the smallest operational level at which we fight and deploy our Army. U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE), provides 2.33 wings of fighter aircraft and a limited number of support aircraft to accomplish a wide range of tasks throughout this theater. U.S. Navy, Europe (USNAVEUR), and Marine Forces, Europe (MARFOREUR), force structure includes only the shore forces that support the Carrier Battle Group, the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit; and conducts maritime surveillance operations. In addition, the Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR), provides unique warfighting and crisis response capabilities necessary to fulfill our theater requirements.

Our infrastructure and basing give us access to this and nearby regions, as well as vital supply lines to maintain and reinforce our forces. This infrastructure is critical to U.S. influence abroad.

Modernization is essential to maintaining our warfighting capabilities. Our forces need the technological edge to ensure greater effectiveness and reduce casualties in the event of war. More importantly, our advantage in technology effectively deters would-be aggressors -- avoiding the need to *fight to win*.

### Theater Security Synchronization

Our strategy of active engagement and preparedness is designed to ensure our national interests well into the next century. Today's complex security environment demands that we synchronize our efforts with the many U.S. agencies outside DoD who are engaged in Europe, the Former Soviet Union, and Africa. We must be able to plan and work together toward a common set of objectives.

To achieve that end, we have developed a comprehensive and integrated architecture that we call the Theater Security Planning System (TSPS). The purpose of this system is to synchronize the planning and execution of the theater strategy by interfacing EUCOM and Component efforts with Embassy Country Teams in the production of executable campaign plans. These plans establish goals, determine priorities, and effectively allocate resources. We believe that TSPS ensures we have One Team. One Voice. One Fight.

### Resource Priorities

The most visionary strategies and wisest objectives are of no use without the "means" to implement them (Figure 10). Our success over the past year is directly attributable to Congressional support for our many programs




Figure 10

### Funding

O&M dollars maintain readiness, train and exercise our forces, and maintain our busy pace of operations. Unfunded contingency operations and theater transition costs drain those dollars and negatively affect training, readiness, and PERSTEMPO. We appreciate the supplemental contingency funding that we received this past year. But timing is critical, and if funding arrives late, even if it is generous, we must cancel exercises, defer equipment and facility maintenance, delay or cancel contracts, or even pay for a contract we cannot afford to terminate. All of these factors adversely impact our combat readiness.

Burdensharing legislation, as we have seen it formulated in recent years, can also result in a reduction in readiness. Cuts made in the name of burdensharing are made with hopes of forcing our allies to pick up the difference. We should remember that "the difference" must

be voted by European Parliaments, and that the people and their representatives sincerely believe that they are both shouldering a fair share of the burdens and risks in this theater's daily operations and contributing to overall security in important and expensive other ways as well. For example, Germany, our largest host nation, spends two and a half times Japan's percentage of GDP on national defense. In addition, Germany contributed four times more than the U.S. to aid economic reform in the Former Soviet Union, which also benefits our interests. This is even more impressive considering the high cost of Germany's reunification. And in Bosnia, it is our Allies' soldiers, 17,000 of them, who are on the ground within the range of Serb guns. I urge the Congress to consider all the risks and burdens shared by our Allies, along with the impact to our troops, before considering future burdensharing legislation.

O&M funds promote stability through several activities, such as our Joint Contact Team Program, bilateral training exercises, Security Assistance, the Marshall Center, and the Partnership for Peace Program. These important programs need funding to work. Our Joint Contact Team Program and Security Assistance programs, under legislative jurisdiction of the State Department, need special consideration since their funding mechanism is outside DoD's control.

The Partnership for Peace Program is vitally important because it provides the vision and the mechanism for the future trans-Atlantic security environment. This program is the catalyst that links the individual security interests of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union countries to the highly successful process of collective security embodied in NATO. PFP is the first step toward a reunited Europe that includes Russia.

Funding the Services to improve mobility is a high priority. Mobility is vital to supporting our crisis response and warfighting strategies. It is even more significant considering the drawdown in Europe. Strategic lift, combined with prepositioned materiel, is critical to fighting or supporting any major regional conflict in or near the USEUCOM AOR. The C-17, our aging C-141s, C-5s and C-130s, and commercial aircraft, provide airlift for initial reaction forces, and follow-on reinforcement and logistics. I strongly support the C-17, key to delivering critically important out-sized equipment directly to the battle front. Likewise, we must improve our strategic sealift capability to provide heavy reinforcement and sustain theater logistics. We also require sufficient amphibious lift to support a forced entry capability and a medium lift replacement helicopter for the Marines and Special Operations Forces.

Funding for modernization of key weapon systems ensures we can achieve our strategic objectives. In USEUCOM, we face a challenging theater missile threat, particularly in the southern region. At present, our theater missile defense systems are limited in protection capability and force deployability. Just over the horizon are several new systems in final stages of development that address the theater missile defense threat. We need to pursue the development of these systems today, to make them operational in the near future.

We need to modernize critical warfighting capabilities through continued acquisition of precision stand-off munitions, strategic precision bombing capabilities, and JSTARS. These systems provide a credible deterrence with proven pinpoint accuracy and critical warfighting capabilities.

Another aspect to maintaining our joint warfighting capabilities is to support the Joint Professional Military Education Program for our senior leaders. USEUCOM requires joint-trained professionals to integrate and employ the unique capabilities of our Service component commands effectively. Joint professional military education is one of the foundations of our joint operations capabilities. It underwrites both our ability to respond to crises in the near-term and our development of long-term strategies in this AOR. Investing in this education will help build the future military leadership of this country as envisioned in the Goldwater/Nichols Act of 1986.

Specialized support capabilities must be funded in this theater to be effective. Of particular importance to USEUCOM are satellite and land communication systems that enhance command and control, and funding for tactical reconnaissance programs that support our intelligence needs.

My highest intelligence priority is the Joint Analysis Center (JAC) at RAF Molesworth, and its associated systems and communications. The JAC is the model for intelligence support to joint and combined operations, and its products meet national, theater, service component, and tactical requirements. The JAC supports every level of our theater's strategy – from arms control verification to humanitarian operations to traditional warfighting capabilities. Its success in meeting the intelligence needs of U.S. forces, NATO, and our coalition intelligence at the United Nations proves that consolidated intelligence at the joint theater level is a concept compatible with today's intelligence challenges and resource constraints.

### Infrastructure

USEUCOM basing and infrastructure are essential to maintain our forward presence, give us access and support to this and nearby regions, and underwrite our commitments to our friends and allies. Our command structure and infrastructure have been streamlined and consolidated to better accomplish our strategy with fewer resources. For example, our Air Force component restructured its headquarters and went from a staff of more than 2,000 to 837 (58%) and reduced the number of General Officers by 64%. Our Army component also restructured and trimmed 42% of their staff. Finally, USEUCOM consolidated many of the theater functions that were redundant at the component level, such as theater intelligence which reduced billets from 20,500 to less than 7,600 – a 63% reduction.

Our drawdown of facilities is near completion and will leave USEUCOM at 59% of our Cold War infrastructure levels. The facilities we retain allow future consolidation and flexibility. Any facility not supporting our end state is being returned to the host nation. We must, however, maintain our remaining infrastructure and provide essential construction projects to meet readiness and quality of life requirements. Military Construction (MILCON) is one of the key factors in maintaining an acceptable quality of life for our people. Above all else, we must maintain our commitment to our people by investing in the infrastructure necessary to meet their needs.

I place a high priority on fully funding one of the most successful burdensharing arrangements in the Alliance – the NATO Infrastructure Program. About 28 cents of U.S. investment buys access to one dollar worth of infrastructure through this revitalized program. But even more impressive is the return we received on this investment. Over the last five

years, we have invested one billion dollars in NATO Infrastructure. U.S. industries have received more than \$1.7 billion in high-tech contracts and more than \$100 million in military construction contracts within the Continental United States, through the NATO Infrastructure Program. Cuts to this program undermine our leadership in the Alliance and adversely impact U.S. and Alliance operational capabilities.

### Forces

A permanent force structure of approximately 100,000 fulfills our commitments to the National Command Authority. The key to reducing our PERSTEMPO to sustainable levels is the rotational forces that serve in varying capacities, such as some of the Operation DENY FLIGHT squadrons, the Carrier Battle Group, and the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit. Also critical to our success are the Reserves, who perform highly specialized and critical functions throughout this theater, such as language experts to augment our Joint Contact Team Program and water purification specialists.

Achieving a high quality of life for the troops and their families is my number one priority. People are our most valuable resource and constitute the backbone of our quality force. We must never break faith with our troops whose dedication and devotion are second to none. We have an obligation to maintain an acceptable quality of life for them and their families. Our troops have endured many hardships while performing diverse missions at an extremely high operations tempo. All of this was accomplished in the midst of the largest drawdown since World War II. In the end, it will be the dedication and professionalism of those who serve our country that will underwrite our commitment to national security. Our loyalty to our people will lay the foundation of their commitment.


### Conclusion

Our active involvement in the USEUCOM AOR offers the very real possibility of preventing the need to engage in more costly operations -- in terms of lives and resources. We must remain engaged as NATO's leader, and continue to help shape events to fit our national purpose. With U.S. leadership and commitment we can help guide this region of the world towards peace and prosperity.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today. On behalf of the men and women under my command, thank you for the support your committee has consistently provided our Armed Forces and USEUCOM. I look forward to your questions.









Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much for an excellent statement. We appreciate the fact that you are willing to be here this morning.

Before we go to questions, I would like to make a statement. It appears that we are going to have quite a number of votes today, so I think in order to accommodate all the Members, rather than using the extended time period for questioning, I think we will try to go with a five-minute time period for each Member and maybe get around the table a couple of times. I want to be able to accommodate the Committee and the votes on the Floor.

Mr. McDade.

#### FISCAL YEAR 1995 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

Mr. MCDADE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you for an excellent tour de force for the Committee; it was very well done.

What would be the impact in your command if the Supplemental, which the House is to consider next week, were not passed? What would it do to you?

General JOULWAN. First, as a forward deployed CINC, I have to take certain risks. I have front-loaded the training. We are taking risk in the fourth quarter and if we don't get the Supplemental—let me be candid—by March, readiness is going to suffer. In actual terms, we will have to stop flying in the fourth quarter with our Air Force.

Mr. MCDADE. Does that mean the whole EUCOM Air Force?

General JOULWAN. Yes, two and a third fighter wings and 41,000 Air Force personnel in Europe.

Of that Supplemental, \$151 million will let me bring—which I am very concerned about—the Army troops back up to 800 miles in their training; we budget by how many miles you put on a tank. We were down to 556 miles, and that is extremely low in order to maintain readiness for a forward deployed force.

There is no decision yet but that is the force that will go into Bosnia if the decision is made by the President and Congress to commit the force to help the U.N. I am trying to get their readiness back up to 800 miles, and the Supplemental will help me do that. I need your help.

Mr. MCDADE. This Committee is very interested in it as well. It was important to find out what the impact was in your command. That was a dramatic statement.

What level of proficiency would you be at overall without the Supplemental?

General JOULWAN. I made a decision this year that, if I have to, I will accelerate the risk at the end of the fiscal year but I cannot, in a forward deployed force with all these operations going on, half-step. I have tried to keep our training at a high level and count on my superiors and this Congress to give me what I need.

We are trying to meet our training goals, and the Supplemental will take us through the fourth quarter. That is where I have to make tough decisions but we would do a disservice to the troops to salami-slice this and train at less miles or fly less hours.

I hope to get back up to 14.5 flying hours on the helicopter program which greatly concerns me; this Supplemental will take me to 13.3. We watch that very closely, and I cannot have the commit-

ments I have and sacrifice readiness. I will take the risk in the fourth quarter.

#### OPTEMPO DEMANDS

**Mr. McDADE.** You testified you have 100,000 people under your command?

**General JOULWAN.** Yes, sir. Approximately 100,000.

**Mr. McDADE.** One of the things this Committee has been interested in over the years is the question of level of manpower versus the demands made on that manpower. I don't remember the OPTEMPO being higher than it has been for the last couple of years? How are you managing that?

**General JOULWAN.** That is a great challenge but no hand-wringing. We get the missions and I have to decide what is acceptable risk.

What has helped in our analysis is the Guard and Reserve, particularly on the air side but also from the Army and the Navy. But the Air Reserve has really helped. We had some crews, in my initial analysis when I first took over, that were home 50 to 70 days out of a year. It wasn't so much the OPTEMPO as it was the PERSTEMPO. How long is the soldier or marine away from home on deployment? We had some air crews flying 250, 270 days. For the Navy now, it is 180 days, for the Air Force 120 days, and I am trying to figure out the right peg for the Army. We are getting closer to that now because of the Guard and Reserve. We are a total force, so that is how we are trying to offset it.

**Mr. McDADE.** How many Guard and Reserve people rotate out of your command?

**General JOULWAN.** Several thousand a year. I will get that for the record.

[The information follows:]

In the last quarter, from September 1 through December 31, 1994, more than 2,700 Guard and Reserve personnel augmented EUCOM forces in direct support of our ongoing operations. Throughout fiscal year 1995, EUCOM plans to use the Air Guard and Reserve from 11 states: Alabama, Hawaii, Louisiana, Colorado, New York, Michigan, Alaska, Idaho, Texas, Missouri and Massachusetts, to augment Operations DENY FLIGHT, PROVIDE PROMISE AND PROVIDE COMFORT II.

#### TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

**Mr. YOUNG.** I want to follow up with one question.

**Mr. McDade** asked about the Supplemental. When you have to stand down your training, as you would have to do in the fourth quarter if we don't expedite the Supplemental, which this Committee has done, as you are probably aware—

**General JOULWAN.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. YOUNG** What does it take for you and your forces in the field to come back up? Once your training has been degraded, your flying hours are down, what does it take to get you back up?

**General JOULWAN.** What I have tried to do is keep us at the right pace. What I don't think is well understood is the issue of timing, when you give me the money. If you give me the money in September, I cannot use it; March is the latest date. That lets us get into the fourth quarter and prepare for it properly.

Right now, I am trying to keep our training for these deployments at the right level. I have not degraded it. I am betting on the come here that we are going to get the resources, but I cannot sacrifice the troops that are doing live operations, so they have stayed at that pace. We may have to cancel a few exercises, but on OPTEMPO right now we are all right. If I get the Supplemental in March, I can meet our objectives in the fourth quarter.

Mr. YOUNG. We are doing the best we can. My question really goes to the "what if." What if you didn't get the money on time and you did have to stand down your training, what does it take you to bring your forces back to a readiness level that you think they need to be at in your area of the world?

General JOULWAN. It is going to take \$288 million for the Air Force and \$151 million for the Army. What we lose, though, is the opportunity—you can't buy back the time, so you lose that opportunity, the training time, the movement time; you lose all of that. If we don't get the Supplemental and I hope that my military and political masters will not let that happen—we miss training opportunities. But I cannot, as I said, half-step during the first three quarters in order to program what I have been given. That is not the way for a forward deployed force to operate and, as a CINC, I can't do that to the troops.

Mr. HEFNER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. YOUNG. Certainly.

Mr. HEFNER. You are going on faith that the last quarter will come through for you. So you are doing what you would do if the money were already in the bag; is that what you are saying?

General JOULWAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Murtha.

#### UNFUNDED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Mr. MURTHA. Is this because you didn't have enough money in the first place, or because of the extraordinary operations like the Rwanda operation?

General JOULWAN. All those contingency operations, what I would call "unfunded missions," add up and they get taken out of hide, as I said in my statement, such as in Bosnia—eventually last year the money trickled in. It is never totally enough, but if it comes in September or August, you lose that training. I am trying to avoid that this year, because you put at risk the level you need for the troops in flying hours and training.

Mr. MURTHA. We have never offset the money before. We have a new group here that believes the money should be offset. Have you any extra money in your command?

General JOULWAN. No, sir.

Mr. MURTHA. I can't even find the money to offset a few—well, a billion dollars. DOD can't come up with a billion dollars to offset. I think we are making a terrible mistake in trying to offset this when we have extraneous operations that the military has been ordered to commit themselves to operate, and we still are forced, because of people who are inexperienced in the ways of what is going on and believe the public command. In the meantime, the young people serving are spending all this time away from home, and

they are sacrificing tremendously, and yet they sit here in these air conditioned offices and say we are going to offset this.

That is ridiculous. It upsets me every time I hear those folks that believe there is some way to wave a magic wand in order to come up with money that is not available. We have always had a policy not to offset the money. We have fought with the Senate every year and won every time.

The votes aren't there right now for the rescissions that they are promoting. You folks are on the frontline, and nobody has worked harder than anybody on this Committee. But let me tell you something; this is a life or death thing, and we are going to commit people's lives that won't be prepared because these folks believe they got a mandate to reduce the amount of expenditure, and the military can't do a thing about it.

I am upset about it, and I hope we will be able to work it out. We have been working diligently trying to work this thing out, and it has not come together yet.

General JOULWAN. Congressman, I trust in the system; the troops have always been taken care of. But I cannot, as a forward deployed CINC, try to manage all that to where we take short-term risk in order to spread something out over four months when you know you need to have something for readiness.

#### HOLLOW FORCE

Mr. MURTHA. We are doing everything to see we are not back to post-World War II, post-Korean War, post-Vietnam: we don't want a hollow force. We are doing everything we can, but it is difficult.

General JOULWAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. General, I think that I could say that Mr. Murtha speaks for an awful lot of the Members of the Appropriations Committee, and we will do the best we can to make sure you don't have to lose any training opportunities.

Mr. Lewis.

#### NATO ACTION IN BOSNIA

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I would like to say also, with my colleague, Jack Murtha, that while I don't agree with offsets relative to emergency circumstances, that nonetheless is the order of the day. In my Committee that involves housing and veterans and NASA, and we are going to rescind whatever money is necessary to make sure it is there.

I want to see if I can learn something by having you help me look back. It seems to me that our force is less valuable than it might be in the world if we don't use it in a timely fashion, and there are those who suggest that some of the very serious difficulties we have in Europe at this time, the former Yugoslavia, might be in a different condition if America had provided the leadership and moved with our NATO allies or otherwise.

Would you look back and tell me what the conditions might be if you could have made other choices?

General JOULWAN. Yes, sir. I have spent a great deal of time in Europe. This is my sixteenth year in Europe; I have spent 20 of the last 30 years out of country. What we have done at the NATO

summit and proposed by the President of the United States, was to ask the question, what could we have done—I think Bosnia was on his mind.

There was an initiative called Combined Joint Task Force, which says that NATO will adjust its structure and will provide a headquarters to be used out of area—now, read that, I believe, Bosnia—to use it out of area so that we can do conflict prevention and early resolution.

We have learned from that and I think the Alliance is wrestling with the political guidance to come to me to make a headquarters and forces available. It would include not just NATO forces but also these new partners who want to contribute to the force. So we are trying to adapt and learn.

I agree with you, in hindsight, if action had been taken earlier particularly by NATO, of which the United States is a member, perhaps this could have been avoided. But we are where we are, and I believe some of the initiatives will help in Europe.

#### HAITI OPERATION

Mr. LEWIS. This is not the first time in the history of Europe that we have found ourselves in great difficulty because we failed to learn from former actions.

Relative to action in Haiti, I didn't think we should go there, but when the Commander in Chief made a decision, this Member is willing to support our position there. Nonetheless, if we showed the good judgment and leadership in Europe that we showed with a small pressure group in the Congress, we would be in a totally different condition.

It is important that we recognize that. There are times for America to act, and frankly, in my judgment, we have been acting in places where we shouldn't. I would like to hear you say strongly, we should have acted.

General JOULWAN. I wasn't there at the time, but in hindsight, I would agree—let me put it in the wider context.

I think NATO should have acted. We are a member of an alliance, and this alliance should have acted. We need to provide leadership within that alliance to act. NATO should have acted much more strongly than it did, and that includes the United States. But that was in the 1992 era—1991 in fact, 1992, 1993—and it kept getting worse.

Again, we are where we are. What do we do now? I am wrestling with some options in my NATO hat where the Alliance is putting together a force to assist in a withdrawal operation for UNPROFOR, United Nations Protection Force. It is complicated, but I think we have learned a great deal from that.

#### LESSONS LEARNED

Mr. LEWIS. I must tell you that from time to time when this Member looks in the mirror, I wonder about the leadership around here; that is, in the Congress. We have responsibility to remember a bit of the lessons of history and, indeed, we wouldn't be in Haiti if it weren't for a small pressure group in their perspective who led, right or wrong.

But within this Committee, we spend years discussing these subjects and this is a major demonstration that on this side of the street, there was a failure of leadership. I am convinced there was a failure of leadership elsewhere. I am not pointing a finger at you, but am interested in your reaction.

General JOULWAN. I am concerned about where are we going and what can we learn from the past. There is a lot going on. I stood for years on the East German border, looking across an Iron Curtain and looking at folks on the other side and coming up with war plans, how we are going to fight a high-intensity, perhaps nuclear, war. That wall is down. Where can we build, where can we go?

At the Marshall Center, Russians were part of the 73 midlevel officers who graduated in the first class. This is another form of deterrence. I had three Russian generals and all the Chiefs of Defense from partnership countries at a SHAPE exercise last April. These former adversaries intermingled with NATO generals, and the Russians stood up there and talked about their definition of peacekeeping, and it was outrageous. And all of a sudden the Russians felt what it was like to be in a democracy, because they had ambassadors from 16 NATO countries taking them on and saying, wait a minute that is not peacekeeping.

What the Russians briefed in April actually happened in Chechnya. They had a Minister of Interior General at SHAPE and he outlined a plan for what we saw in Chechnya, and they call that peacekeeping. That is how we can dialogue with our new partners and former adversaries. I don't think we should isolate Russia or other former members of the Warsaw Pact. Theirs is a different mentality, but we have to get on with it.

I have been to the Czech Republic. How do we engage? What Marshall did after World War II, we need that same framework of how we go forward with our allies in creating this consolidation of Democracy. We cannot miss this window of opportunity, and we don't realize that as much as we should. It is a great opportunity but I think this window will start closing because of Chechnya and other events. I had one country ask me about what the Russians call the "near-abroad," and there are a lot of nations in that near-abroad that are nervous now because of Chechnya. It is a different NATO with a different mission, but the solidarity and influence of the leadership of the United States is every bit as important as it was in the past.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you.

Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.

#### CONTRIBUTION OF NATO ALLIES

Mr. SKEEN. I have a lot of trepidation about just what is the contribution that our NATO allies make. It has been our leadership, our equipment, our lift, our mobility; and what do they bring to the table? I know they have problems as well, but I would like an assessment of what they could do, are they reaching their full potential in their contribution?

General JOULWAN. Yes, sir. Let me answer it this way.

As we go down to approximately 100,000 troops from 314,000, we have to work with our allies in these operations I talked about. For example, in Operation DENY FLIGHT, there are 200 NATO com-

bat aircraft, 65 percent of those aircraft are provided by our allies. In Operation SHARP GUARD, 80 percent of the ships are not U.S., they are allied, this is burdensharing in the truest sense of the word. ———. Ninety-seven percent of the force in the former Yugoslavia is other than U.S. manpower plus ships, plus planes.

You asked me, what are they doing. They really are contributing. Germany, for example, has spent billions and billions of dollars on the former Eastern Germany and, with the Russians, are trying to reform and stabilize this region. I was in Berlin when the last allied occupation troops left Berlin and the last Russian troops left Germany, a great accomplishment.

So there is a great deal going on with our allies in trying to create a free and open and democratic Europe, plus they are participating in these operations that I talked about.

Mr. SKEEN. From this side, we are not getting that story at all. For instance, airlift—if France has a problem moving troops somewhere, we have to provide the airlift.

General JOULWAN. We just did that for them in Rwanda. They were contracting, trying to get Russian planes to move them, so the Chief of Defense cabled me and asked, can you help?

Mr. SKEEN. It is like private enterprise; they have to do a little bidding.

General JOULWAN. We are partners.

Mr. SKEEN. That is the point.

General JOULWAN. We have to help them. They don't have the strategic lift, we have. They provided some of their own but, when they got into a crunch, I provided lift for them. They paid for it, so it wasn't gratis.

Mr. SKEEN. We don't hear that side of the story; even military leaders have the attitude that we are providing for them because they don't have the lift capability.

General JOULWAN. Sir, number one, we brought in 650 British. We brought in Dutch water purification units. Australians got involved, and we were reimbursed for much of that. We brought in an Ethiopian battalion to help create a situation for peace in southwest Rwanda; I pulled our forces out in 60 days. So the question is, how do we balance our commitment in this multinational environment? We have a lot to learn, and I am learning.

We have to come to grips with what I think will be our challenge for the rest of this century—how do we create this partnership? The untapped potential is going to be Eastern and Central Europe and I am working that very hard.

I had the greatest experience in the Czech Republic. I just visited there and met with the President and Prime Minister. They took me to the troops and I visited this brigade, structured after NATO, called the Rapid Reaction Brigade. It was uplifting for me to talk to these Czech soldiers; all of their officers spoke English, and they introduced me to this Colonel. He said, "I am the Brigade Commander," and then he said, "Army War College, Class of 1994, Carlisle, Pennsylvania."

Therefore, IMET and all the things we are trying to do with former adversaries is part of my engagement strategy. It is important to remember that we in the U.S. military stand for more than just tanks, planes and ships. We have developed ideals and values,

and those are important characteristics as we engage in Post-Cold War Europe.

Mr. SKEEN. And a great deal of diplomacy.

General JOULWAN. What is the role of the military in the system? We have 12 such states now, former adversaries without reservists in them—I mentioned South Carolina with Albania—so we have a great opportunity with low cost but high payoff because it is another way of deterrence. And that isn't some weak way—it is a strategy, believe me. You are talking about a war fighter here who wants to prevent war. The way you do that is to figure out how we engage in peacetime.

I am excited, but we must stay within this Alliance and have leadership in the Alliance to keep it together. It served us well for 40 years and is as relevant today as in the past.

#### AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT

Mr. SKEEN. One last question. Airlift, the C-17s—we are about out of C-141s; also sealift, I understand we are doing a great deal insofar as roll-ons?

General JOULWAN. Yes.

Mr. SKEEN. You mentioned force enhancers; is that part of your airlift plans?

General JOULWAN. It is 19 in the way of the fast sealift of the roll-on/roll-off. In the C-17, there are 40, but we need to improve our strategic lift, both sea and air, and we must look at intra-theater lift to allow us to have the agility we need. This is an area that needs our continued attention. As we drawdown the force, we must make sure the force is more capable, modern, and able to move to where our U.S. interests are involved.

We are working that very hard. As a forward deployed CINC, I am looking at that every day.

Mr. SKEEN. Unless the money goes down the tube?

General JOULWAN. Then there is risk, and you will hear me talk about what is prudent risk and what is unacceptable risk. If we are putting troops in harm's way in my command. If I have to fly back here to explain the risk, I will do it.

Mr. SKEEN. Thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Hefner.

#### REMARKS OF MR. HEFNER

Mr. HEFNER. I think you had a magnificent statement; and your answers, it boils down to where we have a situation our country and other countries are trying to deal with. It appears to me you are having to deal with too many politicians, and I mean that in a way that—politicians in other countries. Here, we tend to simplify and take a little bit of information, so we bad-mouth our NATO allies, and there, I imagine, it would be the same. When they are running an election, they find a reason to bad-mouth the Americans. Here, a lot of people get all their information from the talk shows and what have you.

But I admire what you are trying to do. It seems to me that your role has changed somewhat. For all these years, we had the Warsaw Pact sitting there; and now these old problems, like Haiti, have reawakened and we have to deal with them. I think you are



doing a magnificent job, and we want to support you as best we know; and the more we know, the better decisions we can make.

General JOULWAN. Thank you, sir.

The challenge that we have—and I will talk to you the same way I talk to the troops about this new conflict spectrum and the analysis that we have to do. All these outreach programs and those cooperation programs, which are like an outreach program explore where you are going and how to reach out to someone and say, we want to be friends and partners. But if it starts going sour on us, that handshake has to be able to come back into a fist to fight.

I think the outreach is very important, to create these conditions which, to me, are another way to deter conflict in the future.

#### QUALITY OF LIFE

Mr. HEFNER. I was impressed by your statement about quality of life. For many years, I was Chairman of the Military Construction Subcommittee, and that was a focus for us, because I don't believe you can maintain a cohesive force unless you have families that are happy and living in decent conditions; and sometimes we neglect that it doesn't have a high enough priority.

General JOULWAN. I do appreciate all you and your Committee did and are doing for the troops. We have made that an integral part of readiness. It is not a separate category. It is an integral part of readiness, and I am pleased with what we had last year and hope to get the same support this year, so when our troops are going back and forth to meet these requirements, their families are taken care of.

We are talking just an adequate standard in Europe, and I truly think that is an important part of readiness.

Mr. YOUNG. General, the Members are going to vote. We yield now to Mr. Hobson and would suggest that the Members that haven't voted might vote in the next seven or eight minutes and come right back.

Mr. HOBSON.

#### MILITARY END STRENGTH IN EUROPE

Mr. HOBSON. I was on the Military Construction Subcommittee. I am going to ask three things.

I am very concerned about the number of troops that you have. Number one, is it a good number? Two, is it a number that you can live with, and could we have done another Desert Storm with the number you have? And can you handle what you have; do you feel comfortable with it now?

General JOULWAN. For the forward force, we will be at 109,000 by the end of fiscal year 1996. We are at 124,000 now. We do not have a crystal ball to say what other contingencies we will have, but I think it is manageable, particularly if we get assistance from the Reserves and support from you.

#### GUARD AND RESERVE FORCE LEVELS

Mr. HOBSON. I was going to do the airplanes, too—but I want to do the Guard and the Base Realignment and Closure—BRAC.

Who is watching the hen house out here? Because if BRAC takes down a lot of Guard units and bases, you aren't going to have those people; they are going to be gone, those units are going to be gone, and you can't bring them back up. Have you made recommendations?

General JOULWAN. Not about BRAC itself, but we have made recommendations on the need to infuse the Guard and Reserve into what we are doing, and not say they are going to be an early deployer or a late deployer, but put them into the active forces now. We have made our requirements known.

#### AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS

Mr HOBSON. On the airplane situation, you talked generally about it but you don't talk specifically.

Have you made recommendations on the kinds of configurations of aircraft? Do you need more C-17s? Do you need more other types like DC-10s or 747s, or what type of aircraft configurations are you looking at?

General JOULWAN. At the strategic level, we have made recommendations on the C-17, in particular, for lift. We state our requirement in what needs to be moved in terms of sorties.

Mr. HOBSON. But as I understand it, the 40 C-17s we have now are going to be located at one place.

General JOULWAN. But they forward deploy as the need arises.

Mr. HOBSON. They will be stationed in one place, as I understand right now; is that right?

General JOULWAN. That is what I understand—in Charleston.

Mr. HOBSON. If they are all in one place and there is a storm someplace, you are going to have a hard time getting them to Europe, overseas, other places. I am somewhat concerned about that when there are lots of places they could be deployed in different numbers. I just hope you have made recommendations about types of aircraft in addition to the C-17s, or maybe you want all C-17s.

General JOULWAN. We have made the requirement for the C-17 known. I am a little concerned about the mix of aircraft we have to carry what I call "precision munitions." Those are very important in what we are doing; I think they give us a qualitative edge. We are looking more and more at those platforms that can carry precision munitions, so that is an issue when we get into delicate situations. F-15Es, for example, carry precision munitions.

The mix of intelligence collectors and aircraft platform is very important because there is a finite number of them, and they get shifted around. We need an adequate number of them to be able to give us eyes and ears before we get involved, so we know what is going on in terms of protecting the force.

Mr. HOBSON. And you have made recommendations?

General JOULWAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCDADE. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Bonilla.

#### FISCAL YEAR 1995 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

Mr. BONILLA. Good morning. I was so impressed with your comments about the need for the Supplemental bill. How it is a clear threat to readiness down the road if we don't pass that. How it would be such a disservice to the troops. I wish that somehow

every Member of Congress could have heard your message because of its directness and conciseness. I would hope that either through correspondence or through your colleagues at the Pentagon, somehow we can get that message out as quickly as we can.

I want to associate myself with Mr. Murtha's comments because I think he hit the nail on the head. Even being a fiscal conservative, I think it is more important to give our troops what they need. As you discuss with other Members of Congress that, perhaps you use the analogy of an athlete in training, if you are training for several months, you couldn't just stop in the middle and take off for 90 days and come back and start anew. Perhaps you can use that in debate as well.

General JOULWAN. I am delighted—as a somewhat former athlete, I agree with that. And I have for years, as a trainer of troops, said very similar things: You must make the scrimmage harder than the game. My job is to train them so that when they get into the game, they feel ready to play.

The greatest compliment I received was when I sent 30,000 of my troops to Operation Desert Storm. When they promoted me and sent me to Panama, I got cards and letters from the troops with one line, "The scrimmage was harder than the game." That has driven me in what I have just said to this Committee.

#### INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET) PROGRAM

Mr. BONILLA. Keep the message up. People forget. There are no social programs, education—that will happen if our country doesn't remain free.

I want to ask about IMET and how important it is to try to get other folks, especially in Eastern European countries, to think like we do. Is that going well?

General JOULWAN. Another area where we are using it—and the second class, just started last week—is at the Marshall Center in Germany, and we have a mixture of Eastern and Central European officers. I am short \$2.6 million of the \$17 million we requested. The military cooperation program we are trying to develop is a small amount of funding in the larger sense of terms, but a high payoff.

We had some shortfalls in funding some National Guard travel, and so the State Partner programs that I talked about didn't get that last piece to fund the National Guard. Because you get a citizen-soldier in there interacting with another country, it is a whole different perspective. I did this when I was in Southern Command, and it is a low-cost/high-payoff program. The Guard developed a relationship where they traveled back and forth from Lithuania to Pennsylvania. It is one of the best programs. There is a high payoff for the things we want to teach them about the role of the military in a democratic political society.

This year, we are several million dollars short, but the program is moving along very well.

Mr. BONILLA. Thank you, General. We look forward to working with you.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Additional information was provided subsequent to the hearing, as follows:]

IMET is a premier component within the Security Assistance Program, promoting military-to-military relations and introducing international military and civilian officials to the democratic process through training in the U.S. In fiscal year 1994 we sent 876 international students to the U.S. from EUCOM and paid for seven English language laboratories in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, all at a cost of only \$11.6 million. Twenty percent of all flag officers in Turkey are IMET trained. Eighty percent of all senior leadership in Portugal are IMET graduates. More than 500 senior civilian and military leaders throughout the EUCOM area of responsibility are IMET trained. Support during DESERT STORM were directly attributed to relations fostered through IMET. Over the years, this familiarity with U.S. doctrine and equipment has led to repeat equipment orders and favorable base rights negotiations. IMET is the centerpiece of Security Assistance.

Mr. MCDADE. The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Dicks.

#### NIMBLE DANCER

Mr. DICKS. General, I am sorry I missed your testimony, but I want to compliment you on the job that you are doing.

In the Bottom-Up Review, there is a lot of concern here about whether we can handle two MRCs; and there has been a major Pentagon war game, NIMBLE DANCER, supposedly that demonstrated the U.S. can fight and win two MRCs. However, the exercise relied on force enhancers. Can you tell us what those are?

General JOULWAN. Primarily in the area of precision-guided munitions and lift.

Let me get the rest for you. But it was in the area of increased capability, particularly in precision-guided munitions.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Classified insert removed.]

#### C-141 AIRLIFT

Mr. DICKS. As we bring the force back to the United States, mobility becomes a very important issue, the quality and the quantities of airlift, and sealift, pre-positioning is very crucial.

How do you feel about the condition of the C-141s and the need for additional and newer equipment?

General JOULWAN. As some of us CINCs said last year, we thought airlift was broken and we think it is getting better; but there is still a lot of work to do, particularly on the age of the lift aircraft, particularly the C-141s. We need to be able to compliment improvements and increases in our airlift capability.

#### INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO COMMANDS

Mr. DICKS. What about intelligence? General Schwarzkopf was somewhat critical; he said he had a tremendous amount of intelligence.

I serve on the Intelligence Committee, as well as this Committee. How do you feel about where we are going in terms of our national technical means and actually getting intelligence out to the commander in the field?

General JOULWAN. That is the key, and in my fifth year as a CINC I can say that intelligence is absolutely essential. It is trying to figure out how to take this big pile of information and sift it to get what you need. Platforms are very important here, and there are shortages of platforms and satellites, and they focus on one area or two areas at a time.

But what I have done, Mr. Dicks, is put together something called the Joint Analysis Center in the U.K., and that is my fusion center for Europe. I have put my assets there and they do the fusion analysis for all the component commands in Europe, and it is working extremely well. They have been up and running for nine months now, but already we can see the difference.

So the intelligence rather than coming all the way back here, is downlinked and provided to me and the components. I have tele-conference signaling. We could talk real-time back and forth. We are getting what I call "intelligence agility" and I can focus that analysis center anywhere I want, whether it is in Chechnya, Bosnia, the Middle East or Africa. That is the intent.

So we are getting better in the use of our intelligence assets, but I am still concerned at the high end about the numbers that are available.

#### GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT

Mr. DICKS. That sounds very good. You have had experience, we went through Goldwater-Nichols, that was resisted. You have been a CINC for five years—

General JOULWAN. I am the oldest one.

Mr. DICKS. If you had to go back, reflect on this; it was resisted somewhat by the Pentagon, how do you feel about it now?

General JOULWAN. I am very high on it. But it cuts both ways. What you have said to me and what other Committees have said, particularly five years ago when we started, about the important role of your personal opinion, particularly with the Congress. That is an important part of our responsibility and what we have been trying to do.

The other part is that you are responsible for what happens in your AOR and you are accountable; and that is another piece that I take very seriously. When you have 83 countries and 13 million square miles, it makes you very aware of the kinds of things we are talking about.

I think it has opened up a candor and frankness with political and military superiors, as well as with the Congress. I have always felt that way personally, and I think Goldwater-Nichols has reinforced it.

#### DEPLOYMENT OF BRIGADES BASED IN THE U.S.

Mr. DICKS. Do you have certain units that are going to deploy under your command from the United States? How does that work?

General JOULWAN. We have earmarked two brigades which become the third brigade of two forward-deployed divisions, and they are focused on Europe. But because we have shrunk so much, when the crisis arises you get dealt forces depending on the crisis you meet. Rwanda is a great test case for this—where you use the forward-deployed force.

If you could have seen our ability, within 72 hours of the President saying I want you to execute to save lives in Rwanda. The challenge was, how do we put a footprint across central Africa to let us move forces in and out?

We took a water purification unit that had pre-positioned equipment in the Netherlands and was stationed in Germany, put it on

a plane and, in 72 hours, it was pumping clean water. So the equipment worked, the training worked, the leadership was there, and that saved thousands of lives. We did that from the forward-deployed force. We put the Air Force at an airport in Kigali and it opened up to aircraft within four hours.

The training has never been better, but as we get smaller, we must tailor it to the mission. I hope we can keep the smaller force more capable to allow us the flexibility that we demonstrated in Rwanda and elsewhere. But the forward-deployed force gives you the ability to move.

In Desert Storm, we moved nearly 90,000 troops from Europe, the best-trained forces we had were from Europe, the best-equipped; that was when we had 314,000 troops. We will soon have 109,000, of which 65,000 are Army, so we would move much less. But that division is absolutely well trained.

We have good ranges over there, good atmosphere to train. I need to make sure that we don't cut training dollars so much that they can't go shoot and keep their training up.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Dicks, because of the number of votes we are having, we are going to have a rotational five-minute rule today.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. YOUNG. I want to yield to Mr. Nethercutt, who has been here from the beginning and has waited very patiently.

Mr. NETHERCUTT. I always defer to you, Mr. Dicks.

Mr. YOUNG. Both are dedicated to their responsibilities.

#### FUTURE REGIONAL CONFLICTS

Mr. NETHERCUTT. General, I also enjoyed your statement very much. I am going to read it more carefully as I fly home today.

My district is the Fifth District of Washington State; we have Fairchild Air Force Base there. I took pride in your comments about National Guard support in Desert Storm since Fairchild sent several units to that conflict. Fairchild also has the survival school for Air Force, Navy and Marine pilots.

As a freshman, I am proud to serve in Congress and I especially appreciate Mr. Murtha's comments. Defense is special; I will be fighting very hard for the Supplemental.

As I look at the map of the U.S. European Command responsibility, which includes eight countries and 13 million square miles, there is an academic exercise here. None of us has a crystal ball. If you had to prioritize or rank what might be the regions for potential for conflict in the future, I would be interested in knowing what your view is on that, particularly in terms of putting stress on EUCOM and your responsibilities.

General JOULWAN. Since this is a closed hearing, I will be candid with my concerns about Russia. I think we must stay engaged with them; we must reach out and try to work this cooperation. But we must be very clear on their conduct and watch it very closely.

There are still several thousand nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Republic and I am not sure how the winds will blow; so strategic balance is important here and we must watch that.

At the high end, hopefully, we can make them a part of the family of democracies, but to do so I think there should be outreach, a program of cooperation. But we need to retain our preparedness

if events require. We should work with the Russians on treaties and try to bring them along.

The other country that is of concern to me is Turkey. They sit in a very tough position. If you look at the map, they have the Balkans on the north, and they have Russian troops in Georgia, Iran, Iraq and Syria along their borders. They are a secular Muslim country, Islamic country, and I think we need to keep them toward the West.

They are getting all kinds of pressure, and I call them the cork in the bottle of what can happen in the southern region.

Further to the south, the northern littoral in the Magreb, we are concerned about Libya. They are getting weapons of mass destruction, including biological, and we are watching that closely. We see a theater in transition after the Cold War and a theater in conflict.

We can't be the world's policeman, but we must show leadership as the only leading superpower. How do we engage? These programs help.

Algeria is also high on my scope right now. There is a religious fanatical group there causing problems; they have killed many, many foreigners. They have threatened more, so we are watching that very closely as well.

It is a dangerous world, a dangerous place and particularly in that area.

#### EUROPEAN FORCE STRUCTURE

Mr. NETHERCUTT. I assume that a troop level of approximately 100,000 would be adequate at this time, without trying to project precisely into the future what your needs might be to deal with Algeria or Turkey or any others that might spring up—

General JOULWAN. Exactly. If I could put that in context, because what we want to do with our 109,000 is important. If it is not in our vital interest to be in Europe, pull everybody back. What can we do with that 109,000—and I don't apologize—that 109,000 is the best-trained, most-ready, best-equipped force in the Alliance. We can leverage our allies now to get up to that level—and some are modernizing and getting smaller but more modern—and we can leverage the Czech battalion. If we can get them under this Partnership For Peace initiative, if we can train them to common standards and common doctrine and common procedures with NATO, then we can work together. If you can leverage those forces to work with you, that, to me, is this engagement strategy I am talking about.

So the question of troops for what we must do right now, unless the NCA, National Command Authorities gives me more missions, 109,000 will do. I will have to assess it as we go along. If I need more I will ask for more, because I think you must match up requirements with resources, both people and money. Right now, I think it is sufficient.

#### NATO TRAINING

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Of the coordinating forces of other countries that you deal with, which two or three would you say are the most closely trained to our forces, and which do you have the most confidence in personally? How do you rank them?

General JOULWAN. We have 16 nations in the Alliance, and those countries are all trained to common standards. In my NATO hat, there are differentiations of equipment, et cetera, but communication procedures are standardized. For example, about a year ago in enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia, DENY FLIGHT, six fighters took off from the Krajina area in Croatia and were bombing a Bosnian village and a NATO AWACS—Airborne Warning and Control System, with a mixed crew on board was vectoring aircraft to it. It was a Dutch controller talking to the American pilot, and it was confirmation of 40 years of work.

We should not throw that down the drain. We need to see if we can put that forward now to new partners to do these common standards and procedures.

So the 16 nations of the Alliance are there—the East, the Czech Republic, and other nations that are standing-up forces. Poland, even the Swedes, want to join. So I am optimistic.

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Thank you very much.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Nethercutt. Mr. McDade.

#### METRO TANGO

Mr. MCDADE. General, you mentioned that you have a fusion center in England. Is METRO TANGO, still operating, and if so, is it different?

General JOULWAN. I don't think METRO TANGO is operating anymore. I will let you know. I tried to consolidate and I have been to METRO TANGO, but not since I have been the CINC. I will get back to you.

[The information follows:]

METRO TANGO was deactivated about two years ago with the advent of the Joint Analysis Center (JAC) in Molesworth, England.

Mr. MCDADE. Thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Lewis?

#### C-17 PROGRAM

Mr. LEWIS. General, I am sorry I wasn't here when Mr. Dicks and you were talking about the C-17 and other things, but I would just like to make a point for your consideration.

That is, these are, very difficult economic times around here, and every piece of the budget is putting pressure on Members and their Committees, et cetera. Having said that, as we go forward with the 1996 process, I think it is very, very important that the CINCs see that their voice is heard relative to raising the level of Defense funding. We are never going to get true supplementals again—which are very important and vital, but the 1996 year is the next step, and we are never going to get to procurement of the numbers of C-17s we need unless we have all the CINCs pushing from their side of this maze. We ought to turn the corner and return to raising the priority we give to Defense, not just in this Committee but in the whole House.

General JOULWAN. I can tell you that the sixth CINCs conference confirmed that. We are busier now than we have ever been in terms of commitments, and it requires agility and the wherewithal to do that. Lift is extremely important.



When you talk to a Committee—and I am delighted that you had us here first; that is a great signal to us on the point of the spear—we try to take assets and synchronize them in a way to carry out the mix. You must get to where you are going first, and that requires lift. The constraint that we have in many cases is timely lift.

Mr. LEWIS. I am not sure that all the Members would agree with my viewpoint relative to what normally is described as defense per se; but in the Rwanda case, C-17s on line being used could have saved lots of lives that first day; and they are human lives, not people on the battlefield necessarily. They are people on a different kind of battlefield.

Thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Nethercutt.

Mr. NETHERCUTT. No questions, thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. General, you have given us an excellent hearing, very informative and helpful.

We have additional questions that I will submit in writing and ask that you respond for the record. Unless you have something else that you would like to add—

General JOULWAN. Nothing except to thank you for the opportunity and for what you are doing and will do for the Supplemental. It is very important for the forward-deployed force in Europe.

Mr. YOUNG. We are doing everything we can. This afternoon's hearing was scheduled for 2:00 o'clock, but in view of the 3:00 o'clock adjournment of the House, and in view of my pledge to my colleagues to try not to have you in session when the House is not in session, we will move up the session to 1:30.

The Committee will stand adjourned until 1:30 p.m. this afternoon.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto follow:]

#### BOTTOM-UP REVIEW

*Question.* In the Bottom-Up Review, DoD assessed U.S. defense needs in the post-Cold War world. DoD determined that it was necessary for the U.S. to maintain the capability to fight and win two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs). During the review process, the DoD determined the force structure, capabilities and funding necessary to engage in two MRCs. How comfortable are you with the results of the Bottom-Up Review?

*Answer.* I believe the current force structure with the BUR enhancements allows the U.S. to maintain the capability to fight and win two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs). The specific BUR assumptions key to successfully executing two near-simultaneous MRCs are:

Forces are extracted from other operations to regional conflicts.

Certain specialized units or unique capabilities are shifted from one conflict to the other.

Sufficient strategic lift assets, prepositioned equipment, and support forces are available.

A series of enhancements, such as improvements to strategic mobility and U.S. firepower, are critical to implementing the two-conflict strategy and should be available by the year 2000.

If one or all of these assumptions prove to be incorrect, then the risk associated with execution of two near-simultaneous conflicts will increase. For instance, if we are unwilling or unable, for either military or political reasons, to extract forces from on-going operations, then risk associated with the second MRC could increase proportionally.

**Question.** The Pentagon's recent wargame NIMBLE DANCER demonstrated that the U.S. could fight and win two major regional conflicts. However, the NIMBLE DANCER exercise relied on "force enhancers."

What are the "force enhancers" that you relied on during the NIMBLE DANCER exercise? If you had not relied on those "force enhancers", would the NIMBLE DANCER exercise still have validated the Bottom-Up Review assumptions? When will the "force enhancers" that you relied upon be in the hands of U.S. troops?

**Answer.** \_\_\_\_\_.

**Question.** A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report raised questions about some of the basic assumptions of the DoD in the Bottom-Up Review. The GAO expressed doubts as to whether the forces structure:

Has sufficient strategic mobility (airlift, sealift, prepositioning) available for deploying in two near simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRC's);

Has sufficient support forces available;

Could redeploy support forces from peacekeeping operations to a major regional conflict in sufficient time to meet CINC requirements; and

Expressed doubts that the Army National Guard Combat Brigades could be deployed within 90 days of being called.

With these criticisms in mind, I'd like to ask some questions about your perspective on the ability to conduct two near-simultaneous MRCs?

**Answer.** \_\_\_\_\_.

**Question.** The GAO study states in part as follows:

"At the time of the Bottom Up Review, DoD assumed that by 1999, 80 C-17s would be available." However, under the current budget plans, only 40 C-17s will have been delivered by September 1998. How many strategic airlift aircraft are needed for the two MRC scenario?

How does that requirement compare to our current inventory and the strategic airlift inventory embodied in the Five-Year Defense Plan?

**Answer.** Airlift enhancements to meet the two near-simultaneous conflicts are currently programmed to include 99 C-17s, 8 C-141s, and 104 C-5s in Fiscal Year 2005.

Our current inventory: C-17s—18 (14 in operational units), C-141s—199, C-5s—104.

#### SUPPORT FORCES

**Question.** The following two tables from the mentioned GAO study list various types of support units that have shortfalls.

TABLE 2.1.—ARMY UNITS IN SHORT SUPPLY FOR A SINGLE REGIONAL CONFLICT AND TASKED TO DEPLOY TO TWO CONFLICTS

Type of unit	Shortfall of units for a single regional conflict	Number of same units tasked to deploy to two conflicts
Aviation .....	4	40
Chemical .....	3	32
Engineer .....	33	94
Medical .....	84	96
Ordnance .....	9	32
Quartermaster .....	20	94
Signal .....	6	25
Adjutant General .....	1	20
Chaplain .....	3	0
Finance .....	0	9
Military police .....	40	45
Military law .....	0	1
Psychological operations .....	0	1
Military intelligence .....	2	4
Maintenance .....	4	22
Headquarters <sup>1</sup> .....	0	4
Transportation .....	29	135
<b>Total .....</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>654</b>

<sup>1</sup> These units consist of personnel that would be assigned to augment command organizations in wartime.

TABLE 2.2.—SHORTFALL OF MEDICAL, ENGINEER, QUARTERMASTER, MILITARY POLICE, AND TRANSPORTATION UNITS FOR TWO MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS

Type of unit	Shortfall of units for two conflicts
Medical .....	96
Engineer .....	59
Quartermaster .....	59
Military police .....	52
Transportation .....	72
Total .....	338

What is your assessment of the adequate availability of support units for two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts?

**Answer.** Combat support, combat service support, and unique units like those listed in the tables are a real challenge to track and predict their availability while they are involved in ongoing operations. Since these forces are first-in and last-out, they may be concurrently tasked to support debarkation from peacekeeping operations and tasked in the early stages of deployment to major regional conflicts. Initiatives such as the NIMBLE DANCER series of wargames highlight the need for visibility of these assets and help us better define the extent of the problem.

**Question.** To what extent has EUCOM "wargamed" the two MRCs scenario? What were the results of that "wargame"?

**Answer.** EUCOM has wargamed the two MRC scenario in coordination with other CINCs at the Global Games at the Naval War College in July 1994 and at the NIMBLE DANCER series of games. However, like all wargaming models, their limitation is that they only provide a basis for further discussion of issues pertinent to warfighting—not answer of solutions to warfighting problems or deficiencies.

**Question.** Did you find that each theater of conflict may require many of the same support forces?

**Answer.** Combat support, combat services and one-of-a-kind units are a real challenge to track and predict their availability in the early stages of major regional conflicts. Since these forces are literally first-in and last-out, they may be concurrently tasked to support debarkation from peacekeeping operations and tasked in the early stages of deployment to major regional conflicts. Initiatives such as the NIMBLE DANCER series of wargames highlight the need for visibility of these assets and help us better define the extent of the problem.

#### SHIFTING ASSETS BETWEEN REGIONAL CONFLICTS

**Question.** According to the Bottom-Up Review, certain specialized assets would be dual-tasked—i.e., shifted from the first regional conflict to the second. Examples of this include the C-17 airlift, sealift and air reconnaissance assets.

The General Accounting Office study states in part, "although DoD assumed that dual-tasking would occur, it did not analyze how assets would be shifted from one conflict to another."

Is that a valid criticism of the Bottom-Up Review?

**Answer.** Yes. However, this review was driven by time constraints and other limitations placed upon the study during its completion. Wargames and other analyses are being conducted to examine the requirements and issues involved in the shifting of assets between MRCs. The issues revolve around establishing an acceptable level of risk.

**Question.** The GAO study also states as follows, "DoD officials explained that because a model for two near simultaneous conflicts does not exist, . . . DoD identifies the specific number of assets required for each conflict and assumed that dual-tasking would compensate for any shortfalls." From your perspective, is the assumption that "dual tasking would compensate for any shortfalls" a faulty assumption?

**Answer.** No. Planning assumptions must be made in examining any contingency, including the near-simultaneous case. Dual tasking to compensate for shortfalls has validity as long as it is clear that "near-simultaneous" accounts for the time it takes to fulfill both tasks. Time delay adds risks. As a warfighting CINC, I must manage this risk to ensure we can be successful in meeting our commitments.

**Question.** Concern has been expressed about whether forces participating in peacekeeping operations will be available in sufficient time to meet CINC needs in case of a major regional conflict.

What is your view on the extent to which military units involved in ongoing peacekeeping operations can be redeployed to your command in a timely manner? For example, what about transportation units that move cargo and personnel through port? Wouldn't they be involved in the debarkation from a peacekeeping operation at the very time they would be needed in the early stages of a major regional conflict(s)?

Answer. Accomplishing such a mission on time depends on a multitude of factors. Extraction from ongoing peacekeeping operations is a complex and multi-dimensional problem. Extraction will not be frictionless. There are a whole range of variables that affect the timelines for extraction and redeployment, for example:

The level of combat that could arise during the operation;

The size of the military force;

The specialties tasked;

The length of time deployed;

The type of equipment deployed;

The availability of transportation.

This is scenario dependent, but generally speaking, there are certain assumptions and caveats to the two MRC scenario that must be taken into account. U.S. involvement in the four lesser regional conflicts (LRCs) ongoing in my area of responsibility today may have to cease to prevent the level of risk from becoming unacceptably high. Starting new ones, such as implementation of a peace plan in Bosnia, may impact our ability to carry out two MRCs at the same time. I also agree with recent statements that the current ability of our airlift fleet to handle two simultaneous MRCs is a concern.

Combat support, combat service support, and one-of-a-kind units used both in current operations and for two near-simultaneous conflicts are difficult to track and predict their impact on operations if unavailable in the early stages of major regional conflicts. Since these forces are first-in and last-out, they may be concurrently tasked to support debarkation from peacekeeping operations and tasked in the early stages of deployment to major regional conflicts. Initiatives such as the NIMBLE DANCER series of wargames highlight the need for visibility of these assets and help us better define the extent of the problem.

It may not be politically judicious to extract forces from contingency operations. There will be situations where extraction is not advisable—where our military presence acts as a deterrent against escalation.

*Question.* Given the current projected force structure, would the occurrence of two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts inevitably mean that the U.S. would have to withdraw from any ongoing participation in any peacekeeping effort?

Answer. Current planning apportioned 100 percent of the force structure to the two MRCs. This implies early extraction from all peacekeeping to successfully support two near-simultaneous MRCs or acceptance of higher risk during MRC Two. Cultivating effective Allied coalitions allows potential for transitioning peacekeeping functions to our Allies and adds to our military capability in MRC operations.

#### ARMY NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT BRIGADES

*Question.* The Army's portion of the forces for the two-conflict scenario consists of ten active divisions and 15 Army National Guard enhanced brigades. The 15 Guard Brigades include 8 heavy brigades and 7 light brigades. Are you confident that the Bottom-Up Review's goal of the Guard enhanced brigades being ready to deploy 90 days after being called to active duty is currently realistic?

Answer. Yes. Today, most Enhanced-Brigades (E-Bdes) could achieve C1 within 90 days of mobilization. U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Rand Corporation development of mobilization training models will result in all E-Bdes being deployable within 90 days of call-up. This accomplishment is even more credible given that FORSCOM plans to mobilize the E-Bdes in increments of three to four at a time, which will allow ARNG resources to be allocated for intensive management of the later mobilizing E-Bdes. The 90 day ceiling was based on the requirements of heavy E-Bdes; the light E-Bdes can be ready sooner.

*Question.* According to GAO testimony last year, in fiscal year 1992 and 1993 many guard soldiers were not completely trained to do their job; many tank and Bradley fighting vehicle crews were not proficient in gunnery skills; and many commissioned and non-commissioned officers had not completed required leadership courses.

Doesn't this make it clear that the availability of the Guard brigades 90 days after being called up is an unrealistic assumption of the Bottom-Up Review?

How central to the two-conflict strategy is it to have the 15 Guard Brigades capable of deploying 90 days after being called up?

Answer. No. The Bottom-Up Review provided guidance on resource enhancements. Title XI enhancements are now being implemented. The Defense Planning — provides resourcing guidance to ensure deployability of the Enhanced-Brigades (E-Bdes) within 90 days of call-up. The Department of Defense (DOD) is making a concerted effort to resource the E-Bdes commensurate with their mission. Each and every GAO concern is being addressed by the Army. The Army stands by its commitment to deploy E-Bdes within 90 days of call-up.

FORSCOM is currently developing training strategies to address each of the GAO concerns. These innovative strategies will be implemented by fiscal year 1997 when the E-Bdes are fully organized and resourced. At any one time, ARNG units will have untrained personnel. To remedy this situation the E-Bdes will be over strength by approximately five percent. Untrained personnel will not mobilize with the unit.

With regard to Officer and NCO leadership training since the GAO observation was made, Army National Guard (ARNG) has implemented the Select-Assign-Train-Promote policy. This policy, in conjunction with the Total Army School System (TASS), will provide sufficient opportunities for ARNG leaders to attend the required training.

Recent modeling for Army General Headquarters Exercises (GHQ) has confirmed the immediate need for E-Bdes as reinforcing, sustainment and reconstitution forces of the CONUS contingency force, and backfill of deployed forward presence forces or forces engaged in Peace Support Operations. An active component force of ten divisions must be augmented to win a two MRC scenario.

#### PRIORITIES AND DEFICIENCIES

*Question.* Commanders in Chief do not submit their own budgets to the Congress. The resources required for the operations at a Command are requested by the Services. What is your role in the annual budget development process of the Department of Defense?

Answer. I identify my Integrated Priority List (IPL) to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Military Service for inclusion in budget. I also provide direct input to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS's) defense planning, an input to the Service budget. Once I receive Service budgets, I provide major Program Review Issues which are tracked budgets during the OSD Program Review Process.

I provide reclama to any Program Budget Decisions that adversely affect my command's operational capability and I weigh-in with major budget issues on any Program Budget Decisions that are unresolved.

Throughout the planning, programming and budgeting cycle, I have ample opportunity to weigh-in with my requirements. Furthermore, legislative hearings such as these provide another path to ensure my requirements are given due consideration.

*Question.* Do you believe that your requirements are adequately addressed in the budget process?

Answer. Yes, throughout the planning, programming and budgeting cycle, I have ample opportunity to weigh-in with my requirements. Furthermore, legislative hearings such as these provide another path to ensure my requirements are given due consideration.

*Question.* As you review the final year 1996 budget, what do you believe are the shortfalls for your command in personnel, training, and equipment maintenance?

Answer. The President's budget meets a sufficient level of our requirements. We can always use more money to meet 100% of our requirements. This money could be applied against Real Property Maintenance, Theater Ground Support Maintenance, Battle Simulations, Installation Level Maintenance, Youth Development Services, Child Development Services, Information Management, Installation Transportation Services, and Unaccompanied Personnel Housing Operations and Furnishings.

*Question.* In the beginning of the budget cycle, each of the Commanders in Chief submits an Integrated Priority List to the Joint Service Chiefs. The integrated priority list outlines the top requirements for each Commander.

What are the top ten items on your most recent Integrated Priority List?

To what extent does the current budget and the Five Year Defense Plan adequately fund priorities?

Answer. —. The current FYDP largely meets the need of EUCOM, provided EUCOM continues to receive adequate funding to sustain approximately 100,000 troops in Europe. A major area of concern to the European Theater is the decrease of DoD Operations and Maintenance (O&M) dollars from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 1998 (fiscal year 1996—\$91.9 billion; fiscal year 1997—\$90.6 billion; and fiscal year 1998—\$89.9 billion). Since our Service Component Commands are funded pri-

marily by O&M, any further reduction to O&M funding would have an adverse effect on readiness and quality of life.

#### TRAINING

*Question.* As the Commander in Chief, you have responsibility for deciding the level of training that the forces under your command require. Do you believe that the troops under your command are receiving adequate training? If not, why?

*Answer.* The joint training conducted in EUCEM is requirements-based, and not event-driven. The Service Component Commanders in EUCEM fulfill their training responsibility and provide me with well trained forces. We then employ these forces in joint and multinational training exercises such as last fall's highly successful "Atlantic Resolve 94." This and other exercises scheduled for fiscal year 1995 help maintain the high state of readiness in this command.

I see proof of this successful training daily. EUCEM forces help enforce UN Security Council Resolutions in the Adriatic and in the skies over Bosnia, they conduct airland and airdrop flights to feed the hungry in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and they protect the people of Northern Iraq from the brutality of Saddam Hussein.

Another example of EUCEM forces' successful training was OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE. When tragedy struck last summer in Rwanda, EUCEM forces deployed 3,600 miles to Central Africa. This joint force stopped the dying of thousands of Rwandans. Within one week, the death toll fell from 6,000 a day to 500, and in a month's time was less than 200. SUPPORT HOPE proved that well-trained and supplied military forces can contribute to emergency humanitarian relief operations.

*Question.* Please comment on the training value of scheduled joint exercises versus conducting contingency operations as they occur.

*Answer.* In EUCEM, we work with each of our Component Commands to schedule joint exercises six years into the future. This long-range planning is critical to forecast resource requirements and to de-conflict training areas and unit schedules. These scheduled exercises allow commanders to develop and hone the military skills necessary to successfully accomplish our mission.

Contingency operations are the crucible, the "conference games" that we must win to promote stability and thwart continued aggression in the theater. Contingency operations may not test every skill, every play we need in our playbook of capabilities to win the championship game. Let me refer again to our humanitarian relief operation in Rwanda last summer. It provided valuable experience in airlift operations, logistics supply, and civil-military cooperation in humanitarian operations.

Scheduled exercises allow us to train our combat forces to be able to fight to win when called upon to defend America's interests in this theater.

*Question.* What training exercises have you planned for fiscal year 1995? Do you foresee any cancellations? If so, why?

*Answer.* My Joint Training Plan (JTP) contains 56 CJCS supported joint training exercises for fiscal year 1995. These exercises are broken down into four categories:

1. NATO exercises.
2. Joint Task Force training exercises.
3. Bilateral exercises with NATO countries and other allies.
4. Partnership for Peace (PfP) and "in the spirit of Partnership for Peace" exercises.

The 56 exercises in the JTP are: 15 NATO exercises; 7 Joint Task Force training exercises; 31 bilateral exercises; 3 Partnership for Peace or "in the spirit of Partnership for Peace" exercises.

An additional 21 PfP and "in the spirit of PfP" exercises are in various stages of planning for fiscal year 1995.

I plan to reduce the scope of one of our bilateral exercises (FLINTLOCK, PHASE II) during fiscal year 1995. I have canceled one Joint Task Force training exercise (SHADOW CANYON 95) in fiscal year 1995 because of a reorganization of our Joint Task Force training program. A total of 76 exercises are envisioned for execution in fiscal year 1995.

*Question.* Are the funds budgeted for the Service's fiscal year 1996 request sufficient for your projected training needs?

*Answer.* Yes. My biggest concern is in the emerging Partnership for Peace program. As you know, funding has been allocated for partner nations but no additional funding was provided for U.S. forces. During fiscal year 1995 we used CINC Initiative Funds to support our forces. If additional funding is not provided to the services to support this program, we will be forced to take funding from other training events.

## CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

*Question.* Unfunded contingency operations impact operations and maintenance funding and negatively affect readiness. DoD has received supplemental funding during previous fiscal years to offset costs incurred by unfunded contingencies. In your statement, you say that the timing of supplemental funding is critical. If funding is received too late, exercises must be canceled, maintenance deferred, and contracts terminated. How has the readiness of the troops under your Command been impacted by unfunded contingency operations?

*Answer.* Contingency operations are not, in and of themselves, a problem. The medical, civil affairs, and water purification units we sent to Rwanda accomplished their humanitarian mission without any loss of readiness. In fact, as a result of Rwanda, these units are more prepared to perform their wartime missions. The problem is that the O&M dollars used to fund these contingencies are no longer available for training.

The timing of supplemental reimbursement is critical. Last year, late receipt of supplemental funding resulted in forfeiture of some training opportunities in the last quarter of fiscal year 1994. EUCOM is currently funding fiscal year 1995 contingency operations with fourth quarter funds and I have gone on record saying that, if we do not receive a timely supplemental for fiscal year 1995, EUCOM units will not fly in the final quarter.

*Question.* Has EUCOM canceled exercises, deferred maintenance, or terminated contracts because supplemental funding was received too late?

*Answer.* EUCOM has not canceled any Joint Training exercises within the Joint Training Plan (JPT) because supplemental funding was received late. We did reduce some exercise participation because of contingency operations, and we rescheduled one exercise (MEDCEUR), but the supplemental funding issue has not affected the Joint Training Program.

EUCOM has been able to sustain its readiness despite the high OPTEMPO. However, late receipt of the fiscal year 1994 supplemental funding caused some training shortfalls. It was pretty tough to execute the supplemental because we received it in the last month of fiscal year 1994. For instance, 48 Ftr wing, RAF Lakenheath, UK, canceled a MAPLE FLAG exercise, squadron exchanges with Allies, and a Weapons System Employment Program (WSEP) in order to ensure airframe, spare parts, and aircrew availability for OPERATION DENY FLIGHT. Additionally United States Army Europe (USAREUR) executed a fiscal year 1994 OPTEMPO of only 569 miles (800 miles was the training goal). Late receipt of supplemental funding contributed to these shortfalls.

*Question.* Has the supplemental funding been sufficient to maintain required levels of training and maintenance?

*Answer.* The amount of supplemental funding has been adequate, but timing is critical. We are mortgaging our fourth quarter accounts to pay for current contingency operations. In previous testimony I have stated that, if we do not receive the supplemental early this year, EUCOM Air Force and Army units will not fly in the fourth quarter.

## MODERNIZATION

*Question.* When we think of readiness, funds for training, maintenance, and daily operations come to mind. Because the DoD budget has been declining and requirements have not, operations and maintenance funds have been offset in the procurement and research and development accounts. Do you believe that there is enough emphasis placed in modernization programs?

*Answer.* I believe short-, mid- and long-term requirements must be balanced. If I must give up something in the short-term to pay for the long-term, I must weigh that against current requirements. I have identified some programs that are critical to EUCOM's future ability to promote America's national security:

**Strategic Lift:** including air and sealift, is required to provide EUCOM with the full agility to respond as needed to meet national security needs. The C-17 is critical for EUCOM airlift requirements. It is the only aircraft in the foreseeable future that has the capability to handle over-sized and out-sized cargo, as well as the capability to land on unprepared runways.

**Communication:** Theater Intel ADP/Communication, MILSATCOM (Military Satellite Communications) (MILSTAR (Military-Strategic/Tactical Relay System)/DSCS III Defense Satellite Communication System)/UHF Follow-on.

**Theater Missile Defense:** EUCOM envisions an evolutionary system consisting of four pillars: active defense, passive defense, attack operations, and a command and control architecture.

**Question.** Are you concerned that near-term problems are funded at the expense of future systems?

**Answer.** Given the current fiscal environment, I believe we have done a good job of balancing short-, mid- and long-term requirements. We have given up some programs in the long-term to pay for short term readiness. However, we have preserved the programs I believe are absolutely essential to future capability.

**Question.** What are your top three modernization programs?

**Answer.** \_\_\_\_\_

**Question.** Last year, you told this Committee that airlift was "broken". Is it still broken?

**Answer.** Airlift is improving and, with your continued support, will meet our requirements. The first C-17 squadron declared Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in January and 14 aircraft have been delivered. DoD is committed to purchasing at least 40 C-17s, but the decision as to future purchases has been deferred until November 1995.

Airlift enhancements to meet the two near-simultaneous conflicts are currently programmed to include 99 C-17s, 8 C-141s, and 104 C-5s in fiscal year 2005. The C-17 is an essential element of the strategic lift for EUCOM with its oversize cargo capabilities in combination with the C-5 payload. In many operations, the initial materiel flow consists of up to 75% oversized cargo.

This strategic airlift capability is a critical component of EUCOM's continued operational agility, with the flexibility to respond to a wide range of contingencies—a flexibility that translates directly into a sixfold increase in available runways in this command's AOR. DoD is currently studying the precise number requirement for C-17s and whether some commercial-based assets may be substituted.

**Question.** Procurement dollars are usually associated with large weapon systems. However, trucks, ammunition and support equipment are also funded with procurement dollars. Are you concerned with the present and future state of these smaller procurement programs?

**Answer.** Cuts in procurement dollars for trucks, ammunition and support equipment could significantly impact the Service's readiness and ability to support the warfighting CINCs.

The Army reported major shortfalls in its two and a half, and five-ton cargo fleet; High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles; and a variety of heavy vehicles critical to maintaining logistics capabilities. Funding to relieve these shortfalls is a top priority for the Army.

The Services are not reporting shortfalls in ammunition stocks; however, much of the stockpile is old and will have to be rotated. All the Services report a need for more sophisticated weaponry to offset the reduction in weapon system numbers and to improve effectiveness. It is imperative that procurement money be available to enhance the nation's stockpile.

New and modern support equipment is essential to maintain today's sophisticated weapons systems. Procurement cuts in this area are shortsighted and would result in reduced readiness. Much of the Service's support equipment is unique, and once the production lines are closed, prohibitively expensive to buy. Common user support equipment must be replaced often because of the wear and tear caused by unprecedented, high OPTEMPO usage.

#### EUCOM: THE THREAT

**Question.** With the end of the Cold War, the monolithic Soviet threat has been replaced by several dynamic, regional threats. What are the benefits of a U.S. military presence in Europe?

**Answer.** A credible U.S. military presence with robust capabilities is the cornerstone that allows USCINCEUR to meet U.S. National Security objectives. Stationing our troops on foreign soil is one of the most tangible and direct methods of assuring our friends and allies of U.S. resolve. This guarantees our continued leadership role in NATO, and enables us to influence regional policies and events in ways that are beneficial to U.S. political and economic objectives.

The four Lesser Regional Contingencies (LRCs) that are currently underway in the USEUCOM area of responsibility are real world examples of the types of operations we are likely to conduct in the foreseeable future. The credible commitment force of approximately 100,000 allows USCINCEUR to meet such a broad range of contingency taskings, as well as promote U.S. policies of peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and democracy advancement in Eastern Europe.

The historical lessons we have painfully learned twice in this century were, in a large part, the result of either the inability or the unwillingness of the U.S. to maintain a strong leadership role in this region. The continued emergence of multi-polar



threats that cover the broad spectrum of military conflicts indicates it is more vital than ever to maintain a credible U.S. military presence in Europe. The consequences of not maintaining that commitment include losing our leadership position and the ability to influence issues affecting our national security interests, dissolution of the Alliance, and increased instability in Europe.

*Question.* Territorial disputes, ethnic and religious strife, and nationalism are historic conflicts that have prevailed throughout your area of responsibility. Coupled with economic decline, environmental disasters and disease, these problems have no near terms solution.

Because the conflicts throughout your area of responsibility are historic regional disputes, how does the U.S. presence in Europe offer a long term solution?

The United States military is often thrust into a "peacekeeping" role. However, once U.S. troops leave a trouble area, the same tensions rise. What role do you think the U.S. military should play in peacekeeping?

*Answer.* U.S. presence in Europe contributes to peaceful and prosperous conditions throughout the Area of Responsibility (AOR) because it both promotes stability and thwarts aggression. When we thwart aggression, we are attacking the problem directly; when we promote stability, we are creating the conditions for success for non-military enterprises.

Although we are under no illusion that we can solve all the problems of the region, U.S. presence in Europe can reduce the danger of catastrophe and accelerate progress toward a better future by engaging in peacetime, responding to crisis, and fighting to win. These three strategic concepts encompass the primary ways USEUCOM serves U.S. interests by maintaining American influence and improving the overall security environment in our region.

"Engage in peacetime" looks toward the future and uses military resources in unconventional ways to mold the security environment in the AOR. It creates an environment in which violent conflict is less likely and in which disagreements are routinely settled without resorting to force or the threat of force. Beginning from the baseline of confidence and security building measures, and the implementation of various treaties and accords (e.g. the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Vienna Document 1994), it encompasses a wide range of bilateral and multilateral activities. They are all designed to preclude armed conflict by enhancing security cooperation and interaction. One of their most important functions is to encourage the development of military establishments which understand and accept their role in democratic societies.

"Respond to crisis" is done at the direction of the National Command Authorities, in some cases because our response is the only way to prevent massive loss of life. In other cases, our early response can rectify an unsatisfactory situation or preclude the development of one in which fight to win is the only effective course of action. Our presence in Europe makes it much easier for us to respond, and, since our capability is quite visible, often eliminates the need to respond altogether.

"Fight to win" is our most important strategic concept. The fact that it is known to be in our overall strategy, and that we demonstrate the capability to implement it, is the key to our welcome presence and our influence in every region in the AOR.

Taken together, these concepts translate our presence into significant control of the "historical conflicts" mentioned in your question. Furthermore, by creating conditions in which violent conflict is much less likely, they facilitate progress towards a fundamentally better and more prosperous future.

I am in full agreement with General Shalikashvili's earlier testimony when he stated that any lasting conflict resolution comes from negotiated diplomatic agreements. The military provides a stabilizing force that prevents the spread of conflict while political resolution is being pursued. Additionally, the presence of a non-aligned military force, interposed between the disputing parties, can often prevent inadvertent reoccurrence of the fighting.

#### BOSNIA

*Question.* There is an on-going debate in Congress concerning U.S. policy regarding Bosnia. The debate revolves around the question as to whether or not the U.S. should actively provide military assistance to Muslim forces. What is your current assessment of the military balance of power in Bosnia?

*Answer.* \_\_\_\_\_

*Question.* What is the size of the Muslim force in Bosnia?

*Answer.* \_\_\_\_\_

*Question.* How much military equipment are the Muslims receiving from outside sources?

*Answer.* \_\_\_\_\_

**Question.** Who are the Muslims receiving military equipment from?

**Answer.** \_\_\_\_\_.

**Question.** What are the equipment shortfalls of the Muslim forces?

**Answer.** The Muslims have a lot of small arms, such as mortars and machine guns. They lack artillery and armored vehicles.

**Question.** Do the Muslim forces in Bosnia need just equipment, or do they also need training and spares?

**Answer.** If we decide to make so radical a change in our policy by providing equipment, spares and training to the Muslims, then we must realize that the one thing we could not provide, without massive military intervention by U.S. ground forces, is time. Adopting this course of action would probably result in a Serbian military reaction which would widen the war and destroy Muslim forces before our assistance could make a significant difference.

If we decide to accept the risk of these developments, then armored vehicles, artillery and spare parts would likely be a part of this package.

Deciding to train the Muslims would also depend on our overall policy and desired outcome. As I started before, it would take roughly two years to train the Muslims to a basic level of integrated combat tactics.

**Question.** If the U.S. decided to deliver equipment to the Muslim forces, what would the mechanics be?

**Answer.** It would be premature to speculate on this since it is very dependent on the policy that is set in Bosnia, the number and types of equipment we provide, to whom we provide the equipment, any geographical limitations to where we provide the equipment, etc.

**Question.** If the U.S. took one of the following actions, how would the Serbian forces in Bosnia, Serbia, and NATO respond?

- a. If the U.S. unilaterally lifted the arms embargo?
- b. If the U.S. attempted to force the UN to lift the embargo?
- c. If the U.S. actively supported the Muslims by providing arms and training?
- d. If the U.S. provided active U.S. military support?

**Answer.** a. Both the Bosnian-Serb Army (BSA) and Former Republic of Yugoslavia Serbs would unequivocally see the U.S. as co-belligerents with the Muslims. The BSA would most likely launch, with tacit support from Belgrade, preemptive offensive operations against vulnerable BiH areas in the eastern enclaves to deliver a decisive blow to the BiH before they could receive new arms. This policy would probably drive all Serbs into one unified political and military camp against the U.S. The BSA would also step up propaganda against the Muslim-Croat federation to drive a wedge into this fledgling relationship. Bosnian Serbs would likely remove all non-Serbs from Serbian held territory, possibly by "ethnic cleansing."

UNPROFOR will most likely withdraw under these circumstances. In this case, the BSA will probably interdict choke points along key routes to hamper a withdrawal and take UNPROFOR, non-governmental assistance organization, or United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) personnel as hostages.

If the U.S. unilaterally lifts the embargo, we will severely damage our credibility in NATO and globally. We would drastically reduce our moral authority to enforce treaties, sanctions or other actions that have their legitimacy based in international law.

b. Belgrade, relying on its Eastern Orthodox political and cultural links, would try to convince Moscow to veto any UN move to lift the embargo. Belgrade would also try to undermine the Contact Group's unity.

c. In addition to the points made above, the BSA will not likely step up attacks on the Muslims to exploit Muslim weaknesses during this window of opportunity—before they were fully trained and fully armed. The BSA would also actively interdict all land routes and air corridors that facilitate new arms deliveries.

d. If the U.S. provided active military support, all the previous points hold true, but with a greatly increased risk of U.S. casualties. Given the terrain and the military capability of the belligerents, U.S. intervention on the side of the Muslims could approach MRC levels before becoming decisive.

**Question.** What do you think would be the Russian response to a "U.S. lift and strike" policy?

**Answer.** The Russians have stated they would veto any motion in the UN Security Council for "lift and strike" and they have threatened to withdraw their UNPROFOR contingent if any multilateral or unilateral action is taken. They would most likely counter such actions with aid/military deliveries to the Serbs.

## MACEDONIA

*Question.* A number of Members of the Committee conducted an inspection trip last year which included Macedonia. What is the current situation on the Macedonia border?

*Answer.* The current border situation is very quiet and stable and, with the exception of last year's small disagreements over hill 1703, there has been little to report.

*Question.* What is the outlook for the continued deployment of U.S. troops on the border?

*Answer.* Both UNPROFOR and the Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) have high praise for the performance of the soldiers in Task Force ABLE SENTRY. They have made an important contribution to the stability of FYROM—a key to regional stability and containment of the conflict in the Balkans. I strongly support continued participation until the conditions threatening FYROM's stability subside.

*Question.* What is the outlook for the U.S. exchanging ambassadors with Macedonia:

*Answer.* My understanding is that political problems between two friends of the U.S.—Greece and FYROM—complicate this issue. As this is a political matter, I would defer to the State Department on this issue.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1995.

**COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES  
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND**

**WITNESS**

**GENERAL ROBERT L. RUTHERFORD, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED  
STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE**

**INTRODUCTION**

Mr. YOUNG. The Committee will come to order.

Pursuant to a vote taken on February 15, 1995, this hearing will be held in executive session, closed.

Today the Committee welcomes General Robert L. Rutherford, Commander in Chief of the United States Transportation Command, to testify on the status of the nation's defense transportation system, which includes all airlift, sealift and prepositioning forces as well as the inland surface transportation grid.

Welcome, General, for your first appearance before this Committee since you became the CINC last year. We look forward to your testimony today, especially in your unique position. You are head of a functional command which provides assets and services to all the regional Commanders in Chief that have testified before the Committee. In effect, your theater of operations is the entire globe. It is the theater that is active every day in the movement of forces and equipment around the world.

As we all know, the tempo of these operations has been extremely high in recent times. As you point out in your statement, since Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, TRANSCOM has been called upon to support a host of contingencies in Somalia, Rwanda, Kenya, Haiti, and Panama as well as disaster relief efforts. Existing assets, in particular certain airlift assets, are being stretched to the limits of their capability to support these missions.

This is of serious concern to the Committee considering that sufficient lift capability is crucial to the country's ability to execute two Major Regional Conflicts, MRCs, as called for by the Bottom-Up Review. In that regard, General, we hope to have a candid discussion today about TRANSCOM's capability to support two MRCs.

The Committee in particular would like to address the present status of all TRANSCOM air and sealift assets, the overall lift requirement to support two MRCs, any deficiencies in equipment and personnel to meet this requirement, modernization plans to correct these deficiencies, and the adequacy of the current Defense budget to execute these plans.

Since this is your first appearance before the Committee, your biography will be placed in the record as well as your full statement, General, and prior to you proceeding, I would like to yield to Mr. Murtha for any opening comments that he would like to make.

Mr. MURTHA. We are delighted to have you and I appreciate the problem that we all have with the amount of money available, but the Chairman and other Members are trying to do what we can to make sure that you have what you need in order to support those great young people who are out there doing the work.

Mr. YOUNG. Earlier this morning we had the senior enlisted representatives of all the Services and one made the case strongly that we are ready to fight but if we can't get there, it is impossible to fight. That identifies the tremendous responsibility that you and your command have.

We are happy to hear your statements.

#### SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL RUTHERFORD

General RUTHERFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is my pleasure to appear before you today to address the readiness and modernization of the Defense Transportation System.

#### QUALITY FORCE

While our military force structure is shrinking, our global involvement has expanded. Now, more than ever, the United States is dependent on strategic mobility to protect America's interests. The men and women of USTRANSCOM eagerly accept the challenge of maintaining a Defense Transportation System ready and capable of meeting our nation's needs.

Our people, the 118,000 dedicated men and women of USTRANSCOM, are the foundation of our readiness and warfighting capability. We are fortunate to be blessed with the brightest, most dedicated force I have seen in my 33 years of service.

In this turbulent time of reduced defense budgets, we must remain sensitive to their needs. Adequate pay, quality medical care, housing, and family support programs must be funded if we are to maintain a quality force.

#### OPERATIONAL TEMPO

Today, USTRANSCOM is prepared to conduct the strategic mobility missions assigned by the National Command Authorities. To ensure we stay ready, there are two issues we must address: the cumulative effects of high OPTEMPO on our people and equipment, and the immediate need to modernize our mobility forces.

The people and equipment of USTRANSCOM have had little rest since Operation JUST CAUSE in 1989. The continued support of peacekeeping activities, humanitarian missions, contingencies, and JCS exercises have strained resources. While the command continues to meet the demands of its mission, there is clearly a point where accelerated OPTEMPO can impact readiness. We have not reached that point in the Defense Transportation System, but in some areas we are close.

#### MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Modernization of the air mobility fleet is USTRANSCOM's number-one equipment priority. Our current workhorse, the C-141

Starlifter, is rapidly reaching the end of its useful life. This aircraft continues to be plagued by corrosion and structural cracks.

I do not believe I overstate the case when I say that the next inspection could identify a yet unforeseen problem that could permanently ground or significantly restrict the lift capacity of our aging C-141 fleet.

The Defense Acquisition Board has placed the C-17 in a provisional status until November 1995. During this probationary period, McDonnell Douglas has made significant progress in getting the program on track. Deliveries are ahead of schedule and quality is excellent.

As planned, and with all conditions met, on 17 January 1995, I declared initial operational capability for the C-17. We are currently operating 14 aircraft at Charleston Air Force Base. While crew training continues as we build to the currently approved 40 aircraft fleet, we have begun to use the C-17 on regularly scheduled airlift missions to meet our customers' needs.

I believe it significant to note that just this month the National Aeronautics Association awarded the C-17 the Collier Trophy, symbolizing the top aeronautical achievement in 1994.

#### SEALIFT PROGRAM

In addition to the modernization of the airlift fleet, we must stay the course and complete the recommended enhancements to achieve 10 million square feet of surge sealift capacity. Today we have approximately 6.5 million square feet of capacity in our organic fleet, and of this, only 5 million square feet is currently available in time to meet surge lift requirements.

To overcome this shortfall, we have begun the process to acquire 11 Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off ships. Acquisition is only part of the story, however. We must have the required operations and maintenance funding to maintain these ships. This past year \$250 million was requested in the President's budget for this purpose, while only \$150 million was made available. As a result, many of our ships had to be placed in reduced readiness status.

Additionally, we need to complete the procurement of eight Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off ships for Afloat Prepositioning. This will release seven ships back to the Ready Reserve Force, contributing to fulfillment of our requirement for 10 million square feet of surge sealift capability.

#### SUMMARY

In summary, there are no simple formulas for prioritizing how we spend our defense dollars. However, the single most important element in the equation is people. We ask our young men and women to make many sacrifices in defense of our nation. We should be willing to compensate them so they can maintain a reasonable standard of living.

This nation needs to modernize its mobility forces. In airlift, we must get on with replacing the C-141. The C-17 appears to meet our needs.

In sealift, we must continue the Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off and Ready Reserve Force Roll-On/Roll-Off acquisition pro-

grams, and we must make available sufficient resources to maintain our fleet in a prudent state of readiness.

With your continued support, I believe we can have confidence in the future readiness of the Defense Transportation System.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of General Rutherford follows:]

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House Committee on Appropriations  
Subcommittee on National Security



## Posture Statement

General Robert L. Rutherford, USAF  
Commander in Chief  
United States Transportation Command

Before the 104th Congress  
House Committee on Appropriations  
Subcommittee on National Security  
28 February 1995



For Official Use Only  
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House Committee on Appropriations  
Subcommittee on National Security





# BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Secretary of the Air Force  
Office of Public Affairs  
Washington, D.C. 20330-1690

## GENERAL ROBERT L. RUTHERFORD

General Robert L. Rutherford is commander in chief of the United States Transportation Command, and commander of the Air Force's Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill. As a unified command commander in chief, he is responsible to the secretary of defense for the nation's defense transportation requirements. He exercises command over service transportation components from the Army, Navy and Air Force. As commander of AMC, he provides operationally trained, equipped and mission-ready air mobility forces to support U.S. requirements.

The general entered the Air Force in 1961 as a distinguished graduate of Southwest Texas State University's Reserve Officer Training Corps program. During his 33-year Air Force career, he has held nine command positions at squadron, wing, numbered air force and major command levels. The general is a command pilot with more than 4,000 flying hours in various airlift, tanker, fighter and trainer aircraft. He has flown 181 combat missions in the F-4 fighter, including 101 missions over North Vietnam.

In addition to his command experience, General Rutherford has been assigned to duties in the personnel, manpower, and programs and resources arenas with nearly nine years of work at Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., and the Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.

The general and his wife, Kita, both Texans, are the parents of two sons who are Air Force officers.



### EDUCATION:

- |      |   |
|------|---|
| 1961 | Bachelor's degree in business administration, Southwest Texas State University, San Marcos, Texas                       |
| 1964 | Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.   |
| 1971 | Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.  |
| 1979 | Master's degree in business administration, Auburn University, Auburn, Ala.   |
| 1979 | Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.   |
| 1986 | National and International Security Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. |

### ASSIGNMENTS:

- July 1961 - October 1966, student, undergraduate pilot training, then flight instructor and T-38 instructor, Reese Air Force Base, Texas
- October 1966 - April 1967, F-4 pilot, 479th Tactical Fighter Wing, George Air Force Base, Calif.
- April 1967 - July 1967, F-4 aircraft commander, 4th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.
- July 1967 - May 1968, F-4 aircraft commander, 435th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand
- May 1968 - January 1971, operations staff officer, Airspace and Air Traffic Control Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters Air Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas

6. January 1971 - July 1971, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
7. July 1971 - May 1972, staff officer, Colonels Group, directorate of personnel, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
8. June 1972 - May 1973, chief, critical skill management division, Colonels Group, Directorate of Personnel, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
9. May 1973 - February 1975, chief, Regular General Officer Assignment Division, Directorate of Personnel, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
10. February 1975 - September 1975, T-38 instructor pilot; commander, 71st Flying Training Squadron, Moody Air Force Base, Ga.
11. September 1975 - July 1978, deputy commander for operations, 38th Flying Training Wing; assistant deputy commander for operations, 347th Tactical Fighter Wing; commander, 339th Tactical Fighter Squadron; commander, 347th Combat Support Group, Moody Air Force Base, Ga.
12. August 1978 - July 1979, student, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
13. July 1979 - June 1980, deputy commander for operations, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, Kunsan Air Base, South Korea
14. June 1980 - August 1982, vice commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing; commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Group; commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, Kadena Air Base, Japan
15. September 1982 - September 1983, vice commander, Air Force Military Personnel Center, and assistant deputy chief of staff for military personnel, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas
16. September 1983 - January 1985, commander, U.S. Air Force Recruiting Service, and deputy chief of staff for recruiting, Headquarters Air Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas
17. January 1985 - March 1987, deputy director of programs and evaluation, director of manpower and organization, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs and Resources, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
18. March 1987 - April 1988, deputy chief of staff for operations, and deputy director of operations for the European Air Combat Operations Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, West Germany
19. April 1988 - October 1989, commander, 17th Air Force; commander, Allied Sector Three; and commander, Allied Tactical Operations Center, Sembach Air Base, West Germany
20. October 1989 - May 1991, deputy chief of staff for programs and resources, deputy chief of staff for productivity and programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
21. May 1991 - May 1992, vice commander, Military Airlift Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.
22. May 1992 - October 1994, vice commander, then commander, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii
23. October 1994 - present, commander in chief, United States Transportation Command and commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.

#### FLIGHT INFORMATION:

Rating: Command pilot

Flight hours: More than 4,000

Aircraft flown: T-37, T-38, F-4, F-15, F-16, F-111, C-5, C-130, C-135 and C-141

#### MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

Distinguished Service Medal

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster

Distinguished Flying Cross with two oak leaf clusters

Mentioned in Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters

Air Medal with 11 oak leaf clusters

Vietnam Service Medal with two service stars

Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

#### EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION:

Second Lieutenant May 28, 1961

First Lieutenant Jan 16, 1963

Captain Jan 16, 1966

Major July 1, 1969

Lieutenant Colonel May 1, 1973

Colonel

Brigadier General

Major General

Lieutenant General

General

March 1, 1978

June 1, 1983

Aug 1, 1986

Oct 1, 1989

Feb 1, 1993

(Current as of November 1994)

Mr Chairman and members of the Committee:

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall America's role in the world has changed significantly. The U.S. military has been involved across a wide spectrum of missions: from the war in the Persian Gulf to our most recent experience in Operations SUPPORT HOPE (Rwanda), UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), SAPPHIRE (the recent airlift of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan to the United States in support of U.S. government non proliferation efforts), and SAFE PASSAGE (return of Cuban migrants to Guantanamo Bay). While our military force structure is shrinking, our global involvement has expanded. Our nation's leadership clearly recognizes that the United States is more dependent than ever on strategic mobility to protect America's interests. The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and our Transportation Component Commands (TCCs) -- Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC) -- are responsible for maintaining a Defense Transportation System (DTS) ready and capable of meeting the Nation's needs.

The men and women of USTRANSCOM, Active, Guard, Reserve, and Civilian, together with their partners in the commercial transportation industry, eagerly accept this challenge. On their behalf I'd like to present the USCINCTrans Annual Report to Congress. It outlines our vision, provides our view of the DTS role in supporting National Security Strategy, assesses the health of the DTS, and highlights our near and long-term efforts to correct the shortfalls in our nation's defense transportation capability.

The performance of the DTS had been hampered by fragmentation along Service and modal lines. The creation of USTRANSCOM eight years ago was a major step toward repairing this fragmentation. Three years ago the Secretary of Defense assigned USTRANSCOM combatant command over common-user transportation resources and designated USTRANSCOM as the single manager for defense transportation in peace and war. This action properly aligned authority with responsibility, and is now paying off.

As a result of this realignment, USTRANSCOM undertook a study to determine the future path for the DTS. We've completed this study and established our vision. The DTS 2010 Action Plan, as it is called, has seven major end state objectives:

- Empowered DTS agents to service customers at the point of origin.
- A Joint Mobility Control Group that integrates common-user traffic management to include both organic and commercial lift.
- A seamless, or transparent, hand off of information, passengers, and cargo at the theater port of debarkation or staging area to the theater commander.
- A global information system that integrates traffic management processes and data bases in peace and war.
- A single, integrated financial management system for DTS common-user transportation assets and operations.
- A single, integrated procurement system for USTRANSCOM.

- A joint transportation technology focal point for transportation engineering and the development and application of transportation technologies.

Our goal is to maximize the effectiveness of the DTS and support for our customers. We have begun the process of incorporating these objectives into our long term planning and programming efforts and are on our way toward achieving our vision for the DTS. All of our efforts are focused on ensuring the DTS will meet its responsibilities within the framework of the National Security Strategy.

As DTS 2010 now guides our future business processes, the primary tool for guiding our force structure and modernization efforts has been the 1992 Mobility Requirements Study (MRS). It identified our mobility requirements and recommended ways to improve our airlift, sealift and surface capabilities.

## DTS -- The Requirement

The 1994 draft Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS BURU) revised and updated the strategic mobility requirements for the next century. It validates the sealift recommendations of the original MRS and revises the requirement for airlift. Achieving these recommendations is essential to our ability to meet our strategic lift requirements.

Our ability to meet the MRS BURU requirements of dual, nearly simultaneous, major regional conflicts (MRC) is a function of assumptions, force requirements, and delivery timelines. It

should be remembered that MRS BURU is a planning tool helping to guide the debate on the kind and amounts of strategic mobility assets our nation should possess at the turn of the century.

The MRS BURU scenario depicts a MRC closely followed by a second MRC where the enemies' attacks are stopped prior to achieving essential objectives. The attacks are stopped by the rapid delivery of halting forces composed of in place, prepositioned, and airlifted forces. In order to stop the enemy and then counterattack, it is essential to rapidly deploy reinforcing units to the theaters. The heavy equipment and supplies for these forces must be moved by sea and the soldiers, Marines and critical and high value material by air. This concept provides the basis for sizing the strategic mobility force--how much and what mix of lift we require to deliver the halting forces, reinforcing units, sustainment supplies, and the overwhelming force required for decisive offensive action.

The assumptions used in the studies, modeling simulations, and ultimately the decisions derived from such work are often not widely understood. Yet it is the assumptions used in our models that can ultimately influence the size and structure of our mobility forces. These assumptions include warning times, Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC), Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) activation, access to ports, and available enroute infrastructure.

While recognizing the limitations inherent in models and simulations, we must make judgments on the criticality of certain unique military capabilities. The deterrent effects derived from

the possession of a large number of mobility aircraft, which are able to move outsize cargo quickly, or execute a large scale airborne assault is hard to quantify. Yet, there is little doubt that this capability does have a deterrent effect. As we debate the risks associated with future operations, we must also remember that we are structuring the strategic mobility force for the next century. That force must retain the flexibility to meet yet unforeseen threats to our Nation's interests.

## **USCINTRANS Assessment of DTS**

Today's DTS is ready to support the warfighting CINCs' war-plans assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the requirements outlined by the NCA. Maintaining this readiness is USTRANSCOM's top priority. I want to share with you my concerns about the continuous high operations and personnel tempo (OPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO) and the need to maintain the high priority of DoD strategic mobility modernization programs.

### **OPTEMPO**

Today's high OPTEMPO is particularly challenging to our active duty forces. Two-thirds of our lift capability is in the Reserve components and commercial sector. We have limited access to these resources during peacetime. The Air Mobility Command is acutely aware of this problem. The temporary duty (TDY) burden required by this high OPTEMPO is highlighted by operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Kenya, Haiti, Panama, as well as support for

disaster relief efforts. Current operations deployments, along with routine permanent change of station travel and individual training, cause extensive duty away from home for AMC personnel. Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE) and Aerial Port personnel averaged over 154 and 175 days TDY, respectively, last year. We have set a goal of no more than 120 days TDY per year for all air and ground personnel supporting air mobility operations. Our efforts to limit the deployed days for aircrews have been relatively successful, but require intensive management.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the number of potential worldwide crises points has doubled to nearly 70. USTRANSCOM must respond quickly in support of U.S. objectives in these areas delivering forces when and where needed. Therefore, the command must focus its attention on the entire world and the full spectrum of support from humanitarian operations to contingencies.

The people and equipment of USTRANSCOM have had little rest since Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) in 1989. The continued support of peacekeeping activities, humanitarian missions, ongoing contingencies, and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises have strained resources. There is a point where peacetime OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO will begin to impact on USTRANSCOM'S ability to support an MRC.

To reduce the OPTEMPO we must efficiently utilize our organic transportation resources while leveraging commercial industry capabilities. We support a strong U.S. commercial transportation industry. We want to maintain access to



commercial lift during this period of Department of Defense (DoD) and commercial downsizing and restructuring. In the past DoD relied on the excess capacity in the commercial transportation industry to move our forces and materiel during a crisis. To survive in today's competitive environment, commercial operators are eliminating excess capacity. This impacts how DoD conducts business with our partners in the transportation industry. To ensure access to commercial transportation during a contingency, we are working to channel the government's transportation business to those commercial operators committing their assets to support operations in peace and war.

### **Quality of Life**

The foundation of our readiness and warfighting capability is our people -- the 118,000 dedicated men and women of USTRANSCOM who provide a responsive DTS for America everyday. We are blessed with the brightest, most dedicated force I've seen in 33 years of service. In this period of reduced defense budgets, we must remain sensitive to our people's needs--to ensure every member of every branch of Service is treated like a true professional.

My primary quality of life (QOL) concern is attractive compensation levels to support our more frequently used, smaller force. The combined direct (pay/allowances) and indirect (housing, health, other installation support) benefits must compensate for the high PERSTEMPO.

To attract and retain an all volunteer force, we need to provide pay and benefits that are competitive with the civilian sector. The actual and perceived erosion of benefits experienced during the 1970's taught us piecemeal budgetary "savings" are outweighed by the devastating impact on retention and readiness. From attractive pay, to quality medical care, a stable inflation protected retirement program, housing, and family support programs ... we must ensure we continue to adequately fund these QOL Programs through the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).

### **Reserve Force Access**

Another area of concern is early access to Reserve forces. These forces augment our active duty forces daily and provide more than 50 percent of our military capability during a mobilization. We require early and assured access to large numbers of Reserve forces to support immediate crises response and to "prime the transportation pipeline." Approximately 10,500 Reservists are required to support strategic mobility--to put in place the infrastructure required to prepare units for movement, to open seaports of embarkation (SPOEs), to provide aircrews, aerial port, and maintenance support for CONUS aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) and OCONUS en route support. Over 55 percent of our strategic airlift crews, 45 percent of our air refueling crews and 66 percent of aerial port personnel are in the air reserve component. The preponderance of the Navy's Cargo Handling and Port Groups are also within the Reserves. Approximately 88 percent of MSC's military shore support and most

of MTMC's Transportation Terminal Brigades/Battalions, Deployment Support Brigades, Port Security Companies, and Railway Operating Battalion are in the Reserves.

The context of involuntary recall is changing from rare and massive to frequent and tailored. During operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), a limited Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) of 5,700 was authorized emphasizing the use of volunteers. Unless a major contingency triggers some level of mobilization, "volunteerism" is the current methodology for responding to crises before resorting to involuntary call-up. This creates a reliance on troops and skills that may not match the scenario. Avail-ability and tailoring of the "right skills" is essential to USTRANSCOM getting the job done. We continue to work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs in exploring alternate methods to ensure reserve forces are available to meet our mobility requirements.

### Air Mobility

Our current capability is approximately 49 MTM/D. The 49 MTM/D is achieved through full mobilization. This includes all Air Reserve Component (ARC) and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) assets. Active duty forces, augmented with 25 percent ARC volunteers, provide a daily peacetime airlift capability of 18 MTM/D, the capability to support an airlift operation like VIGILANT WARRIOR (Saudi Arabia/Kuwait) without activating the reserves. The fully mobilized military airlift fleet provides 31 MTM/D with the remaining 18 MTM/D coming from CRAF.

Modernization of the air mobility fleet is USTRANSCOM's number 1 equipment priority. Without a robust and long-term commitment to modernization, our air mobility forces will become the weak link in the DTS. To sustain and improve our use of non-lethal air power as the "first weapon of choice," we should make a definitive decision on the modernization of the airlift fleet this year.

We have stated the problem before. Our current workhorse, the C-141 Starlifter, is rapidly reaching the end of its "life." We rely on its capabilities to meet current DoD requirements. The C-141 weep hole situation clearly demonstrated the potential for the next inspection to identify a problem that could permanently ground or drastically restrict our aging Starlifter fleet. We have attempted to reduce flying hours and extend its life; however, day-to-day mission taskings remain high and its retirement is quickly approaching.

Beyond the issue of a tired airframe, Army and Marine Corps modernization efforts limit the effectiveness of the C-141. Combat systems (M-1 tank, Multiple Launch Rocket System, Patriot missile launcher) have grown bigger and heavier. Today's outsize equipment will not fit into the C-141. As a result we are putting additional resources into our other primary airlifter, the C-5 Galaxy, to improve its reliability and increase mission capable rates. The C-5 is limited by its 1960's technology in avionics, engines, instrumentation and flight controls, all expensive to maintain. We have achieved some success in raising the C-5 mission capable rates. However, it is expensive to

upgrade the dated technology. Also, we have reached the limit on modifying and utilizing the cargo carrying capability of our tanker fleet to reduce the demands on our airlifter fleet. To enhance our global operations, we must continue to ensure the availability of the KC-135 for both air refueling and airlift support.

## **The C-17 Decision**

The 1993 Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review placed the C-17 in a provisional status until November of this year. During this probationary period, it appears McDonnell Douglas has made significant improvements to get the program back on track. Deliveries are ahead of schedule and show dramatic improvements in quality. During developmental testing, the aircraft showed it is well on its way toward meeting our demanding requirements.

As planned, and with all conditions met, on 17 January 1995, I declared initial operational capability (IOC) for the C-17. We are currently operating 14 aircraft at Charleston AFB.

The next major test is the 30-day Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability (RM&A) evaluation this summer. We are committed to a vigorous RM&A evaluation to ensure the C-17 meets the nation's needs and will serve as a reliable replacement for the C-141. The results of this evaluation will aid our decision in November 1995 at the Milestone IIIB DAB. Our preliminary evaluation has shown the program on track for this summer's events.

In preparation for the November decision, AMC is participating in the Strategic Airlift Force Mix Analysis (SAFMA), an evaluation of several combinations of C-17s and/or nondevelopmental aircraft to determine the most cost effective force to meet our military requirements. SAFMA utilizes the same assumptions as MRS BURU to assess air mobility capability to meet requirements in support of the National Security Strategy. SAFMA results will be integral to the C-17 decision and determining the number of Nondevelopmental Airlift Aircraft (NDAA) in source selection.

The NDAA, in the form of a wide-body commercial derivative or other military aircraft, can potentially be procured to augment the C-17. Although the NDAA offers the potential for a less costly option for general airlift, the design of commercial aircraft prevents them from fully meeting the nation's militarily unique air mobility requirements. Therefore, as USCINTRANS, I must emphasize, while I fully support the analytical efforts of MRS BURU and SAFMA to quantify the most cost effective solution to the airlift force mix, we cannot forget the flexibility afforded this nation by those unique military characteristics only certain aircraft provide. Air refueling, austere field operations, limited ramp space operations, and airdrop ... are capabilities that will prove critical in military operations of the future just as they have in the past.

## **Materials Handling Equipment**

An airlift system is only as capable as the materials handling equipment (MHE) supporting it. The backbone of our current MHE fleet is the 40K loader. It is increasingly unreliable due to age and condition. The present inventory fills only 77 percent of that required to meet Defense plans. In addition to the 40K loader, wide-body elevator loaders (WBELs) are necessary for reaching the high cargo floors on commercial wide-body cargo aircraft and our KC-10s. The current inventory of WBELs is limited.

The prognosis for the MHE is good--but funding must remain intact. The new 60K loader is our second highest air mobility acquisition priority. It is slated to replace the 40K loader and many of the WBELs. The 60K loader, which can be airlifted by C-141s, C-5s, and C-17s, will meet MHE requirements for the 21st Century. The 60K production contract was awarded in April 1994. The acquisition strategy requires two 5-year buys to meet the requirement of 318 loaders.

## **Airlift Defensive Systems**

Protecting airlifters from the infrared (IR), surface-to-air missile (SAM) threat is essential to performing our global mission while minimizing risks to crew and aircraft. The proliferation of these mobile IR SAMs makes airfields susceptible to terrorist threat or enemy activities. The initial effort to protect airlifters was a program called SNOWSTORM. It provided defensive

capability against IR guided threats to 18 C-130s, 13 C-141s, and 4 C-5s and a prototype for the larger Airlift Defensive System (ADS) program. The current ADS program includes missile warning and countermeasure dispensing systems for 83 C-141s, 28 C-5s, and up to 120 C-17s.

## **Global Positioning System**

A Global Positioning System (GPS) modification will provide our air mobility fleet with a more precise, worldwide navigation capability. Our goal, in complying with Congressional guidance, is to provide aircrews the best GPS system integrated into other cockpit modernization efforts by the end of fiscal year 2000. Our plan is to integrate installations with inertial navigation, communications, and flight instrumentation systems to complement the overall cockpit modernization process.

## **Flight Simulators**

The assured readiness of our airlift and tanker crew force requires high quality flight and simulator training. The increased use of high fidelity flight simulators, similar to those used by the commercial sector, will provide a cost effective training system reducing the demands on our aircraft fleet. Acquiring these systems requires a commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software upgrade to our existing simulators. This avoids an expensive research and development program. This upgrade will allow us to transfer proficiency training requirements from the aircraft to the simulator with no reduction



of aircrew readiness. These simulators will result in direct savings, increase the operational availability of airlift and tanker fleets and extend their useful service life.

## **Civil Reserve Air Fleet**

A critical piece of our strategic airlift capability is the CRAF program. For our most demanding scenarios, commercial air carriers will provide over 90 percent of our long-range passenger capability and more than 30 percent of our long-range cargo capability. Commercial carriers volunteer to participate in the program in exchange for access to government airlift business. Congress has supported this program in the past, and I ask your continued support.

Current commitments to the CRAF program meet DoD cargo requirements, and based upon draft MRS BURU analysis, approximate total passenger augmentation needs. However, a significant shortfall remains in the aeromedical airlift segment. Currently, only 46 percent of the B-767 aircraft needed for aeromedical airlift requirements are enrolled in the program. This year we will focus on closing the gap by attracting more aircraft into the program and by modifying aeromedical configuration kits so they can be used on other types of aircraft.

To sustain and stimulate the CRAF program, we must work both current and new initiatives. We expanded the CRAF business base by approximately \$1 billion by working with the General Services Administration (GSA) to link award of the GSA city-pair contract to CRAF participation. This addressed concerns raised by sched-

uled passenger carriers and induced two major carriers to return to the CRAF program after a one-year absence. We also plan to work with GSA to link their award of GSA small package contracts (several of which will be up for renewal in FY96) to CRAF participation.

The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act allows DoD to open its military airfields to commercial carriers participating in CRAF. This, coupled with access to military airfields as weather alternates, will provide direct economic benefits to our CRAF partners.

## Sealift

### Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships (LMSR) Acquisition and Conversion

Today we have approximately 6.5 million square feet of capacity in our organic fleet--MSC's Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) and the Maritime Administration's (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force (RRF)--of which 5 million square feet is currently available in time to meet surge lift requirements. To meet the total MRS surge requirement of 10 million square feet of capacity, we plan to acquire the recommended 11 surge LMSRs and 7 additional RRF Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) ships and restore the readiness of selected RRF ships currently in reduced readiness. Additionally, 8 LMSRs are planned for acquisition for prepositioning. Critical to the whole concept of 10 million square feet of surge capability is

continued adequate operations and maintenance (O&M) for our organic surge vessels.

The acquisition strategy for the 19 LMSRs is conversion of 5 existing ships and new construction of the remaining 14. Currently, three ships are being converted at the National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) in California, and two ships are being converted at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry-dock Company in Virginia. Estimated delivery for the lead ship from both the NASSCO and Newport News yards is December 1995. Avondale Industries, Inc. in Louisiana and NASSCO were awarded contracts in September 1993 for the design and construction of new LMSRs. The contract with each shipyard was for one ship with options for up to five additional ships, for a total of 12 new construction LMSRs. New construction LMSRs under contract now total six. The acquisition strategy for the remaining two LMSRs has not yet been determined, but we anticipate contract award in FY99. We need your continued support to keep this program on schedule.

### **Ready Reserve Force (RRF)**

The RRF is a critical component of our sealift fleet, comprising 40 percent of our total organic capability. It provides over one-half of the total sealift capability necessary to deploy the two Army heavy divisions and Marine Corps amphibious task force assault follow-on echelon forces required to halt an enemy attack and then build-up for the counterattack.

Some question the need to maintain the RRF in the high readiness status established in the original MRS. We reexamined our requirements for this force as part of the MRS BURU effort. The draft MRS BURU validated the requirement to reduce the size and readiness of the RRF in FY01, but only after we complete the LMSR and remaining RRF RO/RO acquisitions and achieve 80 percent containerization. Today, the RRF is the most cost effective source of surge sealift, and coupled with our eight FSSs, represents our only source of organic surge sealift capability.

In FY95, RRF O&M funding was reduced by \$100 million from the President's Budget. This forced us to make significant changes in force size, maintenance, and readiness status in order to focus limited funds on our most capable and critical ships. Specifically, while maintaining our RO/RO ships at 4-day readiness, we reduced the readiness and maintenance on 26 vessels, placed 29 vessels in a minimal-maintenance 30-day readiness status, and transferred 16 vessels to the National Defense Reserve Fleet.

Although \$43 million was appropriated to DoD in FY95 for RRF RO/RO acquisition, \$158 million previously appropriated to MARAD in FY94 was rescinded. As a result, instead of completing acquisition of all seven additional RO/RO's required by MRS analysis, we will only acquire one to two ships.

The shortfall in RRF O&M and acquisition funds have the potential to derail our sealift program. Specifically, if these funding trends continue, we will fall short of our 10 million square feet of organic surge sealift capacity goal by 1 million

square feet (the capacity necessary to move approximately two combat brigades) and realize lower overall force readiness in FY01 and beyond.

Reductions in RRF funding have pushed MARAD to propose a number of new steps to improve the program and maintain the necessary 10 million square feet of organic surge capacity. In particular, we believe it appropriate to shift funding responsibility for the program from DOT to DoD. This shift, especially in light of strategic lift's high-priority in our overall defense program, ensures RRF funding can be appropriately and sufficiently considered by the Congressional committees having oversight of defense related programs.

Second, we must restore and sustain O&M funding through FY00. This will permit us to restore maintenance and readiness levels consistent with MRS BURU recommendations. Furthermore, in addition to the RO/RO ship we plan to acquire this fiscal year, we are requesting the acquisition of 2 RO/ROs in FY96.

## **Maritime Revitalization**

While we pursue the essential modernization of our organic sealift fleet, we have not forgotten the importance of the U.S. maritime industry to our overall sealift capabilities. Just as we did in the Gulf War, Somalia and most recently, back to the Persian Gulf, we rely extensively on our commercial partners to support our worldwide commitments. In peacetime we ship over 16 million tons of DoD cargo using privately owned U.S. flag ships manned by U.S. mariners, spending over \$1.7 billion annually

within the maritime industry. In wartime we depend upon the U.S. merchant fleet to support the flow of sustainment and ammunition cargoes and to provide the mariners necessary to man our organic ships.

To ensure continued availability of this critical capability, we support the proposal for a Maritime Security Program (MSP) funded by DOT which furthers national economic and security objectives. We will be working closely with DoD and the MARAD to ensure that military sealift requirements are met at best value to the American taxpayer. We must emphasize that the MSP is not a substitute for the unique RO/RO military capabilities of DoD's programs which are specifically designed for rapid deployment of the full range of military equipment.

### **Merchant Marine Reemployment Rights**

Increased productivity of modern containerships has resulted in shrinking numbers of qualified seafarers in the commercial seagoing industry. In the worse case scenario, when trying to crew DoD surge sealift ships rapidly in a crisis this reduced availability of U.S. merchant mariners could delay the availability of surge sealift. However, additional study is required to quantify the availability of mariners from the inland waterways, Great Lakes, domestic offshore industries, and other sources before an accurate assessment of any potential shortfall is known. One initiative to help maximize the number of crews available in a war or other national emergency would be a legislative provision extending reemployment rights for certain

merchant seaman employed in shore-based industries but holding active U.S. Coast Guard certificates and licenses to serve aboard activated surge sealift assets. These mariners represent a large pool of labor that was willing to volunteer during the Persian Gulf War, but could not due to lack of reemployment rights. This provision would be similar to the reemployment rights guaranteed for reserve military personnel. Several bills were introduced during the last Congress which included such a provision, but none passed. Such a measure is necessary and prudent to improve the availability of merchant seaman during a time of crisis.

### **Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF)**

Prepositioning of equipment afloat is key to our flexibility in responding to contingencies in widely separated theaters. Currently, we preposition afloat Army and Marine Corps combat forces, and general equipment, supplies, and ammunition of all the Services.

Central to the effectiveness of the APF is the acquisition of the vessels designed to carry the Army brigade and support package. Both MRS and MRS BURU validated the requirement for LMSRs with a total capacity of two million square feet to support prepositioning and early closure of the Army brigade. Based on this, our APF will increase by eight LMSRs, one heavy lift prepositioned ship and two container ships to support an Army heavy brigade (afloat) with 30 days of sustainment. These prepositioning LMSRs are currently under conversion or construction with all scheduled for delivery by FY01. To ensure

the current readiness of our APF, since the first LMSR will not be delivered until late FY95, interim afloat prepositioning capability is being met using seven RO/RO ships from the RRF. Prepositioning will also be enhanced with the addition of one ship to a Maritime Prepositioning Squadron. Funding for this ship was provided for in the FY95 budget.

## Surface

As previously stated, much of the commercial transportation surge capability that existed is being trimmed through restructuring. The commercial transportation industry has become more efficient and divested itself of excess capacity.

For example, rail is much more efficient today. Railroads have 700,000 fewer rail cars, 550,000 fewer employees and 10,000 fewer locomotives than in 1960. The commercial rail industry cannot provide sufficient heavy lift flatcars to meet current Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) time lines. The importance of these rail cars was highlighted during DESERT STORM when the average wait for access to commercial rail cars was 5-7 days. This situation, along with the limited number of commercially available heavy lift flatcars, has forced the Army to initiate a program to procure flatcars and position them at installations to meet early deploying time lines. The Army budgeted \$11.8 million in FY96 for rail car procurement. The need for this program was revalidated during UPHOLD DEMOCRACY



(Haiti) where we again experienced as much as a 7 day response time for access to commercial rail cars.

The deregulation of the 1980s has compelled structural changes in the railroad and trucking industries. As entry barriers dropped, more carriers have entered the trucking industry while forcing many inefficient companies out of business. Railroads have cut costs and gains in efficiency have added pressure on the trucking industry as more companies gained access to intrastate/interstate markets.

In addition to the rightsizing of the industry, trucking firms, railroads, and steamship companies are entering into intermodal and long term partnerships with vendors/shippers to respond to the needs of the marketplace and provide better overall service. More domestic freight is being carried intermodally as truckers use more rail piggyback for long hauls. Intermodalism and information technology have expanded service and blurred the lines between markets. Intermodal traffic is the fastest growing area of the transportation industry and USTRANSCOM is committed to ensuring we take advantage of it.

### **Joint Container Exercise Program**

The goal of the Joint Container Exercise Program is to improve the readiness and responsiveness of DoD to deploy, sustain, employ, and redeploy forces using the intermodal transportation systems. It provides an opportunity to stress in place infrastructure which supports modern transportation systems. Exercises such as TEAM SPIRIT 93 (Korea) and

TURBO CADS 94 (Containerized Ammunition Distribution System), have demonstrated the effectiveness of containerization, intransit visibility (ITV) and intermodalism.

Future exercises are designed to build upon these successes. Our goal is to promote an effective and efficient intermodal container transportation system by increasing DoD's use of intermodal systems, ensuring interoperability between DoD and commercial systems, and maximizing use of intermodal assets and infrastructure.

### **Rail Car Requirements**

Based on the MRS and the ASMP, there is a requirement for 2,027 rail cars to support the movement of equipment for the Army and Marine Corps. This total includes 397 heavy lift cars prepositioned at Army and Marine installations to support the early deployment of lead brigades until commercial rail cars become available on or about day 7. Sufficient heavy lift rail cars are available to move all of the M-1 tanks assigned to these early deploying units. We currently have 718 rail cars on hand with 53 new rail cars under contract and project buying 241 in FY95 and 238 in FY96.

### **Infrastructure**

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) actions, deteriorating facilities at existing bases, and lack of funding for infrastructure upgrades also concern me. From my perspective as USCINCTRANS, mission requirements must be the driver behind down-

sizing. As DoD downsizes, it is reducing its infrastructure and capacity to deploy, support, and sustain forces. The remaining capacity must be managed to make it more efficient to ensure the right things move to the right places at the right times. With fewer military bases and depots, the remaining bases must be world class launching platforms from which we can project and sustain power.

USTRANSCOM is involved with studying the effects on en route infrastructure due to closure of overseas bases and development of our Global Reach Laydown packages. We are involved with the BRAC 95 process to ensure our stateside transportation infrastructure is correctly identified, protected, and enhanced to meet the deployment needs of our CONUS based forces. Other initiatives are the West Coast Ammunition Port, Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS), and programs funded through the Mobility Enhancement Fund.

## **En Route Infrastructure**

Since December 1992 we have reduced air mobility en route infrastructure from 39 locations outside the U.S. to 13 key locations (6 PACOM, 6 EUCOM and 1 SOUTHCOM). We are working an ongoing effort with the warfighting CINCs and the Joint Staff to validate key en route infrastructure requirements which must be considered during downsizing. This is tied to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process through the Overseas Presence, Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Work Group. As an example of the success of these readiness efforts,

working with the Joint Staff we have analyzed the requirement for Spanish facilities from a strategic air mobility perspective in a major contingency. The Joint Staff has incorporated the analysis into the JROC process and is now beginning to query the CINCs on their needs for the Spanish bases to formulate a DoD strategy for future deliberations between U.S. and Spanish officials.

### **West Coast Containerized Ammunition Port**

It is critical to have a containerized ammunition capability on the West Coast to effectively support dual, nearly simultaneous MRCs. Without a West Coast facility, ammunition for an Asian MRC would have to be shipped to Sunny Point, North Carolina, our East Coast ammunition port. This adds 12 days to the transit time due to the East Coast to West Coast sail and Panama Canal transit.

We currently have enhancement projects funded by the Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) underway at Port Hadlock, Washington and Concord Naval Weapons Station, California that will increase our West Coast through-put capability to 720 twenty-foot ammunition containers per day as recommended in the MRS. The project is planned to be completed by FY99.

### **Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS)**

All of the warfighting CINCs with regional responsibilities have identified JLOTS as a required capability to support their operations and contingency plans (OPLANS and CONPLANS). In fact as recently as Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), we were

prepared to use JLOTS capabilities had the Haitian military closed Port au Prince's seaport facility. We did use selected pieces of this capability to increase port capacity -- tugs, cranes, and landing craft.

JLOTS exercises, culminating in OCEAN VENTURE 93 (Onslow Beach, North Carolina), demonstrated low operational proficiency due to lack of training was the foremost JLOTS problem. In response USTRANSCOM has proposed a 5-year JLOTS training plan. USTRANSCOM has advocated one dry cargo and one liquid cargo JLOTS exercise be conducted each year in each CINC area of responsibility. The proposed exercises were approved by the CINCs and incorporated into the Joint Master Training Schedule. The Joint Staff JLOTS Exercise Initiative has allocated to USTRANSCOM \$15 million each year through FY01 to pay for JLOTS related Strategic Lift (RRF and airlift) and Port Handling and Inland Transportation (PHIT) costs.

### **Mobility Enhancement Fund (MEF)**

The FY95 MEF is a special \$50 million authorization provided by Congress to enhance the readiness of strategic mobility infrastructure. In November 1994 USTRANSCOM submitted a list of projects to the Joint Staff and in December 1994 OSD sent Congress the list of recommended projects. USTRANSCOM's proposal allocated \$25 million for military rail repair, \$4 million for port and pier improvements, \$16 million for runway and ramp maintenance, \$1 million to support joint mobilization exercises, and approximately \$4 million for other infrastructure

improvements. This fund has provided an outstanding opportunity to quick fix some pressing infrastructure problems.

### **Command and Control**

As our nation moved from the industrial age into the information age, the importance of command and control systems for the DTS increased. The proper management of large scale deployment and sustainment operations increases the capabilities of America's combat forces. Ensuring the right forces arrive at the right location at the right time; integrating air, sea, and surface assets; and enabling commanders to divert shipments while en route are critical capabilities that USTRANSCOM must provide the nation's warfighting CINCs. In the past USTRANSCOM has focused its attention on moving people and cargo. Today, our focus is on moving people, cargo, and information with a stronger sense of synchronization.

Our current systems and processes are marginally adequate to support our mission. However, based on our DTS 2010 vision of truly integrating the nation's DTS, fielding a state-of-the-art, customer focused command and control system will likely be the greatest force multiplier we have to offer the warfighting CINCs.

USTRANSCOM has embarked on a multitude of programs to make this happen. Through our Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management Center we have developed a migration strategy to eliminate or consolidate the large number of legacy and duplicate transportation information systems. We are applying functional, technical, and programmatic criteria

developed by the joint transportation community in our analysis of these systems. The result of our efforts -- a strategy to decrease the number of systems from 120 to about 25 -- has been delivered to the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Logistics and Transportation Policy for approval.

Another initiative moving us into the 21st Century is DoD's downward-directed secure successor to the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) -- the Global Command and Control System (GCCS).

The GCCS is a Joint Staff initiative designated and certified to replace the WWMCCS and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPEX). GCCS will take advantage of rapidly developing technology to produce a single, modern, joint command, control, communications, and computer system for our warfighters. This single, modern system for controlling and coordinating military operations will give us a significant advantage in moving required forces, cargo, and information to the right place, at the right time, and in the proper quantity. This system will provide the connectivity and a variety of software applications and tools used by the warfighting CINCs. One of the programs in this system for which USTRANSCOM is responsible is the Global Transportation Network (GTN).

### **Global Transportation Network (GTN)**

Intransit Visibility (ITV) is information on the location of deploying units' personnel and equipment, patients and sustainment cargo, and other vital resources while they are in

the DTS. GTN provides this service while tying together transportation data from AMC, MTMC, MSC and other DoD agencies. This information will provide the combatant commanders critical information about the location of personnel and materials throughout the DTS. This will significantly improve the capability of the combatant commander to respond to rapidly changing priorities.

GTN is a software rather than hardware intensive system. In other words instead of becoming obsolete it will be routinely enhanced with software upgrades. Access will be available to any authorized user who has a lap top computer, modem, access to a military or commercial phone line, and is cleared to enter the network. Information from GTN will be available to any registered user from the origination of a movement until delivery in theater. A GTN intransit visibility prototype is on-line now, providing intransit visibility of air and sealift movements from APOEs/SPOEs to APODs/SPODs.

When GCCS and GTN are fully matured, they will provide planning support enabling USTRANSCOM to analyze transportation options, forecast total DoD requirements, determine the best mix of lift modes, and identify potential resource shortfalls.

## **Joint Intelligence Center, Transportation (JICTRANS)**

Our global transportation mission demands global awareness. In 1994 USTRANSCOM established JICTRANS to lead DoD in production of relevant transportation intelligence. Renewed emphasis on



timely, accurate information, reflecting the status of worldwide transportation infrastructure, to include vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction, is necessary to support USTRANSCOM, other warfighting CINCs, and mission planners at all levels. A quick global response capability requires swift and prudent operational decisions supported by quality intelligence services. JICTRANS will provide this service for mobility forces.

## **Global Patient Movement**

USTRANSCOM's Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC<sup>2</sup>ES) is the product of a 1993 DoD directive tasking USCINCTRANS to consolidate and control the separate processes of medical evacuation and medical regulating under a single unified command. TRAC<sup>2</sup>ES is a decision support system being developed to integrate worldwide medical regulation and aeromedical evacuation activities. We anticipate initial operational capability by the end of CY97.

Advanced artificial intelligence technologies form the core of TRAC<sup>2</sup>ES' unique, enabling decision support capabilities. Those capabilities include forecasting for operations 2-5 days into the future, as well as reactive replanning for forecasted changes to today's and tomorrow's current operations. The integration of long range planning, short range forecasting, and near-real time decision-making makes TRAC<sup>2</sup>ES a revolutionary "state of the practice" command and control tool.

TRAC<sup>2</sup>ES development has been in concert with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Information Management and a

Joint Services Corporate Information Management (CIM) Business Process Improvement Team. The success of this developmental effort was highlighted at the National Business Process Reengineering Conference when USTRANSCOM's project received the prestigious Award of Recognition for its significant contributions to improved federal government service and efficiency through the exemplary practice of business process reengineering.

Future capabilities of TRAC<sup>2</sup>ES will include support for intratheater patient movements (wholly within a theater), the National Disaster Medical System, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and Deployable Medical Regulating Teams which quickly respond to all contingency scenarios.

### **Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR)**

In partnership with our Components, the Services, and the Office of Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Transportation Policy, we are developing the Defense Transportation Regulation. We plan to consolidate 38 existing transportation publications into one, comprehensive DTR, derived from DoD Directive 4500.9, Transportation and Traffic Management. This regulation will standardize transportation operations for the movement of passengers, freight, personal property, and units from origin to destination. With the strong support of our Components and the Services, and consistent with the intent of Vice President Gore's National Performance Review, our goal in

drafting the DTR is to reduce the volume of the original regulations by at least 50 percent.

## USCINCTRANS Closing Thoughts

Today, USTRANSCOM is ready to successfully conduct the strategic mobility missions assigned by the NCA. For the future I have two concerns -- the cumulative effects of high OPTEMPO on our people and equipment and the need to maintain the high priority of our strategic mobility modernization programs.

There are no simple formulas for prioritizing how we spend our defense dollars. However, the single most important element in the equation is people. We ask our young men and women to make many sacrifices in defense of our nation -- we should be willing to compensate them so they can maintain a reasonable standard of living.

This nation needs to modernize its strategic mobility assets in order to meet the full range of mobility requirements of the warfighting CINCs. **AIRLIFT** . . . we must get on with replacing the C-141. The C-17 may be the right choice. The program is on track and the aircraft is performing well. A decision on the C-17 program and on modernization of the strategic airlift fleet will be made in November 1995. **SEALIFT** . . . we must continue the LMSR and RRF RO/RO acquisition programs plus the appropriation of sufficient resources to maintain our organic fleet in a prudent state of readiness. **SURFACE** . . . we must carry through with acquisition of heavy lift railcars and improve

our "fort to port" capability by ensuring the maintenance of our nation's highways and railways and taking full advantage of intermodal initiatives like the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act. **INFRASTRUCTURE** . . . we need a properly sized and modernized defense transportation infrastructure, leveraging the contribution of private/public sector facilities while we maintain emphasis on upgrading our militarily unique facilities identified as Strategic Mobility Enhancement Fund projects.

With emphasis in these areas, continued emphasis on partnership with industry and the internal reengineering of our command and control and business practices, I'm confident we can ensure the future readiness of the Defense Transportation System.

## ROLE IN NIMBLE DANCER

Mr. YOUNG. General, thank you very much for your statement. I would like to start off by asking you about Nimble Dancer. We have had some of your fellow CINCs in and talked about Nimble Dancer.

What did you do in Nimble Dancer actually with aircraft or on computers as head of TRANSCOM.

General RUTHERFORD. I was involved in the CINCs conference in which we discussed the results of Nimble Dancer. Prior to that, my Chief of Plans had participated in the wargame. Basically, we started off at the colonel level, went through the analysis and the wargaming, then it was reviewed by the two stars and then CINCs had an opportunity to make an input.

If I can, I will take the time to contrast the Mobility Requirements Study, Bottom-Up Review Update, MRS BURU, and Nimble Dancer and get into some of the details associated with that.

Mr. YOUNG. I think that would be a good idea.

General RUTHERFORD. The reason that I bring up MRS BURU is that it is still in draft. I assume the Secretary of Defense will sign it shortly and send it over.

MRS BURU was a study, an analysis done on the lift requirements. Nimble Dancer was a wargame where we talked about the issues, but the analysis on the lift side of the house was not as extensive as it was in MRS BURU.

Nimble Dancer was based upon the 1997 support structure and, of course, MRS BURU was based upon the 2001 force structure. In MRS BURU, we looked at the war in basically three phases: one, the halting phase, then the buildup phase, then the counter-attack phase.

The same three phases apply in Nimble Dancer. In terms of lift, the critical phase is the initial phase, the halting or denial phase, if you will. You are heavily dependent in that phase on getting forces in place very rapidly and therefore you are dependent upon prepositioning and airlift to move those forces in the initial days of a conflict whether it be in Southwest Asia or in Korea, for example.

We would, of course, have to fall in on that force using airlift to bring the people over to marry up with that prepositioned equipment. In the western MRC, again, since the major contribution west for the halting force is air tactical air forces and bombers, you don't have that tremendous personnel requirement right up front nor are your lift requirements necessarily that heavy.

So if you will, what we would do in the MRCs in MRS BURU and Nimble Dancer is we will fall in on top of prepositioned equipment and use airlift to bring the people and the essential equipment and put them in place.

## NIMBLE DANCER ASSUMPTIONS

Mr. YOUNG. General, let me ask you about the assumptions for Nimble Dancer. The transportation force that was assumed for Nimble Dancer, how does it compare with the actual force that you have available today?

General RUTHERFORD. It is a little healthier. In terms of airlift it is about the same in million ton miles per day. As the C-141 comes down and the C-17 comes in, remember, we are talking about 1997 here, so basically the dollars that have already been spent give us that force structure. It is different in 2001.

On the sealift side of the house, we are at a deficit position now. We need 10 million square feet of surge sealift capacity. Today we have 5.1 million square feet of surge sealift capacity. By 1997, we will be at 7.6 million square feet of sealift capacity, 2.4 million square feet short of our requirement.

The way you fill that requirement in Nimble Dancer is with a heavy dependence on the civilian sector. We don't necessarily like to think that we are going to have to go out on the open market and find sealift to meet our surge sealift requirements to meet these contingencies, but that is what we would have to do in this time frame.

Mr. YOUNG. I have additional questions on Nimble Dancer and will submit them for the record.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto follow:]

*Question.* What were the assumptions made concerning the life assets that were available to prosecute two Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) in the wargame (Nimble Dancer)? In giving your answer please be specific with regard to: The number and type of airlift assets available; the number and type of sealift assets available; the extent to which Guard and Reserve forces were utilized; the extent to which the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and the Ready Reserve Sealift Force were activated; and the number of transportation support units that were available.

*Answer.* ———.

*Question.* How does that transportation force that was assumed for Nimble Dancer compare to the force that exists under your command today?

How does it compare to the force currently programmed in the new six year defense plan?

*Answer.* The following chart provides a comparison of transportation force assumed for Nimble Dancer I ——— to the force that exists today (1995). The Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review Update (MRS BURU) determined that airlift requirements are between 49.4 million and 51.8 million ton miles per day. Current (1995) airlift capability provides 48.88 MTM/D. ———.

*Question.* What were the lessons learned of Nimble Dancer?

*Answer.* ———.

*Question.* General, a recent GAO report questioned the assumptions, used by DoD in the Bottom-Up Review which concluded that two near simultaneous MRCs could successfully be executed. One of the issues brought up was the availability of transportation support units for two near simultaneous MRCs. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the present and projected level of transportation combat support units being available to successfully conduct two MRCs?

*Answer.* The Bottom-Up Review (BUR) was a programming initiative using forces projected for 2001. At this time, we cannot validate the conclusions of the BUR. Combatant CINCs will formulate war plans for two near simultaneous MRCs using current forces and capabilities over the next 18 months.

*Key Points:* BUR is a programming initiative looking at future requirements. OPLANs are crafted using current forces and capabilities. The OPLAN process (Joint Strategic Planning System) may determine we have shortfalls in transportation combat support units. However, we won't know the answer for about 18 months.

*Question.* If one assumes that: Two near simultaneous MRCs occurred; and a number of U.S. forces had to disembark on ongoing peacekeeping efforts or other contingencies to deploy to the MRCs; how serious of a shortfall would there be of transportation assets and transportation combat support units?

*Answer.* ———.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Murtha.

## C-17 AND NON-DEVELOPMENTAL AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT

Mr. MURTHA. It sounds like to me that you have pretty well made up your mind about the C-17. We did a study last year and Mr. Skeen and Mr. Visclosky looked into the problems, it may have been the year before, and it was always a matter of, will this thing be cost-effective, and of course it sounds like they are building them on time now. The cost obviously is still a big problem.

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURTHA. When you make a decision, are you going to recommend we buy them in enough quantity, if that is the decision, to reduce the cost substantially, or are you going to still try to just get by?

General RUTHERFORD. Right now, sir, assuming that this November we will make a decision to proceed with the C-17 program, as we know it, we would buy 120, the recommendation would be to buy 120 to 140 C-17s if we went only with the C-17. But we are also considering a NDAA option, a Non-Developmental Airlift Aircraft. This is a cost-effectiveness issue based upon the amount of bulk and oversized cargo that we might have to carry, and is there a cheaper way to do that. Bottom line, we are looking at a mix analysis right now to make sure that we have sufficient lift, at the best price.

Mr. MURTHA. So if the recommendation is to buy C-17s, to go beyond the 40, you will take into consideration the fact that if you bought 20 in a year or 12 in a year, the price is substantially less and it could be a mix; but that will be part of the consideration?

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir. Let me say that I think Congress did something very, very significant last year by approving the settlement for the C-17 program between McDonnell Douglas and the United States Air Force.

I think also that the Deputy Secretary of Defense at the time, the acquisition czar, put together a good program, because he has placed a lot of pressure on McDonnell Douglas to produce. Right now with the NDAA competition and this cost-effectiveness issue that I talked about I think McDonnell Douglas recognizes they are going to have to sharpen their pencil on airlift prices. So while we are just going into the final discussions on the contract for 1995, which will take us to 32 of the 40 C-17s, I think we will see the prices start to come down.

Mr. MURTHA. I am glad to hear that because I think this Committee is also dedicated and you will notice that in our language and everything we did last year and the years before. All the Members pretty well agreed that there was a need for airlift, but we didn't feel McDonnell Douglas was doing enough to get the cost down and they had the quality program in addition to that fact. We appreciate what you are saying and I am glad to hear that your decision is based on a mix of the C-17 and the other carriers.

General RUTHERFORD. I don't know that it will turn out being a mix by the way—

Mr. DICKS. It better.

General RUTHERFORD. But we are considering the mix. I saw Congressman Dicks walk in. That is why I had to say that.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Dicks, you are recognized.

## FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank General Rutherford for that very prompt reply to the letter. Have you had a chance to look into this further—my colleagues are aware of this problem. If the Federal Maritime Commission were eliminated and we got rid of the Shipping Act of 1984—you know we made such great help from the commercial liner fleet in military sealift, I am told that American liner shipping companies moved 85 percent of the sustainment cargo in the Persian Gulf crisis.

I got your letter and we are trying to get that out to the Members so that they will understand the implications of it. That would be a serious problem if we lost Sea-Land and APL. Would you be concerned about that?

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir. I am a good customer of Sea-Land and APL. We ship about 16 million ton miles per year, spend about \$1.3 billion on sealift in the DOD. So we are very, very concerned about not only our peacetime business but our sustainment during wartime.

We are dependent upon the U.S. flags to provide that sustainment fleet and, of course, the threat is if legislation should be passed along these lines that they would reflag and be lost to us as possible U.S. flag carriers and that is contradictory to the way we have been moving and it would be more expensive to us in the long run.

Mr. DICKS. I think it would, too. I appreciate your testimony on that.

Without objection, I would like to put a copy of the CINC's letter in the record if that would be acceptable.

[The information follows:]





UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND  
 808 SCOTT DR  
 SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE IL 62230-0027

16 Feb 95

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks  
 House of Representatives  
 2467 Rayburn House Office Bldg.  
 Washington, D.C. 20515-4706

Dear Mr. Dicks

Thank you for sharing your views regarding the potential impact of proposals to eliminate the Shipping Act of 1984 (the Act) and the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC). I understand that the structure of the statute represented a compromise of conflicting interests of many government and commercial entities. USTRANSCOM has several interests in the Act and the FMC.

To the extent that the Act provides an incentive for U.S. carriers to remain under the U.S. flag, its elimination could have a negative impact on our sealift readiness programs. In accordance with current law and government policies, these programs today focus largely on use of U.S. owned carriers to meet defense requirements. Carriers indicate that eliminating the Act could result in predatory pricing and reduced profitability, causing them to either reflag or leave the trade. Should reflagging occur, we would urge that it be conditioned on continued participation in a DOD readiness program. Should a significant number of carriers leave the trade, we would need to refocus our readiness programs to assure access to the necessary sealift capacity.

The Act also provides a defense to antitrust charges. Such defense is critical to carrier pooling arrangements which currently support DOD requirements. If the Act is eliminated, authority for such defense must be found elsewhere.

In peacetime, tariff filing with the FMC provides us visibility over prices being charged, which is useful for analyzing prices proposed for our contracts. If tariff filing is eliminated, another way of obtaining such visibility may be necessary. Also, as a large shipper, DOD is concerned that the power of a conference not be used to set prices that are abusive. If the Act is eliminated, there will still need to be some authority to enforce antitrust law and prevent abuses.

These are a few of our concerns. Should legislative proposals be introduced, USTRANSCOM will work with the Joint Staff to develop a Department of Defense position.

Sincerely



ROBERT L. RUTHERFORD  
 General, USAF  
 Commander in Chief

## C-17 AND NON-DEVELOPMENTAL AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT

Mr. DICKS. Moving back to the subject you were talking about prior to my getting here or when I got here. As I understand it, the decision of the Defense Acquisition Board on NDAA and C-17 is due in November to determine, one, the overall airlift force structure, and two, the go ahead and the decision about what to do beyond 40 C-17s. Can you tell us how that decision is going to be made and kind of what your view of it is?

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir. Be glad to. Approximately a year and a half ago, we placed the C-17 program, I will call it, on probation. Our concern was whether McDonnell Douglas could deliver a quality product that met our needs within acceptable cost. At the time the program had for various reasons bogged down and I summarize that by saying that the lawyers had become the program managers, and so after looking at that, we said what are the alternatives if the C-17 does not proceed.

The answer was an NDAA, a Non-Developmental Airlift Aircraft, and that took two different avenues there. One was a commercial derivative of a commercial airliner, MD-11, 747, DC-10 type airplane. And the other possibly a C-5D, if you will, to meet our outsize requirements.

We came up with a settlement approach which was approved by the Congress, very wisely I think, and now we are proceeding with our analysis leading up to the November DAB. Going into that analysis, we wanted to produce some more C-17s and see if McDonnell Douglas could produce them on time. We wanted to complete the development test. We are now into the initial operational test which provides us additional data on the capabilities of the airplane.

We wanted to get the airplane out and start using it in the system, which we are doing today. We will run a Reliability Maintainability and Availability Evaluation this summer to see how the C-17 performs. That test by the way will run for 30 days.

Mr. DICKS. Who is going to run this test?

General RUTHERFORD. The United States Air Force has responsibility.

Mr. DICKS. I want to put this as delicately as I can, General. You are a man of great integrity and I have great respect for you, but is this test going to be credible? I know it is going to be credible, but should we have IDA, the Institute for Defense Analysis, or somebody else there with the Air Force to make certain—because we know how strongly the Air Force feels about the C-17. I wonder whether a test like this will ring true and credible on the Hill or with the American people if it is done by the leading advocate of the C-17.

General RUTHERFORD. I don't see myself as a leading advocate of the C-17 program.

Mr. DICKS. I am not saying you, but the Air Force. We know how the Chief of Staff feels about this, your predecessor at TRANSCOM. We are trying to get an objective look at this thing. Can you assure us this will be objective and fair?

General RUTHERFORD. I will be very pleased to have anyone, GAO, whoever has an interest in the program, to come down and assist with the evaluation and look over our shoulder.

Mr. DICKS. That is a good idea.

General RUTHERFORD. And I would offer that if they would like to look at the way we have laid the test program out and should they have criticism before we begin, I would like to receive that criticism beforehand so that we can work on that.

I will tell you right now there are some people that think this test ought to be a 45-day wartime surge. The program is not that mature yet. I have 14 airplanes down there, I don't have all the crews that I need nor can I demonstrate today a full up C-17 mature wartime capability, but I think we can get a good feel for whether the airplane is capable of doing the kind of things we need it to do.

Mr. DICKS. Last time around when we did comparisons they kind of, some of us thought, puffed the C-17 and gave lesser marks to the 747 freighter and there were some convoluted factors used in order to get the kind of results that the Department of Defense wanted. All I am saying is let's have a fair and objective test.

I will say to my colleagues here, you have RAND Corporation that says a mix of about 65 C-17s and 60 747s is the most inexpensive way to proceed. Estimates I have seen say you would save between \$7 and \$10 billion. So this is worth talking about because of the difference in cost to the C-17. GAO said that the most cost-effective mix are these two planes.

My argument, and I have been through this airlift thing a few different times, is you are going to have a tremendous amount of outsize capability. You are going to have 105 C-5s, 65 C-17s, so in terms of outsize—we rarely carry tanks, Bradleys and Apaches, the so-called outsize equipment we really need—an efficient cost-effective airlifter that will be able to take the other things out, the supplies, all the other things that have to go. A 747 freighter can carry more in terms of overall poundage than a C-5 can and it can go further, it is more efficient, the cost of ownership is dramatically less than either one of these planes.

When we are talking about the difference and I hear \$10 billion, that we want to make sure that we get a good, fair, objective look at reliability and maintainability. Secretary Deutch has said to me that if the numbers aren't what they have to be, and there are standards in the contract that they are supposed to reach, then he is going to reevaluate this decision. I have supported the C-17 all the way. I have been a strong advocate for it.

I am at the point now where we have to look at the hard realities of this budget and the other things that we would like to do for the Air Force and if there is a chance to combine the two programs and save the taxpayers \$10 billion, we have to look at that seriously.

General RUTHERFORD. I agree.

#### INTERMODAL INSTALLATION PROGRAM (IIP)

Mr. BONILLA. General, I am Henry Bonilla from San Antonio, and we are known as Military City, U.S.A., because we have five installations and not too far from there we also have Laughlin Air Force Base and Fort Bliss which is also in my district.

I would like to ask about the intermodal project being proposed, one of the contenders is Fort Bliss. This is something Mr. Skeen would be very interested in as well because he borders the far western part of Texas which butts up along there with New Mexico. I know that you are working on this now and you are considering several sites. We have contacted you about the location benefits of Fort Bliss. How it is close to interstate highways, how there is room for expansion, trying to point out all of these positive things for Fort Bliss.

My question is about how the decision is coming along and what will be the primary criteria that will be used to make the decision.

General RUTHERFORD. I am from San Antonio too so it is good to be able to see you.

Mr. BONILLA. What part of town?

General RUTHERFORD. I was born in Luling, Texas. My family moved there. I reviewed the intermodal installation program when I first walked into the job four months ago. I found out we were surveying sites without having done the spade work necessary with the Services who are going to use the facilities and also the spade work with DOD.

So basically I stopped what we were doing until we had full commitment from the Services and DOD, and they were on board. Unfortunately we had created some interest with our initial surveys in the field. We are not ready at this stage of the game to make a commitment or even to sit down and talk about the criteria that we will use to make a selection on the site.

I hope to be in that position within the next six months, to have laid out the criteria for the site that we are looking for. I will tell you that Fort Bliss is very attractive to us but we are not yet in a position to make a decision.

Mr. BONILLA. How many sites will be selected?

General RUTHERFORD. One right now is all we are talking about. It is a demonstration project. We are trying to move forward with intermodalism in the use of containers. One of our problems is facilities and infrastructure, and this I think is an excellent opportunity to demonstrate to the rest of DOD what we can do if we get the right infrastructure and facilities in place.

We would like to do that at least cost, and that is why we are looking for civilian partners. I think it is premature for us to be proceeding much further until we have a buy in by the Services on this issue. Specifically, the Army needs to be on board because they are a big player.

Mr. BONILLA. Thank you, General.

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. BONILLA. I yield now to Mr. Nethercutt.

#### KC-135 TANKER AIRCRAFT

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, welcome. I am a new Member of this Committee from Washington State. We have Fairchild Air Force Base in our district.

In your testimony you talked about the C-141 and how today's outsized equipment won't fit into it, the C-5 improving its reliability and the C-17. You also mentioned that we want to enhance our

global operations and ensure availability of the KC-135 for refueling and airlift support. It seems to me that there may be added pressure and use of KC-135s, which in our area of the country are used a lot for refueling and worldwide missions.

What do you see as the next step as we use more KC-135s while we decide whether we are going to buy more C-17 or upgrading C-141s or C-5s? How do you see the future for the KC-135, and won't it likely receive more use as we turn to it for different functions other than just refueling?

General RUTHERFORD. Yes. The KC-135 fleet is one of the oldest airplanes that we have in the inventory today, 35 years old on average. It is an old Boeing 707 airplane. It is old in age but it is young in terms of flying hours. They have on average 14,000 flying hours as opposed to a C-141, which has about 37,000 hours on average. So we are watching the KC-135s very closely.

We are doing extensive inspection of the KC-135s to make sure that we don't run into the same kind of corrosion problems that we ran into in the C-141. That would be the major concern with the KC-135.

We have reengined a good portion of the fleet now, putting fan jet engines on, at the same time we reskinned some of the wings, beefed up the gear and put an auxiliary power unit in the airplanes. Tremendous airplane, considering its age. It has one of the highest mission capability rates of any airplane I have in the fleet now and departure reliability is next to the KC-10, which is very, very good. So I am very pleased with the machine.

We don't see the corrosion problems now that we thought we might find, and we have looked fairly extensively. I see the fleet going out somewhere well beyond the year 2020 right now unless we run into something unexpected. It is an old airplane but it is flying very well.

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Even with expanded use of it, at least the contemplated expanded use?

General RUTHERFORD. When we were having C-141 problems, we looked at using the KC-135 for additional cargo moving. There is a small niche there it can fill. We have bought some rollers to go on the floor of the airplane so we can move cargo on and off more easily. We bought 100 sets. We have used the airplane to haul some cargo but that is not an efficient use of that airplane and it has a limited capacity in terms of a 747 or a C-17. So if forced to use it in that role, we have some potential but I don't see us using it in that role very often.

Mr. NETHERCUTT. I took a refueling mission with the Air National Guard people out our way and let me tell you they keep those airplanes in wonderful shape, as you know, I am sure, and there is a very dedicated group that flies them out of Fairchild, and I am sure across the country.

General RUTHERFORD. Thank you, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Nethercutt.

Mr. Neumann.

Mr. NEUMANN. I have no questions, sir.

## AIR MOBILITY COMMAND DEFICIENCIES

Mr. YOUNG. General, let me ask you a couple of questions relative to the hearing that we are going to have next month on the overall issue of airlift. The airlift mission area plan, which is part of the soon-to-be-published Air Force modernization plan, details numerous process infrastructure and equipment deficiencies for the Air Mobility Command, AMC. Among these are; AMC capability is limited by insufficient airlift capacity, AMC aircraft are vulnerable to attack, AMC aircraft lack worldwide navigation coverage and accuracy is less than desired. AMC aircraft on-load and off-load capability is limited by insufficient materiel handling equipment. Current mission planning methods and systems take too long and make use of information that may not be current. AMC's ability to command and control assets lacks speed, simplicity, depth, security and compatibility with other C-2 systems.

In view of these deficiencies, General, number one, do you agree with these listed deficiencies; and number two, what can we in the Congress and you in your position do to help resolve this?

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir, I do agree with those deficiencies. As with any system there is always room for improvement, and that is what we are talking about in this regard.

I mentioned that my number-one priority right now is replacing some of my airlift equipment, specifically that C-141. I will address my second concern in that area, the Material Handling Equipment, MHE as we know it. These are the 40K loaders. It is a device that we use to roll cargo onto so that we can roll it on and off the airplane. You would say that doesn't sound very sophisticated. It is not, but it is absolutely essential.

The equipment we have right now, the 40K loader, is 23 years old. It was intended to have a life span of eight years. It has a mean time between failure right now of 10 hours. Thank goodness this Congress has been good enough to give us the money to start a replacement program and we have the 60K replacement program ongoing right now. It will replace the 40K loaders and will also replace another wide-body loader that we use for commercial-type airplanes, which, by the way, we have only 50 percent of the required capability there today. So these are areas that we are working. I think they are well underway.

Navigation, for example, we have the funding program to put Global Positioning System, GPS receivers in all our airplanes. I think we are coming along well. The real issue is, can we stay the course and maintain the funding in an area that sometimes doesn't receive as much attention as the things that go bang but nevertheless are very essential.

I would plead with you to hang in with us and see the airlift modernization program through to completion, and I think by the year 2001 to 2006 we will be in a fairly good position in the airlift business.

Mr. YOUNG. Under the leadership of Chairman Murtha in past years, the Committee has placed a very strong emphasis on air and sealift, and I can assure that we are going to continue that effort. We are doing battle today to get a higher budget number so that

we can begin to turn the corner and make some of these improvements that are required.

Could the deficiencies threaten the capability of AMC to conduct a mission or to support two MRCs in the near future?

General RUTHERFORD. If these programs are not corrected they will ultimately have an impact on us. Like I said, I think we are in decent shape now. My real fear is that we will find a problem in the C-141 tomorrow which will restrict the airframe again or possibly ground it. I think it is essential that we get on with the replacement program.

Mr. YOUNG. We certainly understand the problem and we are doing everything we can to help correct it.

General RUTHERFORD. Thank you, sir.

#### SEALIFT PROGRAMS

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Murtha.

Mr. MURTHA. Where are we with sealift, General? I know you mentioned that in your opening statement. We have been so interested in this and everybody has fought us, and finally General Powell, a couple of years ago, said he was going to take a personal interest in it.

The Committee has been in the forefront of working sealift. Going back 15 years, if it hadn't been for this Committee SL-7s would not have been available in Saudi Arabia. We got criticized for that decision but it turned out we were right.

Where are we in sealift now?

General RUTHERFORD. If I can talk about it in three boxes. One is surge sealift, the ships we are looking for to leave the States and move immediately into the AOR, wherever that may be. Our requirement is for 10 million square feet of surge sealift. As I mentioned, today we have about 5.0 million square feet but we have a program in place to get us to 10 million square feet. We do that by buying 19 Large, Medium-Speed Roll-On and Roll-Off ships.

Mr. MURTHA. Are those the Army ones?

General RUTHERFORD. Actually, sir, of that 19, eight of them end up going to work for the Army in the prepositioning RO/RO and 11 end up back here ready to move the surge requirement, Army heavy divisions and Marine afloat follow-on echelon. So we need 19 of those ships. These are big ships, carrying about 250,000 square feet, about twice as big as a normal Roll-On/Roll-Off ship, and capable of doing 24 knots, so they have a tremendous capability.

Mr. MURTHA. So you gave up speed for the size?

General RUTHERFORD. They have pretty good speed and pretty good size. They are not as fast as the Fast Sealift Ships but twice as big as the RRF Roll-On/Roll-Off ships. Not twice as big as the SL-7. That is a pretty good size ship, 180,000 square feet. We are talking 250,000 to 280,000 square feet for the LMSRs.

Mr. MURTHA. The SL-7 goes over 30 knots; is that accurate?

General RUTHERFORD. The maximum speed of the SL-7 is greater than 30 knots, however, we do not normally operate at those speeds. So these ships are important to us.

The other thing that you did is give approval to expand the Ready Reserve Force to 36 ships Roll-On/Roll-Off ships. We found out in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, we didn't have enough

RO/RO ships to move the heavy equipment we needed to move. So we have invested in that now.

We will ultimately end up with 10 million square feet; we will have eight fast sealift ships, 11 Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Offs, 36 RRF RO/RO ships, normal RO/RO ships that I buy off the open market are 15, to 25 years old but capable, and then 34 other ships, few break bulk ships, five tankers and a miscellaneous assortment of other types. That gives you 10 million square feet of surge capability.

Mr. MURTHA. You are at 5 million right now?

General RUTHERFORD. Actually 5.1 million to be exact. In addition to that, we have a requirement for sustainment follow-on if you will, that we do not need to go buy and put in the organic force. We can contract that in the open market. That is why we have U.S. flag carriers out there and effective U.S. control hooks on some of those ships.

We think we need about 19 ammunition ships from the civil sector, container ships to carry ammunition and we need another 14 ships worth of capacity per week to move 20 foot containers to the area for sustainment.

I am, generally speaking, about a 33-ship capacity for sustainment to support one MRC. In addition to that, we have the prepo ships sitting out there. Right now the Marine Corps has 13 going to 14 MPS ships. We have another 10 ships tied up in the AWR-3. That was the Army portion that you were talking about.

By the way, while waiting for those eight Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off ships—we have less capability out there today than required. We have seven Roll-On/Roll-Off ships out of the RRF that are doing that prepo mission today. That is only half of what we need.

When the LMSRs come out, we will put those over there and we will bring those RO/RO ships back to the RRF. Then you have some Navy and Air Force prepositioning, which is about another 10 ships. That is our total sealift picture as it stands today.

#### JOINT LOGISTICS OVER-THE-SHORE (JLOTS)

Mr. MURTHA. What is the difference in time when you go to a port facility like Saudi Arabia has, which is modern, versus an area where you don't have those kinds of port facilities available? What is the difference in time in loading and unloading?

General RUTHERFORD. If you have to go over the shore, sir, and we use what we call the JLOTS capability where we are standing offshore and unloading over the shoreline that is a very difficult operation. You can't do that over a sea state three because you have to drop the doors and roll that equipment on and off.

I would say, generally speaking, you have increased your off-load time three- to four-fold and it is heavily dependent upon weather conditions. Right now we plan on going into a port, it takes it four days to load and two to four days to off-load, if we are in a decent port.

Mr. MURTHA. Even in Saudi Arabia with all the cranes and everything, it takes four days. What would you say when you go into Korea and you have the facilities that are destroyed; what would it take?



General RUTHERFORD. If we could not use the port at all it would take us a long time, sir, 12 or 13 days.

Mr. MURTHA. Three or four times as long?

General RUTHERFORD. It would take a long time.

#### PREPOSITIONING OF EQUIPMENT

Mr. MURTHA. So prepositioning becomes very important, putting anything you can get on the ground is important, ammunition and so forth. Personnel you can fly in,—

General RUTHERFORD. But sealift prepositioning is important too because once on the ground, say in Saudi Arabia and they decide they need it in Korea, it is much harder to move that. If I have it prepositioned on a ship sitting in Diego Garcia, then I can go either way with it.

#### WARTIME RISK TO PORT FACILITIES

Mr. MURTHA. You can go either way if you have the port facility?

General RUTHERFORD. Yes.

Mr. MURTHA. My concern is in Korea, if they came South, the first thing they would do is destroy the port facilities for obvious reasons, and it would take us not only time to get there but time to get unloaded. So our reaction time would be delayed substantially if we had to come into port facilities that weren't modern.

General RUTHERFORD. That is why the halting phase is so important to us in those two MRCs and getting that force in place early on. —

In Korea, I think the Koreans are very sensitive to that. They have a 750,000-man force. It is no small force that they have in place, so I think they would try to protect the ports.

Mr. MURTHA. We went over there a year ago and we were concerned. Because we went there, they sent several teams over and I think we improved substantially—General Luck is still concerned about the potential of North Korea, but I really see, and one of the staff just mentioned to me, that you got the other, the SCUD missile attacks on the port facilities in addition. So we have real problems if we had to reinforce in ports that weren't adequately provided for.

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir, no doubt about that. I share your concerns.

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. McDade.

#### C-17 STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS

Mr. MCDADE. General it is good to see you again. Let's talk about the C-17. In January, this year you declared the C-17 to be operational with the first squadron of 14 currently operating in Charleston.

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCDADE. The Committee has been told that even though the unit is operational, there have been difficult structural problems with respect to most of the planes. For example, the first plane that was flown in, the Committee is informed, had 16,000 pounds of concrete to correct the center of gravity problem that existed on

that first plane. We are told that virtually every other C-17 that has been flown needs to be taken to Oklahoma for modification work to correct structural deficiencies that should have been taken care of prior to acceptance.

Would you comment on that?

General RUTHERFORD. I wasn't around when the first airplanes came off the line. I am told that when we tested the first airplane because of the way we do testing it was restricted due to center of gravity limitations. To maintain the airplane within previously tested limits while we expanded the envelope, we put concrete blocks in there to get the CG in an adequate position.

Mr. MCDADE. Not a critical item?

General RUTHERFORD. Not a critical item. That is customary. So I was not concerned with that.

There are modifications going on with the airplanes right now. We went into production before we completed the test of the airplane. We found out we wanted to strengthen the wing, so we are in the process of putting strengtheners in the wings. That is being done by McDonnell Douglas. That was in the specification. They are paying for that and making those modifications to the airplane.

But with any program in production while development is still going on, you are going to have those kinds of things. They have made the modifications on time in accordance with agreement.

I just received my first test airplane, P-5, which was part of the test program, and they completely rehabbed that airplane and gave it to us and it was in great shape.

#### C-17 FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS

Mr. MCDADE. Are there any flight restrictions on the first squadron?

General RUTHERFORD. There are two continuing restrictions. One has to do with Army release on air-drop issues. We are presently conducting operational tests on the airplane. It is at this stage of the game when the Army comes in and looks at the test program and says that it meets their standards and that we are clear to go ahead and drop. So right now until the Army completes their testing on it, we are restricted from dropping in certain configurations.

The other stipulation we have is we are withholding clearance for the airplane to take off on a 3,000-foot dirt runway. We have taken it off on dirt runways, but if we lose an engine on a 3,000-foot dirt runway, our problem is being able to stop because the coefficient of friction is not the same on dirt as on a paved surface. Just being able to operate off of a 3,000-foot runway is pretty significant. When you consider it is dirt, that is also significant.

Our concern is the safety margin associated with the loss of an engine, and stopping the airplane in the remaining runway. But under operational conditions if we had to use that airplane, we would use it.

#### C-17 OPERATIONAL MISSIONS

Mr. MCDADE. What operations has the C-17 participated in to date?

General RUTHERFORD. We have used the C-17 to support the operation in Saudi Arabia, this last year when Iraq moved south. We

only used two airplanes and it was a demonstration. It was the first time the C-17 had been away from home.

We are using the airplane regularly to support channel routes today, to support troops in Haiti. Today I have an airplane running a normal channel route to Mildenhall in England. Yesterday I had one running into South America. So the airplane is working for us.

Mr. MCDADE. Beyond two C-17s you had 14. How many are being used for operational activities?

General RUTHERFORD. Probably one every other day.

Mr. MCDADE. Is there some reason that you don't get through all 14—

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir. We are trying to use the capabilities of this airplane in the system, but, we are also trying to train 75 crews.

Mr. MCDADE. So the aircraft and crews are in training?

General RUTHERFORD. Yes. Additionally, I have operational tests going on. That is pretty good for 14 airplanes.

#### C-17 PERFORMANCE

Mr. MCDADE. What do the performance records say after the planes have been either in operation or training activity? Can you tell us what they appear to tell you about the airplane?

General RUTHERFORD. In terms of what sir?

Mr. MCDADE. You know what performance records generally talk about, right? Did it perform well?

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir. I have flown the airplane myself. It is a superb airplane. I have refueled the airplane, I have turned it around on a 90-foot runway, I have landed it on a 3,000-foot runway. I have backed the airplane up 2,000 feet. It is like driving a car. It is a tremendous air machine.

Mr. MCDADE. You didn't find any negative performance reports, I take it?

General RUTHERFORD. I was very pleased with the airplane. The only criticism I would have, is if you sit in the back end next to the paratrooper's door, it is too cold when working at altitude.

Mr. MCDADE. Are there any negative reports that have been filed?

General RUTHERFORD. We are still finding things. We are losing too many panels off the airplane. Manufacturing hasn't figured out how to attach them properly. One of the causes is landing on a 3,000-foot runway because it is like landing on a carrier.

Mr. MCDADE. McDonnell Douglas is paying for all repairs and modifications?

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCDADE. Is there anything that you know about the airplane that critically affects its mission?

General RUTHERFORD. No.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Dicks.

#### C-17 CENTER OF GRAVITY ISSUE

Mr. DICKS. General, you declared the C-17 to be operational on January 17, 1995, with the first squadron of 14 aircraft currently operating at Charleston Air Force Base. The Committee under-

stands that even though this unit is "operational," most of the aircraft in the squadron have had performance/structural problems.

For example, the first C-17 delivered to Charleston had to be flown in carrying 16,000 pounds of concrete to correct for center gravity problems. Virtually every other C-17 aircraft delivered to date—was this just asked?

Mr. MCDADE. Yes.

Mr. DICKS. Is that true?

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir. The initial airplane was restricted to 30 percent CG. As we went through the test program and we expanded the envelope on the CG, we pulled the blocks out and that is what you would do in a normal test. You start off conservatively and expand as you go along.

When we received the airplane it was restricted because the test program had not reached that point yet. As the test continued to develop, we took the weights out and expanded the CG limits. Not a problem.

Mr. DICKS. It had to be flown to Oklahoma?

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. DICKS. Is that normal?

General RUTHERFORD. In a program of this sort, yes, sir it is. We were in production before we completed development test. We found things in development test and we told McDonnell Douglas, this doesn't meet our standards so you take the airplane back and fix it.

Mr. DICKS. Have they been able to fix it?

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir.

#### RELIABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY, AND AVAILABILITY EVALUATION

Mr. DICKS. What were the initial numbers for reliability, maintainability and availability?

General RUTHERFORD. Let me give you the numbers that we sought to demonstrate last November. Even though it was very small in nature, we established some targets and I will give you those for the record and show you the results of that test that we did in November.

[The information follows:]

#### READINESS REVIEW DATA—NOVEMBER 1994

(Readiness review No. 1—final reliability, maintainability, and availability (RM&A) results)

Parameter (ORD mature)	Spec			Mature		
	Req	Goal	Act	Req	Goal	Good
Mission completion success probability .....	82.2	91.1	92.7	93.0	97.0	↑
Mean time between maintenance (inherent) .....	1.15	1.31	2.80	1.61	1.78	↑
Mean time between removal .....	1.98	2.34	5.36	2.80	3.10	↑
Maintenance man-hour per flying hour .....	33.1	26.3	5.78	18.6	17.0	↓
Mean man-hours to repair .....	8.65	8.01	3.60	7.35	6.71	↓
Mission capable rate .....	79.8	81.0	82.0	82.5	83.7	↑

Cumulative fleet production flying hours=4796.9<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Fleet maturity flying hours=100,000.

#### C-17 MANUFACTURING DIFFERENCES

Mr. DICKS. Staff says that up to this point each of the planes has been different. Is that a fair criticism, that we are getting—that

each plane has its own set of unique deficiencies and that they are really not manufactured the same? Is that a fair criticism?

General RUTHERFORD. I haven't heard that criticism, sir. There is no doubt in my mind that each airplane is a little bit different. These are not fine dresses off a rack. Any airplane has a few differences over time. We have learned some things as we have gone through development and we have incorporated some of those and that is what we are doing at Tulsa now, bringing them all up to the same standard.

Mr. DICKS. This summer if you are going to do the Reliability, Maintainability and Availability Evaluation, aren't you going to have a homogeneous plane?

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir. That is the goal by the time we reach this July for that test; we will have the 12 airplanes we are going to use in the tests all in the same configuration.

Mr. DICKS. Are they going to be able to correct their problems and start producing off-the-line planes that are less deficient than these original ones?

General RUTHERFORD. They have, sir.

Mr. DICKS. We are at 14. Have we gotten two planes that are pretty close to being similar to each other?

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir, 17 and 18, which they just delivered, are very close to the same airplane. I can provide some additional information for you for the record if you would like, but for all intents and purposes I think they are close.

You are asking me, are these airplanes exactly the same? They have millions of parts in them. The software systems in the airplane right now are the same. There are a few differences in the airplane, and that is why I said we are doing modifications at Tulsa. The early generators were government-furnished equipment and we said we don't think they are big enough so we are putting 75/90 KVA generators in there and we had 45/60 KVA generators in to start with.

#### C-17 OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS

Mr. DICKS. Are they flying under any restrictions?

General RUTHERFORD. There are two restrictions on the airplane now. The Army has not given us full release. This is part of the test plane. After we finish development test we go into operational test and the operators take over and operate it. It is not only guys flying the airplane; the Army also gets involved in the act. We are going to drop cargo out of the back of the airplane and have people jump out of the airplane. They have not completed their test until we complete the Operational Test and Evaluation, OT&E, test on the airplane. At that time they will give us release to do the day-to-day jumping out of the aircraft.

The other thing we have on hold is being able to take off from a 3,000-foot dirt runway. Our concern here is the loss of an engine as we are doing the 3,000-foot take off roll and being able to stop on the runway. Our concern is the coefficient of friction on dirt versus a paved surface. We are still evaluating whether we want to proceed with that option.

There is no doubt, if operational considerations call for us to do this we would go ahead and take off on a 3,000-foot runway and

operate, but right now, at this stage of the game, we restricted the aircraft from this operation.

#### RELIABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY, AND AVAILABILITY STANDARDS

**Mr. DICKS.** When you do reliability, maintainability and availability, what are those standards?

**General RUTHERFORD.** Basically what we are looking for, sir, is a high-use rate on the airplane.

**Mr. DICKS.** So how many hours a day?

**General RUTHERFORD.** Twelve point two-five hours a day, wartime high surge rate 15 hours a day. Those are some of the factors that we will test against in July. We are looking at mean time between failure on parts, at how many parts we use during an extensive RM&A evaluation.

The evaluation this summer is 30 days long. Seven days of that will be during wartime TEMPOS. We will fly 2,000 hours during those 30 days on two airplanes. A thousand of that will be flown during a seven-day wartime period. It is not a full-up 45-day wartime surge capability because we are not mature enough to be able to do that yet.

I think it will be a decent test and I invite critics to look over our shoulders, and if they have criticism about how we do the test, I would like to hear about it. I will provide additional RM&AE requirements for the record.

[The information follows:]

#### RELIABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY, AND AVAILABILITY EVALUATION (RM&AE) REQUIREMENTS

[RM&AE contractual requirements and goals]

Parameter (ORD mature)	Spec			Mature		
	Req	Goal	Act	Req	Goal	Good
Mission completion success probability .....	85.9	93.1	.....	93.0	97.0	↑
Mean time between maintenance (inherent) .....	1.29	1.46	.....	1.61	1.78	↑
Mean time between removal .....	2.33	2.59	.....	2.80	3.10	↑
Maintenance man-hour per flying hour .....	28.2	23.1	.....	18.6	17.0	↓
Mean man-hours to repair .....	8.20	7.60	.....	7.35	6.71	↓
Mission capable rate .....	80.7	81.9	.....	82.5	83.7	↑

Estimated cumulative fleet production flying hours at RM&AE=13,500<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Fleet maturity flying hours=100,000.

**Mr. YOUNG.** **Mr. Hobson.**

#### C-17 PROGRAM

**Mr. HOBSON.** How much has this airplane cost so far?

**Mr. RUTHERFORD.** Sir, I am the user. I would say roughly, and I can get the number for the record, probably in the neighborhood of \$15 billion has been committed on the airplane right now. Maybe a little bit more than that.

[The information follows:]

Total cost to include RDT&E, Procurement, MILCON, and Simulators to date is \$18,134.9 million (\$18.1 billion).

Purchase 32 C-17s and long lead for next 8 (Block VIII)\*. Funding reflects the C-17 fiscal year 1996 President's Budget documentation.

Prior .....	14
Fiscal year 1993 .....	6
Fiscal year 1994 .....	6

Fiscal year 1995 .....	6
Fiscal year 1996 .....	*8
Total .....	40

Mr. HOBSON. How many do you have now?

General RUTHERFORD. They have delivered 19 airplanes, sir. We have been at the program since 1981. It has taken us 14 years to get to this point.

Mr. HOBSON. And you are scheduled to get what, 40 of these; is that right?

General RUTHERFORD. That is the plan, to take us to 40. The last eight airplanes are in the 1996 budget this year.

Mr. HOBSON. How would you characterize the program overall? I am sorry I wasn't here for the beginning—let me ask from two perspectives, one from a taxpayer's standpoint and two from a military standpoint, how does this program look?

General RUTHERFORD. This program has been a disaster. It should not have taken us this long to get to the point we are at today. I think there is a lot of fault to go around. There are many Members of this Committee that are more familiar with the background than probably I am.

What I have seen since the Congress approved the settlement last year between the U.S. Government and McDonnell Douglas, is a turn around in the C-17 program. I wasn't involved in the program prior to this, but I have seen the last six deliveries ahead of schedule. On average they have been 22 days ahead of schedule.

We did a miniature Reliability, Maintainability and Availability—RM&A test in November this year. The results exceeded our expectations. I declared Initial Operational Capability, IOC, on the airplane on 17 January, and to do that I needed to have 12 airplanes on the ramp. At Charleston that day, I had 13 because they had delivered another airplane early. I had 48 aircrews trained, maintenance personnel trained, spares and training systems in place. And the enroute capability was there for the airplane to demonstrate that it had an operational capability.

I went out and flew the airplane and was very pleased with its performance. I talked to all the people, got recommendations from everybody involved in the program before I declared IOC on the airplane, and I am very pleased with what I see today.

Mr. HOBSON. What did you become—

General RUTHERFORD. In October of this last year, sir.

Mr. HOBSON. I was down there and that is why—I think it was before you were there. One of my problems with this is—and I don't mean this to you; you can never find anybody who was ever involved in these things back when. It is always we are here now, and we screwed up, and we are going to fix it. That goes on. I never sat on this Committee before, but I will bet there have been a lot of people over the years on this aircraft and other aircraft have had to pick up the same thing you have.

As a taxpayer we sit out there and we look at this stuff and that is why we have a lot of trouble defending ourselves in the budgetary process, because of this type of thing. When I flew on the airplane, for example, there were a lot of problems with the software still. Has that been taken care of now?

General RUTHERFORD. When was that, sir?

Mr. HOBSON. Last spring.

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir, it has been taken care of.

Mr. HOBSON. Because when I was there, that lady's voice kept coming on and saying there is a problem here. We flicked it off because we got tired of hearing it and kept on flying the airplane.

General RUTHERFORD. In December we got the IOC final release to go operational with the software, the one we will take into RM&AE. I think the airplane is doing good.

#### C-17 SOFTWARE

Mr. MURTHA. What about software?

General RUTHERFORD. We got our last release on the software in December before I declared IOC, which corrects many of the problems. There were problems but nothing of great magnitude in my mind.

You were talking about accountability. I happen to know two Air Force general officers who are no longer in the United States Air Force as a result of this program.

#### NUMBER OF C-17 CREWMEMBERS

Mr. HOBSON. Good. I would like to ask about the crew. How many crew persons will be on this aircraft when it is truly operational?

General RUTHERFORD. Three.

Mr. HOBSON. Who looks at that? I think if there is somebody firing at you, and you are trying to land this thing, you have only one person in the back. As I understand it, there is a pilot, co-pilot and one crew person or loadmaster in the back. Is that adequate to use this aircraft in a hostile environment?

General RUTHERFORD. I don't have any concerns about that, sir. I am not necessarily going to run a C-17 in the middle of a place where they are going to be shooting a lot unless I need to.

Mr. HOBSON. It seems to me that one person capable of handling that back because there is a lot of mechanisms that that person has to operate. If they are incapacitated, that mission is going to have a hard time being accomplished back there or on the flying capabilities. You get too many people on this side if you don't have enough, but it seems to me that you are asking an awful lot of that Roadmaster.

General RUTHERFORD. If we had that kind of situation we could put another observer in the airplane, but that wouldn't be the normal mode of operation.

#### C-17 BASING

Mr. HOBSON. The other thing is all those, all 40 of these are going to be located—I am being a little parochial—all 40 are going to be located in one spot?

General RUTHERFORD. That is the current plan. If we get more than 40, they could be in more than one spot.

Mr. HOBSON. Why was that decision made about putting 40 aircraft in that one spot, which I understand the test mode of it, but what was the reasoning behind that?



General RUTHERFORD. The efficiency and economy provided by one single operation location. For example, you only have to have one set of training material and one set of spares. I understand the vulnerability associated with that.

Mr. HOBSON. You have weather problems. You have to move those aircraft out of there once in a while.

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir. I was stationed in Georgia for some time and we never moved our airplanes for the three years. B-2 is a similar situation. AWACS is another situation where we have a concentration of airplanes.

#### C-17 CARGO CAPABILITIES

Mr. HOBSON. I have some problem with locating all those aircraft in one spot. I have heard other reasons why they are there but won't get into that at this time. I do think that the airplane does have some good capabilities but it is a heck of a price to pay for those capabilities and I have been on the old—I flew there on a C-141 and have had them come in and out of my Guard base at Wright Paterson and we do need to reconfigure this environment.

There are some people—I guess Mr. Dicks left—who would look at different types of configurations of aircraft and not depend on one. This may be a little unfair to you—when I was there, and I can't remember which airplane it was, we don't seem to talk to each other very well on some things. Can you put two HMMWV's side by side on this airplane?

General RUTHERFORD. I believe so.

Mr. HOBSON. There is one that we can't and I can't remember whether it was this one or not.

General RUTHERFORD. The C-141 you can't.

Mr. HOBSON. Two inches or four inches, probably the HMMWV wasn't developed when the C-141 was developed.

General RUTHERFORD. A Bradley Fighting Vehicle is a good example. The M-113, its predecessor, would fit in a C-141. The Bradley you have to tear down. It takes you longer to tear it down and put it back together than it takes to fly across the Atlantic.

Mr. HOBSON. There is some sort of truck, special purpose truck, and I don't know what it is, that this one will take that hardly anything else will take?

General RUTHERFORD. It is the new Army vehicle they call it the FMTV. You are going to ask me what that stands for, it is the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles for the Army, and it is replacing their 2.5 and five-ton trucks.

It will fit on a C-17 and on a C-141 if you take the cab off of it. There are two versions of it, one has a removable cab and one does not.

Mr. HOBSON. Guess which one will show up when you have to go on a C-141.

General RUTHERFORD. That is an issue between the C-17 and the NDAA. When we get into what we call oversize cargo, a big part of that is vehicles, and to the extent that the Army is expanding the size of their vehicles, then you get into a determining if those vehicles will fit in a commercial type airplane. For example, you will have to expand some doors and increase the strength of

some floors in order to be able to handle the FMTV 2.5 and five-ton trucks in a commercial-type airplane.

Mr. HOBSON. Would it be your suggestion—and again I apologize that I wasn't here—from what you see of this aircraft, we have a problem with configuration analysts. If you were us and you got to bet on the future from what you know about this aircraft, would you bet on this aircraft to solve that for our future lift capability or would you look at a configuration that includes something, other types of existing aircraft now—what would be your bet?

General RUTHERFORD. I will take the C-17, sir, based upon what I know now.

#### C-17 CREW TRAINING

Mr. HOBSON. Crews—I understand that in the training of the crew, and you have gotten 48 of them now—

General RUTHERFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HOBSON. You fly the simulator and you go out and you fly this once with an instructor and then it is yours, is that right?

General RUTHERFORD. No, sir, I don't think so. That is the way I did it, but the normal guy is going to get more training than that. The airplane itself is not hard to fly. You are always going to have two pilots in the airplane and one will be qualified and one may be upgrading. The airplane is extremely easy to fly. All you need to know is the software and what the buttons do and a lot of that you can pick up on a simulator.

Mr. HOBSON. I thought, wow, but they say the young guys can fly this better than the older people because they are used to playing computer games and this thing is all video in the cockpit so older pilots have a harder time. You are obviously very young—

General RUTHERFORD. The problem I have with the airplane is it has a stick in it, not the wheel. It has a stick just like a fighter. It is in the left hand in the left seat so that is kind of an awkward way to fly.

#### TANKER AIRCRAFT REFUELING

Mr. HOBSON. I was going to ask you about one other thing and that relates to there is a fight going to go on—it is not a fight—the Air Force uses one method to refuel, the Navy uses another. Is there going to be any meshing of that from what you can see?

General RUTHERFORD. Not immediately, sir, and the problem is not necessarily in the equipment in the tanker airplanes. It is modifying all the receiver airplanes we have now. The Navy uses a probe system into a basket. Probe and drogue we call it. The Air Force has always had a boom into a receptacle. To go back and modify all the Air Force and Navy airplanes right now would be prohibitive, it seems to me.

Mr. HOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS. I apologize that I couldn't be here. I won't ask any questions right now.

Mr. YOUNG. Do other Members have questions?

## PROGRESS OF THE C-17 AIRCRAFT

Mr. BONILLA. One question. General, to summarize the C-17 discussion, wouldn't it be correct to say that this is the only game in town for oversize airlift at this time and we ought to look forward rather than back on years past that were kind of a mess?

General RUTHERFORD. There are alternatives, sir. The C-17 is making good progress. I reemphasize that. I think we have come a long way. It took us far too long and cost too much money, I will be the first to admit.

If we go through the rest of our evaluation here and get to November and the cost is too high or the C-17 doesn't meet its performance specs, we can still drop back to the C-5D or a commercial version of the 747, or MD-11 or DC-10. I don't think those alternatives are very attractive because they don't offer the potential that the C-17 does.

The C-17 has far more capability to do the kinds of missions I need to do. If you are going to take off from Dallas-Fort Worth and go to Frankfurt, a commercial version is a good way to go, especially if you are going to haul bulk cargo. If you are going to take off from Travis and you are going to air refuel and take water equipment into Rwanda to save some starving people, the 747 can't do that. We did that with the C-5 last time but that is old technology, very expensive to operate. The air crew is about twice as big. The maintenance crew is about twice as big on the C-5.

So there are alternatives. I am telling you as an operator that has to fly a thousand missions a week into 40 different countries that the C-17 is very attractive to me. I want it at the right price. We don't have dollars to waste now, so we have to get the right price. I think Congress did the right thing last year when they approved the settlement to McDonnell Douglas to get the price down.

Mr. LEWIS. Will the gentlemen yield? Since you are responsible for delivering troops and material when we really need them, this is a very important area from my perspective.

Is there another aircraft that can deliver that material as well as other things that we need in a 3,000-foot airstrip or less?

General RUTHERFORD. When we laid out the requirements for the C-17, we looked for an airplane that had the ground maneuvering capability and the short field landing characteristics of a C-130 while having lift capabilities of the bigger C-5D.

We were looking to replace the C-141, so we took the best of both and tried to design it in one airplane. I think that is what we have today. For an operator it is the best of all worlds. I can carry outsize cargo, bulk cargo, I can refuel, airdrop, go into austere fields, maneuver there; that is the kind of thing I need to give me the flexibility to do the job.

We can argue about how much of that flexibility we need. That is what we are talking about when we talk about this mix as we approach the November decision, is there a niche in there for some less expensive commercial type airplanes? We will have to review the data to make that decision.

## USE OF C-17 IN RWANDA

Mr. LEWIS. I understand in Rwanda if the C-17 were available there are some estimates we could have gotten there very quickly and saved thousands of lives in that kind of emergency because of the maneuverability. The cost of the maneuverability of the airplane, any time we go on a contingency, one of the biggest problems is being able to operate on the ground.

General RUTHERFORD. In Rwanda we had to have tankers loiter above the airfield there because we were so crowded on the ground that we were air refueling airplanes to keep them airborne. The C-17 is not only smaller than a C-5, it is about the size of a C-141, but it also has the ability to back up. You can nose dock it and back it up.

If you can imagine being at Dallas-Fort Worth where all the gates are full, all the ramp spaces are full, and you are sitting on the runway—you have shut down the airport. We can run into this situation more frequently because we don't have many Dallas-Fort Worths to operate into.

One of the big advantages of the C-17 is its ability to move around on the ground and not take up so much space.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Nethercutt.

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Nothing further, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. Do any other Members have questions?

General, thank you very much for an extremely interesting hearing. I think we are going to see you again on March 29 specifically with the airlift hearing. We want to extend an invitation to you to communicate with us without waiting for a hearing.

Thank you very much for your excellent testimony.

The Committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto follow:]

## SEALIFT REQUIREMENTS

*Question.* Describe the overall sealift requirement to the Committee that is necessary to support two major regional contingencies. What sealift assets are available to your command today to support this requirement in both the organic sealift fleet and the Ready Reserve Force?

*Answer.* The Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-up Review Update (MRS BURU) determined the intertheater strategic lift requirement for a conventional conflict within four separate scenarios. Included in this scenario set are the nearly-simultaneous MRC East—MRC West scenario and the nearly-simultaneous MRC West—MRC East scenario.

The overall sealift requirement for the dual MRC case is 4 million square feet capacity for afloat pre-positioning, 10 million square feet of CONUS-based organic surge sealift, approximately 7000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) of resupply, and 19 dedicated vessels for ammunition (15 container ships and 4 breakbulk vessels). To meet this requirement, the MRS BURU validated the acquisition recommendations of the 1992 Mobility Requirements Study. MRS recommended the acquisition of 19 Large, Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off vessels (LMSRs) and an expansion of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) Roll-On/Roll-Off vessel fleet to a total of 36 through the purchase of 19 used roll-on/roll-off vessels.

Today, we have approximately 3 million square feet of capacity in our afloat pre-positioned force and a total of 6.5 million square feet of capacity in the CONUS-based Military Sealift Command (MSC) organic fleet and RRF. Of this CONUS-based capacity, 5 million square feet is maintained in readiness sufficient to support surge requirements. Completion of LMSR and RRF RO/RO acquisition, coupled with

full-funding of the operations and maintenance of all of our sealift fleets is essential to attaining the MRS BURU capability goals by fiscal year 2001.

To meet the ammunition and resupply requirements, we plan to rely upon U.S.-owned and treaty-committed commercial sealift capacity. We are currently working with the U.S.-flag commercial maritime industry to develop the procedures and programs necessary to provide assured access to commercial sealift capacity to meet our resupply and ammunition movement requirements.

*Question.* In the recent Nimble Dancer wargame what assumptions were made about the activation times of the organic fleet (the Fast Sealift Ships) and the Ready Reserve Force (RRF)?

*Answer.* The following were the assumed activation times for the FSS and RRF ships in Nimble Dancer I \_\_\_\_\_.

*Question.* During Operation DESERT SHIELD, the Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) were the first U.S.-based ships to be activated and ready to be sailed to the Gulf. These ships had a requirement to be ready to sail in 4 days. Did the FSS fleet meet its 96 hour activation schedule?

*Answer.* Six of the 8 FSS ships met their 96-hour activation requirement. Two vessels were undergoing scheduled shipyard repair work. One activated in 156 hours while the other activated in 188 hours.

*Question.* What percentage of cargo was carried by the seven FSS ships in the initial 35 days of DESERT SHIELD? The first 70 days? The entire conflict?

*Answer.* The eight FSSs carried 26 percent of all cargo delivered by sea in the first 35 days, 19 percent of all cargo delivered by sea in the first 70 days, and 11 percent of all cargo lifted by sea during the entire conflict (through 28 February 1991).

*Question.* It is also the Committee's understanding that during OPERATION DESERT STORM the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) was on a planned activation schedule of 5, 10, and 20 days. Is this accurate?

*Answer.* Yes, this is accurate.

*Question.* Of the nearly 100 ships in the RRF, how many were activated during OPERATION DESERT SHIELD?

*Answer.* Of the 96 ships in the RRF at the commencement of OPERATION DESERT SHIELD 78 were activated.

*Question.* What was the actual activation schedule of the RRF and how many ships met that schedule without requiring waivers?

*Answer.* Two RRF crane ships were already operational for a previously-scheduled exercise, 58 ships were assigned to 5-day readiness; 16 to 10-day readiness; and two to 20-day readiness. 18 RRF vessels met their activation timelines. None of the RRF vessels tendered by MARAD to MSC during the operation required waivers.

*Question.* What percentage of cargo was carried by these ships during the first 35 days of DESERT SHIELD, The first 70 days, and throughout the Gulf conflict?

*Answer.* RRF vessels carried 5 percent of all cargo delivered by sea in the first 35 days, 27 percent of all cargo delivered by sea in the first 70 days, and 22 percent of all cargo lifted by sea during the entire conflict (through 28 February 1991).

#### READY RESERVE FORCE (RRF)

*Question.* According to the GAO and previous testimony by the Military Sealift Command, the problems associated with the activation of the RRF during the Gulf War were due to the poor material condition of the fleet because maintenance was deferred and crews of skilled mariners were in short supply. Even though mariners in their sixties and seventies were called back into service many sealift ships sailed under-manned. Please provide for the record the total cost of purchasing and maintaining the RRF fleet to date. Include and specify costs associated with DESERT SHIELD activation and deactivation.

*Answer.* Cost totals since fiscal year 1977 include \$1,394,000,000 for operations and maintenance and \$1,204,600,000 in ship acquisitions. These totals include both Navy and Maritime Administration outlays. For Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, \$139,065,000 was spent for activations and \$297,669,000 for deactivations of RRF vessels. High deactivation costs were a result of the intense preventive and corrective maintenance performed on all vessels to bring them up to the readiness standards set forth in the Mobility Requirements Study.

## READY RESERVE FORCE EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEAR 1977-1995

[In millions of dollars]

Fiscal year	1977-1991	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total	1996 est
O&M .....	552.7	166.7	97.0	277.7	149.9	150.0	1,394.0	289.0
Acquisition .....	684.8	26.2	30.4	388.7	31.5	43.0	1,204.6	70.0

**Question.** As a result of the RRF's performance in DESERT SHIELD, didn't the 1992 Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) identify an annual RRF O&M budget requirement of \$357 million?

**Answer.** MRS projected annual costs (fiscal year 1993-fiscal year 1999) to acquire 19 additional RO/RO vessels and maintain the RRF (including the new acquisitions) at the readiness levels recommended in the study. O&M costs were projected to range from \$313 million in fiscal year 1993 (\$357 million in fiscal year 1994) to \$490 million in fiscal year 1999.

These projections were predicated upon maintaining an RRF which was projected to grow to a total of 140 vessels (102 dry-cargo) by fiscal year 1999. The MRS BURU, however, revised the requirements for RRF composition downward. While the number of RO/RO's should be increased to a total of 36, we plan to hold the number of other RRF vessels to approximately 56 through at least fiscal year 2000. Upon completion of RRF RO/RO and surge LMSR acquisition (fiscal year 2001), we plan to reduce the number of non-RO/RO RRF vessels to 34. Because we are building to a smaller, but newer and more capable fleet, O&M costs are projected to grow from \$289 million in fiscal year 1996 to no more than \$340 million in fiscal year 2001—far below previous projections.

**Question.** What has been budgeted for the RRF operation and maintenance in fiscal year 1994 and 1995? What is contained in the fiscal year 1996 request?

**Answer.** \$158 million was available in fiscal year 1994 and \$150 million in fiscal year 1995. The fiscal year 1996 President's Budget includes a request for \$289 million for RRF & O&M.

**Question.** The MRS also recommended expanding the size of the RRF fleet from 96 to 142 ships. What is your budgetary priority, expanding the size of the RRF or adequately budgeting for the maintenance of the existing fleet?

**Answer.** Our goal is to provide a surge sealift force capable of closing required reinforcements into any theater within the timelines established by the DPG. In accordance with MRS BURU, this force must comprise 10 million square feet of sealift capacity, 67 percent of which must be ready to load cargo in 4 days, 15 percent of which must be available within 5 days, 14 percent in 10 days, and 4 percent in 20 days.

This combined capacity and readiness goal can only be achieved by completing recommended acquisitions and providing sufficient funds to maintain the fleet at required readiness. The fiscal year 1996 President's Budget offers a prudent approach to achieving this goal by providing sufficient O&M funding to restore readiness on existing RRF vessels and sufficient acquisition funding to purchase at least two high-priority RO/RO vessels.

**Question.** If DoD continues to expand the size of the inactive RRF, how do you propose to address the shortage of trained merchant mariners to man the RRF in time of activation?

**Answer.** The problem of merchant mariner manning for reserve fleet vessels was indirectly addressed in the MRS BURU study in two ways.

First, reevaluation of surge sealift requirements resulted in a projected (fiscal year 2001) RRF composition which is one half that recommended by the original MRS. Upon completion of RRF and LMSR acquisition, the RRF can be reduced to approximately 70 vessels (65 dry-cargo, 5 tankers).

Second, reevaluation of our readiness requirements resulted in the recommendation that almost 70 percent of this 70-vessel fleet should be maintained in a reduced operating status (ROS—either 4 or 5-day readiness). ROS vessels have reduced crews continuously assigned. These crews are made up of key licensed and unlicensed mariners whose expertise makes them capable of activating their vessels with minimal outside assistance and without awaiting the arrival of the remainder of the crew.

While reduced fleet size and greater employment of ROS crews mitigates our manning problems somewhat, we need to develop a program for ensuring access to trained mariners in the event of a large RRF activation. We are currently working with an inter-agency study group (DoD and DOT) to identify and evaluate alternative mobilization manning programs.

*Question.* What would be the cost of this program?

Answer. The cost of the program or programs will be determined during the development of the RRF Crewing Plan which will specify number and skills shortages. MARAD plans to work with the merchant mariner labor unions and ship operating companies to identify personnel to man RRF ships in a contingency. MSC has proposed a plan that uses civilian mariners that are employed through MSC. Ultimate costs will depend upon the program approach and the specific severity of the shortage.

#### NATIONAL DEFENSE SEALIFT PROGRAM

*Question.* In fiscal year 1993 Congress established the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF). DoD under the NDSF program would pay for defense unique requirements, National Defense Features (NDF) on new commercial roll-on/roll-off ships, such as strengthened decks and ramps. These ships would be paid for by the private sector, and operated in the car trade during peacetime under the condition that they may be made available to DoD in time of mobilization. Have you explored the possibility of an NDF program as an alternative to continued expansion of the inactive RRF? If not, why not?

Answer. An analysis of the costs, benefits, and feasibility of the NDF program was recently submitted to Congress. The study concluded that the NDF concept has potential as a cost-effective recapitalization program for older RRF vessels. Although NDF vessels cannot be available in sufficient quantity to meet our significant 4 and 5-day availability requirements they may be an alternative for aging 10 and 20 day RRF vessels. The study concluded that an NDF program must not be given priority over LMSR and RRF RO/RO acquisition.

*Question.* What cost-effectiveness analysis has been performed which examines an NDF program versus an expanded RRF fleet?

Answer. The NDF study recently forwarded to Congress by OSD examined the cost-effectiveness of the NDF concept. The study's findings indicated that from a 40-year life-cycle cost standpoint the NDF program compared favorably with acquisition and maintenance of comparable capacity in the RRF. This cost-effectiveness, however, is dependent upon profitable operation of these vessels in a commercial trade. The study also concluded that successful implementation of an NDF program requires establishment of a share of the international car carrier market.

*Question.* In the past the Department has argued against an NDF-like program stating that commercial ships cannot replace RRF ships because they would not be available for loading as quickly as RRF vessels. Given the poor performance of the RRF in DESERT STORM has the assumption been rethought?

Answer. The poor performance of the RRF in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was the result of underfunding of vessel maintenance. Following the war, all RRF vessels received significant corrective and preventive maintenance prior to lay-up in reserve. As a result, all RRF vessels activated since that time have met or exceeded their activation timelines. The value of a good maintenance program has been amply justified and demonstrated by the performance of these ships in question since DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Unfortunately, program underfunding in the last few years has led us to the point at which we can no longer live off the maintenance performed during the war. Further deferral of preventive maintenance programs necessitates greater (time-consuming and costly) corrective maintenance during activation for a contingency.

While the NDF program is attractive because it offers vessels which are continually operational and maintained by commercial carriers, it cannot provide the assured capacity needed in the initial surge phase of a deployment. As clearly demonstrated during Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY only a well-maintained organic fleet, including the RRF, can meet this requirement.

*Question.* Has the Department conducted any analysis or demonstrations to determine how quickly commercial ships could be loaded in the event of mobilization?

Answer. The US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) plans to initiate a major exercise starting in June 95 to test the ability of US-flag commercial shippers to transport large quantities of ammunition, packed in 20-foot containers, aboard containerhips through US ports to bases overseas. The very challenging goal is to integrate munitions transport into existing commercial intermodal service. The TURBOCADS 95 exercise—CADS stands for containerized ammunition distribution system—is expected to demonstrate the capability of commercial shipper to provide USTRANSCOM with a more efficient alternative to older breakbulk handling methods for the transport of ammunition during the sustainment phase of resupply to operating forces that follows the initial surge phase. This exercise follows a similar effort, TURBOCADS 94, where three private companies—SeaLand Services, Amer-

ican President Lines, and Alaskan Cargo Transport—were expected to participate. Significant problems in communication and coordination between USTRANSCOM and the companies prevented the use of privately owned containerships in that exercise. This exercise did demonstrate the critical need for USTRANSCOM to provide commercial shipping companies with early and complete information on the time allowable for planning the exercise, and on restrictions on the transport of ammunition.

#### TRANSPORTATION INFORMATION AND VISIBILITY

*Question.* The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) serves as the single DoD manager for transportation requirements in both peace and wartime operations. This includes the Service component commands: the Military Sealift Command (MSC), the Air Mobility Command (AMC), and the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). During Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, USTRANSCOM's operations were hampered by the lack of a fully implemented central data base with accurate and complete transportation information. USTRANSCOM frequently did not have visibility of where materials were sent or whether they were delivered. According to the GAO, similar problems have plagued the Defense Transportation System during peacetime as well. Another problem area has been USTRANSCOM's extensive field organization and multiple component command responsibilities. Proposals to consolidate the individual headquarters commands have traditionally been met with stiff opposition from the Services. In this era of downsizing and restructuring in the Defense Department, how has USTRANSCOM responded to the challenge?

*Answer.* We are continuing to try to improve on our record of success by addressing the need for reengineering of transportation processes through development of the Defense Transportation System (DTS) 2010 Action Plan.

The first sentence of the question indicates the US Transportation Command serves as the single DoD manager for transportation requirements. The word "requirements" should be "support." The users (CINCs and Services) of the DTS manage transportation requirements, USTRANSCOM does not, we may apportion lift during contingencies.

USTRANSCOM, as the designated DoD functional proponent for In-Transit Visibility (ITV), declared 1994 as "The Year of ITV." As an outgrowth of this declaration, USTRANSCOM embarked on an aggressive program of study and development. This has resulted in a comprehensive ITV integration plan designed to focus energy, attention, and resources toward obtaining an ITV capability for DoD. The two principal elements of this capability are: (1) automation at shipment points to generate accurate data and send it to other operational nodes to support follow-on processes and (2) a central transportation data repository to support transportation management processes, current and future operations planning processes, reports and data sharing, and customer inquiries. This plan has been coordinated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military Services, the unified commands, and the defense agencies. USTRANSCOM is the primary agency to coordinate DoD-wide efforts to implement this plan and ensure DoD gains a comprehensive ITV capability. The USTRANSCOM Global Transportation Network (GTN) Program Management Office will use this plan to prioritize and schedule development efforts. USTRANSCOM is now in the process of expanding the ITV module to GTN. We are continuing to improve our capability to provide visibility of cargo (material) and passengers (personnel, including patients) during movement whether in peace or contingency operations. The successes we have attained during development and fielding of the prototype Global Transportation Network (GTN) will be maintained and enhanced during development and fielding of the fully operational GTN. GTN utilizes an integrated data repository with feeds from other key operational transportation automated information systems as the source for timely, accurate, and complete movement status. USTRANSCOM's Joint Transportation CIM Center is orchestrating changes to data structures as a result of process improvements, systems migration, and reengineering efforts. A transportation system migration strategy is being implemented to ultimately reduce the number of non-standard Defense transportation systems, which will reduce the number of system interfaces required to support ITV. Many of DoD's logistics problems during Desert Shield/Desert Storm will be minimized in future deployments when USTRANSCOM completes the development of GTN and integrates it into the Total Asset Visibility Systems Architecture under development in DoD.

Near term consolidation of our individual component command headquarters would have a detrimental effect on the DTS. Retention of the transportation component command headquarters is essential to our warfighting success. USTRANSCOM



operates across a broad spectrum of requirements, but our primary purpose is to enable the warfighting capability of other unified Commanders in Chief. The relevance of doctrine to the business of household goods delivery may be debatable, but it becomes critical when the mission is delivering airborne assault forces. The Military Departments, by law, through the Transportation Component Commands provide for organizing, equipping, and training the strategic lift forces assigned to USTRANSCOM. To reassign this Service responsibility to a unified, combatant commander would result in a loss of Service advocacy for lift research, development, and acquisition and degrade the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process. USCINCTRANS would become involved with Service administration and support of the Transportation Component Commands to the detriment of his responsibilities to the theater CINCs. The increased burden brought on by field commanders reporting directly to the unified command headquarters would far outweigh any manpower savings the consolidation may bring, and taken on a daily basis, would hinder accomplishment of the command's primary mission. In order to accomplish our wartime taskings and maintain an adequate command and control infrastructure, the Component Commands will continue to require adequate headquarters to manage and control their transportation assets.

USTRANSCOM and our Component Commands have participated fully in DoD's downsizing efforts. In fact, as a direct result of the stand-up of USTRANSCOM and the Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters by Derek J. VanderSchaaf, February 1988, a total of 189 billets were reduced: Four billets from a still-growing one-year-old unified command, 35 billets from MTMC, 45 from MSC, and 105 from AMC.

Organizational inefficiencies and streamlining are reviewed on an ongoing basis; specifically as part of our DTS 2010 Action Plan and the command's strategic planning process. Implementation of the "operational" end state objectives that address Defense Transportation System (DTS) Agents and the Joint Mobility Control Group, as well as the Joint Transportation Technology Focal Point have significant implications to the organizational structures within USTRANSCOM and Component Commands along with the potential for future savings.

*Question.* Since Defense Transportation was consolidated under a single command—USTRANSCOM—has the organization overcome Service parochialism, gotten smaller, and begun implementing some layers, such as cutting the component command headquarters?

*Answer.* Consolidation of the component command headquarters as a means of "delaying" the defense transportation business is a radical departure from established, proven doctrine which separates force employment from the resource management responsibilities of the military departments. Consolidation of the individual headquarters would result in a highly centralized command vice a "truly unified command." Centralization can be beneficial, but when carried to such extremes, it can lead to a blurring of roles and responsibilities, and ultimately, ineffective mission accomplishment. Four main arguments support retention of the Service Components:

a. Unified Commanders-in-Chief depend on Service components to train and equip the forces and to support and administer these forces. The primary roles of components (including the Transportation Component Commands) are to provide trained and ready forces to unified commanders, then support them when employed in furtherance of the CINC's mission objectives. This requires the solid welding of doctrine, organization, and equipment that is produced by the Services as force providers.

b. There is great potential for diverting the attention of the unified commander from his primary warfighting responsibilities with the addition of the traditional Service Department responsibilities.

c. USTRANSCOM operates across a broad spectrum of requirements, but our primary purpose is to enable the warfighting capability of other unified commanders in chief. The relevance of doctrine to the business of household goods delivery may be debatable, but it becomes critical when the mission is delivering airborne assault forces.

d. Removal of the Services and their departments from the resource allocation process would significantly complicate programming and budgeting. The healthy scrutiny and priority review afforded programs by the Services and Departments during the Planning, Programming, and Budget System process would be lost. Finally, there is a potential loss of Service advocacy due to less direct involvement in key research and development and procurement actions.

Delaying transportation functions and ultimate consolidation at USTRANSCOM would drive increased manpower to manage and administer the peacetime mission and would cloud Service support responsibilities for field organizations. It would

cause the USTRANSCOM staff to spend an inordinate amount of time managing the problems inherent in day-to-day operations. The SECDEF Memorandum, February 14, 1992, Strengthening Department of Defense Transportation Functions, clearly concurred with this philosophy. To strengthen the Department's ability to carry out its transportation missions effectively and efficiently, the mission of USCINCTRANS was expanded to include both peacetime and wartime common-user transportation management. The authority and duty to organize, train, and equip forces for assignment to USCINCTRANS, and the associated programming and budgeting functions, was clearly directed to remain with the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

USTRANSCOM and our component commands have participated fully in DoD's downsizing efforts. In fact, as a direct result of the stand-up of USTRANSCOM VanderSchaaf, February 1988, a total of 189 billets were reduced: Four billets from a still-growing one year-old unified command, 35 billets from MTMC, 45 from MSC, and 105 from AMC.

As an ongoing effort, we continue to try to improve on our processes, support systems and organizational structures in a planned, methodical manner. We recognize there are still significant identified deficiencies, Service issues that need to be addressed, and inertia to overcome, to put in place the practices, policies and procedures needed. It would be less than prudent to make organizational changes on a large scale without having the processes and support systems in place to allow operation of the DTS with reduced managerial and operational infrastructure. We are addressing the need for reengineering of transportation processes through development of the Defense Transportation System 2010 Action Plan. Organizational inefficiencies are being reviewed and streamlined as part of this implementation process. Specifically, implementation of the "operational" end state objectives that address Defense Transportation System (DTS) Agents and the Joint Mobility Control Group, as well as the Joint Transportation Technology Focal Point have significant implications to the organizational structures within USTRANSCOM and Component Commands along with the potential of future savings.

#### ORGANIZATION PROBLEMS

*Question.* How will USTRANSCOM overcome the difficulties associated with implementing a standard transportation information system if the separate component commands continue to develop and implement their own systems?

*Answer.* USTRANSCOM's objective is to have a single transportation automated information system of systems. These systems would have minimal redundancy to assure operational requirements are met regardless of operational tempo (peace or contingency). During the late part of 1994 and early 1995, USTRANSCOM's Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management Center evaluate some 120 automated information systems for purposes of determining and recommending transportation automated information systems for migration. On March 31, 1995, Deputy Under Secretary for Defense/Logistics approved 23 automated information systems for migration by March 1997; 20 systems remain in candidate status awaiting further evaluation/decision. This effort was in support of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Mr. Perry) memo of October 13, 1993 which directed specific actions be taken to improve the effectiveness and efficiencies of the automated information systems that support the operational Defense Transportation System. On the surface, one might conclude that resources from 77 systems would no longer be needed. For the short term between now and March 1997, many of the systems determined as legacy will have to be maintained until the functionality can be built into the approved transportation migration systems. Once functionality is available in the migration system, legacy system funding will be terminated.

*Question.* Shouldn't USTRANSCOM concentrate on changing and improving processes first, including reducing unnecessary management layers, before developing an automated information system?

*Answer.* USTRANSCOM is not developing an automated information system without changing and improving business processes. We are reducing the number of transportation automated information systems and changing business processes and standardizing data in a very organized fashion using Corporate Information Management techniques. The aspect of this question that deals with, "what is being done to reduce unnecessary management layers," must be looked at from different angles. To reduce quality skilled personnel solely to achieve manpower ceilings and then find that you have to rehire to support reengineered business processes that could have been met by reassigning existing skilled personnel without detriment to mission performance is not a sound approach. USTRANSCOM certainly continues to

look at reducing overhead costs, including personnel adjustments, as matters of conducting future operations well into the next century.

*Question.* How will USTRANSCOM address the need for a system that integrates different modes of transportation—rail, air, ocean, truck—so that DoD can quickly identify opportunities to lower cost and speed delivery through intermodal transportation?

*Answer.* DoD transportation automated information systems currently include integration of intermodal carriage requirements. Movements of cargo and passengers are seldom accomplished from origin to final destination by a single mode. Cargo moves from CONUS inland points to the point of embarkation (air or water) by truck, rail, or pipeline and the same situation occurs from the point of debarkation into the theater. Passenger movements also utilize the best mode and methods within a mode to meet the requirements of the mission. Relational data bases populated with rating and routing information are consulted by traffic managers at all levels as an early step in determining the most cost effective and efficient means of moving DoD requirements.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1995.

**COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES CENTRAL  
COMMAND**

**WITNESS**

**GENERAL J.H. BINFORD PEAY III, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED  
STATES CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. ARMY.**

**INTRODUCTION**

Mr. HOBSON. Good morning. The Committee will come to order and we will get started. The Chairman is at the Pentagon, and will be arriving shortly.

This morning, we begin a series of hearings with the Commanders in Chief. These hearings are especially important as they give the Committee a perspective from the regional commander's viewpoint.

For the first of these hearings, we will have General J.H. Binford Peay III, Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, as the witness. The area of responsibility of the Central Command is one of the most volatile and dangerous in the world. In recent years, three major conflicts have occurred in the region: The war in Afghanistan; The Iran-Iraq War; and The Persian Gulf War.

The area of responsibility of the Central Command is of enormous strategic importance to America. Two-thirds of the world's oil reserves are located there; Various of the world's most strategic waterways are located there; Numerous deployments of U.S. forces have occurred there in recent years and continue to take place as we speak. For example:

U.S. forces are deployed off the coast of Somalia to possibly intervene to assist U.N. Forces; U.S. forces are enforcing the no-fly zone in southern Iraq; and U.S. forces recently deployed to counter Saddam Hussein sending troops to the Kuwaiti border.

General Peay, we welcome you here today. You have a long and distinguished career with the Army.

Your most recent appearance before this Committee was last year when, as the then Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, you testified before the Committee on Readiness issues.

We are looking forward to your testimony today, and you may proceed, but I should caution you that we do not have a quorum present today so we are not presently closing this meeting, and as a quorum arrives, we will then do so. So I caution you on classification.

Do you have any comments?

Mr. MURTHA. No.

Mr. HOBSON. You may proceed, General.

## SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL PEAY

General PEAY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I would like to put my written statement in the record, and in a short time I will have the Command's annual posture statement that we would like to also submit for the record.

Mr. HOBSON. Fine.

## USCENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

General PEAY. As you mentioned, Central Command is comprised of 19 nations that spread from the eastern part of Africa northward towards Egypt and Sudan, across the Gulf region, and into Afghanistan and Pakistan. Sixty-five percent of the world's oil reserves reside in this area; and the United States imports 12 percent of that oil, Western Europe, 28 percent and Japan, 69 percent.

The key maritime routes cross this region. There are three significant choke points that, from a military perspective, must be considered. Ninety-five percent of the DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM equipment transitioned through the Suez Canal, and on a daily basis, the Suez handles more than 33 percent greater tonnage than the Panama Canal. It is the birthplace of three religions. It is a region of stark contrast. On any day there are 14 conflicts ranging from border violations to larger kinds of conflicts.

Of greater concern is the entire business of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There are tensions between Iraq-Iran, Iraq and Kuwait, and there are tensions between Pakistan and India.

## CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

This morning, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH continues in the region. It has been in existence since 1992 with over 58,000 sorties that have been flown in support of the sanctions against Iraq and the protection of the Shiites in the Southeast corner marshes. Thirty-eight thousand sorties have been flown over Iraq, and last evening 103 were flown into Iraq. It is a story that is not widely known in our country.

There are the maritime intercept operations designed to hold sanctions against Iraq. They have been in place since 1990 and 10,000 boardings conducted.

Last October, the Command responded with VIGILANT WARRIOR, which was against the provocations of Iraq as they build up their forces for the second time on the Kuwaiti border. We are offshore today preparing to assist in the—to actually handle—evacuation of U.N. forces in Somalia.

## USCENTCOM STRATEGY

Our mission continues to be to protect United States vital interests in the region and ensure access to resources. We assist friendly states in providing for their own defense and are concerned about the geopolitical moves of other states in the region.

We have designed a strategy which is seamless, and designed to move from peacetime to wartime. We have founded it on five pillars: forward presence, combined exercises, security assistance, projection of combat power from the United States, and the readiness and ability to fight when required. These pillars support a three-

tiered concept of force: Tier 1, the self-defense forces; Tier 2, regional collective security; and Tier 3, extra regional support.

There are a number of enabling requirements that would assist us in the strategy—first, pre-positioning; second, the business of strategic lift; theater missile defense; the entire business of the military education for international students which has so much to do with democratization down the road; and the improvement of C4I.

#### SUMMARY

In conclusion, challenges remain daunting in the region. I am very concerned about Iran and Iraq—particularly Iran in the long term—in terms of their ambitions in the region, weapons of mass destruction, and their proliferation, ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan, and internal stability and famine and other kinds of disasters.

I think this is the correct strategy, one designed around accessibility and stability, and I am very proud of the great job that our men and women are doing as they stand at the pointed end of the spear, which is in a dangerous part of our world today.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The statement of General Peay follows. The 1995 Posture Statement of the Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, is printed at the end of this hearing. See page 237.]

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL J. H. BINFORD PEAY III

COMMANDER IN CHIEF

U. S. CENTRAL COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

15 FEBRUARY 1995



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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

**GENERAL J. H. BINFORD PEAY III**  
**UNITED STATES ARMY**

General J. H. Binford Peay III is the Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

General Peay was born in Richmond, Virginia, on 10 May 1940. Upon graduation from the Virginia Military Institute in 1962, he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant and awarded a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering. He also holds a Master of Arts from George Washington University. His military education includes completion of the Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the United States Army Command and General Staff College and the United States Army War College.

General Peay's initial troop assignments were in Germany and Fort Carson, Colorado. During two tours in the Republic of Vietnam, he performed duty as a Firing Battery Commander in the 4th Infantry Division in the central highlands of Vietnam and later as a Field Artillery Battalion Operations Officer with the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Returning to the United States, he served as a Field Artillery Branch Assignments Officer with the Army Military Personnel Center in Washington, D.C. Assigned to Hawaii in 1975, General Peay commanded the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery, 25th Infantry Division. Following attendance at the United States Army War College, he served as Senior Aide to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C. While in Washington, he was also Chief of the Army Initiatives Group in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army. Following that was service as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3/Director of Plans and Training, I Corps, and Commander, 9th Infantry Division Artillery, both assignments at Fort Lewis, Washington. In 1985, he was reassigned to the Army Staff as Executive Officer to the Chief of Staff, United States Army. From 1987-1988, he served with the Screaming Eagles as the Assistant Division Commander (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, followed by an assignment in July 1988 as the Deputy Commandant, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He assumed command of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) on 3 August 1989 and led the Division throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in the Arabian Gulf. Promoted to Lieutenant General, he was assigned as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of



the Army and Senior Army Member, United Nations Military Committee, from June 1991 until March 1993. On 26 March 1993, he was promoted to the rank of General and appointed the 24th Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army. He assumed his present position as Commander in Chief, United States Central Command on 5 August 1994.

Awards and decorations which General Peay has received include the Army Distinguished Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Silver Star, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Bronze Star Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters, and the Purple Heart. Also, he has received the Meritorious Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, several Air Medals, and the Army Commendation Medal. Additionally, he wears the Parachutist Badge, Ranger Tab, the Air Assault Badge, the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge, Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge, and the Army General Staff Identification Badge.

General Peay is married to the former Pamela Jane Pritchett, and they have two sons, James and Ryan.





MEETING THE CHALLENGE IN THE CENTRAL REGION: AN ASSESSMENT OF  
U.5. CENTRAL COMMAND (USCENTCOM)

INTRODUCTION

In October 1994, Saddam Hussein again threatened the fragile stability in the Arabian Gulf. Iraq's build-up of forces along Kuwait's border exhibited a willingness and ability to threaten its neighbors and to jeopardize access to the oil that is the lifeblood of the industrialized world. The strong, rapid U.S. response during Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR demonstrated our military capability, likely averted another war in the Gulf, and highlighted the importance we attach to this vital and volatile region. Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR was a resounding success for several reasons. First, the decisive response of our National Command Authorities, backed by the overwhelming support of Congress and the American people, sent an unmistakable message of resolve. Second, the superb performance of our trained and ready forces, both forward deployed and moving on short notice from the U.S. or standing alert, provided a clear and convincing demonstration of America's military power. Finally, it validated the importance and criticality of the enhancements to our forward presence posture and the increase in prepositioned equipment in the Gulf region since DESERT STORM.

At the onset of the crisis, USCENTCOM relied on forward deployed Navy and Air Force units, Marines, Special Operations Forces and Patriot missile batteries, along with regional and allied forces, to make clear our resolve to defend against Iraqi aggression. Within days, these forces were joined by the aircraft carrier USS GEORGE WASHINGTON, additional cruise missile ships, reinforcing Air Force squadrons, and two Army brigades. Meanwhile additional U. S. forces were deploying or standing by for further orders. This vivid demonstration of American military capability and resolve in the face of a very real Iraqi threat forced Saddam Hussein to back down and defused the crisis. Perhaps equally important, U.S. resolve and our rapid and decisive response to a threat in the Central Region sent a clear message to other potential aggressors who might be tempted to challenge U.S. interests.

Today our forward deployed forces are actively engaged in the execution of U.S. policy throughout the Central Region. In the North Arabian Gulf, Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO) enforce UN sanctions prohibiting certain trade with Iraq. In 1994 our ships conducted the vast majority of MIO boardings, which have now totaled nearly 10,000 since the operation began in 1990. Also in the Gulf region, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH aircraft have flown over 58,000 sorties, 38,000 of them over Iraq since

the creation of that task force in 1992. Finally, we currently have over 4,000 personnel participating in Operation UNITED SHIELD in support of the withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia.

Despite our success during Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR and these other ongoing operations, numerous threats to regional stability remain. The traditional Persian/Arabic rivalry for dominance in the Gulf region continues between Iran and Iraq as they vie for influence with their neighbors. Population growth and worsening oil-based economies will lead many nations to greater reliance on outside assistance, despite the vulnerability to influence and manipulation that it brings. Famine in Africa will likely again require massive international efforts to curtail widespread starvation. Tensions over water rights and disputed borders will also continue. However, the single greatest threat to stability in the region is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the associated spread of ballistic missile technology.

#### KEY REQUIREMENTS

Pivotal to USCENTCOM's ability to respond to these regional threats has been your support for several key programs. Some of the most critical ones that require your continued support are highlighted here. They include: (1) prepositioning, (2) strategic lift, (3) theater missile defense, (4) International Military Education and Training (IMET) and foreign military financing, and (5) improvements in command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) infrastructure.

#### Prepositioning

Foremost among the programs critical to our mission is the prepositioning of equipment in the region which allows us to quickly link up personnel with equipment in theater. Having completed the fielding of a brigade set of equipment in Kuwait, we must now press forward to establish a second brigade set with a division base in Southwest Asia. This second set of equipment will dramatically increase our military capability in the region, adding flexibility and the requisite firepower and command and control in the early phases of a military operation. We need your support for the MILCON to house this equipment. Similarly, we should continue to pursue the prepositioning of a third set of equipment in the region, which will provide us with a heavy division's worth of equipment Prepositioned forward. This presence will serve as a clear signal of American resolve to contain potential adversaries and will greatly enhance our warfighting capability. Land basing promotes access, stability, and coalition solidarity in the region.

### Strategic Lift

Of comparable importance, strategic lift is essential to the successful implementation of our strategy. It is the critical lifeline for the Central Command, and vital to the success of our operations. At over 7,000 air miles and 8,000 sea miles, the extraordinary distances from the U.S. amplify the immense difficulties of moving a force in response to a regional crisis or contingency. As has again been demonstrated during recent operations in the Gulf region and in Somalia, strategic lift must remain a high priority.

Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR saw the first operational use of both the C-17 and the Army Prepositioning Afloat, and both programs met our expectations. Your continued support of the C 17, Fast Sealift Ships, and the RO/RO upgrade to the Army prepositioned equipment afloat is vital to our ability to close forces quickly in the theater. Although not tested during VIGILANT WARRIOR, our Ready Reserve Fleet must not be allowed to slip back into the questionable readiness posture of the pre DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM days.

### Theater Missile Defense

The continued proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, combined with the relative ease with which potential adversaries can enhance armaments through purchases of "off-the shelf" technology, calls for enhanced theater missile defenses and space-based capabilities that will protect U.S. forces, support our strategy, and facilitate warfighting. The priority over the next ten years should be to establish a multi-layered missile defense founded on the lower-tier Patriot Advanced Capability with a variant for naval defense; upper-tier Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); and highly mobile point defense Corps SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) to protect ground forces maneuvering rapidly over extended distances. We must also devote resources to detecting unmanned aerial vehicles as well as cruise and short range missiles; to enriching the missile tracking capability of our satellite program to provide rapid, highly accurate flight data on enemy missile launches; to expanding our acquisition of theater-based capabilities to directly downlink satellite data for intelligence and rapidly transmitting it to subordinate units; to broadening our satellite communications architecture to ensure that it meets future demands; and to fielding interoperable systems that support joint and combined operations. Your support for these initiatives is essential to their achievement.

International Military Education & Training and Foreign Military Financing

Over the years, the United States has profited greatly from investments made in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Both of these activities have provided the U.S. government opportunities throughout the world and in particular within the Central Region to assist in the development of foreign militaries, gain access, deter conflict, and promote stability and democratic ideals. Both of these programs have suffered from reduced funding over the last few years. We strongly encourage a reconsideration of these programs and increasing funds to assist our friends, enhance access, facilitate implementation of our theater strategy and realize U.S. goals for the region. By promoting respect for human rights, civilian control of the military, and democratic ideals, while enhancing self-defense capabilities, we decrease the chances of a conflict today and tomorrow that might result in the commitment of U.S. forces abroad.

Improvements in Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C4I) Infrastructure

The limited infrastructure in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, combined with the fact that our headquarters is located in the Continental U.S., create significant C4I challenges. Our C4I systems and architecture must allow us to effectively gather, process, distribute and display information at all decision making levels, whether we are providing command and control for a Joint Task Force from CONUS or fully deployed for a Major Regional Contingency. The timely delivery of high quality, pertinent intelligence to the commander in the field is key to military success.

Robust satellite systems for communications, intelligence, warning, positioning, and meteorology are essential to our success. In addition, technological advances are allowing us to make great strides in interoperability and corresponding joint effectiveness. Interoperability and joint system use have improved, and support from the national intelligence community remains essential to providing correlated, accurate intelligence from all sources to build assessments about regional activities. Several key systems are being implemented and your support is needed to provide sufficient funding to complete their implementation in a timely manner. Key examples are the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), and the

Global Command and Control System (GCCS). All of these replace and integrate the functionality of multiple stovepipe systems into standard DoD wide capabilities.

Finally, it is essential that the USCENTCOM Joint Intelligence Center's budget request for and FY97 be fully supported for us to meet the full range of intelligence requirements for warfighting and the overall DoD Intelligence Production Program.

#### THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

On the strength of these programs and others, United States Central Command is ready to defend America's interests in the Central Region today and is looking forward into the 21st Century. We are guided in the performance of our mission by the following "vision" for the future:

**U.S. Central Command: A flexible and versatile command into the 21st Century. . . . Trained, positioned, and ready to defend the nation's vital interests, promote peace and stability, deter conflict, and conduct operations spanning the conflict continuum; and prepared to wage unrelenting, simultaneous joint and combined operations to achieve decisive victory in war.**

To achieve this vision, U.S. Central Command has developed a theater strategy that relies on a combination of overseas presence, U.S. power projection capability, and carefully cultivated regional relationships. Our continued success in this effort requires patient, long-term national dedication to the defense initiatives and commitments that we have undertaken over the past several years.

#### REGIONAL OVERVIEW

The nineteen nations of the Middle East, northeast Africa and South Asia that make up the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility cover a vast geographic area. Larger than the continental United States, it stretches from Egypt and East Africa, through the Arabian Peninsula to Pakistan, and includes the waters of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Gulf.

It is a region rich in culture and history, home to the birthplace of civilization, 427 million people making up seventeen different ethnic groups, 420 major tribal groupings, six major languages with hundreds of dialects, and the birthplace of three of the world's major religions.

It is a region that has suffered repeatedly from natural disasters, political upheaval, and war, and a region of stark contrasts. These include wealth and poverty, stability and unrest, some of the world's highest mountains and greatest rivers along with some of the world's most barren deserts.

It is a region that, owing to its key maritime routes and abundance of oil, is of vital interest to our nation and to the international community. Nearly two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves are located in the region, with worldwide economic significance.

It is a region where disputes over borders and unequal distribution of resources, particularly water and oil, can explode suddenly into conflict.

It is a region where an arms race in weapons of mass destruction and an assortment of different types of ballistic missiles threatens to intensify old animosities, fears and hatreds among traditional rivals. Proliferation of such weapons represents a significant peril that could threaten U.S. and allied military forces, undermine regional and international resolve to confront belligerents, and unhinge the U.S. regional strategy.

It is a region where securing our nation's vital interests is complicated by lines of communications extending 7000 miles between the continental United States and the Gulf: Iraq's ability to threaten Kuwait within hours: Iran's ability to intimidate its neighbors with its growing air, naval and missile forces: the lack of formal treaty alliances the requirement to balance U.S. and allied military requirements with cultural and political sensitivities of regional states: and the need to be able to fight, maintain, and communicate in rugged terrain and harsh climate.

These regional dynamics and threats require United States Central Command to adopt a theater strategy that capitalizes on the social, political, economic, and military elements of our national power.

#### USCENTCOM STRATEGY

The National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), identify key U.S. interests and Central Command's tasks, and provide a basis for our theater strategy In keeping with these

guidelines, U.S. Central Command focuses on promoting regional stability by reassuring its friends, deterring conflict, and maintaining readiness to fight and win. These concepts are imbedded in our mission:

- Promote and protect U.S. interests
- Ensure uninterrupted access to regional resources
- Assist friendly states in providing for their own security and contributing to collective defense; and
- Deter attempts by hostile regional states to achieve geo-political gains by threat or use of force

To overcome the many security challenges of the Central Region, we endeavor to establish conditions in peacetime that promote stability, deter conflict, and provide the mechanisms for prevailing in combat operations, if necessary.

The success of diplomatic and military activities in the region requires actions that stress U.S. partnerships with regional states and coalition building. One of our nation's great success stories over the last decade is the durability and depth of the relationships and friendships that our military leaders have forged with their regional counterparts. These relationships support achievement of strategic ends, facilitate implementation of our theater strategy, and provide access to the region.

Achieving these partnerships and building coalitions is made possible by a long-term and flexible, three-tiered approach to deterring aggression. Tier I calls for each country to bear primary responsibility for its own self-defense. Next, if aggression occurs, friendly regional states should provide a collective defense known as Tier II. Under Tier III, the U.S. and other allies from outside the region stand ready to form a coalition to defend common interests in the region, if necessary.

This concept underlies a theater strategy supported by five pillars. These include: (1) forward presence; (2) combined exercises; (3) security assistance; (4) power projection capability from the U.S.; and (5) readiness to fight. Taken together, these five pillars and their inter-relationships describe the major activities that this Command pursues to accomplish assigned missions.

The first three pillars - forward presence, combined exercises, and security assistance - comprise the overseas presence portion of our strategy and facilitate our continued engagement in the region.

Forward presence demonstrates U.S. commitment, strengthens deterrence, and facilitates transition from peace to war. Naval forces are critical to our long-term forward presence because of their flexible offshore stationing. As a result of the Gulf War, and more recently our resolve demonstrated in Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, presence ashore has been expanded. Air forces remain deployed in the region to deter aggression and to enforce UN resolutions under Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. Patriot air defense batteries and Special Operations Forces (SOF) and other Marine and Army forces conducting frequent exercises add to our presence. Based on our VIGILANT WARRIOR experience, prepositioned equipment and supplies for heavy armored forces, and supporting military construction, have become increasingly important elements of our forward presence. These stocks reduce the strategic lift demands inherent in deploying significant combat forces and improve responsiveness to our forces in the region.

The carrier battle group and the amphibious ready group (ARG) with its Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) have continued to be the mainstay of naval operations in the Central Region throughout the year. Inclusion of attack submarines in deploying CVBGs provides an added dimension of strategic capability through monitoring and protecting sea lines of communication and enhancing strike capability with an increased presence of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs). Because of their limited footprint, strategic agility, calculated ambiguity of intent, and major strategic and operational deterrent capability, naval forces are invaluable. Naval operations this year have included enforcement of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, support for Somalia operations, and Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. Our ability to rapidly move these forces in 1993 and again in 1994 from the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Gulf to positions off the coast of Somalia and Kuwait demonstrates extraordinary utility and versatility.

Providing support for UN sanctions against Iraq, operations in Somalia, and 37 joint and combined exercises, the CVBG, in particular, has been an unmistakable sign of U.S. commitment and resolve in the Central Region. The ARG/MEU's immediate response to Iraq's hostile posture in October 1994, complemented by the rapid deployment of Army forces falling in on prepositioned



equipment in Kuwait and the Air Forces in the region, capitalized on the synergism of joint operations and placed a combined arms team forward that effectively deterred Saddam from further aggression.

Air operations over southern Iraq are conducted by Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA), consisting of over 100 U.S. aircraft along with a smaller number of allied, aircraft. Since commencing operations in August 1992, JTF-SWA has flown close to 60,000 sorties, nearly two-thirds of them over Iraq. With its carefully selected mix of reconnaissance, air-to-air, air-to-ground, and support aircraft, this force enhances regional defensive capabilities, facilitates rapid build-up of U.S. combat naval and air power during crisis, and is capable of inflicting significant damage on enemy forces in the first hours of hostilities. Furthermore, air operations involving regional forces strengthen relations with regional friends. All of these benefits of forward positioned air forces were demonstrated in Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, where presence facilitated rapid reinforcement and signaled Iraq and other would be aggressors that the U.S. was capable of unleashing punishing attacks against its foes. We are convinced that forward positioning of U.S. air and other forces provides a valuable deterrent to aggression in the region.

More limited in scope than our daily sea and air operations, ground operations are, nonetheless, an essential dimension of our overseas presence. Deterrence of potential adversaries requires that we maintain a credible capability to defeat ground offensives. This can only be obtained by synchronizing joint and combined air, sea, space, and ground operations. The positioning of Patriot batteries in the region emplaces a credible defense against enemy ballistic missiles. An interim measure, these systems may eventually be withdrawn as regional countries field their own weapons. Additional forward ground presence is afforded by frequent exercises by Army and Marine forces, complemented by other activities by Special Operations Forces (SOF).

Significant is the repositioning of heavy Army equipment in theater. In particular, the brigade set in Kuwait, combined with a robust exercise program, allows us to readily close into the theater a lethal forward positioned combat force early during a crisis. In this fashion, we establish conditions conducive to blunting an attack and creating conditions to seize the initiative. As mentioned previously, we are moving forward with plans to augment this capability by constructing facilities for a second brigade set of Army equipment in Southwest Asia and are examining the possibility of placing a third set elsewhere in the area. Collectively, this would place a full Army division on the

ground in short order; this enhanced ground combat capability will ensure U.S. military flexibility, enabling us to promote stability in the region and reduce risks during crises.

Our repositioning program also includes Air Force and Navy equipment stored throughout the region. During the last three years, great progress has been made in concluding Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCA's) and in establishing storage sites for Air Force bare base sets (Harvest Falcon), Navy forward logistic sets, water and fuel distribution equipment, medical supplies and infrastructure, support vehicles and equipment, and rations. Stockpiling this material reduces strategic lift requirements, decreases deployment times, and provides critical sustainment early during the force build-up.

Success in all of these endeavors requires your support and consistent, patient, long-term negotiations in order to achieve the proper blend of U.S. and host-nation commitment and responsibility sharing to minimize U.S. costs.

The benefits of forward presence are complemented by our second pillar, combined exercises. Involving all of the Services, this effort offers over 100 joint and combined exercise opportunities annually, to include numerous naval and special operations exercises, BRIGHT STAR in Egypt, the INTRINSIC ACTION in Kuwait, and the ULTIMATE RESOLVE series of exercises. Through such activities, we maintain access, advance interoperability with regional partners, enhance forward presence, and improve the individual and collective military capabilities of the GCC states. Over the last few years, we have witnessed measured progress in the ground force capabilities of our regional partners, and even greater improvement in their air, naval, and special operations capabilities.

We expect to see continued operational improvement over the long term as regional military leaders modernize their forces and gain more experience working with the U.S. and with one another. Continued improvement will allow more rigorous and demanding trilateral and multilateral command post and field exercises -- all focused on raising the proficiency of participants to operate collectively to secure common defensive goals. Throughout the AOR, combined exercises are the mechanism for providing U.S. forces valuable training in this distinctly different environment, assisting friendly states in satisfying legitimate defense needs, and increasing U.S. access to the region.

Our third pillar, security assistance, provides an additional means of improving defense capability of regional friends, training regional military forces, promoting interoperability, gaining access, strengthening military to

military relationships, and increasing over time the ability of states to provide for individual and collective defense. It includes four major elements: foreign military sales, foreign military financing, IMET, and mobile training and technical assistance field teams. Such activities support our aim of building regional defensive arrangements while providing a degree of U.S. control over arms transfers.

Since 1990, foreign military sales (FMS) in the Central Region have accounted for a large portion of total U.S. military sales abroad. Through FMS, regional friends purchase a wide assortment of military equipment, training, maintenance, and follow-on logistic support. A portion of FMS is dedicated to military construction that supports our forward presence and allows rapid reinforcement. The security assistance program is reinforced by the more limited foreign military financing programs that provide grants to regional states. Past benefits of military funding in assisting foreign friends and maintaining access justify its cost and demonstrate the importance of continued support. Both military sales and military funding promote interoperability and regional self-defense.

To enhance the warfighting capability of regional partners, we should continue to modernize their forces. Effective employment of new equipment is achieved through training teams and IMET initiatives. Through more than 680 personnel deployed in the region on training teams, we are able to increase technical and tactical proficiency of regional military forces and their leaders. Such teams provide an ancillary service of strengthening regional friendships and bolstering our forward presence. Our efforts in this area are reinforced by the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program that educates regional military leaders in U.S. military institutions. Through this effort, we improve the military capabilities of foreign military leaders, increase trust and friendships with regional states, and help familiarize foreign military and civilian leaders with America's military and its democratic values and culture. Key points stressed in this training include civilian control of the military, preservation of human rights, and the workings of democratic institutions. There are enormous long-term benefits for our own country as a result of this education and formulation of ideals and relationships.

Taken together, these three pillars allow the U.S. to maintain a visible presence in the region and respond to crises spanning the spectrum of conflict. In the event of a crisis, forces and equipment forward deployed in the region become the foundation for executing flexible deterrent options (FDOs) which hopefully are successful in resolving the crisis, and if not, serve as the vanguard for follow-on forces.

Also critical to our readiness to fight is the vital contribution made by the Reserve Component of our Armed Forces. Reserves complement active duty forces by bringing important capabilities that facilitate early access and continued sustainment. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), air guard crewmembers and others perform key functions in staff operations, airlift, port openings, civil affairs and many other areas.

Continued support for professional military education (PME), both joint and Service, lays the groundwork for an officer corps which can think creatively, reason critically, and act decisively in the face of ambiguity and uncertainty. Our nation's PME institutions make direct and enduring contributions to the professional competence of our rising military leaders and deserve our strong support in the coming years. We cannot afford to reduce the quality of PME at a time when its fruits are in highest demand.

Through the five pillars of our theater strategy, U.S. Central Command promotes regional stability, maintains access, and deters aggression. We also establish the military conditions required to limit the intensity of conflict should deterrence fail, and finally, to fight and win when required. Activities undertaken in the five pillars position this command to transition smoothly and seamlessly from peace to war.

#### THE WARFIGHT IN THE CENTRAL REGION

As we deal with the demanding peacetime requirements in the Central Region, we must remain focused on the fundamental purpose of our military forces: To fight and win our nation's wars. If deterrence fails, USCENTCOM must be able to conduct combat operations spanning the conflict continuum, from humanitarian assistance to high intensity war, against a full range of potential military adversaries, to include insurgents, terrorists, mechanized ground formations, air and naval forces, and ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. While we recognize that each form of conflict and type of adversary calls for an appropriately tailored response, we need to address the major threat to this nation's vital interests: high-intensity war in the Central Region.

In this context, capitalizing on U.S. advantages in technology, weapons, leadership, and quality people reduces risks to U.S. and coalition forces and minimizes friendly casualties. Our military forces take advantage of the complementary capabilities found within each of the Services to advance across great distances; strike at enemy weaknesses; launch unrelenting precision deep strikes against the enemy's military, industrial,

initiatives an invaluable contribution to maintaining our high standards of professionalism.

Threats to America's vital interests in the region represent a grave challenge for our nation now and for the foreseeable future. To meet these demands, U.S. Central Command employs a long-term strategy and undertakes daily activities that send a clear signal to friends and foe alike that we are resolute in confronting threats to regional stability.

We at U.S. Central command are committed to meeting the challenges of preserving U.S. interests in this challenging and vital portion of the world. We look forward to working with the military Services, Department of Defense and members of Congress in the coming months to realize our nation's goals in the Central Region.

The fourth pillar of our theater strategy, power projection, defines activities and qualities of U.S. military forces that support rapid projection of forces from the U.S. into the Central Region and preparation of those forces for combat operations. Within this context, U.S. Central Command is keenly interested in the Air Force's C-17 program, the Navy's Fast Sealift Ships and Ready Reserve Force, the Army's brigade set of equipment afloat (currently 12 ships) and the Marine Corps' Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF). This latter force includes three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPs), each able to support a Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) of nearly 15,000 personnel with supplies and equipment for 30 days. Similarly, the Command can rely on the Air Force's four logistic ships, carrying supplies and ammunition. With these capabilities, USCENTCOM can fly a heavy Army brigade's personnel to link up with equipment stored in Kuwait, and additional forces to link up with Army and Marine equipment arriving aboard prepositioning ships.

To sustain all of our forces in theater, the Command supports advances in the full range of power projection logistics and will exercise these activities frequently in the year ahead. Initiatives include gaining access to and exercising air bases and ports worldwide that will facilitate deployment of forces to the Central Region, procuring automation that ensures asset visibility providing real-time location of in-transit equipment, and enhancing port-opening equipment robustness. To ensure that all of these activities are properly sequenced and priorities established, Central Command is continuing to refine plans, review force deployment requirements, and clarify movement priorities.

The requisite command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence infrastructure that is needed to carry out assigned military tasks allows U.S. Central Command to execute a full range of FDOs to preclude hostilities. It also enables us to limit conflicts when they occur, and conduct decisive combat operations if required.

The fifth and final pillar of our theater strategy, readiness to fight, stresses activities that ensure that the Central Command headquarters and individual Component Commands possess standard operating procedures that facilitate rapid deployment during crises, for conducting synchronized joint and combined operations, and waging high tempo warfare. To ensure readiness, we are constantly engaged in reviewing and refining our war and contingency plans. In addition, we conduct warfighting conferences with Component Commanders and their staffs, perform joint and combined training, and conduct command post and other exercises to maintain enhanced levels of readiness.

and information infrastructure; conduct continuous, all-weather joint and combined operations; and simultaneously assault tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. The speed, precision and flexibility associated with such operations require commanders to exploit the advantages of the entire battle space, maximizing the benefits derived from each Service.

U.S. Central Command's war and contingency plans and standard operating procedures build on the Command's peacetime activities to address the exigencies associated with single and dual major regional contingencies as well as military operations at the lower end of the spectrum. Using peacetime partnerships and regional access as a foundation, we are prepared to forge coalitions and integrate U.S. and friendly military capabilities to confront regional aggressors. As tensions heighten, we rely on the three-tiered defensive structure established in peacetime to elicit regional support for coalition activity and create the military structures needed to defeat adversaries.

Our war plans envision employing U.S. and coalition forces in concert to safeguard U.S. and allied interests. Given ambiguous early warning and early deployment decisions, U.S. military forces would undertake a series of flexible deterrent options in concert with regional partners to send a clear signal of resolve to hostile powers. If these measures prove inadequate, the U.S., with coalition support, would continue to deploy air, sea, and ground forces to defend against attackers. If such actions fail to blunt enemy action, the U.S. would deploy additional forces and launch a joint and combined offensive to quickly overwhelm the enemy and restore regional stability.

#### CONCLUSION

For years the United States has been successful in securing its vital interests in the Central Region and in progressing toward realization of long-term regional aims. We should honor the superb work of U.S. personnel who have performed a great service by forging close relations with regional friends, negotiating basing agreements and host-nation support for our operations, and putting in place the structure of our theater strategy. We should take particular pride in the work of military men and women who have toiled long hours, often under difficult conditions, to improve the capabilities of our friends, bring famine relief and security to Somalis, carry out maritime intercept operations in support of UN sanctions against Iraq, fly air operations as part of SOUTHERN WATCH, and so ably defend our nation's interests in this complex region. Continuing in their fine tradition with a smaller force will require us to recruit and retain only the top quality personnel, making your support for professional military education and quality of life

Mr. HOBSON. Since the Chairman is not here, I will let him ask his questions when he gets here.

Mr. Murtha.

#### MAJOR THREATS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION

Mr. MURTHA. We certainly welcome you to the Committee, General. They couldn't have picked a better individual to head this very important part of our armed services, and we know that things are in good hands when you are in charge. And we obviously realize, as I have said over and over again, the biggest threat America faces when you take the world—since the Soviet Union is no longer the same threat they were before—is the possibility of losing access to the oil in the Middle East. I think the recent reaction by our armed forces was again a key in stabilizing the area and also in reducing the threat.

Do you see any possibility of them threatening us again, or testing us again in the near future? Is it stable there? Are our allies able to handle it without U.S. intervention? What do you see as the threat now? Is Iraq a military threat?

Obviously, they were moving troops and there was a real threat that they were going to go into Saudi Arabia. What do you see happening there?

General PEAY. Sir, there are two major threats in the Gulf Central region. The long-term threat when you talk to all the nations in the Gulf is Iran. There is great concern about the movement and ambitions of Iran in the long term.

In the near term, it is Iraq. Iraq is hard to read because it is built around Saddam Hussein, and he is an irrational leader and, therefore, we must react to his capabilities and not try to judge his intentions. I am very concerned about what that means in the months ahead because as the sanctions stay on and his people continue to suffer, he will then, in my view, have a tendency to want to lash out.

On the other hand, if we take the sanctions off ——— he will quickly rebuild his army, in my view; in less than three years. So we are going to be faced with a military capability that we are going to have to address under either condition.

At the start of the Gulf War, the intelligence estimate was that Iraq had the capability to put 66 divisions on the ground in varying degrees of readiness. ——— in a pretty good state of readiness and the rest were in some other state. ——— a capability that we have to address. So I am very concerned that he can lash out with hardly any warning in the near term and that if we take the sanctions off, he will greatly improve his capability over time.

The challenge is what I have said is the race to Kuwait. ———. And while for external public consumption, which was great for deterrence—and the armed forces performed superbly in the dash to Kuwait last time ———.

The fundamental decision, in my view, is if oil is important in the statistics that I have mentioned, then we must stay involved in the region. We must have access. Access means we must carry on personal relationships, try to have people involved in schooling here in our country and through combined exercises, and mobile



training teams. We need to keep our foot in the door any way we can, so if they do call upon us, we can respond. ———.

Mr. MURTHA. So you are talking about, in three years, they would have the capability of moving again, or what are you talking about?

Mr. YOUNG. Would you yield?

Mr. MURTHA. Sure.

Mr. YOUNG. I want to apologize for being late this morning. I rode two and a half hours in snow. It took me longer to get here than it took you to get here from MacDill.

General PEAY. That is why I am ready to go back to Tampa.

Mr. YOUNG. I yield back to Mr. Murtha.

#### IRAQ'S MILITARY CAPABILITY

Mr. MURTHA. They moved 60,000 troops, if I remember the last time. I am trying to get a concept of what we are talking about, what the real threat to us is.

General PEAY. ———.

We have to be prepared to go today just as we were last October. I think the challenge continues to come down to risk, and unfortunately, risk involves casualties. It is how much risk can you handle here as you work through a very difficult time.

Mr. MURTHA. So we would win eventually even—the last time had they gone into Saudi Arabia it could have been a bloody engagement and we could have sustained substantial casualties, but we would have prevailed in the end; is that what you are saying?

General PEAY. We are going to win. This fellow is not going to defeat us. ———.

#### UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ

Mr. MURTHA. Which countries are trying to lift the embargo on Iraq?

General PEAY. It is not totally clear. ———. You are seeing a number of the small countries that are openly more concerned from a humanitarian standpoint with the Iraqi populace. You are not seeing that move from Kuwait or Saudi Arabia at this time.

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. McDade.

#### CINC INPUT TO THE BUDGET PROCESS

Mr. MCDADE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, welcome. We are glad to have you back. Would you describe your role in the annual budget development process for the Department?

General PEAY. Yes, sir.

Quarterly, I submit a personal letter to the Secretary of Defense that outlines problems with events that have transpired in the past quarter regarding readiness challenges. We are involved in Defense Resource Boards, the DRB process, where, after the process in the Pentagon has taken place, the Secretary of Defense convenes a large committee and the CINCs have a chance to state their views against the program that has been developed.

And then we have been involved in the recent joint operational requirements, the JROC process, that is handled by the Vice Chairman, in terms of having a chance to express our views. Those are the three principle inputs, other than just discussions.

Mr. MCDADE. Institutionalization of your input into the budget process has been pretty good, hasn't it?

General PEAY. I have no complaints.

Mr. MCDADE. Do you have any deficiencies as a result of this budget that is in front of us today?

General PEAY. The trouble is, all of us want more. We are sitting at the front end of the spear with certain requirements.

Yes, I would like to have more things. I think, principally sooner. It is a case of they are coming but they are further down the road than what you would perhaps be comfortable with. I certainly understand the process we are in today and what is a reasonable expectation.

#### STRATEGIC LIFT

Mr. MCDADE. What is the status of your strategic lift?

General PEAY. There has been—as you know General Joe Hoar last year made his—he is a close friend of mine—made his statement about strategic lift being broken. On the sealift side of strategic lift, I think there is a program now in place that brings that on by the turn of the century. That is much more healthy than what it has been in past years. We would all like to see that come a little quicker. ———.

The airlift piece has much work to be done. The Department of the Air Force is conducting a study to look at the mix of C-17s and non-developmental airlift aircraft. There probably needs to be a combination of both that will get at the shortage. ———.

#### PREPOSITIONING

Mr. MCDADE. How about prepositioning? That was always a big, important role of your command.

General PEAY. Prepositioning is now more than ever the latest innovation, and it tries to get at this closure rate into the theater and tries to buy access which buys stability. If we can get into the theater and use the prepositioning, we get commitment of the allies against the threat. ———.

Mr. MCDADE. How long has that been in the works?

General PEAY. ———.

Mr. MCDADE. Would you identify the places where funding is in the budget for that item?

General PEAY. ———.

Mr. MCDADE. Give it to the staff as well.

General PEAY. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

Service funding for construction of the required facilities is found in the Military Construction Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 1996. The Army project is shown in Division B, Military Construction Authorization, Title XXI—Army, Section 2101, Authorized Army Construction and Land Acquisition Projects outside the United States.

Army Operations and Maintenance funding to support the prepositioning is shown in Budget Activity #2, Mobilization for Southwest Asia Prepositioning.

Mr. MCDADE. What kinds of resource dollars are required to get that division in place?

General PEAY. The equipment would come from across the world, but principally would come out of the prepositioned sets in Europe. ———. There will be dollars associated with the transportation and maintenance of that equipment. I don't have a feel for that today.

Mr. MCDADE. Is all that coming out of Europe the best modern stuff we have?

General PEAY. That will be modern equipment, yes sir. The divisions will be equipped with the same sets of gear that they are currently manned with back in the States today.

Mr. MCDADE. Thank you, General.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Lewis.

#### THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILES

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, General. I am interested in your comments regarding the problems of proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. I would appreciate a discussion of theater missile defense; specifically, one of the items I am interested in involves unmanned aerial vehicles, but other comments you might have about that whole problem.

General PEAY. Yes, sir. It is clearly the threat I am principally concerned about in the region.

During DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM the inability to quickly close against that threat resulted in the shifting of a lot of our air assets in what are commonly known as SCUD hunts. That meant that those aircraft could not be used by commanders forward in terms of intelligence or attacking targets that they had on their list the following morning. So we need to get ourselves in a posture that doesn't put us in an operational status like that in the future, much less just the protection piece of that fight. ———. There is no one solution. There is no silver bullet for how to respond to that. It is a combination of protective equipment and vaccines for our troops; it is a combination of intelligence, command, control and communications, so that once we identify the threat missile, we can respond to it in terms of communication, command and control directions. Then it is a multi-layered air defense piece that must control the deep part of that in terms of protection of ports and the closure of the force. Additionally include the rapidly attacking land forces, Marine and Army forces that are far out on the point at 400 miles, need the shorter range capability that the upper tier capability cannot in the near term protect. ———. I think those are probably the four ways I would come at it.

#### INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

Mr. LEWIS. General, as you know, there have been discussions that swirl around North Korea relating to the question of nuclear missile proliferation. I personally think that proliferation and the potential of adversaries to deliver that kind of threat, along with the terrorist threat, are the two most significant challenges that we face, at least in the near term, and maybe the long term as well.

I would appreciate some discussion of our space-based capabilities, what you think we are doing that is effective. What do we

need? What should we be looking to in terms of priority for additional funding as it related specifically to the ballistic missile proliferation and the nuclear threat that is connected with it?

General PEAY. ———. Probably the best is overhead imagery, and I think we do a reasonably good job with that. There needs to be balance across the three areas. As defense becomes strained and operational tempos—OPTEMPO—increase, then you find the day-to-day monitoring is reduced. I think we have to be very careful today about reducing the robustness in those areas if we want to know what is going on.

Mr. LEWIS. In another capacity, I have responsibility for HUMINT for analysis and counterterrorism. I am very concerned about the priority which we are giving those assets as it relates to meeting this challenge.

Do you think we are spending the kinds of resources—the HUMINT problem is a very real problem; are we giving it the priority that we need, and are the other elements that you described already getting the kind of financial support that at least leads us towards being above average? I would hope we would be above average.

General PEAY. No commander is ever going to be satisfied with intelligence or communications. Since we were young people, we have always complained about those two functional capabilities. Those staff officers take the biggest beating in every meeting that you have. ———. I don't know how to answer your question on budget priorities, because that is the Service Chief's dilemma. He is trying to spread shortages, and the Service Chief is trying to balance near term to long term. So I am a little hesitant, once I put the requirement on the plate, to say how the Service Chief responds to that.

#### OPERATION VIGILANT WARRIOR

Mr. YOUNG. Will the gentleman yield?

I would like to ask how much advance notice you had that Saddam was going to move the forces to the south, or if you had any advance notice at all prior to the movement?

General PEAY. Sir, we received—as I recall, about a ———. So we had a week in there of discussions. I thought there were some very quick responses by the leadership.

#### UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Mr. LEWIS. I recall General Schwarzkopf's reaction to the need for real-time communication between the commanders in the field and what could be observed.

Recently we have been testing some advanced unmanned aerial vehicles. Have you been briefed on those?

General PEAY. ———.

Mr. DICKS. ———?

Mr. LEWIS. There is testing taking place now that you ought to be briefed on, especially with your responsibilities there.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I was going to shift to training, and we will get back to it.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Dicks.

## BOMBER CAPABILITY

Mr. DICKS. General Peay, I want to say how glad I am that you have been selected to be at CENTCOM. I enjoyed very much working with you here in your role as the Vice Chief, and I am glad that you are in this very important job. I think you will do an outstanding job for the country.

A number of us on this Committee have been concerned about our overall bomber capability and have advocated that Stealth bombers, we think, can play a very important role not only in the traditional thinking for strategic purposes, but also as a conventional weapon.

There was a RAND study that was done about three years ago that was commissioned by Secretary Aspin. I don't think he ever read it, because it didn't quite say what he wanted to hear. Basically what the study said was that we have a deficiency in stealthy long-range bombers and that 20 bombers simply wouldn't meet the test.

In the Gulf War, we saw how effective the F-117 was in being able to go in against very heavily defended targets that couldn't have been knocked out by conventional forces, or we would have had to risk young peoples' lives in airplanes that were not stealthy. I think that proved the combat utility of Stealth technology being able to operate autonomously.

It took us five months to get ready to fight this war. We didn't have an ability to stop Saddam in the Gulf. I remember going out with Congressman Murtha and seeing—with a few Marines and a few Army people—that is an awfully big desert; and it didn't look like much of a force to us at the time. Five months later it was completely different. ———.

I mean, I don't like to see us have our chain jerked by Saddam Hussein. I would like to see this country have a capability that could operate either from the United States out of Whiteman Air Force Base, or you could deploy the B-2s to Diego Garcia. And if Saddam is going to send his Republican Guard down, we could be in a position to destroy that division in the field. ———. Would that kind of capability be something you would be interested in?

General PEAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DICKS. Whether we get the 20 B-2s or 40, that is something you would favor, wouldn't you?

General PEAY. Yes, sir. In training, we have exercises today which we are flying both for deterrence and for training. We are flying long-range B-52, B-1s into the theater from the States to exercise that capability. Certainly if he launches with little notice from those close divisions a hundred miles outside of Kuwait City, that is the capability you will have to have to ruin his Sunday.

I guess the question is what is the balance of precision versus nonprecision weapons that is required to attack large tank formations. That has to be balanced against another CINC, say in Korea, where General Luck may be more interested in heavy tonnage in mountainous areas and those kinds of things.

Mr. DICKS. ———. The thing that is important is that you have these radars, and people forget that even in places like Iraq or Iran or Korea, you have very heavy radars. So the advantage that

Stealth gives you is that where the B-1s or B-52s would have to stand off and launch long-range cruise missiles that go to a fixed point, using some of that to take out some of the additional radars, that would be no problem for the B-22 or F-117. Once that is done, you can go in right over the target and use these munitions, whatever kinds you want, depending on the scenario.

I just think that this is a capability that we need to think more about, and we are coming to a major decision point here whether we leave the country, stop the production of this thing.

I talked with Colin Powell at the White House, and when this decision came up, he recommended to Dick Cheney that we have 50 of these. Every study done says between 40 and 60 is the right number.

Your B-52s and B-1s are going to have to stand off. They will not be able to penetrate initially, or they will get shot down because of heavy radars that we face in these situations. I want you to think about that.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Classified insert removed.]

#### STRATEGIC LIFT

Mr. DICKS. Mobility. You mentioned in your statement that the C-17 was used in this recent exercise. Could you tell us how well it did in terms of—

General PEAY. I don't know the details. My understanding is it performed very well.

You are going to need a combination. I think the Air Force Chief is doing a study, due out this fall that tries to address that. You are going to need to move the outsized cargo as well as just tonnage, people and things. You are always going to be short on airlift. The question is how much can you buy? It needs to be a combination, whatever the budget will hold.

Mr. DICKS. But continued concern about mobility—this Committee under Chairman Murtha and our Ranking Member, Joe McDade, we pushed on, I think we have done a good job of giving you the resources.

Let me point out another troublesome thing. There is a discussion under way to do away with the Federal Maritime Commission. One of the acts administered under that Commission is the Shipping Act of 1984, which was something that President Reagan promoted. If that gets repealed and the Shipping Act of 1984 gets repealed, it will force Sea-Land and APL to locate offshore. They would then not be available to us as they are today to do sealift.

In the Gulf War, I think 75 percent of what we sent there for sustainment purposes went on those U.S.-flag carriers. I have talked to General Rutherford about it. In the rush to get rid of the Shipping Act of 1984, this will be a major blow, because even with the sealift that we are going to buy, the extra Roll-on/Roll-off, RO-ROs, and pre-positioning and the Ready Reserve fleet, you still need to have ability to charter some U.S. carriers to carry sustainment cargo; isn't that correct?

General PEAY. Yes, sir. The challenge is, the more you have, the quicker you close the force.

It seems to me the challenge is to make all this happen in balance with the funding streams that we are dealing with here.

## READINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY OF FORCES

Mr. DICKS. As one of our top military commanders, let me ask you, are we in a situation—with the size of the Army today coming down to below 500,000, do you think we still have the forces to be able to deploy to all these various commitments we are making in terms of peacekeeping and still do the job that we are assigned to do? Is this becoming a problem for you and your commands?

General PEAY. Sir, I am in a different position because I have no major combat units assigned. Forces are provided to me. I can only tell you that the forces that came over last October were in a terrific state of readiness at that time.

In my travels around with soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, I have not picked up—they probably wouldn't tell me—I haven't picked up the major, major concerns of operational tempo, but I think probably the providing commanders back in the States would have a different view of that. I have no major combat units assigned.

Mr. DICKS. One thing we are doing in the Intelligence Committee is working mightily to get whatever intelligence we are able to gather, whether it is signals intelligence or imagery, out to the battlefield commanders. This is one of the highest priorities. And when you tell people that is one of your highest priorities, it makes a difference. We collect all this intelligence, but we have a problem getting the intelligence to field commanders, and that is a very high priority.

I think we have a good architecture, so I think we are making progress, along with MILSTAR, which I think will be important to communications.

Mr. YOUNG. Will you yield? You asked the General about readiness.

I would like to ask a follow-on, and that is what about sustainability? You could be as ready as ready could be, but how long could you sustain that if you had to deploy to a Southwest Asia contingency?

I realize it depends on a lot of factors, but readiness is not the only issue. You have to be able to sustain that readiness long enough to win the battle.

General PEAY. My challenge is I don't have visibility as a CINC into all the tails that go back into the depot systems and back into the spare parts piece. I have memories of my previous job, but in this job, I hesitate to talk because in six to eight months you get out of date very, very quickly.

Mr. DICKS. Do we have enough of a rotation base? You deploy; at some point you will have to move troops in and out. Can we do that with 500,000 people in the Army?

General PEAY. If it is the only-war-in-town kind of a context, then clearly you can do that. The CINCs and the Chiefs met week before last and went through this NIMBLE DANCER wargame and tried to determine if you could do two MRCs. It kind of came down to ———.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## TWO MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Dicks. General, you were quoted just a few days ago that the Bottom-Up Review's assumption that the U.S. military would be able to fight and win two MRCs is based on the assumption that certain force enhancers would be available in the fiscal year 1999 to 2001 time frame.

Could you give us a quick briefing on what force enhancers you were referring to?

General PEAY. Yes, sir. It is mainly those that I just mentioned. — at that particular period. I think those are the principal ones.

Mr. YOUNG. Are those enhancers available now?

General PEAY. There are problems with airlift that have to be addressed. Sealift, there has been improvement. The precision munitions are coming; we have to bed those down in theater. We don't have the time to take them over from the States, so that is some of the work we have to do.

Mr. YOUNG. We will do the best we can to help provide those enhancers.

Mr. Hobson.

## TRAINING AND MODERNIZING THE FORCE

Mr. HOBSON: Mr. Chairman, let me go to another subject a bit along this line. I appreciate all the stuff about precision strikes and electronic gear. As an enlisted guy, a lot of times it didn't work when I was in the service a long time ago. There always has to be somebody around who can pick up a weapon and walk or ride someplace. I worry when not enough attention is being paid to the people and their capability, because after you do all that other stuff, somebody has got to go someplace, and I know that we are not building any more big trucks.

General Schwarzkopf talked about, he couldn't have gotten all those people around over there if he didn't have some trucks and vehicles.

Mr. MURTHA. If the gentleman will yield, we were criticized severely for adding funds for trucks. This Committee put in trucks.

Mr. HOBSON. I wasn't on this Committee then, but I came to a couple of people on this subcommittee and suggested—

Mr. DICKS. It was the wrong size.

Mr. HOBSON. That is another point, the other size truck that has some difficulty, as I understand it. That is my point.

Tanks may be a problem. We are not building—are we going to buy foreign tanks? Are we going to build U.S. tanks, U.S. trucks to get these people around?

Second, what are we doing about equipment for the person in the field? I don't hear anybody talking about new and improved capability there very much. All I hear about is tilt-wing airplanes. The next generation of helicopter may even be put off. What are we going to do in this capability?

Is there any problem with munitions? Do we have enough munitions now? In my district, they fly airplanes in all the time and pick up munitions and take them all over the world. I don't know whether repositioning is working or not. Every once in a while, I



see a contingent of airplanes coming into Wright Patterson, picking up.

My point is, move down to the people in the field. Do we have that capability? Are we enhancing that capability to move and equip people properly, to train them properly, to do the jobs that are expected after the other stuff is done.

General PEAY. I have no major combat units assigned.

Mr. HOBSON. Part of your job is to know what is going on so you can defend the area.

General PEAY. As I look at the forces that are provided today, they are of the highest quality. I think the forces that are provided are well equipped, have modernized gear, are well trained, and have high morale.

It is back to the sustainability problem, and your finger is right on the point of that balance problem, and yet I would have to respectfully ask that you ask the Service Chief how he is balancing that. And that is the Service Chief's problem today. He is balancing shortages, and he is looking over a budget that has come down over many years. The question is, where is the upturn in terms of modernization? You have to do that modicum of things that keep this moving.

On the other hand, I am just as worried that, in the outyears, that we have no modernization. If it takes 10 or 15 years to bring equipment on, the way we do things today, we can't keep putting that off. So it is the balance between the near-term sustainment and the modernization piece.

Mr. HOBSON. You said something that concerns me, and that is the time frame that we bring stuff on.

In business, one of the things we found out is the Japanese could bring a car frame on a lot faster than we could for a long time. Our car companies say, we have learned some things, and it doesn't take us the turnaround time.

Is the military and the support from the private sector, are we looking at our abilities—do you have input into these people as the type of thing that you see from your commands that we need to do differently?

General PEAY. In a war-fighting CINC job, I am not involved in that. As a former Vice Chief in the Army, there was a lot of work done on acquisition. I think there have been steps made to speed up the process, but it is still a long process.

Mr. HOBSON. I know a lot of the Air Force stuff is done in my district, and I know how long that takes. It is just, in this environment, we may have to look at some of those things as we go back. That doesn't help you in your current job, but it is something that we have to look at here.

Thank you very much for being here.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Hobson, thank you.

Mr. Bonilla.

#### WITHDRAWAL FROM SOMALIA

Mr. BONILLA. Good morning, General. I would like to begin with something I saw last evening on one of the network newscasts. That was a report that, as our Marines are preparing to deploy off Somalia to aid in evacuation, they will be told not to defend them-

selves in the traditional way, but rather use some substance that is fired from some kind of weapon, or rubber doughnuts. I am concerned that the report—perhaps it was inaccurate—but there is some concern over political correctness. Perhaps our troops out there are told to go in a different direction, rather than just defend themselves when attacked on foreign soil.

That concerned me greatly, that perhaps our Marines, as they land in Somalia, were going to be unable to defend themselves as they should.

General PEAY. ———. They all know that they always have the authority to act on a second's notice to defend themselves. The coalition task force commander, General Zinni, asked for some of these nonlethal things as a way to do crowd control so he can perhaps keep that from escalating to a harder problem that he would have to face.

We have talked to all of the faction leaders; we spent a lot of time with Aideed. Last night, Ambassador Simpson faxed Aideed a message that was very critical of his public performance, where he is trying to bolster his place among his own constituencies. We made it clear that we are not coming to stay in the area, that we want to go in, withdraw the Pakistani's last battalion, and come out. We have made it clear that if there is provocation or hindrance in that movement, that they will be subject to our actions. The Ambassador has reiterated that with Aideed.

We will have to continue to do that because Aideed is in that process of continuing to make public announcements. ———.

Can those factional leaders control their people regardless of what they are saying secretly? That is like the Saigon withdrawal in the early 1970s. Crowds can get out of control. A long story around, General Zinni wanted to have these nonlethal pellets, ways that he could start dispersing crowds early on, at distance, versus having that problem close on him quicker. But the servicemen know that they always have authority to protect themselves and take necessary actions.

Mr. BONILLA. So based on intelligence that you have now, you expect that to go as smoothly as possible, based on those who control the different factions in Somalia?

General PEAY. We would hope that would be the case. But no way would I sit here and tell you what you and I would call a retirement operation is without risk. No question, it has risk associated with it.

#### GOLAN HEIGHTS

Mr. BONILLA. I have a question—some have suggested that perhaps American troops should serve as monitors in the Israeli-Syria agreement in the Golan Heights. Two concerns I will ask you about. If that were pursued, with the wild card being Syria, how we can trust them to behave. The other question would be the wild card we would create by being in and not allowing Israel to properly defend the area because we would be in the area.

General PEAY. As you know, that is not my area of operation and I really, other than just speculation, it would be unfair of me to make a judgment in that area. I have not studied it to that degree.

## SAUDI ARABIA-YEMEN DISPUTE

Mr. BONILLA. One more question relates to Saudi Arabia and Yemen and their border dispute. What do you think about the potential threat to Saudi Arabia if Yemen becomes more aggressive?

General PEAY. I don't think that Yemen, sir, is going to be a threat to the Kingdom. I think probably it is just the opposite. Those are long historic border discussions. ———.

Mr. BONILLA. As you know, I am a new Member on this Committee and have a lot to learn. I look forward to working with you as we progress in this term. Thank you.

General PEAY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Neumann.

Mr. NEUMANN. No questions, other than to say thank you for being here. It is very informative.

## GAO REPORT ON TWO MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES

Mr. YOUNG. I would like to get your opinion on the issue of the MRCs and the report of the GAO that was somewhat critical of some of the assumptions of the DOD when establishing the Bottom-Up Review.

The GAO expressed doubts as to whether the force structure has sufficient strategic mobility available for deploying to two near-simultaneous MRCs, whether there are sufficient support forces available, and could support forces from peacekeeping operations be redeployed to a major regional conflict in sufficient time to meet CINC requirements. They also expressed doubts that the Army National Guard combat brigades could be deployed within 90 days of being called.

I know that you have touched on some of these issues already, and I also know that these troops are not dedicated to your command. You call on them when needed. But as the Commander of Central Command, I would think you would be real interested in what is out there and available to you.

I wonder if you would comment on those points that the GAO raised.

General PEAY. ———.

Mr. YOUNG. What would have to be done to provide you with the flexibility that you are talking about? Where is the lack of flexibility?

General PEAY. ———.

Mr. YOUNG. Your use of the words "consistent turmoil," tell us something about that.

General PEAY. Well, I think over the years we find that ———.

## WARGAME OF TWO MRC SCENARIO

Mr. YOUNG. Has Central Command wargamed the two MRC scenario?

General PEAY. We have not done a complete wargame. We participated in the Chairman's NIMBLE DANCER wargame. We have run some computerized runs against the advancements of the threat and the forces that we commit against that threat to see where we eventually stabilize the leading edge of the battlefield, to try to determine if we need so many divisions, so many carrier

groups, et cetera, and at what places. We have not run what you would call a full-up wargaming capability.

#### CENTCOM REGIONAL THREATS

Mr. YOUNG. General, Mr. Murtha and I have to leave to go to the Rules Committee to try to continue the fast track that we have tried to put the Defense Supplemental on, but before we do leave, I wanted to ask one more question.

In the part of the world for which Central Command has responsibility, where you have your jurisdiction, how stable would you say that part of the world is today as it would affect a threat to our interests?

General PEAY. I think it is the most violent area of the world that we are dealing with today with the greatest chance of destabilization in both the near term and the long term. The near term is the Iraq threat.

In the long term, there are two, maybe three threats. There is ——. When you put that together, you have for a period of time a very tough region of the world that you have to deal with.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much for your appearance. Any time you have something that you believe the Committee should be made aware of, please consider this an invitation to make us aware of it at your convenience.

Are there other questions? Mr. Dicks.

#### STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

Mr. DICKS. General, you mentioned a couple of times your concern about airlift. Can you tell me what that is?

General PEAY. I just think that in the near term, despite some splendid work that has been done to try to enhance the age and the maintenance status of the current C-141 fleet, that with the numbers involved and the wear and tear that is on that fleet today, there are going to have to be some major improvements in the airlift side of that to handle both tactical and cargo lift requirements. It is going to require the completion of this study that the Air Force Chief is doing today, and that is how to get to this problem of airlift.

Mr. DICKS. Some of us in the Congress have suggested that we ought to look at, in combination with the C-17—we favor the C-17, of course, but that you ought to look at a nondevelopmental aircraft; in other words, you could buy something off the shelf.

I have my favorite, the 747 freighter. There are many applicants. But the GAO did a study in which they suggested that combining 65 to 70 C-17s with 60 747 freighters, you could actually save the taxpayers \$10 billion over the next 10 or 15 years in terms of doing a combination.

We have looked at the ability to use that and it would work. So we are trying to figure out ways to do it, but there are some who don't want to consider anything other than just C-17s, and they are very expensive; I just point this out.

If you have any comments, I would be glad to have them now or for the record. We are trying to help.

[The information follows:]

Although both the C-17 and the 747 freighter—the commercial version of the Non-Developmental Airlift Aircraft (NDAA)—would help meet USCENTCOM's strategic mobility requirements, the C-17 has some distinct advantages. First, the C-17 can carry outsized cargo, such as the Army's M1A1 tanks, a capability currently available in only one other airframe, the C-5. Additionally, the C-17 can be air-refueled, and can operate into short, unimproved airfields common in the Central Region. The C-17 also takes less space to park on the airfield than the NDAA. In many cases, two or more C-17s can park in the space required by one 747. That feature, coupled with a C-17 average ground time of one hour, versus the three hours required for the 747, dramatically increases the amount of cargo the C-17 can deliver over the 747. Additionally, the C-17 has airdrop capability, the 747 does not.

Although the 747 is a proven airframe; we view it as a supplement to the C-17, not a replacement. I suspect that once the decisions have been made, we will see a mixture of both the C-17 and the selected NDAA. Determining that mix is beyond my area of expertise. The Air Mobility Command (AMC) has been commissioned by the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct a Strategic Airlift Force Mix Analysis (SAFMA) study for this very purpose. Their recommendations, due this fall, will be instrumental in determining the proper mix of C-17 and NDAA aircraft.

General PEAY. I know you are trying to help, sir.

Mr. HOBSON. Were those new or used freighters?

Mr. DICKS. They could be both.

#### FISCAL YEAR 1995 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman—we have exercised ourselves pretty extensively because of our concerns about the impact of contingencies upon the limited resources available to carry forward the responsibilities you face. I am interested in your views about this Supplemental, the need and urgency for it.

On the record, as long as we are pushing ourselves as we are, I would like to know what the General has to say.

General PEAY. Yes, sir. I think it is a must.

The contingency operations have happened, there has been some movement of funds to handle those. Some of the contingency operations have very good training, but it is a cut at the O&M budgets of all of the Services.

It is fundamental that the Services get this money to make up for the diversion they have had to go through as we have gone to an increased mode of responding on short notice to these new world requirements.

Mr. LEWIS. Not all of us supported all these contingencies, but when I visited Haiti, I was impressed by the training opportunity. Once you are there, you are there; and it was a good experience, but the financial drain is very real.

We have been communicating at the CINC level about this question since November or December. The Committee has decided to move the Supplemental because we are not getting response at the highest level of the Administration. There is some public discussion about differences here, but there is time between now and the time we go to conference to settle differences. But in the meantime, I think the urgency is very real.

Thank you.

Mr. MCDADE. Any further questions? The gentleman from Washington.

#### DUAL TASKING DURING TWO MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES

Mr. DICKS. I don't think you answered this one. I will read this question.

According to the Bottom-Up Review, certain specialized assets would be dual tasked, shifted from the first regional conflict to the second. Examples include F-17, airlift, sealift and air reconnaissance which DOD assumed dual tasking would occur. It did not analyze how assets would be shifted from one conflict to another.

Is that a valid criticism of the Bottom-Up Review and has anything been done to fix that problem?

General PEAY. There is going to have to be some dual tasks. The Joint Staff has to go through just what those assets are.

Mr. DICKS. There is a list, GAO points out the shortfalls in units for a single regional conflict, and it goes from aviation, chemical, engineering, medical, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, right down the line and that shortage is 38 and the shortage if you have 2 conflicts is 654 units. That is why people on the Hill are worried that we don't have the ability, the resources to handle two major contingencies.

General PEAY. Those are what you would call generic combat service support assets, truck companies, and hospitals. Those are the ones I was talking about that are below the line. There needs to be some reordering of that, and Total Army Analysis between now and May will look at what those shifts should be.

My caution is that you don't make a radical shift to a lot of that. Take the DESERT STORM piece. When we needed truck battalions in DESERT STORM, we converted battalions at Fort Lewis, Washington, and moved them as truck battalions into the Desert.

We don't want to do this across the force in large numbers, but I would go to some reordering in the middle of the fight and try to get that list lined up so we can fight MRC East and MRC West. Most of those are Army units; we are not going to have an 800,000-man Army, so you have to be careful that you don't give up combat units to fill them up with these combat service support units to keep this thing in such balance. We can't afford to go that way either.

#### READINESS OF THE ENHANCED BRIGADES

Mr. DICKS. Going back to two MRCs, it says the Army's portion of the forces for a two-conflict scenario consists of 10 active divisions and 15 Army National Guard Enhanced Brigades. The 15 Guard brigades include eight heavy brigades and seven light brigades. Are you confident that the Bottom-Up Review's goal of the Guard Enhanced Brigades being ready to deploy 90 days after being called to active duty is currently realistic?

General PEAY. ———.

Mr. DICKS. How about the ones that are assigned to you?

General PEAY. I don't have those Enhanced Brigades assigned to me by title. The plan will come out. They will tab the specific units by number that will come to us. That is not taking place because the 15 Enhanced Brigades are a recent add-on.

Mr. DICKS. We went through this last time when the Guard was not deployed because there was a question of their fitness to deploy. Some people said it would have been a disastrous decision to deploy them.

General HOBSON. The Army Guard or the Air Guard?

Mr. DICKS. Army Guard. It was just the readiness of the forces. The Guard units and the Air Reserve units, especially Air Force and others, did a very good job. But in combat brigades there was a problem of ability to deploy.

Are you comfortable—have we made any progress in that area?

General PEAY. I am sure there has been some progress made. I don't have visibility of that. It is a challenge that we are going to have to work on.

Mr. DICKS. Especially with a smaller Army, it seems to me that making sure we have made progress on that has to be a high priority.

General PEAY. I agree. I think the challenge is, when you bring an Army down this small, the Reserve Components must do the job. Frankly, I am always astounded at how well they do and how many hours that they put into their military business from a patriot standpoint and continue their civilian occupations. I have never been critical of their patriotism.

Mr. DICKS. No one is questioning their patriotism, but there is a question over sending somebody into combat unprepared.

General PEAY. We are going to have to get them ready.

Mr. DICKS. Do you think 90 days is enough?

General PEAY. If we can get them properly equipped and get into a reasonably good training program and they can do the recruiting they have to do. Their reenlistment and recruiting statistics are not the best across the line today because of the enormous hours that go into this business. That is what I meant. I am surprised they do as well as they do today.

High-tech warfare has not made the business easier in terms of time and has not made the job any easier. It comes down to prudent risk.

Mr. DICKS. Are they getting to the National Training Center?

General PEAY. Sir, I don't have visibility from overseas today. This discussion is one of the risk and one of casualties and how much. No one wants to have casualties, but how much is the Nation ready to absorb today?

And we have gotten ourselves, unfortunately, we have perceptually gotten ourselves in a position because of the enormous success in Desert Shield and Desert Storm that we probably don't have the Nation properly prepared for what combat normally does to us in this tough business. So it is a case of risk, prudent risk and casualties.

#### PERSIAN GULF SYNDROME

Mr. DICKS. This is something I saw on TV the other night. It was on—about the Persian Gulf Syndrome and the problems that people are having. This is not your responsibility, but there are some people who say we have ways to cure what the problems are, give them heavy antibiotics, and yet we are still having a problem with the Army willing to recognize its responsibility. I mean, these are people that were part of CENTCOM, went out to serve their country.

You were the Vice Chief of the Army. Why is this such a problem to come to closure? If there is a way to treat these people, why aren't we doing it? Do you have any idea?

**General PEAY.** I don't. I have had my command surgeon come in once a month because a headline comes up in the paper on this illness with regularity. Because of the speeches, I have had him try to lay out for me what is the status today. I have talked to the DOD health leader. There are lots of studies that have been done.

Certainly I can tell you in the community there is an open hand to anyone that has a concern in this area to report himself and go through this series of regimens that are associated with trying to get at the bottom of this. I can only assure you that there is an openness to do something.

**Mr. DICKS.** This is one we have to talk to the Secretary about.

**General PEAY.** I am out of my lane.

**Mr. HOBSON.** If the gentleman would yield. Along that line in your overall planning—I know when you are thinking about how many people you are going to put in and equipment and stuff, it is not necessarily your high priority, but I wonder if you have people looking at various parts of the world that you are responsible for, and other places. Because in Vietnam there are other types of diseases that people get because they are in a particular part of the world.

Do you have anybody in your group that I look at—the question of if we do this again, what will we do differently in talking to people when the kinds of environment they are going to be in. That is, if we have that opportunity in time. Do you have anybody looking at that sort of thing so you can be prepared if something similar comes up in the future?

**General PEAY.** Yes, sir, we do. We are trying to get ahead of the problem. We have study teams today ———. So that kind of research is ongoing.

**Mr. HOBSON.** Had that been happening prior to this engagement or is this something relatively new?

**General PEAY.** Sir, I just don't know.

**Mr. HOBSON.** Is there any way to——

**General PEAY.** Certainly, I can provide the information to you for the record. I would be glad to go back home and ask questions on that.

[The information follows:]

The military medical departments have long recognized that Disease and Non-Battle Injury (DNBI) casualties for all military operations throughout recorded history have exceeded those produced as a direct result of combat. Additionally, our most recent experience in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM resulted in post conflict casualties—probably best included in the DNBI category—with a constellation of medical problems now known as the Gulf War Syndrome. It follows, then, that a major part of the CENTCOM's job is to identify current DNBI threats within our theater in order to prevent casualties wherever possible. There are at least seven sources of information presently utilized to address the DNBI threats within the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). These include:

1. Disease surveillance data reported from military units permanently stationed in the CENTCOM AOR;
2. Disease surveillance and experiential data collected and reported from military units deployed to the AOR on operations or exercises;
3. Medical observations and experiential data from U.S. Embassy health units;
4. Theater level medical surveillance and investigative data obtained when the Problem Definition and Assessment (PDA) team deploys on major operations and exercises in CENTCOM's AOR (NOTE: See a more complete description of the PDA team below);
5. Intelligence assessments provided by the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, CENTCOM & Joint Staff Intelligence;



6. Reports and information from medical research projects in the AOR sponsored and/or directed by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (e.g., malaria vaccine trials); and

7. Reports and information from regional medical research laboratories located within the CENTCOM AOR, namely the Naval Medical Research Unit Number Three in Egypt and the Army Medical Research Institute in Kenya.

All of the medical threat information from these various sources is then centrally analyzed by our CENTCOM Surgeon. The resulting medical assessments are then further verified and/or modified based on personal appraisals by the CENTCOM staff before inclusion in operational planning and/or execution. In short, casualty prevention is a major focus for the U.S. Central Command.

Description of PDA Team Make-up Function: Major deployments virtually always have a medical surveillance system instituted whereby DNBI threats can be detected immediately after surfacing and can be effectively countered. Taken to the next step, medical surveillance at the theater level began to evolve during the Vietnam conflict. The Field Epidemiological Survey Team (FEST) deployed to Vietnam with the 5th Special Forces Group to investigate disease outbreaks, to teach preventive medicine principles to the indigenous population as well as U.S. troops, and to perform laboratory diagnostic surveys defining disease prevalence. Since that time, this theater level concept has continued to evolve to what is now known as the Problem Definition and Assessment (PDA) team.

Historically, CENTCOM has been a prime user of the PDA team. Initially, the PDA team augmented the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), CENTCOM's forerunner. Since then, the PDA team has deployed on virtually every Bright Star exercise, investigating disease outbreaks in Jordan (75th Rangers) and the Sinai (Multinational Force), deployed in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and deployed with the advance parties on our most recent major operations—Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia and Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR in Kuwait. In Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR—a large scale return to the Persian Gulf region—the PDA team was a key player in supporting CENTCOM efforts to prevent casualties as a result of DNBI. The composition of the team supporting Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR provided the necessary expertise—epidemiology, occupational medicine, infectious disease, toxicology, air quality assessment, and diagnostic laboratory capability—to address all aspects of casualty prevention.

Mr. MCDADE. The time of the gentleman has expired. Chairman Young has a series of questions that will be inserted in the record and we ask for your responses to them. Thank you very much.

The Committee is adjourned until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto follow:]

#### PRIORITIES AND DEFICIENCIES

*Question.* General Peay, CENTCOM is somewhat unique because of the fact that units which would participate in a conflict in your area of responsibility are not under your day to day command, but would be assigned to you in case of a war.

Nevertheless, in terms of your assessment of the units that would probably be under your command in case of a war, what are the major shortfalls in Personnel; Training; Equipment; and Maintenance?

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The Department was unable to provide a response in time to be printed in this hearing volume.]

*Question.* What are the top ten items on your most recent Integrated Priority List?

To what extent does the current budget and the Five Year Defense Plan adequately fund these priorities?

*Answer.* —. Generally speaking, the fiscal year 1996 budget and the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) support our top ten items. However, less than full support for Strategic Mobility and Prepositioning objectives adds additional risk to USCENTCOM's ability to accomplish its mission.

The Bottom-Up Review and the Army's Global Prepositioning Strategy supports USCENTCOM's strategy of placing a second Army Brigade in Southwest Asia. The first phase of a three year program to build warehousing for the second brigade re-

quires \$48.1 million of Army Military Construction (MILCON) funding in fiscal year 1996. The Air Force MILCON requirement for prepositioned facilities requires \$17.1 million in fiscal year 1996. These requirements are fully supported. \_\_\_\_\_

#### TRAINING

*Question.* As Commander in Chief you have responsibility for deciding what annual training the forces under your command require.

From your perspective has training of the forces which would be under your command in case of a conflict been adequate in the past year?

*Answer.* USCENTCOM does not have permanent forces assigned. We rely on the force providers to conduct annual training. We have conveyed the needs and requirements unique to our area of responsibility to them. From my observation of the exercises we have conducted over the past year, these forces are mission capable and ready to fight.

*Question.* To what extent have any training exercises been canceled in the past year because of the Services' O&M funds being diverted to contingency operations? Do you see any degradation of readiness because of the increase in contingencies?

*Answer.* During fiscal year 1995, no USCENTCOM sponsored exercise was cancelled because of Service O&M funds being diverted to contingency operations. We have seen no degradation of readiness because of the increase in contingencies. However, several exercises were cancelled, postponed, or restructured due to the non-availability of forces. Thirteen were cancelled due to VIGILANT WARRIOR and one due to Somalia.

*Question.* Please comment on the training value of scheduled joint exercises versus conducting contingency operations as they occur.

*Answer.* Joint exercises, conducted with our regional allies in the Central Region, offer an opportunity for deliberate face-to-face planning with the host nation. During this planning process, command & control and interoperability issues are resolved before they become a problem. Combined training and operations objectives are also determined through deliberate planning. These objectives form the basis for improving U.S. and host nation forces' ability to respond to actual contingency situations. In essence, it is through exercises that specific preparation for response to contingencies is practiced.

*Question.* What training exercises have been scheduled for fiscal year 1995? Do you foresee any cancellations? If so, why?

*Answer.* A total of 103 combined exercises were scheduled for fiscal year 1995. Of these, 30 are Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises using JCS provided strategic lift. To date, 13 exercises were cancelled due to Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. Of these 13 cancelled, 4 have been rescheduled.

*Question.* Are the funds included in the Services' fiscal year 1996 budget request sufficient for your projected training needs?

*Answer.* With the current exercise schedule, yes. However, there is no funding room to accommodate an increase in participation should the host nation so request, as has happened on other exercises in recent years.

*Question.* A continued concern of the CINCs has been the impact of a high tempo of operations on morale, quality of life and readiness.

Certain types of units have been deployed time after time in recent years. From your perspective, is there a shortfall of certain types of units in the force structure as outlined in the Bottom-Up Review?

To what extent are you relying on Reserve Components to meet OPTEMPO requirements caused by frequent deployments?

Have you noticed any decline in morale because of the high tempo of operations?

*Answer.* Even though USCENTCOM does not have permanently assigned forces, we share the same concerns regarding the impact high OPTEMPO has on deployed personnel and their families. We depend on the other CINCs/Services to provide trained and ready forces in response to directed missions. \_\_\_\_\_. While the operational requirements placed on U.S. personnel has been demanding, we have not experienced any decline in morale. The forces provided by the owning CINCs have been, without exception, highly motivated, professional, and ready to complete their assigned tasks.

#### SHIFTING ASSETS BETWEEN REGIONAL CONFLICTS

*Question.* According to the Bottom-Up Review, certain specialized assets would be dual-tasked—i.e., shifted from the first regional conflict to the second. Examples of this include the F-17, airlift, sealift and air reconnaissance assets. The General Accounting Office study states in part, "although DoD assumed that dual-tasking

would occur, it did not analyze how assets would be shifted from one conflict to another."

Is that a valid criticism of the Bottom-Up Review?

Answer. It more correctly questions the Department of Defense (DoD) Bottom-Up Review analysis for completeness. The Bottom-Up Review was intended as a programming document, not as a thorough analysis. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) are currently working the two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflict (MRC) issue. The results of that study will be a close examination of the CINCs' warfighting requirements and the feasibility of shifting key forces from one theater to another. We will know the answer to that question by the end of fiscal year 1995. The Joint Staff analysis of this issue continues, however \_\_\_\_\_.

Question. The GAO study also states as follows, "DoD officials explained that because a model for two near simultaneous conflicts does not exist, DoD identifies the specific number of assets required for each conflict and assumed that dual-tasking would compensate for any shortfalls." From your perspective, is the assumption that "dual tasking would compensate for any shortfalls" a faulty assumption?

Answer. \_\_\_\_\_ USCENTCOM's joint study with U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces, Korea and other studies, such as the Total Army Analysis, are expected to provide more information through their ongoing studies.

Question. Concern has been expressed about whether forces participating in peacekeeping operations will be available in sufficient time to meet CINC needs in case of a major regional conflict.

What is your view on the extent to which military units involved in ongoing peacekeeping operations can be redeployed to your command in a timely manner?

For example, what about transportation units that move cargo and personnel through ports? Wouldn't they be involved in the debarkation from a peacekeeping operation at the very time they would be needed in the early stages of a major regional conflict(s)?

Answer. The question of "frictionless" withdrawal of forces from an on-going peace operation has been examined extensively most recently in the \_\_\_\_\_. The final answer is that there probably is no such thing as "frictionless" withdrawal. The Department of Defense continues to examine "offsets," such as allied and coalition support, contract support, and Reserve Component forces to replace "one-of-a-kind" units like the Army's 7th Transportation Command.

A major concern is the combat readiness of Combat Arms units which have participated in a peace operation and not trained on their wartime Mission Essential Tasks. Based on the amount of time a maneuver unit participates in an action like Haiti, it will require re-training in its primary mission skills.

Question. Given the current projected force structure, would the occurrence of two near simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts inevitably mean that the U.S. would have to withdraw from any ongoing participation in any peacekeeping effort?

Answer. The question would have to be qualified as to the nature of the peace operation, the political implications involved, and the type of unit participating. For example, the United States' longstanding participation in the Sinai with one battalion would probably not be impacted while a significant U.S. military ground force commitment to Bosnia for peace enforcement would be another matter.

Some forces, including "below the line" Combat Service Support forces, would have to be withdrawn from peacekeeping, but the question as to "how many" cannot be categorically answered.

#### DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE

Question. The May 1994 Defense Planning Guidance contains a scenario depicting two near simultaneous conflicts and is being used to develop program and budget requirements for the strategy. Do you have any concerns about the defense planning guidance scenario for the two conflict strategy?

Answer. Our main concern was with the time split between initiation of both crises. \_\_\_\_\_.

Question. If so, how do you differ from the DoD or the Joint Chiefs of how the U.S. should conduct a two conflict situation?

Answer. We differ only in the assumed time split between combat engagements in both theaters and, the associated level of risk. We believe that the shorter the separation between initiation of crises, the greater the risk.

Question. Based on your knowledge of the Bottom-Up Review and the Five Year Defense Plan, do you think they provide the force structure and funding to execute the two-conflict strategy?

**Answer.** We believe the "above the line" (combat) forces are there to accomplish the two Major Regional Conflict (MRC) objectives. We will have a better idea of both "above" and "below the line" (combat service/service support) force capabilities once we compile an integrated two MRC Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) during our current planning cycle. Funding appears to be adequate as long as we can procure the programmed force enhancements, such as the critical ashore prepositioning, C-17 airlifters, and Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) sealift ships requested, and if the cost of military operations other than war (MOOTW) doesn't degrade our state of readiness.

**Question.** The Committee is advised that your command is undertaking a study which will address: Number and types of assets required to shift between conflicts; Apportionment of strategic mobility assets; and The mix of combat and support capabilities? When will your study be complete? Do you have preliminary results?

**Answer.** The Chairman directed such a study last year to my predecessor, General Hoar, and CINCPAC at the time, Admiral Larson. It is an on-going joint study between USCENTCOM and USPACOM. ———. We have only scratched the surface in analyzing the Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) requirements of a two MRC scenario. ———. Preliminary results of our study have been provided to the Joint Staff. The study is on-going, and we intend to continuously update our analysis. ———.

#### INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE WARFIGHTER

**Question.** In the aftermath of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, questions were raised about shortfalls in Intelligence Community support for the military efforts specific to that conflict, as well as for military planning and deployment requirements in other areas. In your opinion, have steps been taken to improve co-operation and provide better intelligence support for your operational missions? What changes have been made to improve on-scene intelligence support to forward deployed forces in your area of responsibility (AOR)?

**Answer.** ———.

**Question.** In your view, has the Defense Intelligence Community fully adjusted to the changes in the environment associated with today's operational requirements?

**Answer.** Yes. The Defense Intelligence Community's ability to react quickly and to organize its resources has been shown by ———.

**Question.** As part of the Command's Intelligence Architecture program, a "CINCs theater intelligence priority list" is prepared and submitted to Pentagon budget planners. What are your top intelligence priorities contained in your intelligence priority list? Elaborate on how well the Service Headquarters, OSD intelligence activities and the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) dealt with and what action has been taken to fill your identified intelligence priorities. Has any item submitted on your most recent lists been fixed?

**Answer.** USCENTCOM intelligence planning priorities focus on the timely delivery of high quality, pertinent intelligence to the commander in the field. Much progress has been made since the last CENTCOM intelligence priority list was published. CENTCOM has been very successful in addressing and in attaining support for planning priorities with the Services, OSD and the MIB. All CENTCOM planning priorities are being supported with positive and appropriate actions. The Command has solicited and gained support for issues through the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Assessment Team of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Military Intelligence Board (MIB) provides a useful management mechanism to assist Intelligence Community decision makers in focusing on important long range warfighting issues and critical near term contingency issues as they occur. The MIB has tasked appropriate Services and agencies to solve issues discovered during DESERT STORM, Somalia, and Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. Regular feedback and active participation in the JROC and MIB processes ensure that CENTOM intelligence priorities are met.

**Question.** Are there any intelligence products or support that you requested but failed to receive for any reason, including problems caused by classification? Do you receive timely and responsive answers to requirements you levy on the Intelligence Community?

**Answer.** ———.

**Question.** The National Security Agency's (NSA) role is being a Combat Support Agency whose primary mission of Signals Intelligence is to support the warfighters. Have you been contacted by various Intelligence Community activities, such as the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, Central Imagery Office, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and Defense

Mapping Agency, to obtain your approval and certification that the advanced development projects they are undertaking meet your requirements?

Answer. \_\_\_\_\_

*Question.* Previous reports indicate that an overabundance of intelligence reports and summaries are electronically transmitted to the CINCs and subordinate commands from the various intelligence agencies and military intelligence organizations. Many of these documents are reported to be lengthy and repetitious, and they clog the communications pipeline during high-tempo operations. In your view, is there an overabundance or duplication of intelligence information being transmitted? Any suggestion on how this situation can be corrected?

Answer. The national intelligence agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Commands have greatly reduced duplication and circular reporting. The intelligence community has undergone and continues to undergo changes to the way they do business. This change focuses on the proper division of effort among the intelligence agencies to prevent duplicate collection, processing and dissemination. The intelligence community has made and will continue to make significant progress regarding these fixes.

*Question.* Additionally, field commanders have at times complained of not receiving useful and timely intelligence support. This problem has been attributed in part to the lack of interoperability between and among a number of Service and agency communications and intelligence systems. Are there interoperability issues or communications shortfalls standing in the way of your receiving the necessary intelligence support?

Answer. Interoperability is one of the key concerns for USCENTCOM in its daily activities. USCENTCOM requires all supporting Unified Commands deploying into the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility to come equipped with compatible and interoperable Joint Deployable Intelligence Support Systems (JDISS). With the widespread deployment of JDISS equipment to all Unified Commands, this interoperability problem has been significantly reduced. The Military Intelligence Board and the Defense Intelligence community in a united effort have made major progress to standardize on a select set of migration applications and the elimination of legacy systems that were not interoperable.

Problems remain when going from the Secure Compartmented Information (SCI) level to the Secret collateral level. Improvement is still needed in moving intelligence from the CINC level through the component level and down. There are some interoperability problems among Service, CINC, component and other systems which limit our ability to provide usable, accessible intelligence products to warfighters. The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) will be a significant step towards improving interoperability among these systems, and will provide an environment in which full interoperability can be provided.

*Question.* How would you characterize the value and level of SIGINT support provided by NSA during the recent military contingency in Somalia?

Answer. \_\_\_\_\_

*Question.* Is the NSA collection and reporting effort meeting your needs? Can improvements be made?

Answer. NSA's collection efforts are fully attuned to the requirements of this command and, along with its analytic and reporting efforts, have provided consistently superb support. The working relationship between CENTCOM and NSA on signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection and reporting programs has been close and highly effective in making the best use of available resources.

CENTCOM strongly supports the current satellite initiatives that would enhance the broad area coverage capability for improved battlefield knowledge and quality of our intelligence databases. Further, we are working closely with NSA to enhance our total SIGINT capability by expanding third party relationships.

#### PREPOSITIONING

*Question.* The afloat prepositioning program based on the maritime prepositioning force (MPF) worked very well during DESERT SHIELD. However, in its inspection trips to the Gulf during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the Committee found that a significant portion of the equipment on the maritime preposition ships was somewhat dated. Comment in general, and provide details for the record, as to whether the mix of equipment on these ships is up to date and compatible with the equipment normally used by the units in training?

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The Department was unable to provide a response in time to be printed in this hearing volume.]

**Question.** What is the extent of the current stockpile of prepositioned equipment in the CENTCOM Region?

**Answer.** ———.

**Question.** What shortcomings remain in terms of land-based prepositioned equipment?

What is being done to overcome that deficiency?

Are there adequate funds in this budget and the Five Year Defense Plan to meet your objectives for land based prepositioned equipment in the CENTCOM Region?

**Answer.** The current plan for Army prepositioning ashore includes one heavy brigade in Kuwait and another heavy brigade plus a division base "minus" ———. We are asking for \$48.1 million in fiscal year 1996 as the first part of a \$177.9 million Military Construction (MILCON) project to construct facilities ——— as well as \$394.1 million in Operation & Maintenance (O&M) funding over the balance of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), to maintain our equipment as the facilities are completed. We have Army assurances that its MILCON program will fully meet these requirements in upcoming budgets. The Army O&M budget meets our current requirements now.

Air Force prepositioning is centered around bare base equipment sets known under the project name "HARVEST FALCON." The status of their equipment is as shown:

Set type	Required	Ready
Housekeeping (accommodates people) .....	46	24
Industrial operations (base engineering) .....	13	9
Flight line (aircraft ops and maint eqpt) .....	13	6

The Air Force has programmed funding over the FYDP (\$296.4 million O&M, \$128.1 million Procurement) to maintain and acquire sets to reach the requirement described above. An additional \$48.4 million for MILCON over the FYDP provides the proper storage of 6 HARVEST FALCON sets and associated equipment ———. The Air Force has budgeted its entire program.

While the Navy has budgeted \$5.79 million for O&M over the FYDP for operations in the Central Region, there is neither equipment on hand, nor procurement dollars programmed for required Forward Logistics Support sets, Navy-provided Special Operations forces equipment or sustainment supplies.

#### PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

**Question.** Which countries in CENTCOM's area of responsibility are developing weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical and/or biological?

**Answer.** ———.

**Question.** Do you believe we have adequate intelligence assets in place to assess the threat that will arise from the development of these weapons?

**Answer.** ———.

**Question.** Russia and Iran recently reached an agreement providing Russian assistance to complete a nuclear power plant in Iran. Construction on this plant had been halted many years ago.

What, if any, are the implications of completing this plant in terms of the nuclear proliferation issues?

**Answer.** ———.

**Question.** Press reports indicate Russia has also agreed to help Iran maintain nuclear research reactors currently in operation and build several more at Iranian universities.

Are those press reports accurate?

If so, what are the implications of that program in terms of Iran developing expertise for the eventual production of nuclear weapons?

**Answer.** In addition to nuclear power plants, Russia has been negotiating to provide Iran with research reactors and related assistance. Certain research reactors, such as those moderated by heavy water or graphite, are better configured to produce plutonium in the reactor's core. Again, effective International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) controls will be necessary to preventing plutonium diversion to a weapons program.

In addition, experience gained from civil nuclear research is applicable to a weapons program.

## IRAQ

*Question.* Give the Committee your assessment of Saddam Hussein's hold on power.

*Answer.* \_\_\_\_\_.

*Question.* What is the current condition of the Iraqi economy? What is the inflation rate?

*Answer.* \_\_\_\_\_.

*Question.* How effective is the oil and arms embargo against Iraq?

*Answer.* \_\_\_\_\_.

*Question.* Considering the embargo, and the condition of the Iraqi economy, where is Saddam Hussein receiving the revenues to support his military and operate the government?

*Answer.* This question is best answered by the national intelligence agencies.

*Question.* Which countries are attempting to have the embargo against Iraq lifted? What is the motivation of these countries?

*Answer.* It is important to note that no country on the UN Security Council supports the lifting of sanctions without further Iraqi compliance with the relevant UN resolutions. \_\_\_\_\_. Their motivation for this appears to be economic; both French oil companies and the Russian government have signed preliminary agreements with Baghdad for the development of Iraqi oilfields following the lifting of sanctions. \_\_\_\_\_. Finally, other UN countries, particularly from the Arab and Third World, are openly concerned about the humanitarian impact of the embargo on the Iraqi populace.

*Question.* What would the impact be on the Iraqi economy and Saddam Hussein's future if the embargo was lifted?

*Answer.* \_\_\_\_\_.

*Question.* What is the tempo of operations for enforcing the no-fly zone in southern Iraq?

*Answer.* \_\_\_\_\_.

*Question.* What level of U.S. forces is involved?

*Answer.* \_\_\_\_\_.

*Question.* How long do you anticipate this level of deployment will have to continue to carry out Operation Southern Watch?

*Answer.* We anticipate maintaining current force levels at least as long as U.S. forces are tasked with enforcement of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). However, U.S. force levels are determined by a variety of factors to include threats to U.S. and friendly interests, access requirements, exercise commitments, etc. When UNSCRs are no longer in effect, the size and scope of U.S. forward presence in the region will be reassessed based on requirements to protect U.S. interests.

*Question.* How long is the typical deployment of U.S. troops involved in Operation Southern Watch?

*Answer.* USCINCCENT established a 90 day rotation policy for Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. Variances to the policy are based on specialized missions and continuity in key positions.

*Question.* What is the current situation regarding international inspections and/or dismantling of Iraqi facilities involved in nuclear, chemical and/or biological weapons?

*Answer.* Since 1991, United Nations teams have conducted over 110 inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and have supervised significant destruction of known capabilities. Significant dismantling of nuclear, chemical, and missile facilities has been accomplished. In June 1994, inspectors completed the destruction of nearly 28,000 chemical munitions and thousands of tons of chemical agents and precursors. The Ongoing Monitoring and Verification regime was declared provisionally operational in mid-October 1994—this effort will be the cornerstone to restricting Iraqi efforts to rearm itself with weapons of mass destruction.

UN officials currently believe Iraq is withholding information on past biological warfare activities. Continuing inspection efforts are aimed at pressing Baghdad to disclose all data on WMD projects so that full-scale monitoring can begin.

*Question.* To what extent has Saddam Hussein rebuilt his conventional armed forces? What level of military threat does he present to his neighbors?

*Answer.* \_\_\_\_\_. Despite its Gulf War losses and the effects of the embargo, Iraq's military remains one of the region's largest and most capable. Iraq retains the military capability to pose a real threat to Kuwait and to Saudi Arabia. \_\_\_\_\_.

## SOMALIA

*Question.* How many U.N. troops are left in Somalia? When are they scheduled to fully depart?

*Answer.* As of February 15, 1995, 5,000 U.N. troops remained in Somalia. Departure of all U.N. troops is scheduled for March 2, 1995.

*Question.* How many U.S. troops are now in the region of Somalia to assist in the evacuation on U.N. troops if it should become necessary.

*Answer.* As of February 15, 1995, approximately 8,000 soldiers, sailors, and Marines were in the region to assist in the withdrawal of the U.N. troops from Somalia.

*Question.* What is your assessment of the probability that U.S. troops will have to assist in the departure of the U.N. forces?

*Answer.* CCTF UNITED SHIELD forces are being provided to assure a peaceful withdrawal of U.N. forces from Somalia. ———. I believe we will see a peaceful withdrawal from Somalia.

*Question.* Have we made it clear to the Somalians that if U.S. troops are sent back into Somalia to assist the U.N. in its debarkation, we will act decisively if our troops are threatened?

*Answer.* As I mentioned during my testimony ———. But most importantly, we have met with all the faction leaders, making it very clear that if there is provocation or hindrance in that movement, they will be subject to our actions.

*Question.* What are the current plans in terms of U.S. civilians remaining in Somalia to assist in reconstruction and other functions after the departure of the U.S. forces? How many American civilians will remain in Somalia?

*Answer.* National guidelines prevent our intelligence activities from gathering information on U.S. civilians, either here or abroad in Somalia. Perhaps the Department of State can provide more information on the intentions and number of American civilians remaining in Somalia.

*Question.* What is your assessment of how events might unfold in Somalia after the departure of the U.N. forces?

*Answer.* ———.

*Question.* What is your assessment of the level of danger faced by U.S. personnel who remain after the withdrawal?

*Answer.* ———.

*Question.* Will U.S. forces have to remain offshore Somalia to provide a potential evacuation force of the U.S. civilians remaining in Somalia?

*Answer.* No U.S. civilians are expected to remain in Somalia.

*Question.* In retrospect, to what extent would you describe the tragedy in Somalia as: Hunger and starvation caused by a severe drought; or Hunger and starvation caused by rival clans using food as a weapon.

*Answer.* Both were equal factors in the hunger and starvation. The drought caused a poor harvest and severe food shortages. Aid agencies, attempting to fill the void, began shipping food into the country. Without sufficient security forces in place to ensure delivery of the food to the feeding and distribution centers, rival clans were able to seize the shipments in order to keep a portion for themselves and sell the remainder. The majority of the Somalis did not have money to purchase the food, thus they were unable to eat.

*Question.* What is your assessment of "lessons learned" in Somalia?

*Answer.* Operation UNITED SHIELD, the withdrawal of United Nations-Somalia (UNOSOM) II forces from Somalia, is coming to a very successful close. UNITED SHIELD concludes several recent USCENCOM operations in Somalia which began with Operation PROVIDE RELIEF in August 1992. We are currently collecting lessons learned from our experiences with Operation UNITED SHIELD. However, we have found the most important lesson learned is not a new one, but a reinforcement of an old one. The lesson is: Before we commit military forces to action, we must carefully weigh that decision against the vital national interests involved and the objective we wish to obtain. Second, we must decide what mission is to be accomplished and then ensure we don't have mission creep. Moreover, the American people must recognize and support the use of military force to obtain that objective.

## SUDAN

*Question.* Another troubled country in CENTCOMs area of responsibility (AOR) is Sudan. There has been widespread fighting and hunger in that country. Bring the Committee up to date on the current situation in Sudan.

*Answer.* ———.

*Question.* What are the roots of the ethnic conflict in Sudan?

*Answer.* The main cause of the civil war is a centuries-old religious, racial, and political division between the Arabic Moslem northern Sudanese and the black Afri-



can Christian/animist southern Sudanese. The current war is an extension of fighting that has occurred for centuries over issues that include Islamization, economic exploitation, political isolation and enslavement of southern Sudanese by the Arabic northern Sudanese. ———.

*Question.* In the past year or two, some have called for Western intervention in Sudan. What is your view of this issue?

*Answer.* Unlike Somalia or Rwanda, the Sudan is not a failed state. There is a government and a central authority in the Sudan that is recognized by the majority of its people. An intervention by foreign forces would be construed as an invasion by the government currently in power. Additionally, intervention in an Islamic country that clearly did not want such an intervention would only serve to inflame the Islamic world and cause rift between us and our Islamic allies.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Young. The 1995 Posture Statement of the United States Central Command, as referred to on page 193 follows:]

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# UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND



## 1995 POSTURE STATEMENT

PRESENTED TO THE 104th CONGRESS BY  
General J. H. Binford Peay III  
Commander in Chief  
United States Central Command

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# UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

## **OUR MISSION**

PROMOTE AND PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS

ENSURE UNINTERRUPTED ACCESS TO REGIONAL RESOURCES

ASSIST FRIENDLY STATES IN PROVIDING FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

DETER ATTEMPTS BY HOSTILE REGIONAL STATES TO ACHIEVE GEO-POLITICAL GAINS BY THREAT OR USE OF FORCE

## **OUR VISION**

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND: A FLEXIBLE AND VERSATILE COMMAND INTO THE 21ST CENTURY...

TRAINED, POSITIONED, AND READY TO DEFEND THE NATION'S VITAL INTERESTS, PROMOTE PEACE AND STABILITY, DETER CONFLICT, AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS SPANNING THE CONFLICT CONTINUUM; AND PREPARED TO WAGE UNRELENTING, SIMULTANEOUS, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS TO ACHIEVE DECISIVE VICTORY IN WAR.

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## USCENTCOM HISTORY

Events of the late 1970's threatened the stability of the Central Region and placed vital U.S. interests at risk. Following the revolution and subsequent fall of the Shah of Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was formed at MacDill AFB, Florida on March 1, 1980. During 1981 and 1982 it evolved from a worldwide deployable force to a de facto regional unified command representing U.S. interests in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. As a result of this evolution, the RDJTF was deactivated on December 31, 1982 to be replaced with the U.S. Central Command on January 1, 1983. The following list highlights key events in the Command's history.

U.S. Central Command established, MacDill AFB, Florida . . . . .	Jan 1983
Operation EARNEST WILL - Escort of reflagged tankers in Gulf . . . . .	Jul 1987
Operation PRAYING MANTIS - Response against Iranian Navy . . . . .	Apr 1988
Operation DESERT SHIELD - Defense of Saudi Arabia . . . . .	Aug 1990
Maritime Intercept Operations - Embargo enforcement on Iraq . . . . .	Aug 1990
Operation DESERT STORM - Liberation of Kuwait from Iraq . . . . .	Jan 1991
Operation SOUTHERN WATCH - Sanction enforcement in Iraq . . . . .	Aug 1992
Operation PROVIDE RELIEF - Famine relief in Somalia & Kenya . . . . .	Aug 1992
Operation RESTORE HOPE - Security for Somali relief efforts . . . . .	Dec 1992
Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR - Response to Iraqi deployment . . . . .	Oct 1994
Operation UNITED SHIELD - Support of UNOSOM II withdrawal . . . . .	Feb 1995

### COMMANDERS IN CHIEF

General Robert C. Kingston, USA . . . . .	Jan 1983-Nov 1985
General George B. Crist, USMC . . . . .	Nov 1985-Nov 1988
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA . . . . .	Nov 1988-Aug 1991
General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC . . . . .	Aug 1991-Aug 1994
General J. H. Binford Peay, III, USA . . . . .	Aug 1994-

v

**GENERAL J. H. BINFORD PEAY III  
UNITED STATES ARMY**

General J. H. Binford Peay III is the Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

General Peay was born in Richmond, Virginia, on 10 May 1940. Upon graduation from the Virginia Military Institute in 1962, he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant and awarded a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering. He also holds a Master of Arts from George Washington University. His military education includes completion of the Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the United States Army Command and General Staff College and the United States Army War College.

General Peay's initial troop assignments were in Germany and Fort Carson, Colorado. During two tours in the Republic of Vietnam, he performed duty as a Firing Battery Commander in the 4th Infantry Division in the central highlands of Vietnam and later as a Field Artillery Battalion Operations Officer with the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Returning to the United States, he served as a Field Artillery Branch Assignments Officer with the Army Military Personnel Center in Washington, D.C. Assigned to Hawaii in 1975, General Peay commanded the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery, 25th Infantry Division. Following attendance at the United States Army War College, he served as Senior Aide to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C. While in Washington, he was also Chief of the Army Initiatives Group in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army. Following that was service as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3/Director of Plans and Training, I Corps, and Commander, 9th Infantry Division Artillery, both assignments at Fort Lewis, Washington. In 1985, he was reassigned to the Army Staff as Executive Officer to the Chief of Staff, United States Army. From 1987-1988, he served with the Screaming Eagles as the Assistant Division Commander (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, followed by an assignment in July 1988 as the Deputy Commandant, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He assumed command of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) on 3 August 1989 and led the Division throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in the Arabian Gulf. Promoted to Lieutenant General, he was assigned as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of



the Army and Senior Army Member, United Nations Military Committee, from June 1991 until March 1993. On 26 March 1993, he was promoted to the rank of General and appointed the 24th Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army. He assumed his present position as Commander in Chief, United States Central Command on 5 August 1994.

Awards and decorations which General Peay has received include the Army Distinguished Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Silver Star, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Bronze Star Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters, and the Purple Heart. Also, he has received the Meritorious Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, several Air Medals, and the Army Commendation Medal. Additionally, he wears the Parachutist Badge, Ranger Tab, the Air Assault Badge, the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge, Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge, and the Army General Staff Identification Badge.

General Peay is married to the former Pamela Jane Pritchett, and they have two sons, James and Ryan.



**COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR  
ROBERT E. HALL  
UNITED STATES ARMY**

Command Sergeant Major Robert E. Hall is the Command Sergeant Major, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

Command Sergeant Major Hall was born in Gaffney, South Carolina, on May 31, 1947. He entered the Army in February 1968 and attended basic training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and advanced individual training at Fort Bliss, Texas. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Management from Park College, Parkville, Missouri.

Command Sergeant Major Hall demonstrated his personal commitment to the Army and his soldiers as he continued to advance to positions of higher responsibility. He has held a wide variety of important positions culminating in his current assignment as Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Central Command. He previously served in the same capacity with the 1st Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery, Fort Stewart, Georgia; Commandant, 24th Infantry Division Noncommissioned Officer Academy, Fort Stewart; the 24th Division Artillery, Saudi Arabia and Iraq; the 2nd Infantry Division, Korea; and the First U.S. Army, Fort Meade, Maryland.

Throughout his more than 27-year career, Command Sergeant Major Hall has held every key enlisted leadership position including: squad leader, 2nd Infantry Division, Korea; platoon sergeant, battalion operations sergeant, and battalion intelligence sergeant, 1st Armored Division, Germany; first sergeant, B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 59th Air Defense Artillery; and drill sergeant, Fort Bliss, Texas. His military education includes Drill Sergeant School, Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course, First Sergeants Course, and the Sergeants Major Academy, where he served as an instructor upon graduation from class 26. He also served on the staff of the Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia. His experience and expertise distinguished him as the 1979 Army Drill Sergeant of the Year and selection into the prestigious Sergeant Morales Club and the Sergeant Audie Murphy Club.

His awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, the Bronze Star Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with



five oak leaf clusters, the Army Commendation Medal with four oak leaf clusters, the Army Achievement Medal with one oak leaf cluster, ninth award of the Good Conduct Medal, the National Defense Service Medal with bronze star, the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, the Southwest Asia Service Medal with three bronze stars, the Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Ribbon with numeral 4, the Army Service Ribbon, the Overseas Service Ribbon with numeral 3, and the Kuwait Liberation Medal.

Command Sergeant Major Hall and his wife, Carole, have three children, Mrs. Apra Rose of Hinesville, Georgia, Rea and Jason.



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In October 1994, Saddam Hussein again threatened the fragile stability in the Arabian Gulf. Iraq's build-up of forces along Kuwait's border exhibited a willingness and ability to threaten its neighbors and to jeopardize access to the oil that is the lifeblood of the industrialized world. The strong, rapid U.S. response during Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR demonstrated our military capability, likely averted another war in the Gulf, and highlighted the importance we attach to this vital and volatile region. Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR was a resounding success for several reasons. First, the decisive response of our National Command Authorities, backed by the overwhelming support of Congress and the American people, sent an unmistakable message of resolve. Second, the superb

performance of our trained and ready forces, both forward deployed and moving on short notice from the U.S. or standing alert, provided a clear and convincing demonstration of America's military power. Finally, it validated the importance and criticality of the enhancements to our forward presence posture and the increase in prepositioned equipment in the Gulf region since DESERT STORM.

At the onset of the crisis, USCENTCOM relied on forward deployed Navy and Air Force units, Marines, Special Operations Forces and Patriot missile batteries, along with regional and allied forces, to make clear our resolve to defend against Iraqi aggression. Within days, these forces were joined by the aircraft carrier USS GEORGE WASHINGTON, additional cruise missile ships, reinforcing Air Force squadrons, and



**UNINTERRUPTED ACCESS TO ARABIAN GULF OIL IS VITAL**



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**FIREPOWER DEMONSTRATION DURING OPERATION VIGILANT WARRIOR**


two Army brigades. Meanwhile additional U.S. forces were deploying or standing by for further orders. This vivid demonstration of American military capability and resolve in the face of a very real Iraqi threat forced Saddam Hussein to back down and defused the crisis. Perhaps equally important, U.S. resolve and our rapid and decisive response to a threat in the Central Region sent a clear message to other potential aggressors who might be tempted to challenge U.S. interests.

Today our forward deployed forces are actively engaged in the execution of U.S. policy throughout the Central Region. In the North Arabian Gulf, Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO) enforce UN sanctions prohibiting certain trade with Iraq, with our ships conducting the vast majority of MIO boardings. Despite the 1994 turnover of

responsibility for Red Sea monitoring to Lloyd's Register of London, boardings have now totaled nearly 10,000 since the operation began in 1990. Also in the Gulf region, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH aircraft have enforced a no-fly zone below the 32nd parallel, flying over 58,000 sorties (38,000 of them over Iraq) since the creation of that task force in 1992. Finally, we recently had over 7,000 personnel participating in Operation UNITED SHIELD in support of the withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia.

Despite our success during Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR and these other ongoing operations, numerous threats to regional stability remain. The traditional Persian/Arabic rivalry for dominance in the Gulf region continues between Iran and Iraq as they vie for influence with their

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THE CENTRAL REGION

neighbors. Population growth and worsening oil-based economies will lead many nations to greater reliance on outside assistance, despite the vulnerability to influence and manipulation that it brings. Famine in Africa will likely again require massive international efforts to curtail widespread starvation. Tensions over water rights and disputed borders will also continue. However, the single greatest threat to stability in the region is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the associated spread of ballistic missile technology.

The United States Central Command's area of responsibility (AOR) is a culturally diverse and volatile region comprised of nineteen nations from Pakistan through the

Arabian Gulf and Red Sea littoral states to the Horn of Africa. Additionally, an area of interest (AOI) is made up of countries in close proximity to the AOR that have significant influence on events there. The Central Region's vast oil reserves and key strategic waterways make it vitally important to the United States. Arabian Gulf oil fuels a growing portion of an increasingly interdependent global economy, making uninterrupted access to the area critical. Additionally, security of the regional sea lines of communication is essential to the unimpeded flow of world trade. The National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy emphasize the dangers of regional conflict and recognize the Central Region as one of the areas where U.S. interests are most likely to be threatened.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A complex political-strategic environment challenges our ability to defend the vital interests of the United States in this important region.

The countries of the Central Command AOR are situated in three distinct but linked sub-regions: South Asia, the Arabian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula, and the Red Sea/Horn portion of Africa. Each has unique characteristics and presents different challenges. However, religious and ethnic conflicts, military adventurism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction all threaten the stability throughout the region.

CENTCOM's South Asia Sub-region consists of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Both are important to the United States and are facing daunting challenges. As the states of Central Asia to the north seek access to warm water ports on the Arabian Sea and Iran continues to build up its military to the west, the changing complexion of the sub-region threatens to weaken stability. The Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India remains a contentious issue, and the continuing civil war in Afghanistan is also of concern. Finally, the acquisition of ballistic missile and nuclear weapon technology by regional adversaries poses another threat to stability. A strong, stable, and friendly Pakistan remains key to our efforts to meet these challenges.

USCENTCOM's Arabian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula Sub-region consists of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; as well as Iran, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen. Strategic oil resources and the waterways which provide access to those resources make the area of paramount importance. Our forward presence operations and an ambitious combined exercise program demonstrate U.S. resolve to defend our friends and interests and help


maintain stability. The primary challenge to that stability is the resurgence of military power in Iran and Iraq. Iran's expansion in the political, military, and economic spheres is of great concern, along with its increasingly aggressive foreign policy. Iraq has also made significant progress in rebuilding its military, despite defeat in the Gulf War and subsequent international efforts to enforce UN sanctions. Iran and Iraq both also pursue chemical, biological and nuclear technology and the delivery systems needed for weapons of mass destruction.

The AOR countries in the Red Sea/Horn of Africa Sub-region are Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia. This sub-region borders the critical sea lines of communication through the Suez Canal, Red Sea, and Bab el Mandeb. Famine, drought, and disease ravage the region, and civil wars in many of these countries have exacerbated the problems. In Somalia, anarchy and factional fighting continue despite over two years of UN intervention. Deteriorating security conditions in Mogadishu in 1994 led to the relocation of the U.S. Liaison Office (USLO) to Nairobi, Kenya, and the beginning of a phased withdrawal of the international forces operating under the auspices of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). USCENTCOM personnel in Africa also assisted in a NEO of U.S. citizens from Rwanda when civil war ravaged that country.

To cope with the unique challenges of our area of responsibility, USCENTCOM pursues a long-term and flexible, three-tiered approach to deterring aggression. Tier I calls for each country to bear primary responsibility for its own self-defense. Next, if aggression occurs, friendly regional states should provide a coalition defense known as Tier II. Under Tier III, the U.S. and other allies from outside the region stand ready to

provide defensive assistance, if necessary. This concept underlies a theater strategy supported by five pillars. These include forward presence, exercises, security assistance, power projection and readiness to fight.

Forward presence demonstrates U.S. commitment, strengthens deterrence, and facilitates transition from peace to war. As a result of our leading role in the Gulf War, and more recently in Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, our presence both afloat and ashore has been significantly expanded. Naval forces such as the carrier battle group (CVBG) and the amphibious ready group (ARG) provide flexible offshore presence and continue maritime intercept operations in support of UN sanctions. Air forces remain in the region to deter aggression and to enforce UN resolutions under Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, while Patriot air defense batteries and Special Operations Forces (SOF) conduct frequent exercises to add to our ground presence. Based on our VIGILANT WARRIOR experience, prepositioned equipment and supplies for



**COMBINED EXERCISES  
DEMONSTRATE U.S. RESOLVE**

heavy armored forces, and supporting military construction, have also become increasingly important elements of our forward presence. These stocks reduce the strategic lift demands inherent in deploying significant combat forces.

Exercises between the U.S. and friends in the region provide a firm foundation for developing closer military-to-military ties and


future coalitions. By supplementing our continuous presence with short-term exercise deployments to the area, we maintain access and increase the readiness of our friends and our own forces, while demonstrating U.S. capability and resolve. Experience gained in the combined exercise program enhances the interoperability that is essential to successful coalition operations. These joint and combined exercises are complemented by the Exercise Related Construction and



**AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP  
KEY ELEMENT OF LONG-TERM FORWARD PRESENCE**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance programs which benefit not only U.S. forces but host nations as well. In addition to activities in the AOR, there are several important exercises in CONUS (e.g. ROVING SANDS, BLUE FLAG, and INTERNAL LOOK) to help ensure that headquarters staffs and other units are ready to deploy and fight.



**STRATEGIC LIFT IS CRITICAL TO POWER PROJECTION**

Security assistance furnishes the equipment required for our friends to improve their self-defense capability. The Foreign Military Sales Program bolsters U.S. credibility as a security partner, improves interoperability, and increases U.S. access and influence. The International Military Education and Training Program provides training to foreign military personnel, thereby improving professional skills, while offering greater insight into American military doctrine and democratic processes. By meeting the legitimate security assistance needs of our friends, we improve their capability to deter adventurism or aggression by their neighbors, and strengthen the close ties between our countries.

Power projection is the ability to rapidly deploy forces from the U.S. into the AOR and posture them for combat operations. USCINCENT supports those Service programs which enable us to meet our strategic lift requirements, such as the C-17 aircraft, Fast Sealift Ships, the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), and the Army's brigade set of equipment afloat. Our ability to respond to crises in the region allows us to implement a full range of flexible deterrent options (FDOs) that may deter aggression. Power projection also enables us to prevail in decisive military operations should it be necessary.

Readiness to fight is based on our ability to maintain a high standard of training to ensure that we are able to carry out the mission efficiently and effectively upon arrival in the AOR. USCENTCOM Headquarters and those of our Component Commands continually refine standard operating procedures and contingency plans to allow rapid integration in the event that forward operations are required. We do so by conducting regular conferences and exercises to that end.

In conclusion, the Central Region continues to grow in importance, and is the overseas area where U.S. interests are most likely to be directly threatened. Maintaining stability in this volatile area is key to the free flow of oil and other commerce essential to the world economy. Through continued attention to the legitimate defense needs of our friends, and by maintaining appropriate military presence and access, we can promote regional security while protecting our own vital interests.



## I. POLITICAL-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT


### A. UNITED STATES POLICY

The broad national security interests and objectives expressed in the President's National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Chairman's National Military Strategy (NMS) form the foundation of the United States Central Command's theater strategy. The NSS directs implementation of a strategy of dual containment of the rogue states of Iraq and Iran as long as those states pose a threat to U.S. interests, to other states in the region, and to their own citizens. Dual containment is designed to maintain the balance of power in the region without depending on either Iraq or Iran. USCENTCOM's theater strategy is interest-

based and threat-focused. The purpose of U.S. engagement, as espoused in the NSS, is to protect the United States' vital interest in the region - uninterrupted secure U.S./Allied access to Gulf oil.

### B. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

The Central Command's area of responsibility (AOR) is comprised of nineteen nations stretching from the Horn of Africa through the Arabian Gulf Region into South Asia. Additionally, the AOR includes four significant bodies of water: the Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Gulf of



LANDMASS COMPARISON


## POLITICAL-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Oman. This region is the historical center of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian cultures, and is characterized by regional disputes, limited water and food supplies, and population growth that exceeds development. A legacy of armed conflict and military rivalries has led to a proliferation of conventional and mass destruction weapons, threatening the already tentative security of the region.

Unrestricted access by the industrial nations of the world to the Central Region's vast oil reserves remains an imperative. Despite previous oil price shocks which caused many nations to temporarily pursue energy alternatives, no appreciable decline in the world's demand for oil is predicted in the foreseeable future. Oil remains a relatively cheap source of energy, limiting incentive to explore alternatives. The narrow crescent of land extending west from Iran and south to the United Arab Emirates contains over two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves. With declining oil production in the U.S., Russia, and Southeast Asia, world dependence on Gulf oil is expected to rise

from one-fourth today to about one-third by the late 1990's. Without costly major development of Russia's oil production capabilities, the world's demand for oil can only be met by the vast oil reserves of the Arabian Gulf region.

This growing global dependence on Gulf oil and the large volume of other trade through the region make unrestricted access to the area vital. The three strategic chokepoints - the Suez Canal, Bab al Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz - are key to maritime freedom in the region. Control of any of these by a non-friendly power could seriously disrupt trade and restrict access to the region's oil resources. Consequently, it is vital that the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) which pass through these chokepoints are kept open. Unrestricted transit is not only critical to the international merchant fleets, but is also an imperative for the introduction of forces necessary to combat hostile actions which might threaten the oil fields themselves.



The unique combination of oil reserves and strategic waterways makes the Central Region vitally important to the United States. Because of this importance we have a set of national interests and objectives designed to help maintain stability in the region.

### C. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

The national interests outlined in the National Security Strategy and the objectives articulated in our National Military Strategy form the bases for the Central Command's objectives and supporting strategy. Primary among U.S. interests in the USCENTCOM AOR is uninterrupted secure access to Arabian Gulf oil. That in turn ensures freedom of navigation and access to commercial markets, security of friends and allies, and regional peace and stability through containment of Iran and Iraq and prevention of hostilities between India and Pakistan. Other interests include a comprehensive breakthrough in the Middle East Peace Process, and security of U.S. citizens and property throughout the region.

Central Command's objectives are to enhance regional stability and demonstrate our steadfast commitment to security in this volatile region. Our continued engagement directly contributes to the strategy articulated by the National Command Authorities. It improves our ability to prevent domination of the region by non-friendly powers, allowing the principles of human rights, free market economies and democratic processes to take root and flourish. The following section provides an analysis of the region, as well as the many challenges to its stability.





## II. REGIONAL ANALYSIS


### A. GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS

#### SOUTH ASIA SUB-REGION: PAKISTAN- AFGHANISTAN

##### OVERVIEW

The South Asia Sub-Region of Pakistan and Afghanistan remains an area of instability with implications that extend beyond the Central Region. Political upheaval and armed conflict continue to plague Afghanistan. Interposed between

Pakistan and Central Asia, an unstable Afghanistan inhibits efforts to reopen traditional trade routes providing Central Asian states with access to the warm-water ports on the Arabian Sea. The historical animosity between Pakistan and India, dating from the partition of British India into Muslim and Hindu nations, is reflected in the ongoing dispute over the Kashmir region. The deep-rooted hostility and mistrust between the two countries undermines efforts to promote non-proliferation and regional security.



SOUTH ASIA SUB-REGION

**PAKISTAN**

Pakistan's strategic location, with India to the east, Central Asia to the north and Iran and Afghanistan to the west, makes it a key regional power. A responsible international actor, Pakistan remains actively involved in the UN, through membership on the Security Council and major commitments to peacekeeping operations such as UNOSOM. Moreover, the Pakistani armed forces were a model of military restraint, demonstrating unwavering support for democracy during the last national elections.

Pakistan exerts considerable influence upon Afghanistan as a result of geographic, religious, and ethnic linkages. It supports over 1.3 million Afghan refugees of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Clearly, Pakistan will play a major role in international efforts to assist in stabilizing and rebuilding war-torn Afghanistan.

The issue of Kashmir is the focal point of Pakistan's foreign policy. This issue has led to two major Indo-Pak conflicts and

continues to be the major source of confrontation between the two nations. Deep-rooted hostility, along with fear of India's nuclear weapons capability and overwhelming conventional forces, has propelled Pakistan toward construction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means. We support a regional agreement to cap WMD efforts with an objective of eventual program roll-back and elimination. Similar regional arms control with regard to the development and deployment of ballistic missiles would further reduce tensions.

Pakistan's desire to maintain close ties to the U.S. has resulted in continued cooperative bilateral relations. Though limited by Pressler Amendment constraints, our military-to-military relationship consists of limited exercises, senior officer visits, and combined peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts under the auspices of the UN. A balanced approach toward India and Pakistan is essential to promoting regional stability, economic growth, and the furtherance of democracy.



PAKISTANIS ON UN MISSION

**AFGHANISTAN**


Afghanistan's juxtaposition with Pakistan, Iran and the new countries of Central Asia, increases the importance of returning peace and stability to this war-torn country. Political consensus remains elusive as factional fighting persists throughout the country, hampering national and international reconstruction efforts.

The success of a consolidated central government hinges on ethnic, religious and tribal accommodation. The Peshawar, Islamabad and Jalalabad accords have each sought to eliminate factional infighting and provide a rudimentary framework for a transition to representative government. However, pursuit of personal power by the country's most prominent leaders has precluded such a transition, and the outlook remains bleak.

The chaotic political situation provides ample opportunity for neighboring countries to take advantage of the ineffectiveness of the consolidation process. In particular, Iran is exploiting tribal and ethnic rivalries to help pro-Iranian and Shia factions secure a disproportionate share of political power. Iran also exploits Afghanistan's precarious situation by funneling resources and ideology through its territory to opposition forces on the Afghan-Tajik border as well as to groups within Tajikistan. This Iranian interference further impedes the consolidation process in Afghanistan by driving a

wedge between radical and moderate political factions.

Political stability is a prerequisite to rebuilding this country. Failure of Afghanistan's political leaders to reach accommodation will perpetuate insecurity, delay refugee repatriation, stall national reconstruction efforts, and cause reluctance on the part of the international community to increase assistance to meet other than essential humanitarian needs. We support efforts to encourage the Afghans to reach political consensus and to ensure the international community remains engaged despite a less than optimistic outlook for a near-term political solution.



**ETHNIC AND TRIBAL GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN**

## REGIONAL ANALYSIS


**ARABIAN GULF/ARABIAN PENINSULA**  
**SUB-REGION: BAHRAIN-KUWAIT-OMAN-**  
**QATAR-SAUDI ARABIA-UNITED ARAB**  
**EMIRATES-IRAN-IRAQ-JORDAN-YEMEN**

**OVERVIEW**


The countries of the Arabian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula Sub-Region can be broadly grouped into two categories. The first are those states comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Members of the GCC - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates - share many common goals with the United States, and have been active partners in support of regional objectives. GCC states actively supported Operations EARNEST WILL, DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, SOUTHERN WATCH, RESTORE HOPE, UNOSOM II and, most recently, VIGILANT WARRIOR. These countries continue to

make constructive contributions in support of the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) and Middle East peace initiatives. The U.S. has bilateral defense cooperation and access agreements with nearly all of the GCC states. In our efforts to improve regional collective defense capabilities, we also continue to encourage multilateral exercises among the Damascus Declaration Countries (GCC plus Egypt and Syria).

Non-GCC countries within the sub-region include Iran, Iraq, Jordan and Yemen. Regimes in two of these countries, Iran and Iraq, continue to threaten the security of the region. Iran, in particular, is rebuilding military capabilities at a rate exceeding that required for defensive purposes. The U.S. and members of the GCC find this pattern alarming. Despite recognizing Kuwait and grudgingly complying with portions of UN



ARABIAN GULF/ARABIAN PENINSULA SUB-REGION



**BAHRAIN - HOME TO COMUSNAVCENT**

Security Council Resolutions, Iraq has remained generally uncooperative. By promoting anti-GCC, anti-Middle East Peace Process, and anti-U.S. postures, Iran and Iraq are the greatest threats to regional peace and stability. The other two non-GCC states, Jordan and Yemen, still feel lingering effects of their pro-Saddam stances during the Gulf War. Jordan has been able to make progress in rebuilding military-to-military relationships with the U.S., and, in its conclusion of a treaty with Israel, has taken a great step toward achieving a lasting regional peace. Despite these efforts, Jordan remains distanced from some GCC states. The government of the unified Republic of Yemen continues to struggle to reestablish relationships with its Arab neighbors while continuing its experimentation with democratic processes. Efforts to transition to democratic institutions have proved challenging,

resulting in ongoing internal struggle and the threat of dissolution.

#### **BAHRAIN**

Moderate and pro-Western, Bahrain shares U.S. goals for regional peace and stability. The country has a prominent commercial role in the Gulf as a regional financial and service center. Faced with diminishing petroleum resources, Bahrain has diversified in the manufacturing, finance, and service fields to reduce its dependence on oil revenues. The Government of Bahrain has moved cautiously since the Gulf War, charting a steady course on economic and social policies. Bahrain established a Majlis al-Shura (consultative council) in December 1992.

## REGIONAL ANALYSIS

The U.S.-Bahraini relationship has traditionally been close and cooperative. The de facto home port for Commander, Middle East Force since 1949, Bahrain has also been host to the Administrative Support Unit since 1971 and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT) since 1993. Our mature bilateral relationship has included the establishment of an Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) in 1986, the signing of a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in 1991, and recurring meetings of the Military Consultative Committee (MCC). Most recently, Bahrain came to the aid of Kuwait in Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR and offered support to U.S. forces brought into the region to restore stability.

Bahrain relies heavily on the U.S. for military training and security assistance. It is a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cash customer, purchasing 98% of its weapons, training, and spare parts from the United States. Our already robust combined exercise program has recently been expanded to include trilateral exercises.

**KUWAIT**

Kuwait has made significant progress rebuilding its country since the end of the Gulf War. Economically, the production of oil has been restored to pre-war levels. Politically, the success of the National Assembly serves as a model for other states in the area. Security, however, remains a major concern because of Iraqi belligerence and threatening activity, such as Iraq's movement of troops to the Kuwaiti border in October 1994, and failure to comply completely with UN resolutions.

**DESERT OPERATIONS IN VIGILANT WARRIOR**

### OMAN

Oman's strategic location at the Strait of Hormuz, and active cooperation in regional security initiatives, make it a significant partner in the protection of U.S. and Western interests in Southwest Asia. Because of its position, a stable Oman is essential to protecting and maintaining the free flow of oil and other trade through the Arabian Gulf.


With a moderate political stance on key issues, Oman is an important regional friend. Long a supporter of our presence in the region, Oman was the first of the Gulf countries to conclude an access agreement with the United States. Additionally, Oman has long provided valuable support to U.S. maritime and air operations in the region, enhancing our ability to respond to contingencies that may arise in the Middle East and Africa. U.S.-Omani security cooperation continues to grow, fostered by Omani support for U.S. regional initiatives and a combined exercise program. In January 1994, Oman assumed a seat on the UN Security Council, where it plays an important role as a world leader and a moderate Arab voice on the Council. The Government of Oman, which has had a Majlis since 1991, continues to support the Peace Process through participation in various regional working groups.

### QATAR


The Government of Qatar is a traditional monarchy governed by constitutional law which institutionalizes the customs and social mores of Qatar's conservative Wahhabi Muslim heritage. A small but wealthy Gulf nation, Qatar has a per capita income among the highest in the region. Yet with oil reserves dwindling, Qatar's economic future is largely dependent on the

vast North Dome natural gas field which lies off its northern coast. This field is now under development, but may become a source of conflict because this shared natural resource underlies territorial waters of both Qatar and Iran.

There has been a significant improvement in the U.S.-Qatari military relationship since the Gulf war. In 1991, the U.S. Military Liaison Office opened in Doha, and in June 1992 the U.S. and Qatar signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). Additionally, we have built a very successful bilateral exercise program which continues to grow. Our relationship is underpinned by regular bilateral military cooperation meetings, and steady progress toward greater cooperation is evidenced by ongoing DCA implementation meetings.



MOSQUE - DOHA, QATAR

**REGIONAL ANALYSIS**

**HOLY CITY OF MECCA,  
BIRTHPLACE OF MOHAMMED**

**SAUDI ARABIA**

The largest and most influential nation on the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia is strategically located between the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. It contains Islam's two most holy sites and the world's largest petroleum producing infrastructure. A stalwart friend and long-time ally of the United States, the Kingdom is recognized as the key to regional security. This relationship was underlined once again in October 1994, when U.S. forces deployed to the Kingdom in response to threatening moves by Iraq. The Saudis are now assuming an expanded, more active role in world affairs, evidenced by their contributions to the international relief effort in Somalia and their continuing financial support for rebuilding the infrastructure in Lebanon following the Taif agreement.

A traditional leader in the region, Saudi Arabia strives to maintain peace and stability in the Middle East, and contributes much to the well-being of fellow Arab countries by underwriting the annual Haj and financing other Arab initiatives. Looking outside the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia is cautiously establishing diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia and the newly created democratic states of Eastern Europe.

The U.S.-Saudi military-to-military relationship continues to mature, and includes the largest Foreign Military Sales program in the world, financed by the Kingdom. Legitimate defense requirements of the Saudis are being met, U.S. national interests supported, and regional security enhanced, through these necessary arms sales. We continue military-to-military discussions with the Saudis in our ongoing effort to solidify our security arrangements.

**UNITED ARAB EMIRATES**

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is becoming increasingly important to the USCENTCOM regional strategy. The country, which borders both the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, is actually an oil-rich federation of seven sheikdoms. A supporter of U.S. naval presence in the region, the Government of the UAE hosts an



**SAUDI AWACS ENHANCE SECURITY**





EXCELLENT PORT FACILITIES AT JEBEL ALI

extensive port visit program. Its strategic geographic location and excellent facilities make seaports such as Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and most frequently Jebel Ali ideal destinations for regular U.S. Navy ship visits. Fujairah, on the Gulf of Oman, offers the unique quality of allowing logistical support to reach destinations on the Arabian Gulf by modern highway without requiring a transit through the Strait of Hormuz.

The UAE is a key supporter of U.S. actions in the region, our relationship having matured significantly during the Gulf War. An appreciation for U.S. efforts to maintain stability in the Gulf has translated into closer military ties and a recognition of the value of U.S. presence as a deterrent to aggression. On 23 July, 1994 the U.S. and the UAE signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement, and in October UAE troops deployed to

Kuwait during Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR in response to the deployment of Iraqi Republican Guard forces along the Kuwaiti border. The UAE continues to support the Peace Process, and contributes financially to improving the life of Palestinians.

In response to potential external threats such as Iranian attempts at intimidation, the UAE is seeking to improve its defensive capabilities. The UAE continues to pursue peaceful resolution of its dispute with Iran over the issue of Abu Musa and the Tunbs Islands, seeking an International Court of Justice ruling on the issue as Iran continues to improve its military position on the islands. Continued support by the U.S. is needed to help the UAE meet its legitimate defense needs.

IRAN

Iran dominates the Strait of Hormuz and the entire north shore of the Arabian Gulf, and possesses the ability to threaten Gulf oil transit routes. It is, by virtue of its culture, population, and geostrategic position, an important player in the Central Region. Additionally, its border with Central Asia and the Transcaucasus provides the access necessary for Iran to expand its influence with the emerging nations of this region in direct competition with the Turks and Russians.

Iran's hostility towards the United States, combined with its proximity to our interests in the Gulf, its growing military might, economic potential, and demographic composition make Iran the greatest long-term threat to U.S. interests and allies in the region. The United States is the focal point for a bellicose campaign against what the Mullahs consider to be the polluting influence of Western culture and thought. Iran's ethno-centric national ego and self-image as the champion of Islam, compel it to seek a return to its historic position as the regional hegemonic power. To this end, it systematically opposes U.S. objectives (actively campaigning against Gulf security arrangements), and undermines the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Accords through its surrogate forces in Palestine. The reintroduction of U.S. forces into Kuwait in October 1994, and the visible GCC security cooperation have limited Iran's activities to consolidating its position in such already occupied areas as Abu Musa and the Tunbs, rather than pressing any new land or sea claims in the Gulf region. Details of the threat Iran poses to regional security are discussed in Section B of this chapter.

IRAQ

Iraq, under the current regime, remains an implacable obstacle to peace and stability in the Arabian Gulf region. It continues to ignore provisions of numerous UN resolutions, complying only grudgingly with others. Examples of President Saddam Hussein's intransigence include: government repression of Iraqi citizens (both in the north with an internal blockade on the Kurds, and in the south with frequent military operations against the Marsh Arabs), reluctant acceptance of the newly demarcated border with Kuwait, selective cooperation with UN weapons inspectors, lack of accountability for Kuwaiti MIA/POW's, and refusal to pay for damages incurred by the victims of Iraqi aggression. Iraq's belligerent statements and its October 1994 redeployment towards Kuwait, have resurrected concerns among its neighbors, and highlight the fact that the current regime is not ready to adhere to accepted norms of international behavior. Attempts by Iraq to convince the world that it is a victim of Western aggression, and that continued sanctions are a vindictive U.S. campaign to destroy the Iraqi people have met with some success in undermining European support for continued sanctions, but has found little support among regional nations that sit in Iraq's shadow. Until Iraq fully complies with all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, Saddam will remain a renegade whose actions must be closely monitored. The continuing threat to regional security posed by Saddam's Iraq is further addressed in Section B of this chapter.



PROGRESS TOWARD A LASTING PEACE

### JORDAN

Jordan's moderate, pro-Western orientation remains important to U.S. strategy in the region. Bilateral relations with the U.S. have steadily improved since the Gulf War when Jordan took an unpopular pro-Iraqi stance. On 26 October 1994, King Hussein signed a peace treaty with Israel, formally ending over four decades of war. Jordan has also encouraged the Palestinians to continue negotiations with Israel. Jordan has made a significant military contribution to the international peacekeeping effort in the former Yugoslavia, and has largely regained its position as a voice of moderation and reason in the region. In addition, Jordan has posted an excellent human rights record, and is one of the few countries in the region willing to grant expatriate Palestinians the full rights of citizens.

Although it has proved to be financially and logistically difficult, Jordan is attempting to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq, formerly its largest trading partner. The U.S. continues to work closely with Jordanian officials to devise procedures to minimize the adverse effects the inspection process has on the Jordanian economy.

As a result of improved relations, our security assistance relationship with Jordan

has been expanded. The program's hiatus had seriously degraded Jordan's military capability, and we are working to help them achieve an improved state of readiness. An important component of this program is the renewal of our combined exercise program, which has returned to pre-Gulf War levels.

### YEMEN

The Republic of Yemen (united since 1990) occupies a strategic position on the eastern side of the Bab el Mandeb waterway between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Yemen's quest for democracy remains unique in the region and multiparty parliamentary elections were held in April 1993. However, serious internal struggles ensued, culminating in the outbreak of civil war in May 1994. Hostilities between the North and South continued for several months, further weakening the already fragile government. Eventual victory by the northern forces ended hopes for an effective coalition government.

Because of lingering connections to Saddam Hussein's regime, Yemen remains relatively isolated from its Gulf neighbors. The country's economic situation remains unstable and prospects for expanding its commerce in the region are slim until it can normalize relations with its neighbors.


Long-term prospects for development are directly tied to President Saleh's ability to reconcile differences between factions in the wake of the recent civil war. A stable domestic environment is a prerequisite to much needed foreign investment. Because of limited resources, Yemen's armed forces are dependent on financial aid, equipment, and advice from abroad. However, U.S. security assistance remains suspended since January 1991 for Yemen's support of Iraqi aggression.

## REGIONAL ANALYSIS

**RED SEA/HORN OF AFRICA SUB-REGION:  
EGYPT-SUDAN-ERITREA-ETHIOPIA-  
DJIBOUTI-KENYA-SOMALIA**

The Red Sea/Horn of Africa Sub-region includes the African countries on the Suez Canal, Red Sea, and Bab el Mandeb. Close ties with countries in the Horn allow access to these critical sea lines of communications

(SLOCs) for transit from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean beyond. Egypt, one of our closest allies in the region, is a pivotal link between the Middle East and Africa and was an invaluable supporter of U.S. political initiatives, such as the Middle East Peace Process and coalition military operations in Somalia.



**RED SEA/HORN OF AFRICA SUB-REGION**

The Horn of Africa continues to suffer from decades of economic chaos and political instability. In Somalia, international humanitarian relief efforts slowed the effects of the recent famine, but these results are only temporary without political reconciliation by the Somalis themselves. Similarly, a decade of civil discord in Sudan produced a level of suffering in the southern portion of that country which may be worse than was seen in Somalia. While international relief organizations attempt to ease this suffering, Sudan's central government continues its efforts to suppress the population in the south and support global terrorism at the expense of working toward reconciliation. Elsewhere in the Horn, Eritrea continues to progress as an independent nation developing close ties to the West, while Ethiopia, Djibouti, and

Kenya are also making progress in development despite trying conditions.

### **EGYPT**

A recognized political leader in both the Arab world and Africa, Egypt remains one of our closest allies in the region. As an important member of the Arab League and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Egypt played a key role in facilitating the Middle East Peace process. By supporting nuclear non-proliferation and contributing military forces to the UN operations in Somalia, Egypt has demonstrated a firm commitment to the long term stability of the region.



**EGYPTIANS SUPPORTED UNOSOM II**

**REGIONAL ANALYSIS**

Domestic economics, demographics, and an increasing reliance on the Nile River for water mean that Egypt will continue to face serious difficulties in internal development and require significant financial assistance from abroad. Radical Islamic elements seek to capitalize on Egypt's internal problems to incite dissension while engaging in a campaign of terrorism and assassination. Notwithstanding this armed threat, the Egyptian government appears able to manage the domestic situation in the face of the radical Islamic challenge.

Our security assistance and military-to-military relations are close and continue to improve through combined operations and an extensive exercise program which both focus on expanded interoperability. A key factor in our Red Sea Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) was the use of Egyptian facilities for logistics support. Similarly, Egyptian air base support has been essential to our ability to support humanitarian relief operations and numerous exercises throughout the AOR. Our exercise program with Egypt is among the largest in the region, spanning the spectrum from large force maneuvers to Special Operations Forces (SOF) exercises.

**SUDAN**

Sudan, the largest country in Africa, continues to experience profound economic and political difficulties. The central government's inability to establish peace with the several separatist movements in the South, its support of global terrorism, its strong ties with Iran and Iraq, and a persistent pattern of fiscal and political mismanagement have led to internal chaos and the diplomatic isolation of Sudan by the world community. These internal problems adversely affect the ability of the OAU and the International Governmental Authority for Drought and Development (IGADD) to

effectively solve the many humanitarian issues facing the region.

The civil war raging in southern Sudan has devastated the country's economy and is responsible for repeated famines and widespread dislocation in the South. Although international groups work to facilitate an agreement between separatist movements and the central government, intransigence on the part of all parties makes accommodation in the near term impossible.

**ERITREA**

Eritrea's proximity to the critical Bab el Mandeb makes it strategically important. Its close political ties with other countries in the Horn of Africa also make it a valuable partner in the mediation of regional disputes. Since emerging as Africa's newest country upon secession from Ethiopia in 1993, Eritrea has made significant progress. It enhanced its reconstruction efforts and economic recovery through international ties, a focus on infrastructure, and the development of national security measures.

Eritrea's prospects for the future seem bright, but the country still faces many challenges, including rebuilding and providing government services for its own population and over half a million Eritrean refugees returning from Sudan. The level of prosperity for this fledgling democracy is largely dependent on how much foreign assistance is received.


USCENTCOM efforts to establish a solid military-to-military relations program have met with great success. Development of a combined exercise program, an active ship visit program, and an Eritrean-led humanitarian demining program are underway. Plans for demining were completed in 1994 and operations are scheduled to commence in 1995. Efforts to

build a professional military through general/flag officer visits and the IMET Program, and the establishment of a permanent USCENTCOM liaison office will also enhance U.S. military relations with Eritrea.

### **ETHIOPIA**

Ethiopia is an East African melting pot of over 50 million people from several different ethnolinguistic groups. The capital, Addis Ababa, serves as home for the Organization of African Unity, and is a frequent meeting place for African heads of state to address regional issues. Though diplomatically influential in the Horn, Ethiopia has an economy strained by the refugee influx from Somalia and Sudan.

President Meles has played an important role in international efforts to resolve disputes between the various warring factions in neighboring Somalia, and maintains close political ties to Eritrea. Additionally, Ethiopia expanded its role in UN humanitarian operations in 1994 by providing an 800-man battalion to conduct relief operations during the crisis in Rwanda.



**DEMINEING TRAINING**

The U.S. encourages Ethiopia to continue its move toward full democracy, and is optimistic that the parliamentary elections in 1995 will seat a unified government. Economic prospects continue to improve, but Ethiopia remains one of the poorest and least developed countries in Africa and will require assistance into the foreseeable future.

Military-to-military relations between the U.S. and Ethiopia continued to grow in 1994 with a low-level combined exercise designed to assist in the disposal of ordnance from years of civil war. This humanitarian demining program, an ongoing IMET program, general/flag officer visits, and excess defense articles acquired through foreign military funding will support our military-to military relations with Ethiopia in future years.

### **DJIBOUTI**

Djibouti's importance stems from its strategic location at the entrance to the Bab el Mandeb. The country's airfield served as part of a strategic air bridge for operations in Somalia, and we have an ongoing ship visit program. Djibouti's pro-Western orientation and longstanding French presence afford the U.S. important access to support facilities for crisis response.

Tribal friction continues between the Afar rebels in the north and the Issas who largely control the government. Although civil war brought increased lawlessness to the country, conditions are now returning to normal. In addition to domestic problems, Djibouti (like Ethiopia) serves as a safe haven for Somalis fleeing violence and anarchy to the south. The government has continuing requirements for international aid organizations to assist in temporary relief and shelter for these refugees. The historic instability of Djibouti's neighboring countries

## REGIONAL ANALYSIS

continues to place an increased burden on its ability to develop economically and politically.

While the Djiboutian military continues its demobilization efforts and the government strives to improve its economic outlook, the U.S. continues to maintain a modest security assistance program aimed at complementing France's leading role. Current assistance is limited to spare parts for vehicles, limited engineer equipment, and a modest IMET program. In FY95 the U.S. will begin a military civic action program designed to "train the trainer" in basic skills.

## KENYA

Kenya retains its position as an important friend in East Africa. The country provides valuable access to intermediate staging bases. The U.S. extensively used Kenyan facilities at Mombasa and Nairobi to support U.S. and UN operations in Somalia and Rwanda. In spite of slow progress in adopting certain economic reforms, Kenya currently maintains an active private sector and an extensive agricultural economic base. The productive private sector is offset by a large and inefficient public sector which significantly drains the country's treasury. However, this and many

other economic problems are now being positively addressed by the government. We support efforts by the international community to promote these economic and democratic reforms.

A long history of excellent military-to-military relations has been challenged by suspension of U.S. aid. Our Foreign Military



EVACUEES FROM RWANDA ARRIVING IN KENYA



Financing (FMF) program for Kenya was suspended by Congress in 1991 for human rights abuses. The U.S., however, released \$3.7M in FMF money in late FY93 to support Kenya's efforts to secure its border with troubled Somalia. The U.S. continues to press the Government of Kenya to move forward on human rights, economic reform, and debt payment. A limited combined exercise program will resume in FY95, emphasizing low-level humanitarian/civic action projects with host-nation forces in rural areas.

### **SOMALIA**

The humanitarian tragedy in Somalia resulted from protracted, near-civil war conditions. The unprecedented UN international humanitarian relief effort reduced the suffering and famine experienced by the Somali people, and undoubtedly saved hundreds of thousands of


lives. This effort, though initially successful, failed to motivate the Somali people to establish a central democratic government or mechanism for infrastructure development. Political chaos therefore continues in Somalia with no end in sight.

Though outside assistance remains essential for stability in Somalia, the United Nations may soon terminate its formal commitment to the country. In 1992 Operation PROVIDE RELIEF reduced the effects of famine through the introduction of UN forces and arrival of relief supplies, and Operation RESTORE HOPE brought an improved state of security to the nation. However, neither brought any real progress in the way of political reform. In May 1993 all foreign forces operating in the country were brought under UNOSOM II. After months of a steadily deteriorating security situation, additional U.S. forces arrived to provide added protection to UNOSOM forces. Upon determining that the situation



U.S. MARINES PROVIDED SECURITY UNTIL USLO RELOCATED FROM SOMALIA

## REGIONAL ANALYSIS



**IRAN POSES THE GREATEST LONG-TERM THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY**

in Somalia was no longer tenable, the U.S. withdrew its forces in March 1994 and subsequently moved the U.S. Liaison Office to Nairobi in September 1994. As the political chaos in Somalia worsens, the requirement for a legitimate democratic government becomes even more imperative.

## **B. CHALLENGES TO STABILITY**

### **INTERNAL TO THE REGION**

Challenges to the stability of the Central Region demand our constant attention. Iran's continuing military build-up, particularly in the southern Arabian Gulf, underscore their desire to become the dominant force in the region. Saddam Hussein remains unpredictable and

dangerous, heading a military force capable of attacking Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to be a significant area of concern in this region, particularly with Iran's acquisition of improved missiles. Additionally, both India and Pakistan are expanding missile forces that could be used in a future conflict between the two countries.

### **IRAN**

Iran remains the single greatest long-term threat to peace and stability in the Central Region. President Rafsanjani continues efforts to rearm and modernize Iran's military forces and is aggressively pursuing development of its weapons of



**SECOND KILO SUBMARINE FOR IRAN**

mass destruction program despite severe economic problems. Russia, China, and North Korea, Iran's primary sources for arms purchases, have provided T-72 tanks, Kilo-class submarines, and ballistic missiles. Iran's quest for hegemony is seen as an attempt to regain what it regards as its traditional position of preeminence. The purchases of Kilo-class submarines, the acquisition of modern missile patrol boats, and reinforcement of southern Arabian Gulf islands all enhance Iran's ability to interdict strategic SLOC's.

We believe that Iran, despite being a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, continues to aggressively pursue nuclear weapons technology through deals for reactors and other materials for various portions of the nuclear fuel cycle from Russia and China. Iran hopes to overcome its technical weaknesses by purchasing "dual-use" technology from both Eastern and Western suppliers. As it matures, Iran's civilian nuclear infrastructure will provide scientists with valuable experience that can be applied to a weapons project. However, without specific outside technical

assistance, the development of nuclear weapons in Iran before the year 2000 is unlikely. Iran has admitted possessing chemical weapons and is likely working hard to develop biological weapons as well. Tehran is believed capable of producing both nerve and blister agents, as well as some of the precursor chemicals used to make these agents. Iran currently possesses both the 300 km Scud-B and 500 km Scud-C ballistic missiles and is reported to have contracted with North Korea to purchase the No Dong missile with a range of up to 1,000 km. In the face of a severe economic crisis, Iran's military buildup and obsession with weapons of mass destruction underscore its ambition to dominate the region, and possibly far beyond.

Tehran is seeking to expand its diplomatic relations – both in the region and globally – as a means of increasing its influence and reclaiming the role of a regional power. In addition to expanding diplomatic relations, Iran also supports militant Islamic groups worldwide, promoting anti-Western sentiment wherever possible. Iran continues to seek closer ties with Pakistan, in hopes of receiving improved technology and military training assistance. Iran is also attempting to gain increased influence with Afghanistan, but instability within the Afghan government has precluded any real gains. Consequently, Iran's near-term efforts in Afghanistan will be limited to promoting economic concerns and cultural relations.

Envisioning itself as the regional leader of the Islamic world, Iran has placed great emphasis on expanding ties with countries of the Former Soviet Union. Tehran will continue to increase trade and expand economic, cultural, and religious ties with the Central Asian Republics, particularly Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. Iran has also approached some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries concerning military

## REGIONAL ANALYSIS

cooperation and security in an effort to gain additional access and influence in the region. Iran wants to be included in any regional security arrangements and warns GCC countries about entering into security agreements with foreign governments such as the U.S. and Russia. Some Gulf countries already have economic ties with Iran, and additional relations could widen existing fractures in the GCC.

The dispute with United Arab Emirates over ownership of Abu Musa and the Tonb Islands continues. Although meetings have been scheduled in attempts to resolve the dispute and the UAE hopes to take the matter to the International Court of Justice, Iran maintains a substantial troop presence on the islands and continues to fortify all three. Iran's denial that there is any need for arbitration, coupled with their recent military build-up, indicates that they have no intentions of relinquishing the islands.

Living conditions for the average Iranian remain poor and will likely get worse unless Iran can recover from its fiscal problems. Worsening economic conditions within Iran pose the most serious threat to domestic stability. Declining oil revenues, runaway inflation, and devaluation of the rial have resulted in Iran's failure to pay foreign creditors, necessitating the rescheduling of payments and the slashing of imports. Furthermore, Iran's rapidly growing population, which is increasing by approximately one million every seven months, has resulted in high unemployment, placing even further strain on Iran's troubled economy.

Despite some internal political opposition from radicals, there are no viable threats to Rafsanjani's regime. Rafsanjani's close relations with Supreme Leader Khamenei and the

Revolutionary Guards, and his firm control of the internal security forces, indicate that his regime is secure. Since Iranian dissident groups enjoy no strong base of support inside Iran they remain little more than an irritant for the regime. The economy has the potential to become the most serious threat facing the regime, and could eventually lead to widespread civil unrest.

Iran's efforts to rebuild its military and develop weapons of mass destruction are continuing indicators of Iran's desire to project power. As such, containment of this rogue state will pose a serious challenge for the foreseeable future and remains one of the top priorities for the United States Central Command.



**PRESIDENT RAFSANJANI**



UN INSPECTORS IN IRAQ

### IRAQ

Despite the devastation inflicted upon Iraq's military during DESERT STORM, Baghdad has made steady progress with its reconstitution and remains one of the strongest military forces in the region. In the years following DESERT STORM, Iraq has fielded an army of 27 divisions, including eight which are Republican Guards. While this is a significant decrease from its pre-war 57 division, 1.2 million man army, it is far more capable than other peninsula ground forces and poses a major threat to regional stability.

Iraq aspired to possess all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to some extent and has demonstrated a willingness to use chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 calls for the elimination of Iraq's WMD and ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 km. To date, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have conducted over 100 inspections in Iraq to monitor disarmament, and have supervised

the destruction of significant Iraqi nuclear, chemical, and ballistic missile capabilities. Last summer, a chemical destruction group completed their two-year-long mission of eliminating nearly 28,000 Iraqi chemical munitions and several thousand tons of chemical weapons (CW) agents and precursors.

Despite these destruction efforts, certain aspects of Baghdad's WMD programs may never be uncovered. Iraq retains the

scientific and technical infrastructure to eventually restart these programs. To guard against such resurrections, both UNSCOM and the IAEA have begun the long-term monitoring of Baghdad's arms potential. After nearly a year of preparation, UNSCOM Chairman Rolf Ekeus announced on 10 October 1994 that the monitoring regime was "provisionally" operational. UNSCOM believes Iraq has not been completely forthcoming with information on past weapons efforts, particularly in the area of biological agents. Concerns increased after the December 1994 discovery of previously undisclosed germ cultures (for cholera, tuberculosis, and the plague) that may have been part of an Iraqi program for offensive biological warfare. Inspectors are pressing Baghdad for complete details of all previous WMD activities in order to begin full-scale monitoring. The long-term monitoring program is envisioned to continue indefinitely.

Iraq announced on 10 November 1994 that it formally recognized Kuwaiti sovereignty and the UN demarcated borders in compliance with UNSC Resolution 833. Nevertheless, Iraq's behavior in the past has

## REGIONAL ANALYSIS

demonstrated that Saddam Hussein abides by international obligations only when he perceives them to be in his direct interest. The recognition of Kuwait, which was announced days before a UN Security Council sanctions review, was clearly a ploy to gain relief from the sanctions. Despite this, other issues remain which preclude an early lifting of the embargo. Among these is Iraq's failure to return Kuwaiti military equipment that it seized during its occupation of the emirate. Baghdad has integrated much of this equipment into its armed forces, and most of the equipment

that it did return was badly damaged. Additionally, the issue of Kuwaiti prisoners of war (POW) remains unresolved, with Kuwait insisting that approximately 800 Kuwaitis continue to be held by Iraq.

In the almost four years since the end of DESERT STORM, Saddam Hussein has weathered many direct and indirect challenges to his regime. Since April of 1991, the regime has endured an active insurgency in the south, the loss of its sovereignty over northern Iraq, a debilitating economic embargo, and several rumored coup attempts. In southern Iraq, Shia insurgents have actively continued their operations. Iraq's counterinsurgency effort in the south has focused on denying the insurgents their support base and their habitat. To do this, Iraq has worked to dry up the marshes by channelizing the water and feeding the run-off into the Euphrates river. The drying of the marshes makes it difficult for the Marsh Arabs to sustain themselves and has severely limited the ability of the insurgents to take refuge and maneuver. While it appears Baghdad has control of the situation, the insurgent problem in the south is likely to continue indefinitely.



**SADDAM HUSSEIN MAINTAINS CONTROL**


The Kurdish opposition in the North remains fragmented, and serious infighting has occurred between various factions over the past year. Nevertheless, over half of Iraq's ground strength remains positioned opposite the Kurdish autonomous zone as a threat

against the continued autonomy of the region. The possible international repercussions of any actual incursion into the Kurdish zone, however, have deterred Iraq from any overt aggression. However, selected bombings and acts of terrorism, probably sponsored by Baghdad, continue. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT forces on the ground in the Zakhu area have acted as an additional deterrent to any significant Iraqi offensive operations. Once sanctions are lifted, Iraqi forces will probably go on the offensive to reassert control of the Kurdish North.

The United Nations embargo has all but crippled the Iraqi economy and has greatly hindered Iraq's ability to reconstitute its military. With resources scarce, Iraq has chosen to focus its reconstruction efforts away from the civilian economy and towards its military-industrial infrastructure. Although prohibited from importing arms under the embargo, Iraq has some indigenous arms manufacturing capability.


For example, Iraq can manufacture some parts for its older Russian aircraft, and has shown the ability to refurbish armored equipment damaged during DESERT STORM. Iraq can also produce ammunition, small caliber weapons, and mortars. Additionally, part of Iraq's reconstitution effort has included the incorporation of selected sophisticated former Kuwaiti equipment into its operational inventory.

The deployment of two Republican Guard divisions to the Kuwaiti border in October 1994 demonstrated that with the consolidation of heavy lift assets and augmentation by national transportation infrastructure, Iraq can rapidly move military units from one section of the country to another. Clearly, Iraq has the military capability to conduct short-term, limited objective, multi-division offensive operations against Kuwait and northeastern Saudi Arabia which would require a coalition response.



ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN IRAQ

The results of UN Sanctions on Iraq have been significant. While the majority of the impact has been felt by the populace, it is believed the effects have slowly encroached on those closest to Saddam. As the impact of the sanctions is felt in Saddam's inner circle, the chances of a coup grow higher. However, Saddam has apparently survived several coup attempts already. Because the ranks around Saddam are closed so tightly, and any perceived disloyalty is brutally repressed, it is impossible to assess the likelihood of a successful coup attempt.



IRANIAN SCUD-B MISSILE

**PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES  
AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

Few issues have more serious and far-reaching implications for global and regional security than the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Many factors have spurred such proliferation. The collapse of the Soviet Union jarred longstanding alliances and encouraged an increasing number of states to further bolster their own military capabilities by developing WMD. This dissolution has caused concern over the possible spread of high technology or scientists to the Third World. Many national leaders seek the prestige they believe possession of WMD conveys. Some wish to dominate their neighbors, others merely seek to offset a hostile neighbor's threatening capabilities.

Finally, some view these weapons as a compelling psychological deterrent.

Eight of the nineteen USCENTCOM AOR nations, and several peripheral countries, have or may be developing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, as well as ballistic missile delivery systems. Iran and Iraq, for example, have the basic technology to eventually develop nuclear weapons. Libya, Iran, and Iraq have stockpiled chemical weapons, and, although Iraq's CW arsenal is currently being dismantled, it will be difficult to prevent Baghdad from reacquiring such a capability. A disturbing pattern of biological weapons development is following closely on the heels of chemical weapons development; a special concern since biological agents could rival the lethality of a nuclear attack.



More than a dozen countries have operational ballistic missiles and more have programs to develop them. Iraq's employment of ballistic missiles as weapons of terror against superior coalition forces during the Gulf War piqued the interest of several nations. Unlike the conventional arms bazaar, there is no open market for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Instead, states often seek to build such an infrastructure under the guise of a civilian program. Establishing certain commercial enterprises often enables a nation to legally import so-called "dual-use" technology and equipment, while providing the option of covertly pursuing WMD, making detection of such efforts extremely difficult. Foreign scientists, engineers, and technicians are often sought to bring much needed skill and experience to a fledgling WMD project. Many nations send students abroad who receive advanced training and education then return to support emerging WMD development programs. The possibility that a country could purchase, outright, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons cannot be discounted.

The collapse of the Soviet Union has raised new opportunities for determined nations to gain access to sensitive technology and material. In light of its financially strapped defense industries, Russia's growing dealings with China and Iraq are of concern regarding proliferation. Specifically, China continues to obtain missile technology from Russia and Ukraine. This is of special concern since it raises the possibility that China could, in turn, pass more advanced technology to other states, as Beijing has done previously with its own technology, including a deal with Pakistan for M-11 ballistic missiles. Today's faltering economies in Russia and other former Soviet Republics, along with attendant hardships among individuals with military and scientific expertise, could lead to more disturbing military transfers and could also encourage illegal exports of technology and material.

Both China and North Korea are also significant WMD proliferation concerns. Having apparently no threshold governing its sales, Pyongyang is willing to sell to any country with the cash or oil to buy and is a key supplier for states such as Iran and Syria. North Korea has sold extended range Scud missiles to Iran and Syria, and is now marketing its new, 1,000 km range No Dong ballistic missile. In addition, North Korea may have already passed nuclear technology to Central Region states. China is also a major proliferation concern and serves as an alternative supplier when Western export controls make technology and weapons more difficult to acquire. Beijing has sold missile, chemical, and nuclear technology and equipment to states such as Iran, Syria, and Algeria.

Controlling proliferation in the future will involve deciphering the webs of suppliers, middlemen, and end users; distinguishing between legitimate and illicit purposes, particularly for dual-use technology; and helping interdict the flow of material and technology to potential proliferating countries. These tasks will not be easy. As international awareness of the problem increases, countries are becoming more clever, devising networks of front companies and suppliers to frustrate export controls.

#### **CIVIL UNREST**

Another significant challenge to the security of the Central Region is the presence of ongoing civil unrest in several of the regional states. Although Somalia remains the most widely publicized, Sudan and Djibouti also have internal problems that threaten regional stability.

Despite the extended efforts of the world community, the Somalis have yet to reconcile their differences or find national stability. The efforts of the international

## REGIONAL ANALYSIS



SOMALI VIOLENCE CONTINUES

community resulted in the successful eradication of most of the starvation in the country, but political reconciliation continues to elude the Somalis and the security situation is rapidly returning to the pre-UNITAF conditions of 1992. Since the withdrawal of the main U.S. contingent in March 1994, there has been a steady decline in the security environment. General lawlessness, banditry, and violence have again become commonplace. The inability of the Somalis to resolve their political differences, coupled with the deteriorating security situation served as the impetus for the U.S. Liaison Office withdrawal in September 1994. Despite ongoing political initiatives, resolution of the situation is not expected in the near term. The tendency of the Somali people to resolve their differences with violence has not been abated by their experience with the United Nations. Current events point toward renewed civil war due to clan factionalization, domination of the country by armed elements, and the lack of credible political leaders. The uneasy truce in Somalia today is likely only a temporary lull in a situation that will almost certainly continue unabated for years. Somalia's future as a nation depends on the willingness and ability of a select group of leaders to subordinate clan and individual interests to national security and stability

requirements. This is not likely in the foreseeable future.

Stability in the volatile Horn of Africa is also threatened by the situation in southern Sudan, where an estimated 1.5 million people are in need of some form of emergency international relief assistance because of natural disasters and an ongoing, debilitating civil war. The civil war between the ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) and factions of the rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has been waged continuously for the last 11 years, based on centuries-old ethnic, religious and political issues. The constant fighting forces hundreds of thousands to seek refuge in Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic. Despite efforts by international and regional governments to end the fighting and broker peace between the government, the SPLA and its various factions, the outlook for a peaceful solution is dim. Both sides seem intent on a military solution and neither side sees any issue that would facilitate compromise.

The Republic of Djibouti is experiencing internal strife between the Issa-dominated government and the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), which represents elements of Djibouti's Afar ethnic group. The Afars comprise about 35 percent of Djibouti's population. The FRUD is fighting for true government representation. The ruling Issas, who comprise 60 percent of the population, have held power since independence in 1977. Most of the fighting has taken place in the north and west of Djibouti city. The government controls lines of communication, but the FRUD moves freely throughout the countryside. The most likely outcome will be a negotiated settlement within the next year offering the FRUD more representation in government.

**NON-MILITARY CHALLENGES****OIL**

Oil will remain the world's primary source of energy fuel for the foreseeable future. Reinforced by projections for increased demand from industrialized countries as well as emerging third world nations, the importance of oil and its availability will be a principal concern for global economies well into the next century. The outlook for increasing oil demand, combined with the fact that 65 percent of the world's oil reserves reside in the Arabian Gulf region, further highlights the importance of Middle Eastern oil supplies.

Emerging as a significant trend in the world oil market is the growing centralization of world oil production in the Arabian Gulf. The area's share of the world supply is projected to increase from one-fourth today to about one-third by the late 1990s. Adding significance to the level of Arabian Gulf oil production is the expected decline in oil production elsewhere. With fewer alternatives to Arabian Gulf oil reserves, production, and exports, supply disruptions within the region would cause great concern.

In 1995, several important factors could adversely affect the availability of energy supplies from the Middle East. The competition among neighboring countries over existing, new, or anticipated energy resources may heighten tensions in this volatile region. Likewise, the growing concentration of world oil production among Arabian Gulf countries, who are also members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), increases the political dimension that could affect world oil supplies. Ongoing rifts between OPEC

COUNTRY	QUANTITY (Billions of Barrels)	PERCENT (World Reserves)
Saudi Arabia	265	26.5%
Kuwait	98	9.8%
UAE	98	9.8%
Iran	90	9.0%
Iraq	100	10.0%
Other	3.3	0.3%
Total	654.3	65.4%

**PRINCIPAL SOUTHWEST ASIA OIL RESERVES**

members over oil production quotas, market share, and pricing strategies will further erode prospects for greater unity among the membership. A weakened and debt-ridden OPEC could threaten the stability of the region's oil-based economies and negatively impact the world's oil consuming countries. These rifts are expected to heighten as the region's oil producers look for ways to accommodate Iraq's ultimate return to the oil market. Balancing supply with demand will be a central issue if Gulf producers are to avoid instability in their respective economies.

Roughly 12 percent of the oil used by the U.S. comes from this region. For most of our key allies, however, dependence on Arabian Gulf oil is even more pronounced. Oil from the Gulf fills over one quarter of Western Europe's needs, and more than two-thirds of Japan's. With 66 percent of the world's known oil reserves, the region will be the key oil producing area in the foreseeable future. As global economies become increasingly dependent on Middle East oil, any threat to the free market access to the region is a threat to global security. Chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Suez Canal remain vulnerable to disruption, and Iraqi or Iranian aggression against them could disrupt not only a large portion of world oil

## REGIONAL ANALYSIS

supplies, but also the more than 15 percent of all world commerce that is routed through these strategic waterways.

**WATER SOURCES**

The potential for conflicts over water resources in the region focus on three major river basins – the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Jordan. Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan all rely on water from the Nile and its tributaries. For each of these countries, projects have been drafted which would divert some of the water, raising concerns over the availability of future resources. Given the projected population increases in the region, consumption demands on Nile


River water will quickly surpass current water allocations further straining a volatile situation.

Turkey, where the headwaters of the Euphrates are located, has been developing a series of dams and irrigation projects along the river that may significantly affect downstream users in Syria, and Iraq. Both the quantity and quality of water are at risk, especially if Turkey meets all of its goals. Similarly, Syria and Iraq have ambitious plans involving the Euphrates, which could be threatened if Turkey completes its projects. Without sound, carefully developed water management agreements between users of the Euphrates, water resource limitations will continue to be a potential flashpoint for tensions.



**CONTENTIOUS WATER SOURCES**

Finally, the Jordan River and its tributaries are the major sources of water for Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. In these countries, population growth has exacerbated water demand, leaving little room for improvement in supplies without active measures in place, such as water rationing. Water negotiations will become critical as potable water supplies will be insufficient to meet the demand by the year 2000.



SPREAD OF ISLAMIC INFLUENCE

**ISLAMIC EXTREMISM**

An area of constant concern is the instability caused by radical elements which support Islamic extremist policies as the solution to various societal problems. Extremist activities threaten U.S. interests when they are rhetorically based on grievances about Western influence. In the Sudan, for example, the National Islamic Front (NIF) expands its extremist influence throughout the region by providing safe haven and training camps for terrorist groups and foreign Islamic radicals. Sudan is suspected of training radical elements targeted at other countries in the Horn, as well as Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Continued Iranian backing (with both forces and money) of plans to export radical fundamentalism adds to the growing concern of more moderate governments in the region.

**EXTERNAL CONDITIONS WHICH MAY THREATEN THE REGION****DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION**

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent nations bordering the northern periphery of the Central Region have continued to develop as sovereign entities. Each state, though, is facing instability brought on by historical animosities and ethnic hatreds, border disputes, political differences, religious intolerance, economic disarray, and outside interference. In addition, a major issue for these nations is to build a sense of nationalism after 70 years of Soviet repression—in some countries, a nationalism that has never before existed.

It is in this uncertain atmosphere that new relationships are developing between

## REGIONAL ANALYSIS

these newly emerged nations and their neighbors to the south in the Central Region. Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia all enjoy some degree of ethnic, linguistic, or cultural/religious ties to the region, and along with Russia are competing for influence there. They see the region as a source of natural resources, a new market for goods, and fertile ground for religious teachings. The region's strategic importance has not gone unnoticed either, and Russia especially is energetically pursuing military ties with some of the new nations.

In the near- to mid-term, these emerging countries will require extensive humanitarian and economic assistance to forestall radical elements and improve their internal stability. The Central Region countries will continue to exert a strong influence, for good or ill, in the development of these states and regional peace and stability.

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

After 45 years of hostility and several wars, Israel and the PLO signed an historic declaration of principles calling for the creation of an independent Palestinian entity in the Gaza Strip and Jericho. The positive momentum of this peace agreement has reduced the potential for renewed conflict, however extremists on both sides threaten near-term progress. Plans for administration of the declaration continue, but further complications are expected as final implementation is negotiated.


Israel and Jordan ended their state of war in July 1994 and signed a peace treaty in October. Historical issues of dispute such as water rights, border demarcation, and territorial integrity were addressed in this treaty. Jordan

and Israel are expected to conclude a variety of economic agreements now that the peace treaty is approved. Meanwhile, peace talks between Israel and Syria continue to drag on. The Israel-PLO and Israel-Jordan peace accords will add new momentum to the peace process and will bring pressure on Syria to reach an agreement with Israel.

While present treaties and negotiations are encouraging and all sides are committed to implementing the accords, we should expect further complications. Until all Arab nations in this region have made peace with Israel, this problem will continue to have profound influence on the social, political and military situation in the area.

INDIA-PAKISTAN

South Asia remains an area poised for both formidable growth and the possibility of regional conflict. Programs initiated by the governments of Pakistan and India to improve their economies and standards of living have had a positive effect, but stability is threatened by the possibility of hostilities over Kashmir, and other issues.



KASHMIR REMAINS CONTESTED

Despite two wars between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, the problem remains unresolved. Prime Minister Bhutto continues to aggressively promote the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Rao contends that it is an internal problem, which India reserves the right to resolve without external interference. India maintains over 300,000 military and paramilitary forces in Kashmir who, until recently, enjoyed relative freedom of action when dealing with the local populace. Indian excesses and Pakistani concern resulted in a recent focus of world attention on the area. This led to heightened tensions between India and Pakistan and finally to a resumption of secretarial level talks between the two countries in January 1994.

After nearly 50 years of friction over Kashmir, leaders on both sides have expressed a willingness to negotiate. Although continuing political dialogue could ultimately result in a compromise acceptable to all parties, Indian intransigence regarding offers of outside mediation also could lead to another impasse and the possible cessation of talks. Unless the situation in Kashmir is resolved in the near future, tensions could escalate into another major Indo/Pak war.

### C. SUMMARY

This regional analysis of the Central Command's area of responsibility addresses the geopolitical situation in each of the countries of the three major sub-regions as well as the challenges to the Central Region's stability and our vital interests there. It provides a fundamental understanding of the environment in which we must operate and serves as a backdrop for the next section, which will address our theater strategy to maintain security in this volatile region.



### III. THEATER STRATEGY

#### A. STRATEGIC CHALLENGE


USCENTCOM's strategic challenge centers on the fact that the U.S. has vital interests far from our own shores, but close to potential threats, in a volatile region where political and fiscal constraints limit the nature and scope of U.S. forward presence. Even after the completion of significant modernization efforts, the nations of the region are not yet capable of defending themselves either alone or collectively. Therefore the United States must be prepared to defend its vital interests unilaterally if necessary. The problem is compounded by shortfalls in strategic lift and competing intelligence requirements which make early warning difficult. Proliferation of conventional weapons and WMD/missiles by rogue states, among others, intent on offsetting the U.S. technological and conventional advantage is an alarming post-Cold War development with serious strategic and operational implications. The United States has no treaties with regional friends and relies solely

on Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) which we have negotiated with most members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

It is the goal of U.S. Central Command to pursue the following theater end state:

"A peaceful and stable region that enjoys close relations with the U.S.; comprised of nations that possess military forces to satisfy legitimate self-defense needs, that engage in collective security arrangements to promote the common defense, that support non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles, and that respect fundamental human rights."

Such an end state will help ensure the international community uninterrupted access to oil. The strategic challenge of achieving this desired end state is the basis of CENTCOM's mission.



**A PROVEN STRATEGY FOR DETERRING AGGRESSION**



**B. USCENTCOM MISSION**

The mission of USCENTCOM is to:

- Promote and protect U.S. interests
- Ensure uninterrupted access to regional resources
- Assist friendly states in providing for their own security and contributing to the collective defense
- Deter attempts by hostile regional states to achieve geo-political gains by threat or use of force

To accomplish our mission we pursue a theater strategy that concentrates on vital U.S. interests. It relies on consensus at home that is best achieved by concentrating on vital U.S. interests, in this case access to Arabian Gulf oil, and ensuring that we maintain the capability to defeat an adversary rapidly and decisively with a minimum of friendly casualties. We must ensure that plans and forces do not fall short of being able to protect U.S. interests. Our strategy must be achievable and affordable. We make it so by being threat-focused, flexible and versatile in the combination and application of force. USCENTCOM strategy requires coalition building that begins with sound long-term security arrangements and security assistance with regional partners essential to collective security and defense. It demands global responsibility sharing for the defense of common interests in the region.

The basis for our security relationships with regional coalition partners is a three-tier concept of defense against aggression. Tier I, national self-defense, involves actions by individual nations to contribute to deterrence and defense of their nation. Tier II, regional collective defense, involves actions by friendly regional nations to support a threatened state in an attempt to preclude hostilities or restore stability should deterrence fail. Tier III, extra-regional

coalition defense, involves direct action by the United States and other friendly states to deter aggression or defend their common interests. The primary focus of the three-tier defense concept is collective responsibility sharing for regional security and stability.


This three-tier defense concept is a building-block approach to the formation of coalitions. It is a confidence-building measure that improves military-to-military relationships and interoperability and recognizes the connection between military capability and cooperation and political and economic interdependence. The tier concept has potential to minimize unnecessary deployments of U.S. forces and buy time. Theoretically, over time, the tiers will enhance GCC stand-alone deterrence and defense capabilities and reduce U.S. overseas forward presence requirements.

**C. USCINCCENT VISION**

We are guided in the performance of our mission by USCINCCENT's vision for the U.S. Central Command:

A flexible and versatile command into the 21st Century... trained, positioned, and ready to defend the nation's vital interests, promote peace and stability, deter conflict, and conduct operations spanning the conflict continuum; and prepared to wage unrelenting, simultaneous joint and combined operations to achieve decisive victory in war.

This vision for the future of the Central Command guides the formulation of strategy and force planning. We know what we want to achieve (U.S. interests and objectives), and we know the conditions likely to prevail during our pursuit of those objectives. We have conceptualized the



PILLARS OF THEATER STRATEGY

ways to accomplish our mission by seeking to effect a more favorable environment. "The true aim [of our strategy] is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce a decision, its continuation by battle is sure to achieve this." (Liddell Hart)

#### D. STRATEGY OVERVIEW

The principles and concepts described above provide the foundation for our theater strategy. The strategy is founded upon the U.S. ideals and interests previously discussed. Access is maintained through the close relationships that military leaders have forged with regional military and political leaders. The strategic concepts that define our strategy are represented by the five pillars: forward presence, exercises, security assistance, power projection, and readiness to fight. Taken together these five pillars describe the major


activities that USCENTCOM undertakes to accomplish its assigned missions.

#### FORWARD PRESENCE

Forward presence of U.S. forces visibly demonstrates our nation's commitment, facilitates access, enhances deterrence, and supports transition from peace to war. This first pillar of the USCENTCOM strategy is directly responsible for

much of the deterrent effect we can bring to the Central Region. Our forward presence relies on the synergistic effect of combining naval, ground, air, and special operations forces in the region, as well as prepositioned equipment and military construction to support rapid introduction of additional forces should the need arise.

Naval forces make up an integral part of our forward presence. The carrier battle



CENTERPIECE OF NAVAL PRESENCE

## THEATER STRATEGY




A MEU CAN PROVIDE AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE

group (CVBG) and the amphibious ready group (ARG) with its Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) have continued to be the mainstay of naval operations in the Central Region throughout the year. These forces provide the flexibility to rapidly bring military power to bear without the delays associated with obtaining approval to place U.S. forces on foreign soil. Their limited footprint, strategic agility, calculated ambiguity of intent, and major strategic and operational deterrent capability make them invaluable. Naval operations this year have included enforcement of UNSCRs, support for Somalia operations, and Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR (OVW). Our ability to move naval forces in 1993 and again in 1994 from the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Gulf to positions off the coast of Somalia and Kuwait demonstrates their extraordinary utility and versatility. Providing support for UN sanctions against Iraq, operations in Somalia, and 37 joint and combined exercises, the CVBG has demonstrated U.S. commitment and resolve in the Central Region. The ARG/MEU's immediate response to Iraq's hostile posture in October 1994, complemented by the rapid deployment of Army forces falling in

on prepositioned equipment in Kuwait, placed a joint combined arms team forward that effectively deterred Saddam from further aggression. Inclusion of attack submarines in deploying CVBGs provides an added dimension of strategic capability through monitoring and protecting SLOCs and deterring aggression with an increased presence of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs).

Providing a continuous presence in the absence of a deployed CVBG or ARG are the ships of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT), the senior USCENTCOM component commander permanently assigned in the theater. These combatant ships actively supported UN sanctions against Iraq in 1994 by conducting the majority of maritime intercept boardings, which totaled 9,781 by year's end. Auxiliary ships of COMUSNAVCENT provide logistics support and repair services to all U.S. naval forces deployed to the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea.




MARITIME INTERCEPT OPERATIONS

Forward deployed forces ashore remain small, but are another key element of deterrence. U.S. Patriot missile batteries in the region provide a visible symbol of our commitment to stability and foster efforts toward a collective GCC theater missile defense. Deployed batteries provide an immediate capability which would enhance protection of initial U.S. forces deploying into the Arabian Peninsula in the event of a crisis. Equally important, the GCC states are showing increased interest in establishing a collective regional air defense network of which the Patriots will be a key element. The capability, agility, and strategic deterrent value of our Patriot presence was again demonstrated during Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR.

The current Air Force composite wing deployment to the region supports both peacetime deterrence and contingency response missions. The versatility of air power makes it a key component of UNSCR enforcement and USCENTCOM theater strategy, as clearly demonstrated by the wing's timely and capable response during OVW. The composite wing provides forces for combined operations to strengthen regional defense capabilities. It also facilitates rapid initial response during crisis as well as the command and control necessary for introduction of additional air forces in a contingency operation. Over the past year, the wing has accounted for the majority of sorties in Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, discussed in Chapter IV. The continued presence of this wing, including the close air support (CAS) capability represented by an A-10 presence in Kuwait, is fundamental to our theater strategy. The wing is vital to

contingency response, reducing lift requirements, buying time and protecting the force, and should remain in place as a guarantor of regional stability.

In addition to conventional units, Special Operations Forces (SOF) play an important role in our forward presence. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) plans for and employs Joint Special Operations Forces in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. Composed of Army, Navy, and Air Force Special Operations Forces, SOCCENT provides a continuing special operations forward presence, conducts an aggressive exercise and bilateral training program, supports humanitarian assistance and civic action programs, provides forces to stabilize crisis situations, and, when directed, conducts combat operations. SOCCENT and its Joint Special Operations Forces have strengthened military-to-military relationships between the U.S. and the countries of the Central Region and greatly enhanced individual self-defense and collective defense capabilities vital to theater strategy. Able to respond immediately to a wide range of contingencies, SOCCENT provides an operational flexibility to conduct operations ranging from unobtrusive, low impact




**A-10s PROVIDE CONTINGENCY RESPONSIVENESS**

**THEATER STRATEGY**

measures to high visibility deterrent operations. During OVW, SOF elements that had been exercising as coalition support teams (CSTs) in Kuwait assisted the Kuwaiti Armed Forces in deploying to the Iraqi border to defend their nation.

Reinforcing our forward presence in the Central Region are the more than 800 military personnel assigned to Security Assistance Organizations (SAOs), Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFTs), and Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) stationed in the AOR. These elements perform the critical tasks of managing the multi-billion dollar security assistance programs in such countries as Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, as well as providing valuable training to host-nation militaries.

Prepositioning is a strategic imperative that reduces warning and reaction time required to deploy forces in accordance with plans, and permits early defense of key infrastructure. It minimizes risk to early-deploying forces, enhances sustainability, reduces strategic lift requirements, and allows for early introduction of critical armor forces. The cornerstone of this effort is the prepositioning of three heavy brigades of equipment ready for use in the AOR in a crisis. Current plans call for the brigade already in Kuwait to be joined by another ashore brigade sited elsewhere in the region and a third brigade afloat. However, in the wake of OVW, we recognized the need for additional ashore prepositioning to enhance our capability to respond during the time we are most vulnerable to enemy attack in the event of a Major Regional Conflict (MRC). Consequently, we are exploring possible locations for a third heavy brigade ashore to complement the one afloat which could be



**ADDITIONAL PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT IS NEEDED**

otherwise committed. Additional items prepositioned in the AOR include: Air Force bare base sets, water and fuel distribution equipment, medical equipment and supplies, and support vehicles.

The total heavy ground force capability ultimately planned for the AOR will be a powerful deterrent, especially in a two MRC scenario where the first MRC might precipitate the second. In view of projected demands on strategic lift assets during near-simultaneous MRCs, prepositioning for three heavy brigades and an enhanced division base is a strategic imperative. To supplement these ashore stocks, the Services have developed afloat prepositioning to enhance flexibility while limiting our footprint in the region. This afloat prepositioning is addressed in detail in the "Power Projection" section.

A key element of our forward presence directly supporting our prepositioning efforts is Service-funded military construction (MILCON). The Central Region is relatively "infrastructure poor," compared to other theaters, with few of the military facilities

required to support deploying air and ground forces. Service MILCON is absolutely essential in Southwest Asia because not all host nations there can afford to finance the construction of the required facilities. As such, continued Congressional funding of Service MILCON projects in future budgets is critically important to USCENTCOM's ability to execute our prepositioning strategy. MILCON, like other forms of forward presence ashore, is considered under an overarching plan for our "footprint" in the AOR. This plan requires close scrutiny by the CENTCOM staff, coordination with the State Department and other interested agencies, and finally approval by USCINCCENT for any initiatives altering the level of U.S. presence in any host nation.


The decision of Congress to support funding of three MILCON projects in FY95 enhanced USCENTCOM's near-term prepositioning posture, and ongoing efforts to institute a responsibility sharing program with other nations could provide some long-term relief for Service funding of MILCON and O&M requirements. However, continued Congressional approval for MILCON funding in the outyears is the only

way to ensure that the Services will be able to meet USCENTCOM's prepositioning requirements to successfully execute our regional strategy.

#### **EXERCISES**

A comprehensive exercise program is the second pillar of our strategy. Combined exercises between forces of the U.S. and other nations maintain access, promote interoperability, and improve readiness of the participants. They also reaffirm U.S. resolve and foster friendships. The valuable experience gained during combined exercises provides a foundation for building strong coalitions in the future and makes continued funding of this program vital.

The extensive exercise program in Southwest Asia (SWA) reinforces the U.S. commitment to regional peace and stability. These exercises provide less-developed military organizations in the region with visible evidence of U.S. support and valuable exposure to modern, well-trained forces, while enhancing military-to-military relationships. A growing appreciation by our regional friends of the importance of these exercises has resulted in a dramatic increase in the total program over pre-Gulf War levels. The program included 54 naval, 7 SOF, 4 Army, and 5 Air Force exercises in the past year, as well as ULTIMATE RESOLVE 95 which was a USCENTCOM exercise.



**SERVICE MILCON IN SOUTHWEST ASIA IS ESSENTIAL**

## THEATER STRATEGY

Of particular importance are the JCS-sponsored joint exercises, which have grown dramatically both in number and in complexity since 1990. One example is the INTRINSIC ACTION series with Kuwait, through which we signal clear U.S. commitment to regional security, improve our ability to rapidly deploy forces to fall in on prepositioned equipment sets, and demonstrate to our friends the deterrent value of prepositioned equipment. Another example is the BRIGHT STAR series with Egypt which routinely involves demanding deployments and close interaction among the Services as well as with host-nation and other participating forces.

In addition to ground exercises, we executed an ambitious program of naval, air, and special operations exercises throughout the region in 1994. Surface, amphibious, air, MPF, SEAL, and EOD exercises were conducted with a variety of other naval forces, not only from the region, but from the United Kingdom, France, and Russia. Air Force and SOF exercises also played an important role, enhancing interoperability between U.S. and friendly forces in the region and providing valuable training for all participants.

From a strong foundation of bilateral exercises with our friends in the region, we have advanced to more challenging and complex trilateral and multilateral exercises. These exercises, both field and command post, greatly enhance the ability of regional forces to operate together for mutual defense, and in coalition with us. Exercise ULTIMATE RESOLVE 95, hosted by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense, provided a valuable forum for frank discussions on the defense of the Arabian Peninsula. Attended by representatives of the GCC states, Egypt, Syria, France, Great Britain and the United States, the seminar spawned



**BRIGHT STAR - ONE OF OUR LARGEST EXERCISES**

recommendations for further long-range exercise development.

Exercise Related Construction (ERC) is an important element of our peacetime exercise program. This construction directly contributes to our strategy by providing facilities to support U.S. troops involved in joint and combined exercises. Last year, Air Force engineers constructed permanent fuel berms to contain deployable fuel bladders, decreasing future exercise costs and increasing the amount of safe storage of fuel for a major exercise series. These and other ERC projects provide irreplaceable training for active and reserve U.S. military engineers in deployment and construction skills.



**EXERCISE RELATED CONSTRUCTION**

Central Command's Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (H/CA) program remains a valuable adjunct to the peacetime exercise program. These projects enable participants to serve some of the basic economic and social needs of developing AOR countries through elementary medical, dental and veterinary care or rudimentary construction of public facilities in rural areas. In aiding the civilian community, H/CA projects serve to bolster host-nation health care and social services efforts (e.g., in FY94 a Seabee-constructed brace/prosthetics facility in the AOR generated tremendous goodwill for the U.S. and Central Command among the local populace). These projects also promote U.S. security interests by demonstrating our commitment to the region and by enhancing operational readiness skills for all who participate. U.S. Central Command will continue to promote this highly cost-effective program, which produces big returns in improved regional relations for a relatively small investment.

The total exercise program is an essential link in our regional strategy. Combined exercises permit engagement at each of the three tiers of our strategy, promoting interoperability. ERC and H/CA projects enhance our ability to forge coalitions to defend against regional threats.



**BRACE/PROSTHETICS FACILITY - AN H/CA PROJECT**

### **SECURITY ASSISTANCE**

As the U.S. defense budget and overseas military presence decline, security assistance becomes an increasingly important foreign policy instrument providing critical U.S. access to the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. Specifically, equipment and training significantly enhance the legitimate Tier I defense capabilities of U.S. security partners, enabling them to assume a greater share of their own defense requirements. These improved capabilities not only increase prospects for peace through deterrence, but further encourage the development of viable Tier II and Tier III cooperative defense arrangements.

A strong Security Assistance program supports several distinct objectives. First, it enhances the ability of individual countries within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility to defend themselves against aggression, the first tier of USCENTCOM's regional defense strategy. Moreover, many countries in the region prefer the use of U.S. Foreign Military Sales to meet their self-defense requirements. Saudi Arabia, for example, has recently purchased F-15s, M1A2s, M2A2s and Patriot missiles; Egypt has acquired F-16 aircraft and M-60 tanks and is now producing M1 tanks; Kuwait has bought F/A-18s, M1A2s, and M2A2s; and the United Arab Emirates have procured AH-64 Apache helicopters. American equipment is recognized as the finest in the world. When coupled with training and logistic support provided under the Total Package Approach, judicious transfer of equipment generates effective combat power for our coalition partners, legitimizing their efforts to achieve a credible conventional deterrent capability. The transfer of excess defense articles (EDA) is another means



## THEATER STRATEGY

to improve host-nation military and government infrastructure as our own forces draw down. Many countries find EDA to be an attractive option because although the equipment is provided "as is", there is no cost for initial acquisition to the host nation other than transportation.

Security Assistance achieves a second objective by facilitating interoperability necessary for Tier II and Tier III capabilities. Any major future conflict in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility can be expected to involve coalition warfare. Coalition partners operating with common equipment, training, and doctrine can more easily achieve their military objectives. In a real sense, interoperability acts as a force multiplier. Security Assistance creates an environment for effective interoperability, making it likely that our security partners will be able to shoulder more of the common defense burden. Interoperability yields tangible benefits in providing a common logistics base, enhancing political and military relations, and providing common doctrine and training.

A third objective of security assistance is to strengthen leadership, professional, and nation-building skills. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program provides funds to allow foreign civilian leaders and military officers to attend U.S. professional education and training courses, yielding significant benefits at a very low cost. The introduction of foreign leaders to U.S. training and doctrine, along with the direct personal contact with U.S. military personnel, strengthens long-term military-to-military relations. Instruction in topics such as human rights and civilian control of military forces directly promote



**THE IMET PROGRAM  
STRENGTHENS MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS**

responsible defense management and democratization in developing nations. Reflecting recent cuts in funding, only 183 students participated in the program in FY94, compared with an average of over 600 students per year over the past decade. Adequate funding for this vital program must be reinstated if we are to continue to positively influence the professionalism of our military partners.

The United States has been pursuing these objectives through the provision of Security Assistance in the USCENTCOM region since 1950. Over these last 45 years, regional military sales have totaled nearly \$125 billion. Since 1983, the year USCENTCOM was established, sales of defense goods and services have totaled nearly \$80 billion. Since 1990, USCENTCOM has accounted for an annual average of 45% of U.S. military sales worldwide. Sales in FY95 are estimated to reach \$2.76 billion.

In summary, security assistance programs are among the most effective

means of achieving our national military objectives in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, improving interoperability, increasing access and influence, and promoting democratic values. These programs prepare us for possible coalition warfare in the region while at the same time lessening the possibility of such an intervention. Grant aid programs reinvest U.S. dollars in the United States economy while enabling coalition partners to contribute to the collective defense. IMET builds professional military and civilian leadership, fosters observance of human rights and civilian control of the military, while enhancing military-to-military relations.

#### **POWER PROJECTION**

While the first three pillars describe our overseas activities, the fourth, power projection, defines the ability of the U.S. military to support rapid projection of forces from the U.S. into the Central Region and posture those forces for combat operations. Within this context, USCENTCOM has a keen interest in the Air Force's C-17 program, the Navy's Fast Sealift Ships (and other elements of the Ready Reserve Force),

the Army's brigade set of equipment afloat (currently 12 ships), and the Marine Corps' Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF). Through these efforts, along with the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), USCENTCOM can currently fly one Army heavy brigade's personnel to fall in on equipment stored in Kuwait and a second brigade to link up with equipment arriving by sea. With the addition of the planned second brigade ashore, and a third either ashore or afloat, we will be able to deter/defeat any potential adversary.


The afloat prepositioning program is based on the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) concept that was so successful during Operations DESERT SHIELD, RESTORE HOPE, and most recently revalidated during Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. The MPF consists of three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS), each able to support a Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) of approximately 15,000 personnel with supplies and equipment for 30 days. Other afloat prepositioning currently consists of three ships of Air Force stocks (primarily ammunition), and five ships containing Army port opening equipment and sustainment stocks (e.g., ammunition and rations). The funding for required new ship construction

to expand this posture has been fully supported. The Army afloat armored brigade is scheduled to be fully fielded by 1997. The Army demonstrated its remarkable versatility during OVW when it offloaded equipment in Saudi Arabia and moved forward to Kuwait to conduct operations to deter further Iraqi aggression. The constitution of this heavy brigade afloat is underway with the loading of the interim ships from the Ready Reserve Fleet



**ARMY AFLOAT PREPO BEING OFFLOADED DURING OVW**

THEATER STRATEGY



### GREAT DISTANCES ARE INVOLVED

These, like other prepositioning ships for the various services, will be strategically located to allow for rapid reaction to likely trouble spots.

Strategic lift is the critical lifeline for the Central Command, and is essential to the success of our operations. At over 7,000 air miles and 8,000 sea miles, the extraordinary distances from the U.S. amplify the immense difficulties of moving a force in response to a regional crisis or contingency. As demonstrated during recent operations in the Gulf region and in Somalia, strategic lift must remain a high priority.

Because of the great distances involved and limited theater infrastructure in the AOR, the en route support structure provided at European strategic ports is vital to our ability to meet our operational commitments. Any rapid response to the Central Region entails flying extended distances and requires en route support to sustain the air bridge. With continuing base closures and force drawdowns it is critical that we maintain sufficient depth and capacity to sustain a protracted, high intensity operations in a major regional contingency in the region. Accordingly, we must retain essential bases and access rights as we draw down throughout the world, as well as cultivating

new opportunities wherever possible.

The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) has recognized existing sealift deficiencies and provides a framework for correcting these shortfalls. It is essential that full funding be provided to meet these MRS-identified sealift needs. Specifically, more roll-on/roll-off ships are required, as are additional strategic sealift ships, and increased funding for maintenance of the Ready Reserve Force to enable deployment readiness.

Though these initiatives will ameliorate equipment shortfalls, manning for sealift ships remains questionable. The average age of merchant mariners is 55 years and increasing, and the number of qualified mariners to operate the RRF continues to decline. These factors, combined with a decreased number of U.S.-flagged merchant ships, signal an erosion in America's national sealift capability that could jeopardize our future ability to deploy, employ, and sustain any sizable force in response to a regional contingency.

The availability of strategic airlift is also of critical importance. Heavy use of C-141 and C-5 aircraft during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM shortened their remaining service lives. Additionally, airlift operations in support of subsequent operations have further taxed remaining C-141s and C-5s. This makes procurement of the C-17 replacement core airlifter critical to meeting future airlift requirements.

Even with the hardware programs in place, strategic lift still requires trained personnel. Our ability to mobilize relies heavily on Reserve Components, especially for tanker and airlifter crews. The critical

role played by reservists in strategic lift can be expected to grow even larger as active forces are drawn down.

Another important program to enhance our ability to sustain forces deployed to the AOR is Total Asset Visibility (TAV). The future integration of TAV into the USCENTCOM logistics infrastructure will greatly improve the theater commander's capability to accurately assess readiness and sustainability. With automation, the ability to research asset visibility through the myriad distribution, transportation, and supply data systems will make the logistical resource allocation process operate much more efficiently.

#### READINESS TO FIGHT

The fifth and final pillar of our theater strategy, readiness to fight, stresses activities that ensure that the Central Command headquarters and individual Component Commands possess standard operating procedures for rapidly deploying during crises, conducting synchronized joint and combined operations, and waging high


tempo warfare. To ensure readiness, we are constantly engaged in reviewing and refining our war and contingency plans. In addition, we conduct frequent conferences with Component Commanders and their staffs, as well as the individual Services, along with joint and combined training, and command post and other exercises to maintain requisite levels of readiness.

Supporting these objectives are several important exercises in CONUS to help ensure that headquarters staffs and other units are ready to deploy and fight. These exercises, including ROVING SANDS, BLUE FLAG, and INTERNAL LOOK, combine elements of command post exercises (CPXs) and field training exercises (FTXs). All are conducted on a recurring basis to ensure continuity, promote exercise development and, most importantly, maintain peak readiness for operational deployment.

#### E. DECISIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS

These five pillars facilitate accomplishment of our strategic objectives of regional peace and stability, deterrence, and warfighting ability.

Our strategy acknowledges that the future of collective security in the Central Region is inextricably linked to U.S. leadership. It also recognizes that promoting U.S. interests and maintaining access involves friends who are more inclined to develop long-term mutually beneficial economic and political relations if they are confident that the U.S. can promote those interests in peace and defend them in war. The




**STRATEGIC LIFT IS THE KEY**

## THEATER STRATEGY

influence of U.S. military power is a vital component of national strategy in the region and is instrumental in the prevention of conflict which could threaten our interests and those of our friends.

The global nature of U.S. interests dictates a National Security Strategy that calls for the military to be able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs). Execution of two nearly simultaneous MRCs requires a focus on identifying enemy centers of gravity and directing joint and multinational power against them. Such power projection will be three-phased, encompassing deterrence, defense, and offense. From a power projection perspective, the Central Region is unique because of a paucity of forward deployed forces, absence of treaties with host nations, and a military imbalance between our regional allies and the current threat. To protect U.S. and allied interests, deterrence depends on the early commitment of active component forces through a menu of flexible deterrent options (FDOs) designed to signal U.S. intent to friends and foe. Should deterrence fail to prevent conflict, defensive forces will establish air, ground, and sea power sufficient to halt enemy forces. Once favorable power ratios are achieved, offensive forces will apply overwhelming power to end the conflict quickly and decisively on terms favorable to the United States. The military victory must position us to also win the peace.

The strategy for Southwest Asia is designed to protect U.S. vital interests in the region. Our national interests include uninterrupted U.S. and allied access to Arabian Gulf oil, a stable political and military balance in the region, and, should conflict erupt, winning the peace quickly and



1994 SOURCES OF OIL

on favorable terms. Access to oil is critical to the success of military operations and is fundamental to U.S. national security strategy. Our European allies obtain up to 30 percent of their oil from Southwest Asia; Japan up to 80 percent; and others, such as Thailand, import nearly 100 percent of their oil from the Arabian Gulf region. The loss of access to Southwest Asian oil would dramatically affect the global economy and could impair the ability of the U.S. and its allies to sustain combat operations around the world.

The warfighting element of our strategy is an extension of the peacetime element. Partnerships and regional access established under the peacetime programs of prepositioned war ready material, combined exercises, and security assistance are the foundations for either a gradual buildup in response to increasing tensions or a rapid introduction of U.S. and coalition combat power in the event of an attack with little or no advance warning. The USCENTCOM strategy gives us the ability to respond in a timely manner throughout the range of operational possibilities and provides the framework for appropriate action.

The strategy for employing the military element of national power is to deter, defend, and if necessary, conduct offensive actions to protect U.S. and allied interests. Deterrence is the result of ongoing Tier I self-defense and Tier II regional security, combined with the Tier III ability to rapidly project U.S. and other Western combat power. Our FDOs provide the NCA with a menu of options to deter hostile actions while building up the requisite combat power. With access to Arabian Gulf oil at stake, rapid power projection using active component forces is vital in the early stages of a U.S. response. Should deterrence fail, our strategy calls for overwhelming U.S. and allied combat power to quickly defeat the enemy and end the conflict on terms favorable to the U.S. and our allies.

#### F. KEY ENABLING REQUIREMENTS

There are certain requirements that must be met to enable us to successfully execute our theater strategy. Some of these key areas are prepositioning, strategic lift and security assistance (such as IMET and FMF) all addressed under their respective pillars. Others include theater missile defense, a comprehensive and modern C<sup>4</sup>I architecture, top quality personnel programs, and the technological superiority that can only be maintained through ambitious Service research and development (R&D) programs.

#### THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE

The continued proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, combined with the relative ease with which potential adversaries can enhance armaments through purchases of "off-the-shelf" technology, calls for enhanced theater missile defenses and space-based capabilities to protect friendly forces,

support our strategy, and facilitate warfighting. The priority in this area over the next ten years should be to establish a multi-layered missile defense founded on the lower-tier Patriot Advanced Capability III, with a variant for naval defense; upper-tier Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); and highly mobile point defense Corps SAM (surface-to-air missile) to protect ground forces maneuvering rapidly over extended distances. We must also devote resources to the following: detecting unmanned aerial vehicles as well as cruise and short range missiles; enriching the missile tracking capability of our satellite program to provide rapid, highly accurate flight data on enemy missile launches; expanding our acquisition of theater-based capabilities to directly downlink satellite data for intelligence and rapidly transmit it to subordinate units; broadening our satellite communications architecture to ensure that it meets future demands; and fielding interoperable systems that support joint and combined operations. Support for these initiatives is essential to their success.

#### C<sup>4</sup>I ARCHITECTURE

C<sup>4</sup>I architecture is also critical to our efforts in the region. There is a demonstrated need in our area for a permanent communications infrastructure, with a quick build-up capability, able to support the rapid flow of timely intelligence to commanders. This need is met by a mix of permanently installed communications equipment such as the Southwest Asia Defense Information Infrastructure (SWADII) and the transportable Tactical Contingency Communications Equipment - Central Area (TCCE-CA). We use this equipment to create a flexible and integrated communications system able to support joint task force (JTF) operations in the region. The SWA DII can also support the early stages of a major regional contingency

## THEATER STRATEGY



WE RELY HEAVILY ON SATCOM

(MRC) operation. Topography and the great distances involved dictate the use of numerous satellite systems for both inter- and intra-theater communications. Sustainment and improvements to the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), UHF Follow-On Satellite Program, MILSTAR and the Commercial Satellite Communications Initiative will provide essential satellite access.

The intelligence portion of C<sup>4</sup> includes the early identification of threats to U.S. vital interests so that planning and operations may proceed. USCENTCOM initiatives to establish intelligence capability forward continue to improve our ability to provide needed intelligence support to U.S. consumers and regional partners. Austere, small nodes at deployed headquarters provide the basis for forward peacetime intelligence operations and the building blocks for expansion to levels required for in-theater wartime support. The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) provides the automated processing capability, while the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) delivers the necessary communications connectivity.

At MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, efforts are ongoing to enhance both communications and intelligence capabilities. The installation of a medium-sized DSCS

terminal at MacDill AFB will greatly enhance the ability of the CINC to directly communicate with the deployed forces under his command. The completion of a Joint Intelligence Center at USCENTCOM will also greatly improve the CINC's warfighting ability. Evolutionary growth in personnel, systems, and facilities through FY97 will address identified shortfalls in C<sup>4</sup> capabilities, enabling us to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.

**PERSONNEL**

Quality personnel remain our most valuable readiness asset. World events in the Central Region keep the tempo of operations high, yet across the board, our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines continue to meet all challenges with pride and professionalism. Operations in Somalia, and most recently Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR on the Arabian Peninsula, tested our troops in all aspects of readiness, and their performance was superb. Bolstering these efforts is the superior training and education of our officer corps. Their demonstrated ability to respond effectively to recent crises, while developing long-term strategies for the AOR, lends great credibility to our Professional Military Education (PME) system. To this end, we have recently established a Command PME program to complement the vital work of our nation's war colleges. Continuing PME is an integral part of any successful force.

Adequate compensation for arduous duties is critical to retaining quality personnel. Renewed DoD emphasis on improving quality of life for our personnel is pivotal to achieving force readiness. Improved compensation, living accommodations, and family support infrastructure directly affect recruiting and retention of quality people. These entitlements are particularly important for

USCENTCOM, as our AOR is characterized by unique cultural restrictions and arduous living conditions. Our efforts are focused toward standardizing quality of life for service members in the AOR by reviewing current programs and making cost effective improvements wherever possible. Examples include: cultural orientation and language training, enhanced off-duty educational opportunities, expansion of commissary and exchange support, and a more responsive Funded Environmental and Morale Leave Program.

#### RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

U.S. Central Command supports a robust research and development (R&D) strategy to ensure the U.S. maintains its technological superiority into the next century. Much of our current edge in technology (such as the C-17, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), stealth aircraft, and high resolution focal plane sensor systems) resulted from R&D efforts of 15 to 30 years ago. While those efforts have served us well, most were focused on Cold War strategic requirements. With our current emphasis on forward presence and fighting regional contingencies, that focus must change. Existing and future R&D efforts which can increase the effectiveness,

lethality, and survivability of our weapons while decreasing lift requirements are essential elements in the overall U.S. warfighting strategy. Such technological enhancements will enable us to tailor a shrinking force structure to maintain peak combat effectiveness.

#### G. SUMMARY

The U.S. Central Command's strategy envisions a smooth transition from peacetime operations through crisis management to warfighting. Our three-tiered approach to regional defense includes self-defense, regional collective security, and assistance from U.S. and other extra-regional powers, emphasizing burdensharing at each of these levels. Essential access is maintained through the pillars of forward presence, combined exercises, and security assistance. If potential aggressors cannot be deterred, we will rely on the two remaining pillars of power projection and readiness to fight. Through these we will assemble the requisite forces for first defensive, then offensive operations to achieve our military objectives. Key enabling requirements for successful execution of our strategy include prepositioning ashore and afloat, strategic lift, security assistance programs, theater missile defense, C<sup>4</sup>I architecture, personnel, and R&D. A balanced combination of these allows us to apply the military portion of our national power as required to support U.S. policy in our area of responsibility.



PAST R&D EFFORTS PRODUCED THE UAV





## IV. OPERATIONS IN 1994

1994 was a very busy year for Central Command leaders and Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines. Principal operations were as follows:


### A. MARITIME INTERCEPT OPERATIONS

Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) enforcing United Nations Sanctions against Iraq continued through 1994. The sanctions provide for an embargo of certain goods destined for Iraq until it complies with a series of UN Security Council resolutions addressing weapons of mass destruction and other issues stemming from the Gulf War. MIO is being conducted by multinational naval forces which patrol assigned areas and monitor, query, board and inspect if necessary those vessels which are suspected of violating UN sanctions. Since the inception of MIO in 1990, more than 21,500 ships have been challenged and over 9,700 merchant vessels have been boarded and inspected. Warships from the United States, France, and the United Kingdom participated in the 1994 operations in the North Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf.

Maritime Intercept Operations underwent significant changes during 1994. In September, 1994, North Red Sea UN Sanction Enforcement Operations shifted from "at-sea" to "shore-based" inspections.

Inspection responsibility was shifted by contract from the UN to Lloyds' Register of London. Additionally, at-sea command of MIO forces shifted from the U.S. Coast Guard back to the U.S. Navy, with the primary area of responsibility moving to the Arabian Gulf. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) continue to remain aboard Navy ships enforcing the sanctions.

MIO continued in the North Arabian Gulf, after being reinstated in 1993 when vessels resumed using Umm Qasr in Iraq as a shipping port. The reopening of Umm Qasr was permitted to allow Iraq to remove merchant ships stranded in the Shatt al-Arab waterway since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. North Arabian Gulf MIO resumed to ensure no contraband was moved in or out of Iraq during this process. Since 1993, a total of 22 vessels have been removed from the Shatt al-Arab, and 133 vessels overall have been intercepted in the Arabian Gulf. A total of 28 merchant vessels laden with food stuffs and bound for Umm Qasr have been boarded and searched. In March 1994, one vessel attempted to export unauthorized foodstuffs from Umm Qasr but was intercepted and diverted by MIO forces. In October 1994, two merchant tankers suspected of transporting Iraqi oil in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions were diverted to ports in GCC states.



**KATERINA P AND OTHER VIOLATORS WERE DIVERTED**

OPERATIONS IN 1994

**B. OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH**

Since the end of the Gulf War, Iraq has aggressively tried to suppress the Kurds in northern Iraq and Marsh Arabs in the south. Saddam Hussein has directed major division-level counterinsurgency operations against the population in the marshes northwest of Basra. Brigade-sized ground and air forces using combined arms tactics carried out search and destroy operations. Additionally, large-scale engineering efforts have been used to divert waters away from the marshlands to facilitate combat operations.


In response to these developments, the United Nations Security Council in 1992 passed Resolution 688 condemning Iraq's repression of its civilian population. To allow monitoring of compliance with Resolution 688, an Iraqi no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel was established. Named Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, the coalition effort to enforce that ban against both military and civilian Iraqi aircraft in the no-fly zone, as well as any surface-to-air weapons presenting a threat to aircraft conducting the monitoring mission has been in operation since August 1992. The United States, France, United Kingdom, and others have contributed forces or support for SOUTHERN WATCH.

Although Iraq challenged the no-fly zone several times in 1992 and 1993, the first nine months of 1994 passed without incident. Two no-fly-zone violations were noted below the 32nd parallel in January 1994, but both were suspected to be unintentional violations. Due to the relative calm in the Operation SOUTHERN WATCH area, Joint Task Force - South West Asia (JTF-SWA) began a force drawdown in February 1994, with the redeployment of 49th Fighter Wing and other USCENAF assets to CONUS from Khamis Mushiat, Saudi Arabia. The operation consisted of a four-phased redeployment of personnel and

equipment, and involved the movement in February of 8 F-117's, approximately 300 personnel, and 958 short tons of equipment to home stations in the United States. In March, JTF-SWA continued the drawdown of forces in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH by redeploying 3 F-16, 3 F-15E, and 3 F-15C aircraft from Dhahran, Saudi Arabia to the United States.

In May, the NCA directed USCINCENT to provide military airlift support for non-combatant evacuation operations of U.S. citizens and designated third country nationals from Yemen. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH forces participated in this operation. Forces, which operated out of Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, included 1 C-21 aircraft, 4 C-130 aircraft, 2 C-141 aircraft, 1 E-3 AWACS aircraft, 1 RC-135 RIVET JOINT aircraft, and 4 KC-135 tanker aircraft. A total of 630 personnel were evacuated from Yemen during the 7-9 May operation.

SOUTHERN WATCH operations continued without incident until October, 1994, when Iraq began troop movements south towards Kuwait, prompting U.S. and coalition forces to react with force deployments into theater under Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR.



NO-FLY ZONES OVER IRAQ

### **C. OPERATION VIGILANT WARRIOR**

In response to the threat of Iraqi aggression and associated troop movements in Southern Iraq, USCINCCENT in early October deployed forces to the Central Region for Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. By late October, USCENTCOM had deployed over 28,000 U.S. troops and over 200 additional aircraft into the region. The aircraft were based throughout the region in the UAE, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The French and British also deployed fighter, reconnaissance, and tanker aircraft in support of VIGILANT WARRIOR operations. The operation included two brigades of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Marine and Army maritime prepositioned forces, over 300 U.S. and coalition aircraft and over 20 U.S. and coalition naval combatants. Of special note, USCINCCENT, a USCENTCOM Headquarters element, and Component Commanders and staffs deployed to the AOR for the first time

since Operation DESERT STORM to provide command and control of these forces and to emphasize U.S. resolve to counter Iraqi aggression.

On 15 October 1994, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 949 condemning Iraqi aggression and demanding Iraq withdraw its forces back to their 20 September positions and prohibiting further enhancement of military capabilities in southern Iraq. On 20 October, the U.S. Government presented a demarche to Iraq outlining U.S. policy concerning enforcement of UNSCR 949.


The Iraqi regime backed away from this determined response, and based upon confirmation of the redeployment of Iraqi forces north of the 32nd parallel, in early November SECDEF authorized redeployment of U.S. forces considered excess to the emerging mission and reduced threat.



TRAINING CONDUCTED DURING VIGILANT WARRIOR

OPERATIONS IN 1994

This crisis reaffirmed the value of USCENTCOM prepositioning programs. U.S. Army forces were able to fall in on prepositioned stocks in Kuwait City and deploy to defensive positions in Southern Kuwait in time to bolster Kuwaiti defenses. Marine Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS) were again used and U.S. Army maritime prepositioned assets were operationally employed for the first time.



PATRIOT MISSILE SITE

The Kuwaiti military deployed four brigades to defend its border with Iraq while the government called up its reserve forces in an effort to bolster defensive operations. The UAE responded to Kuwaiti requests for assistance by deploying a mechanized infantry battalion to Southern Kuwait. These forces, along with an infantry battalion from the United Kingdom, presented a formidable coalition ground response to the Iraqi threat. As Iraq began to pull back its Republican Guard units north of the 32nd parallel, coalition forces conducted joint and combined maneuver training designed to further enhance operations and interoperability. On 2 November, coalition and U.S. forces began the process of redeployment back to home stations.

During VIGILANT WARRIOR, USCINCCENT deployed Patriot air defense personnel from Ft Polk, LA, to place into operation the two off-line batteries in Riyadh and Dhahran. USCINCCENT concurrently ordered the relocation of a Patriot battery from Dhahran to Kuwait City in order to provide air defense coverage of key facilities in Kuwait.

VIGILANT WARRIOR provided an excellent opportunity for Army and Marine forces to exercise land based and afloat prepositioned stocks. Prepositioned equipment in the area of operations allowed

the U.S. to maximize strategic lift assets and limited deployment response time.

#### D. AIR DEFENSE/PATRIOT DEPLOYMENT

In 1994, USCENTCOM continued its commitment to regional stability in the Arabian Peninsula by maintaining a theater missile defense umbrella with the Patriot Air Defense System in Saudi Arabia. Four on-line and two off-line batteries (ready reserve storage) were deployed to Saudi Arabia throughout the year. Air defense units from the U.S. routinely conduct no-notice deployments to bring off-line batteries to operational status and to demonstrate our ability to respond to heightened tensions in the area. The Patriot deployments provide opportunities for interoperability training and promotes initiatives in collective air defense among regional security partners. In October 1994, during VIGILANT WARRIOR, the ability to react quickly to a crisis in the AOR was demonstrated by the rapid deployment of air defense personnel from CONUS to activate the off-line batteries. These two batteries were fully operational in a matter of days and one of these batteries was repositioned to Kuwait during Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR.

**E. SUPPORT TO UNOSOM II**

USCINCCENT completed its military support to UNOSOM II with the final withdrawal of U.S. forces on 25 March 1994. The Somalia United States Liaison Office (USLO) remained in Mogadishu in an attempt to further the political reconciliation process in Somalia. Security for the USLO was provided by a Fleet Antiterrorist Support Team (FAST) platoon from the Marine Corps Security Force Battalion. Because of rising tensions and increasing interclan fighting in and around Mogedishu, the USLO and FAST platoon relocated to Nairobi and Mombasa, Kenya, respectively, on 15 September 1994. The FAST platoon redeployed to home station on 18 September.

In late 1994 the President announced his decision that U.S. forces would assist in the withdrawal of UNOSOM forces from Somalia. U.S. Central Command then conducted extensive planning with UN representatives to support the final phases of the UNOSOM II withdrawal from Somalia in February and March 1995.

**F. EXERCISE PROGRAM**

In 1994, the U.S. Central Command's Combined Exercise Program continued to demonstrate our strong commitment to this important pillar of our strategy. The program included a total of 71 exercises completed in 13 of the 19 AOR countries. Naval forces present in the AOR accounted for 54 of these exercises. These included amphibious, Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), surface, air, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and SEAL exercises. There were also numerous special operations forces (SOF), Air Force, Army, and Command Post exercises conducted, and Exercise Related Construction (ERC) projects completed.

A significant improvement over the 1993 program was the shift to joint force exercises in several AOR countries. Each of these joint force exercises included a joint force commander and staff with a full range of joint forces. These joint exercises are critical not only for improving the effectiveness of the host nation's military effort, but also for establishing a common military architecture that will ensure better military coalition efforts in future military operations.



**FAST MARINE PROVIDING SECURITY**

Our exercise program ensures invaluable training for our regional security partners, as well as our own troops, by enhancing coalition interoperability and providing participants advanced scenarios and operations. Vast distances from the U.S. to the Central Region make it important to exercise the deployment and redeployment capabilities of our forces. The employment of afloat prepositioned equipment during Exercise NATIVE FURY clearly demonstrated

## OPERATIONS IN ISRA

our readiness and mobility. It showed our friends and potential aggressors alike that we possess an unmatched rapid deployment and off-load capability. The INTRINSIC ACTION ground exercise in Kuwait similarly illustrated the quick response capability of our ground troops to fall in on prepositioned equipment ashore. Our quick, successful response to the latest threat of Iraqi aggression can be directly attributed to actions planned and rehearsed during previous exercise activity.

A key part of the Combined Exercise Program is the involvement in multilateral coalition building exercises such as ULTIMATE RESOLVE, a multinational command post exercise that examines defense matters of concern to the Gulf Cooperation Council nations and our Gulf War western partners.

Complementing the exercises conducted by our conventional units are those involving special operations forces. They cover a wide variety of skills and take place in countries across the AOR. Of special interest are those which share medical expertise with locals having limited knowledge in that area, and those which deal with training host-nation personnel in demining operations to clear away reminders of civil wars and other internal fighting. In 1994 extensive plans were made for such demining training in Eritrea and Ethiopia. Actual exercise activity is scheduled to commence in early 1995.

As the U.S. Armed Forces continue to downsize, our success in major operations will become increasingly dependent on coalition warfare. As such, combined exercises, perennially a high priority in USCENTCOM, have taken on even greater



**EXERCISES ENSURE INVALUABLE TRAINING FOR OUR REGIONAL SECURITY PARTNERS**

importance, making their sustained funding essential. Specifically, adequate funding to cover operations and maintenance accounts and strategic lift in support of exercises is necessary for the program to fully meet our contingency planning requirements. Such funding is critical to allow us to remain engaged at current levels and to capitalize on new opportunities as they arise.

#### G. SUMMARY

USCENTCOM continued to maintain an intense tempo of operations during 1994, as the Central Region attracted international attention repeatedly during the year, including October when Iraq massed Republican Guard forces near the Kuwaiti border. In response, we rapidly deployed air, ground, and naval forces to the region in Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, and had plans to deploy additional formidable forces to counter the Iraqi threat, to demonstrate U.S. resolve to defend vital areas and to respond to threats to our friends. As a part of this operation, we deployed portions of the USCENTCOM and all Component headquarters to the region to enhance our deployability and warfighting ability.

Although operational commitments placed great demands on U.S. forces in the Central Region, we also accomplished our ambitious goals for joint and combined exercises. The program continued to grow in frequency of exercises and complexity of scenarios. We continue to expand our efforts to organize trilateral and multilateral exercises, to the benefit of our own forces as well as those of our regional security partners.



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## V. CONCLUSION

In 1994, the Central Region was the scene of further U.S. efforts in Somalia and a renewed challenge by Saddam Hussein which elicited military action by the United States and coalition partners. Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, the deployment of forces to counter Iraq's threatening actions, reinforced the fact that the Central Command's AOR is one of the overseas areas most likely to become the scene of a regional conflict. Maintaining stability and preserving the free flow of oil and other commerce through this vital region will become ever more critical as the world grows more economically interdependent.

Challenges to this stability can be expected to persist in the future. These will likely include military adventurism, ethnic and religious rivalries, and natural disasters. To meet these challenges we must actively promote regional stability through forward presence, combined exercises, and security assistance. By so doing, we encourage our regional partners to meet their own legitimate defense needs, while demonstrating to friends and potential adversaries alike that we remain committed to act when needed to protect the vital interests of the United States.







TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 1995.

**COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC  
COMMAND**

**WITNESS**

**GEN. JOHN J. SHEEHAN, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC,  
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC COMMAND, U.S.  
MARINE CORPS**

**INTRODUCTION**

Mr. YOUNG. The Committee will come to order.

This afternoon the Committee welcomes General John Sheehan, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command. The Atlantic Command is important during wartime because the Atlantic Ocean is a vital link to the major overseas theaters. In addition, the Atlantic Command is important during peacetime.

Following your reorganization in 1993, the Command now has day-to-day supervision of over 80 percent of the entire Active Force structure and most of the conventional forces based in the Continental United States. You must ensure these forces are combat ready and can function well in joint military operations.

The Atlantic Command recently played a major role in both Haiti and Cuba operations. The Atlantic Command also plays a key role in developing modern technologies, such as defending Navy ships from advanced anti-ship cruise missile attacks, which is a major initiative of the Committee.

Welcome, General, and we look forward to your testimony today. Your complete written statement and your biography will be included in the record.

The hearing today, pursuant to an earlier vote, is conducted in executive session due to the classification of some of the material to be discussed. We will be happy to hear from you and your entire statement will be placed in the record.

**SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL SHEEHAN**

General SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be here this afternoon. I am not going to go over my testimony. I would like to focus on four kinds of areas that I am concerned about. First, and second are the ongoing operations in Haiti and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and third and fourth are where we are in the readiness business with U.S. forces that we have in the United States today, what it is going to look like 60 days from now, and where we are going to be in the year 2000, 2005.

In terms of where we are in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and also in Haiti, I think the performance of U.S. forces there has been exemplary. I think the American people could not be prouder of what

those kids have done under very, very trying circumstances. We are on track with a transition to the U.N. at the end of March, at which point, we will have a little over 250 troops in Haiti under the U.S. control of Major General Joe Kinser, a U.S. officer, although working under U.N. mandate.

In Cuba, we are working on getting Cubans repatriated at a rate of about 170 every other day. My major concern is that by mid-July we will be down to some 20,000 Cubans for which there is no exit strategy, and we will have some 6,000 U.S. forces tied up there.

This has an impact on the readiness of the U.S. forces, because without the Supplemental that has been talked about for over 2 months, if we don't get a Supplemental by July 1, we will be forced to shut U.S. forces down in CONUS starting with the U.S. Forces Command.

My major concern is the budget that is being presented. Clearly, there is no recapitalization for the future. It is not the big things, it is the trucks, the light-armored vehicles, and the artillery pieces that will be required to be replaced after the year 2000 that I am concerned about.

Those are my four major concerns, and I am prepared to answer questions now, sir. I will submit my formal statement.

[The statement of General Sheehan follows:]

**For Release Only By The  
House Appropriations Committee  
National Security Subcommittee**

***Statement of  
General John J. Sheehan  
Commander In Chief  
United States Atlantic Command***



***Before the  
House Appropriations Committee  
National Security Subcommittee  
7 March 1995***

**For Release Only By The  
House Appropriations Committee  
National Security Subcommittee**



**General John J. Sheehan**  
**United States Marine Corps**

**Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic  
 (SACLANT)**

**Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command  
 (USACOM)**

General John J. Sheehan was born on August 23, 1940, in Somerville, Massachusetts and graduated with a B.A. degree in English from Boston College in June 1962. After graduation, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps. He holds an M.S. degree from Georgetown University in Government.

He has served in various command positions ranging from company commander to brigade commander in both the Atlantic and Pacific theater of operations. General Sheehan's combat tours include duty in Vietnam and Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

His Staff positions include duties as regimental, division, and service headquarters staff officer as well as joint duty with the U.S. Army, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the U.S. Atlantic Command.

Prior to assuming his current duties as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command on 31 October 1994, General Sheehan served as Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.

His professional education includes the Amphibious Warfare School, Naval Command and Staff College, and National War College.

His decorations and medals include: the Defense Distinguished Service Medal; Silver Star Medal; Defense Superior Service Medal; Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V" and gold star in lieu of a second award; Purple Heart with gold star; the Defense Meritorious Service Medal; Meritorious Service Medal; Army Commendation Medal; Navy Achievement Medal; Combat Action Ribbon; Presidential Unit Citation; Navy Unit Commendation; National Defense Service Medal with one bronze star; Vietnam Service Medal; Southwest Asia Service Medal with two bronze stars; Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with silver star; and the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Honor (First Class).

General Sheehan is married to the former Margaret M. Sullivan of Boston, Massachusetts. They have four children: Kristen, Catherine, Karen, and John.



**Remarks by  
General John J. Sheehan, U.S.  
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic  
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command**



**Before the House Appropriations Committee  
National Security Subcommittee  
February 1995**

**Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. My prepared statement provides a brief threat assessment, reviews Atlantic theater issues - - including an assessment of ongoing operations in Haiti and Cuba, highlights the command's strategic goals, talks about USACOM's role as the joint force capabilities integrator and trainer, discusses ACOM in the context of its juxtaposition with the headquarters of the NATO Allied Command Atlantic, and concludes with a few comments on readiness and budget issues.**

**As you recall, as part of the 1993 reorganization of the Unified Command Plan, USACOM now bridges military capabilities across the continental United States with the Air Forces's Air Combat Command, Army's Forces Command, Marine Corps' Marine Forces Atlantic, and Navy's Atlantic Fleet serving as its service components. As a result, USACOM has Combatant Command (COCOM) of over 80% of the active force structure.**

**CINCUSACOM retains Combatant Commander responsibilities within its assigned Atlantic Area Of Responsibility (AOR) – the Atlantic bridge to Europe, the southern hemisphere and beyond. Concurrently, command of NATO's Allied Command Atlantic has been retained, as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), reinforcing the Alliance with the joint capability of CONUS forces.**

#### RESPONSIBILITIES

- Atlantic Area of Responsibility
- Joint Force Packaging
- Joint Force Training
- Assist in Joint Doctrine Development
- Counter Drug Operations
- MSCA/MACDIS CONUS Operations
- Land Defense of CONUS/CANUS

**The command's newest mission – *Provide joint trained and ready military forces where needed throughout the world in support of Atlantic theater and forward CINC requirements, and insure those forces are trained as joint units capable of carrying out their assigned tasks* – is its most challenging task.**

**Other additional and enhanced missions require:**

• **Identifying , training, and facilitating deployment of joint force packages in support of peacetime presence, contingency response, peacekeeping, or humanitarian assistance operations;**

• **Developing a joint training program for and providing Military Support to Civilian Authorities and Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances within the 48 contiguous states, the District of Columbia, and the geographic**

**AOR;**

- **Planning for the land defense of CONUS and combined Canada - United States defense of Canada (CANUS);**
  
- **Providing forces for worldwide strategic and theater reconnaissance;**  
and
  
- **Planning for and conducting counter-drug operations in support of U.S. Law Enforcement agencies.**

### *Threat Assessment*

**USACOM must prepare its forces to respond to a wide array of challenges in both the Atlantic AOR, and the AORs of the forward Unified CINCs.**

**The challenges in USACOM's AOR include political instability, primarily in Cuba, continued narcotics trafficking through the Caribbean, and the reality of a significant maritime capability by the Russian Northern Fleet in the North Atlantic. Excepting Russian naval capability, the scenarios of challenge to U.S. national security in the Atlantic AOR fall into the lower end of the conflict spectrum.**



Since our primary focus is to train U.S.-based forces for joint and combined operations outside of USACOM's AOR, we maintain acute awareness about the threats facing the forward unified CINCs. These threats cover a wide assortment of potential crises from political instability to Major Regional Conflicts similar to Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Finally, there are significant non-traditional challenges and threats such as the proliferation of advanced weapons world-wide, and growing potential for mass migration of the economically, socially and politically deprived.

### **Regional Update**

USACOM's first year of existence set a standard for joint operations. The success of combined and multi-agency operations in Haiti and migrant operations in Cuba met or exceeded expectations. We are continuing to build on that strong foundation.

#### **Haiti**

Commencing with the mid-1993 Governor's Island formula for restoration of the duly elected government of Haiti, and subsequent United Nations Security Council resolution, U.S. forces have led a coalition of nations in the enforcement of economic sanctions against the illegitimate Cedras-Francios-Biamby regime, and humanitarian assistance to the thousands that

**fled. U.S. forces were introduced into the country of Haiti, in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 940, on 19 September 1994 as part of Operation Uphold Democracy. The purpose of this interdiction was to restore the democratically elected government of President Aristide and provide for a mechanism to assist in sustaining a secure and stable environment to allow for democracy to sustain itself in this long deprived nation, and reduce the flow of Haitians leaving in unsafe boats in an attempt to reach the United States. This operation is the best case study to date in the execution of a multi-service, multi-agency and multi-national synchronous operation. Forces of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Coast Guard, non-military elements of U.S. government and state agencies and, a Multinational military and police force, and a host of international non-government and private volunteer organizations all contributed unique capabilities.**

**On 15 October 1994, President Aristide returned to Haiti and began the process of reestablishing his legitimate government. U.S. military force levels in support of this operation have been reduced based on operational requirements from a high of 20,000 to currently less than 6000. We have been careful to rotate personnel and units in an effort to be conscientious to the morale of our people and readiness of our units. Currently, MG Fisher, Commander, 25th Inf Div (L) commands the Multinational Force (MNF) in Haiti. At present:**

- MNF Haiti continues to contribute to the secure and stable environment in Haiti.**

- **The U.S. contribution to MNF Haiti is approximately 6,000 personnel.**

• **International presence in MNF Haiti totals approximately 2500 personnel. Forces from around the world have and continue to contribute – to name but a few – Bangladesh, Guatemala, Poland and for the first time in such an operation a battalion of soldiers from the Caribbean Island nations operating under one commander.**

• **International Police Monitors from eighteen nations representing all continents, total 1029 personnel.**

• **Weapons confiscation and buy back programs have netted in excess of 29,000 weapons – from artillery to small caliber weapons.**

• **USACOM, MNF Haiti and United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) staffs continue to plan the MNF Haiti transition to UNMIH. MG Joseph Kinzer, USA, has been designated Commander, UNMIH and Commander, U.S. Forces Haiti. The United Nations Security Council established 31 March 1995 as the date for this transition.**

• **An agreement has been reached between the UN and DoD on the composition of the U.S. contingent to UNMIH. Total U.S. strength will not exceed 2400 personnel.**

Cuba

**No longer a significant military threat, economic decline and political oppression increase the prospect of illegal mass migration and regime threatening civil unrest. Since the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the political system and economic infrastructure of Cuba have significantly deteriorated, a situation that will only further increase in seriousness and import for the United States in the remaining years of this century.**

**This continuing decline of the economy in Castro's Cuba, coupled with Castro's array of tactics to get international attention, continue to encourage migration by any means for Cubans seeking relief. The Cuban migrant challenge in 1994 was the largest since the Mariel boat lift of 1980. Concurrent with the migrant flow from Haiti, the Cuban migration severely stressed facilities at Naval Base Guantanamo Bay. A Joint Task Force (JTF), JTF 160, was established at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to support relief and migrant processing centers for migrants of both countries.**

**We continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Haitian and Cuban migrants at Guantanamo Bay in coordination with designated Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs), and in support of other U.S. government agencies. Almost all of the Haitian migrants have been repatriated, while over 20,000 Cuban migrants are still being cared for. JTF 160 provides:**

- **reception, housing, subsistence facilities and medical care for migrants;**

- safety for U.S. personnel;

- coordination with appropriate agencies to provide support for the screening, processing, paroling and movement of selected migrants to CONUS and other designated locations; and

- to optimize the Quality of Life of all migrants both in the interim and long term.

To the maximum extent possible, Cuban migrant and Haitian migrant participation in and contributions to camp administration and support has been encouraged.

In addition to the more than 6,300 U.S. military personnel, there are approximately 187 civilian personnel supporting migrant operations in Guantanamo Bay. They represent various U.S. government agencies, NGOs and PVOs. Examples of these organizations are Department of State, Immigration and Naturalization Service, International Organization on Migration, Community Resources Services, U.S. Public Health Service, United Nations High Commission on Refugees, World Relief Council and the International Red Cross.

While we are at a sustainable steady state for the moment, the favorable and peaceful resolution of this situation will only occur with the end of totalitarian rule in Cuba.

## Command Strategic Goals

Our primary objective is to sustain and improve the readiness of military forces based in the continental U.S. We are planning, training, organizing, exercising, rehearsing and deploying units and individuals capable of operating in a joint environment. Our standards are the joint mission essential tasks (JMET), by which USACOM, the combatant commanders and the joint staff identify critical tasks, conditions, and standards required of our forces.

### 1995 Goals

- Sustain and improve readiness of CONUS Forces
- Add value to JMET concept
- Energize JTASC
- Sustain competitive edge in combat multipliers
- Improve multi-national readiness
- Integrate capabilities of Non-DoD agencies
- Support DoD and Joint Services Planning and Acquisition Process

The key to the training concept is a three tier approach. The Tier One foundation is service training, where soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coast guardsmen attain their core competencies. In Tier Two our focus is on achieving service and joint mission essential task standards at the tactical level. It is field training of forces; bringing together units from all four components on the ground, in the air, and at sea to rehearse those unit level, joint tasks that would be required of them in wartime. It is at the third level of training where value is added to achieving joint operational readiness. At this level, USACOM combines simulation and computer-assisted decision making

to train JTF commanders and their staffs more efficiently. The seamless functioning of this three tier formula is key to improving joint readiness.

USACOM's centerpiece for component joint task force operations, planning and staff readiness is the new Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC). On track to become one of the world's premier centers of next-generation computer modeling and simulation, the JTASC will provide the mechanism by which we can train JTF commanders and their staffs without the expenditure of massive resources normally associated with large field training exercises.

The next USACOM goal is to sustain America's competitive edge in combat multipliers. These include strategic lift; logistic agility; technological advantage; and command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C<sup>4</sup>I) interoperability.

With the CINCUSACOM dual-hatted as the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, USACOM is in a unique position to influence multinational operational readiness. In this light, the command will pursue leveraging the existing infrastructure of NATO and friendly nations in exercising the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept and encourage other nations to participate in planning and exercising regional or coalition response.

Next, the command will continue to cultivate interagency relationships and cooperative knowledge that can be capitalized upon in contingency planning

**execution.** We also want to factor in non-DoD agencies, non-government organizations, private volunteers and private sector capabilities in all appropriate JTF plans and exercises.

Finally, USACOM will **actively support the Department of Defense and Joint services program planning and acquisition process.** This will be accomplished by active participation in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process, drafting Joint Mission Needs Statements for Future Oriented Missions, and developing integrated priority lists.

### **Forces and Capabilities**

America has a superior competitive advantage in military capability -- led and operated by the most dedicated and highly skilled military personnel in the world. A declining resource base need not tear at the coherency of this capability nor at the morale of our people. A significant part of the answer to ensuring the capability and readiness of our military capability to defend against future challenges is keeping pace with the technology, management and leadership skills available in this new age. We must invest in what our instinct tells us will work in the future, not necessarily in what we planned to employ in the past.

Given this requirement, USACOM's charter is to retain and evolve the readiness of CONUS based forces, and maintain our ability to respond to



contingencies while continuing to reduce force structure to the levels specified in the Bottom-Up Review. We are doing this by leveraging technology and joint training to maintain forward readiness. The key is seamless interaction between the supported and supporting CINCs across the spectrum of U.S. military capability.

Historically, we have responded to theater requirements from a threat-oriented perspective with fixed combinations of forward stationed forces and standard augmentation/reinforcement packages. From our current response orientation, we are moving toward capability-based planning. Trained and ready joint forces, trained to theater CINC Joint Mission Essential Tasks will be ready and provide a menu of options from which theater commanders may select suitable joint capability in response to current and projected scenarios. These joint forces will be capable of deploying on short notice to meet requirements in any theater. The concept of tailoring and training joint forces in CONUS for worldwide applications will continue to evolve as we restructure to meet the challenges of the new security environment.

### **Readiness and Budget**

A visit to USACOM or its components would demonstrate that we have the highest quality military force our Nation has ever fielded. Our components are capable of executing the missions required of them. However, to examine the issue of readiness, one must look at three indicators.

**First, the current readiness system only measures static metrics. It does not measure joint readiness, nor is it predictive in nature. DoD is doing a great deal of work in this area. USACOM's approach to joint training will help satisfy the development of a methodology to apply indices or indicators on joint readiness. Readiness should not be characterized solely by static measurements of on-shelf supplies. Readiness should be determined also by the ability to effectively assemble, train, and employ the capabilities of units and subunits of potential joint task force configurations.**

**USACOM stands in a unique position to advance joint unit readiness status even further, as we implement the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Exercise and Scheduling Program.**

**Of near-term concern is the adverse impact of unprogrammed contingency operations on readiness. Because supplemental funding of contingency operations remains uncertain and untimely, too often USACOM components absorb contingency costs through drawing down Operations and Maintenance (O&M) fund accounts, resulting in lost training opportunities and declines in force readiness. When supplemental funding arrives, it is often too late to recapture these training opportunities and restoration of readiness levels may be too late if unanticipated force demands must be satisfied.**

**In addressing this problem we must first rapidly pass this year's emergency supplemental to restore depleted O&M accounts in all USACOM components. Subsequently, we need to develop a new funding mechanism and additional fiscal authority to preserve funds for readiness and accelerate the**

reimbursement of the services for other funds expended on contingency operations.

Finally, we must devise a re-capitalization process that will allow all the services to procure required systems for the future. The proposed FY 96 DoD Budget is a step in the right direction.

### Conclusion

The Bottom-Up Review force levels provide adequate future force structure provided we adopt efforts to employ and deploy capability relevant to our national security objectives, provide BUR specified force enhancements, better joint training, and provide requested funding to achieve more capable combat forces.

Our war fighting capabilities and doctrine must be melded to optimize efficiency.

Advanced technology, however impressive, serves only as a force multiplier. It cannot substitute for forces. Meeting future operational demands will still require the capabilities inherent in our performance platforms, our fleets, our air wings, our amphibious and land maneuver forces, and the manpower needed to operate these performance platforms.

America's security is based on the quality of our armed forces – keeping

**our personnel and equipment ready. Most importantly, we must provide for our people with adequate compensation, quality of life programs, and some measure of career stability.**

**In closing, joint training has been and will continue to be a major focus of our readiness efforts at USACOM. As we move into the 21st century and continue to face a changing national security environment, our ability to maintain readiness at the joint level will become the linchpin of our ability to field a credible and affordable military presence worldwide.**

Mr. YOUNG. General, I had a brief opening statement. I would like to yield to Mr. Murtha for any statement he would like to make and questions that he has.

#### HAITI AND GUANTANAMO BAY

Mr. MURTHA. I saw the CNN article on Haiti. I was one of the few people that advocated going into Haiti since I felt it was in our hemisphere and something we ought to do. I am concerned about the impact of a Supplemental that is offset because I know that doesn't help us the way it should. I know that most Members of this Committee feel the same way. Unfortunately, we haven't been able to convince the majority of the Members.

Let me say how proud I am of the way the military handled a very difficult situation. Very few people would appreciate the delicacy of handling a crowd when you have rioting going on, or a near riot, and your troops have to stand back and the news media is criticizing you for not intervening. People have forgotten how well it was handled.

On top of it, you have people in Washington saying that you shouldn't allow this to happen, and yet, if you intervene, you become the enemy, like we did in Somalia. I have said over and over again to audiences all over the country, how adept and how well the military handled this very, very delicate situation with real expertise, and I think the CNN article, or whatever you call it on TV, did a magnificent job in portraying the way our folks have adapted to this very difficult situation.

I am glad you are getting them out, because I know you can't withdraw prematurely. But I think it is absolutely necessary that we don't prolong our stay. It was entirely different in Somalia, but there is a time to get out, and I am glad to see it turned over to the U.N.

I applaud your work and the work the troops have done. I have been looking at a number of scenarios, and I saw the article in the paper today about housing. Of course, the Chairman and all the Members of this Committee have been concerned about readiness from the standpoint of quality of life for the troops, and I assume with this money we are spending in Guantanamo, the money we are spending in Haiti being reprogrammed, it is going to cause future deterioration of quality of life.

General SHEEHAN. Absolutely, sir. It is costing us about a million dollars a day in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and about \$1.3 million per day in Haiti, all coming out of Operation and Maintenance, O&M dollars. General Dennis Reimer, who is the Forces Command Commander and who you were visiting, I believe, is absorbing most of these costs out of his O&M dollars, and he can only spend 40 cents on the dollar that he receives for fixing up his post and stations. So what you see is a gradual deterioration, and if the money comes in terms of the Supplemental through reprogrammings, then all you are doing is just pushing the bow wave out to the future.

Mr. MURTHA. I don't know that we will be able to convince the majority in the House and Senate. We have always been able to get it through the House, and then with the Senate, we had to argue because they tried to offset everything. We made a compromise usually and got the extra money.

The danger with a Balanced Budget Amendment is the fact that it will eventually affect the military substantially, and I think that is what is happening when we are starting to see erosion of our readiness, because the money is just not available. I know it is the mood of the country and we have to be concerned about that, but this Committee has done everything it could to help alleviate that situation.

I just wanted to applaud your work and the work of the military in Haiti. It is almost as if they have been forgotten and people don't appreciate how much they did. But we are not replenishing it. Even after the majority of Congress voted—probably the Members of this Committee didn't vote for what I consider the reauthorization, which was nearly a resolution.

I wish we could find a way to replenish the money. I hope with the leadership of the Chairman we will be able to find a way not to offset that money.

Thank you.

#### FISCAL YEAR 1995 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much.

General, you mentioned that we have been talking about the Supplemental for a long time, and that is true. I recall back in 1994, the latter part of the year, we were talking about the Supplemental and this Committee tends to be a doing Committee rather than a talking Committee. When we failed to get the Supplemental request officially, we marked up the Supplemental anyway, based on the figures that we had gotten from DOD.

In the bill that we passed for Haiti, we funded \$594.6 million for Haiti. The Senate version of the Supplemental reduced that to \$433.8 million. They cut \$62 million for United Nations reimbursement, \$60 million for logistical contract services, \$37 million for Guard and Reserve pay offsets, and \$1.8 million for procurement cuts. If their number were to stay through conference, what would be the effect?

General SHEEHAN. As I said, the real issue is that both Haiti and Guantanamo are both expending, roughly, a million dollars a day to do these types of activities. That is coming out of Service budgets.

In the case of the Army, on 1 July, III corps, for example, at Fort Hood, Texas, will stop driving tanks. I will start tying up ships in the Atlantic Fleet in mid-July, except for these Marine Forces that are required in the European theater and those ships that are required in the European theater.

We will start shutting them down. They won't conduct any training. As this continues, also ACC, Air Combat Command, that owns all of the air forces, will start doing the same thing, and you will see a degradation of joint training and individual training.

#### HAITI TRANSITION TO U.N. COMMAND

Mr. YOUNG. The statement by Mr. Murtha indicating that he supported the effort in Haiti, I was one that did not. However, I believe the U.S. forces conducted themselves in a tremendous fashion. I think they deserve all kinds of credit for the good job that they have done.

But I notice in your statement that the command on the Haiti mission will transition from the U.S. commanders and the U.S. troops to the U.N. Security Council. How confident are you that the U.N. will be able to sustain the advances that U.S. forces have made in Haiti?

General SHEEHAN. I was just in Haiti this weekend going over the transition with General Kinser, who is the U.N. Commander and the U.S. Commander, and I also met with the U.N. staff. There is a U.S. officer, for example, who is the Director for Operations, and there is a Dutch Marine, who is Assistant Operations Logistics Officer.

From a technical and a tactical perspective, I think we will have sufficient forces down there, there is, roughly, about 70 percent of the U.N. forces down there. They will just take kevlar helmets off and put blue helmets on. So from a security perspective, I think they will be able to maintain the security situation in Haiti through elections in February and March 1996.

I think the real key to the future of Haiti is international investment. It is not going to be the rifleman on the street, because he can only do so much. It is the international community's willingness to invest to put the Haitian people back to work. The Haitians have to establish the departments of governance that really work.

The Justice Department has got to work. The jails have to work. I think that is the \$64,000 question between the time of the transition at the end of February and March of 1996. I think Haiti has a chance. I think the U.S. has done a tremendous job in terms of restoration of democracy but it is time for the Haitians to carry their share of the burden and bring this to closure.

Mr. YOUNG. How long do you think the transition period will be?

General SHEEHAN. On 31 March, we intend to have a ceremony. I intend to go there to make sure that the flag is passed and that the U.N. assumes its responsibility, as indicated.

#### COSTS OF HAITI OPERATION

Mr. YOUNG. The Supplemental funding that we have appropriated only runs through the end of March. Obviously, we won't be finished by then since the transition is only going to begin then. Where will you get the money to fund the balance of that operation?

General SHEEHAN. O&M dollars out of LANT FLEET, ACC, and Forces Command.

Mr. YOUNG. Are we looking for another Supplemental?

General SHEEHAN. To my knowledge, no, sir. I think there is supplemental to carry us through this fiscal year, although I do not see in the budget any funding to continue Guantanamo Bay past October, and I will tell you now, we are going to be in Guantanamo well past October of this year.

Mr. YOUNG. I think you made the statement that there is no exit strategy from Guantanamo?

General SHEEHAN. That is correct.

Mr. YOUNG. Do you have any idea about the additional cost of Haiti after the March 31st date?

General SHEEHAN. No, sir. The U.S. cost should only be about 30 percent, but I think the cost should be relatively comparable to

what we are paying right now, about a million dollars a day. So, U.S. cost will be a third of that.

I think the real thing, I wish I could give you the answer, is that the Brown and Root contractor that is doing most of the service support for the U.N. will be starting a bridge contract in the June-July time frame, and I don't know what the cost of this is.

They are going to put that in the international market for competitive bidding and the U.N. has not passed a formal budget from which I can get hard numbers. As soon as I gather that information, I will be happy to submit it.

[The information follows:]

U.S. Army's Forces Command (FORSCOM) incurred \$272 million of costs for Haitian operations through the end of March 1995. It anticipates an additional \$80 million of costs for the remainder of fiscal year 1995.

FORSCOM will continue to incur the following costs for U.S. forces: travel and per diem; supplemental rations; food preparation, warehousing and distribution of rations; supplies and maintenance for U.S. forces' helicopters (UH-1s); over ocean transportation and port handling; reconstitution of forces upon redeployment; linguists; local hire for redeployment of forces; Morale Welfare and Recreation support; and the establishment of a central receiving point for U.S. forces' supplies and equipment that flow to Haiti.

What is difficult to estimate are the costs of U.N. requests for additional support that we will receive during the operation. In addition, U.N. estimate of anticipated costs do not include any other requirements, such as humanitarian and civic action projects, to support U.S. interests that may also occur in the future.

Mr. YOUNG. We appreciate that. This Committee added \$670 million over the \$2.5 billion that had been requested from the Pentagon. All of those adds I think are extremely important, but if nothing else, they would make a little extra funding available for such costs as the Haiti operation after March 31st.

When we go to conference on this issue, we will stand very strongly trying to maintain that additional funding, because we recognize that these contingencies are not over just because the Supplemental is working its way through the Congress.

I yield to Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General, the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, CINCLANT—you are a CINC?

General SHEEHAN. I have two jobs. I am Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic in my NATO hat and I am the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command.

Mr. WILSON. Does Bud work for you?

General SHEEHAN. Yes. Admiral William Flanagan is my naval component under my U.S. hat and he also has a NATO hat. He is Commander in Chief, East Atlantic Command or CINCEASTLANT. From an efficiency standpoint, what I am trying to do is merge the two staffs together so I can reduce the overhead and cut down the cost of building a command and control architecture.

Since I have 80 percent of the continental forces, if there is going to be a reinforcing requirement to NATO, I will have to do the planning for it and it seems to me it is common sense to have all the kinds of people that do that stuff in one building.



## MOBILE OFFSHORE BASING

Mr. WILSON. Right. The only thing I know about Guantanamo is that the 12 most miserable weeks of my life were spent there training off two destroyers in the summer.

I would like to ask you about a concept as a Marine General Officer, as well as your current job. Are you familiar with the—I say this over and over because my colleagues only learn by repetition and it takes a lot of repetition for them. Are you familiar with the mobile offshore basing proposal?

General SHEEHAN. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. Would you like me to explain what this is?

Mr. MURTHA. No, I understand.

General SHEEHAN. Actually, the original concept of mobile offshore basing started with U.S. Marine Corps back in the early 1970s, when we tried to build a concept of war at sea that said that you increase the size of your footprint to shore by moving logistic functions onto the beach. It is a huge landing port and security requirement, so we sea-based much of the logistics system from Marine Expeditionary Force, MEF, on board naval vessels, gray hulls, and commercial vessels, and specialized those commercial vessels to do maintenance for aviation aircraft.

The aviation logistics support ship TAVB, for example, is an outgrowth of that concept, that says you can specialize maintenance afloat. That survived for a couple of years and then kind of died because the shipbuilding program in the United States also died. The current version of that is essentially to take, what I would call commercial riggings, out of the Gulf Coast that are movable.

In the vernacular of someone that hangs around the water front it is called guerilla gear, and you can lash those together so you could put habitats on them. The theory is that you can link them together to create an 11,000-foot runway for fixed-wing aircraft or for helicopters and move it at 2 or 3 knots.

Certain parts of the world, such as the Persian Gulf, where you are talking about are prepositioning supplies and equipment, you are going to spend \$35 million on POMCUS-type shelters, so an alternative thought process might be that you buy these barges, preposition the equipment on these barges and then move these barges to where the point of conflict is, albeit at a slow rate.

It is currently under investigation. I have been working with Admiral Owens, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to review this process. I think it holds some promise, but I think we need to examine it a little more before we sign up and say it's the way to go.

Mr. WILSON. I don't think it is necessarily taking over existing barges—I think that it will be new construction, really.

General SHEEHAN. There are variations, but the technology and the thought process has been around since the early 1970s.

Mr. WILSON. But do you generally feel favorably toward the idea?

General SHEEHAN. The only other time we have done this for real, when I was a captain or a major in Vietnam, was at a place called Solid Anchor. We built a mobile platform out of Mike-8s with AM-2 mating and used it to house an infantry battalion and heli-

copters from the Special Mission Marine Air-Ground Task Force, MAGTAF, in South Vietnam.

It turns out that on a long-term basis, your maintenance gets very, very intensive because of exposure to salt air and sea. It turns out also that in the summertime, it gets to be a very hot environment because metal captures heat.

I think that if we really think our way through this and take it on a deliberate basis, it has some applicability. For example, if we used it in the Persian Gulf like we did a couple of years ago doing the tanker reflagging operations, permanently positioning assault forces with helicopter assault capability, for example, Harriers, then I think it has applicability. We need to think through the operational concept and to figure out where that could work.

Mr. WILSON. What Admiral Owens is talking about is five or six together, an 11,000-foot runway, landing C-17s on it.

General SHEEHAN. I would defer to Admiral Owens' concept of the future. From a guy that has lived in both Solid Anchor in South Vietnam in the 1960s, and did seaborne logistics in the early 1970s as a regimental operations officer, I think that we have to go a few more steps before we get to an 11,000-foot runway that will land a C-17. I think it is theoretically possible, but there are a lot of other pieces of that equation that we have to buy off on.

Mr. WILSON. Not a lot of high technology?

General SHEEHAN. No, but articulated barges are a fairly sophisticated concept. As you know, we do that in a Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, JLOTS, process on Maritime Prepositioning Ships, MPS; marry a barge system up to a ramp system on an MPS-type ship. We can only do that in Sea State 3, because of the articulation of the barges and the technical gear that you need to off-load supplies and equipment. So while the theory is there, as well as the technology of the service support and life support systems for a large size force, I think we need to continue thinking our way through.

Mr. WILSON. Very quickly, are you familiar with the LSQC, landing ship quay causeway?

General SHEEHAN. No.

Mr. WILSON. Then I won't bother you with it.

Thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Bonilla.

#### FISCAL YEAR 1995 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

Mr. BONILLA. Good afternoon, General. I would like to start asking about the impact, what the impact would be, in your opinion, on your forces should the Supplemental Appropriations bill that we have already approved in our Committee fails to pass?

General SHEEHAN. As I indicated to the Chairman, if nothing happens by July, U.S. Army Forces in the United States will stop training. By mid to the end of July, I will start tying up ships in the Atlantic Fleet except for those that are required to operate in the Mediterranean and other forward areas, Marine Forces will shut down probably the second week of August, and Air Combat Command—ACC Forces, depending on the type of aircraft, will start shutting down in August also.

Mr. BONILLA. That is one of the most concise, targeted ways I have ever heard that put. I hope your colleagues are getting the

word out to other Members of this body who have reservations about supporting this Supplemental Appropriations bill, because you couldn't be more clear about how it would affect your training.

General SHEEHAN. I am the guy that owns 80 percent of the CONUS forces. Admiral Macke and General Joulwan and General Peay use forces. They use them, I pay the bills. If we don't get a Supplemental, we are going to shut down.

Mr. MURTHA. Talk about it not being offset. If it is not offset, what is the advantage—

General SHEEHAN. All you are doing is pushing the bow wave out.

Mr. MURTHA. I think it is important that the Members understand that. It solves the problem only in the short term. In the long term, it is going to hurt them and it is something we have to really think about.

#### DEPLOYING GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES

Mr. BONILLA. Thank you, General.

I would like to move on to the readiness of the Guard and the target of deploying in 90 days. Should the 90-day goal be changed and what, if any, additional training is needed before we can accomplish meeting that target?

General SHEEHAN. If anybody is talking about moving it to the right, making it 110 days, we can't fight without a total force concept. We couldn't go to Haiti without activating 2,000 Reservists. So clearly, in my discussions with reviewing the program with General Reimer, the Forces Command Commander, there is tremendous investment being put into these Guard Enhanced Brigades. You can't execute a two MRC strategy without them.

The Army has decided to go the brigade structure, that is the heavy brigade and light brigade. Unlike the Marine Corps that focuses on individual pilots and companies—that is a different philosophical approach—I will tell you that if we don't have a well trained, organized Reserve force that works for the combatant CINCS and is trained to joint standards, then I think we are investing in the wrong business.

#### SEAWOLF SUBMARINE

Mr. BONILLA. My last question relates to the SEAWOLF submarine. Could you tell me your opinion on whether or not we need a third one or a different kind of New Attack Submarine?

General SHEEHAN. I approach the issue of submarine warfare not from a single dimension. Clearly, I am concerned at the direction that the quieting of the Akula class submarine brings to the fight. I think that's just as important as the 209 diesel technology that exists on the foreign market. In many cases, it is quieter than the Akula.

When you look at Anti-Submarine Warfare, ASW, as a function, it runs from a maritime patrol aircraft to a surface combat type vessel to another 1B1 type of platform, like a SEAWOLF submarine. I think we need to continue the research and development into quieting.

I think we need to continue keeping warfare skill up. So I think it is a linear equation that you deal with on this issue. Kilo sub-

marines in the Persian Gulf are very, very difficult to find so I suggest that we deal with ASW as a total system as opposed to focusing on one piece of it.

Mr. BONILLA. In closing, thank you for giving us a concise point to address about training without the Supplemental bill. This Committee, as you know, will do all it can to make sure this passes because we know you need it and we will be there until the very end.

General SHEEHAN. This Committee has been extraordinarily helpful and I appreciate that.

Mr. BONILLA. Thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Nethercutt.

#### SUBMARINE THREAT

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Following up on Mr. Bonilla's comments about submarines and your comments about submarines. Is Russia our greatest competition in terms of meeting whatever threat might be out there, or are there others?

General SHEEHAN. I deal with capabilities. When you look at what is the Northern Fleet, I was in Norway last week in exercise Strong Resolve with NATO. When you look at the Russian military and what it is doing; they are virtually shut down. The performance of their forces in Chechnya, to include the people that did the final assault with the Naval Infantry Brigade that they took out of the Kola peninsula, frankly, didn't perform very well, but the curious piece is the SSBNs have increased their patrol length. They have gone from 52 or 55 days, to 72 days on patrol. They are investing in submarine capabilities, especially SSBNs but the rest of the surface fleet is declining in terms of its forward deployments somewhere between 40 and 60 percent.

Mr. WILSON. If the gentleman would yield?

Isn't it true that they are still building the missile submarines?

General SHEEHAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Three a year or something like that?

General SHEEHAN. I don't know what the production rate is. They are building that technology. The question is whether to attack with just one system. The intelligence world will tell you there are no indications that there is a fourth generation going on, but clearly, they have made a strategic decision to invest in the Northern Fleet area in terms of SSBNs and the type of a capability.

Do we need to be careful of it? Yes, but I would be far more concerned about the exported Kilo submarines tied up at Bandar Abbas, that are in the Persian Gulf and can shut down the oil shipping in the Persian Gulf. I think they are a bigger threat than an SSBN on patrol in the bastion areas of the North Cape.

It is a complex problem. That is why I think we need to deal with this ASW issue from an end-to-end perspective. We can't let the maritime fleet decay itself. We can't let the surface ASW capability go away. We can't let the quieting technology that we need for the future go away. A 209 submarine that is being built by our friends on the commercial market is a tough target.

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Looking at the proliferation of the submarine capabilities, I'm concerned by the one or two nations who are not friendly to us. It seems to be incumbent on our part to the sure we can meet whatever threat exists out there.

Are you satisfied with the progress we are making thus far?

General SHEEHAN. I think that we have clearly been ahead. I think that is why we need to continue investing in the technology of ASW work, to stay ahead of that kind of capability.

#### DRUG INTERDICTION

Mr. NETHERCUTT. With regard to drug interdiction, to what extent are our forces engaged in that task in connection with law enforcement and intelligence agencies?

General SHEEHAN. We do. The USACOM does what we call the transit zone of the piece. It is a three-part strategy, the source country piece done in SOUTHCOM and through the State Department, differential crops, et cetera. Then there is the transit piece that we do in concert with the Coast Guard and other law enforcement agencies, and then there is the domestic piece of demand reduction.

Two and a half years ago, the Administration made a conscious decision to shift the strategy to a source country strategy and the money that was in the transit zone was diverted into source country. Now it is said that it takes three to five years for the source countries to kind of absorb this money and really make a difference in what they do in the drug production business.

I don't see any diminishment of the drug production capability. As a matter of fact, I think it might be increasing. I haven't seen the numbers for the last quarter.

As a result, we have had to reduce the total number of aircraft and ships that we put into the transit zone. That doesn't mean that we are neglecting it, but that we have to shift platforms. We now use 3-D capable Aegis cruisers, AWACS aircraft, E-2s and very good cued information. But the real solution to this problem is going to have to be in demand reduction.

We can put the entire U.S. military between here and South America, and I will tell you, as long as there is demand for it, it is still going to come.

Mr. NETHERCUTT. I had a briefing on it, and it seems like a tremendously complicated and massive problem. Your statement rings true and you could put everybody in charge of trying to stem the influx of drugs and it is almost impossible. When the drug world will pay \$700 or \$1,000 for a sheet of paper that has the AWACS orbits on it and they buy high-tech equipment—they have in some cases, better technology than the U.S. military does. Discouraging. Thank you for your testimony.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Murtha.

#### REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. When General Luck comes in, he always reminds me that when we were over in the desert, that the 82nd Airborne landed in order to secure that area for the Marines. Now, I used to always compliment him on the small size of his staff. I want this to go on the record so I can send this to him. Last time he was here, he had the room filled with staff. You are now the champion.

You have the smallest backup staff of anybody that has appeared before the Committee. I want to put that on the record so that I

can send it to Gary Luck in retribution for his comments about the Marine Corps.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT CAPABILITY

Mr. YOUNG. General, after the sailors died in the Iraqi aircraft attack on the U.S.S. STARK, the Committee has taken a real keen interest in development of defenses against advanced anti-ship cruise missiles. Cooperative engagement is the phrase that we talk about now where ships share radar data to mutually defend one another. Tell us something about the ship self-defense test that was conducted by the U.S.S. EISENHOWER Battle Group last summer.

General SHEEHAN. Sir, it is one of the primary focuses we spent a lot of time on. We are trying to work the technology with the various Services for cooperative engagements. I don't remember the exact numbers, but I think it is on the order of, I think there were 18 Standard II missiles fired.

These are threat simulated missiles, surface skimmers, high velocity and we successfully engaged, I think, 15 of the 18. Clearly, the technology of sharing data from an outpost skip to an AWACS to linking it back to a shooter, such as the Patriot system, is the way we have to go.

I applaud the Committee for its interest in this issue. It is a tactical version of a theater missile system. We tried it in the European theater where we used the International Maritime Satellite, INMARSAT system, to link data from ship back to a firing battery. We have used it in the sense that we used an Aegis cruiser linked to a Marine I-Hawk radar system tied to an AWACS aircraft downlinked to a Patriot battery system; so the technology is there to do this.

The SS-25 missile technology is currently being exported at such a rate that within 8 to 10 years, most third World nations will have that technology available to them. So if we don't integrate ourselves on the battlefield with this electronic concept, EC-type concept, I think that we are being negligent.

I think we ought to be putting it on ships like the LHD that is coming off-line. Every major ship that we have that has the capability to be a command and control platform ought to have this capability.

Mr. YOUNG. Fifteen of eighteen; that is a pretty good record.

General SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. I think those are the numbers.

[The information follows:]

The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is an advanced sensor measurement and fire control/weapons data exchange system. The system is designed to optimize existing and future force air defense capabilities to counter the increased agility, speed, maneuverability, and reduced detectability of cruise missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, and manned aircraft. CEC improves overall theater air Defense (TAD) capabilities by coordinating all CEC unit (CU) force sensors into a single, real-time, fire control quality composite track picture. ———. For DT-IIA testing, pre-production CEC equipment was installed in five ships of the USS EISENHOWER Battle Group and integrated with the ships sensors and weapon systems, including the SPS-48C and SPS-48E 3D search radar, the SPS-49 2D search radar, OY-88 fire control radar, and the Target Acquisition System (TAS). DT-IIA testing included missile firing scenarios in June of 1994 at Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training

Facility, Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico which demonstrated CEC capabilities against live targets. ———.

Mr. YOUNG. How did Secretary Perry feel about that?

General SHEEHAN. When he got the briefing, he told us to press on with this issue. I think his quotes were something like he thought this was the next stealth technology, the next revolution that was going to occur in technology warfare.

Mr. MURTHA. You are talking about stealth and low observable?

General SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. He thinks that stealth brought a new dimension to warfare, this cooperative engagement process where you are able to take data links from different aircraft, gives you a different radar aspect and a much higher probability of an intercept and kill.

Mr. MURTHA. Are you saying the low observables or very low observables?

General SHEEHAN. No, sir. He was saying that what stealth did to penetrating aircraft against radar systems is a revolution in technology. Cooperative engagement was the next step in the evolution.

Mr. YOUNG. General, I am curious about why the Air Force was absent from these tests.

General SHEEHAN. I can't give you an answer, sir. We did have Air Force components. As a matter of fact, we had an Air Force communications squadron who did some of the downlinking, and I thought there was an AWACS included in this test. Let me confirm that and get back to you. I am almost positive we used an AWACS.

[The information follows:]

An AWACS aircraft from the 963AWACS flew two sorties for a duration of 13.4 hours in support of JTF-95 Phase II. Personnel from the 74 and 726 Air Control Squadrons were other Air Force assets used in the exercise. However, the USAF did not exercise a Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). During this exercise the Navy was equipped with CEC, while the USAF provided cueing through Tactical Digital Information Links (TADIL-A/B) data links.

Regarding Air Force use of CEC, House Conference Report 103-747 directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a report by 15 October 1995 on the findings of incorporating CEC on the AWACS fleet. The Air Force is currently assessing operational utility, E-3 availability, procurement planning and doctrinal implication of adding CEC to the AWACS fleet. It will then conduct a technical analysis of upgrading the E-3 fleet with CEC. Based on study findings, a CEC upgrade to AWACS may be submitted to the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process for further analysis.

Missions to which AWACS CEC could potentially contribute include theater aircraft, cruise, and ballistic missile defense as well as fleet defense. CEC will generate a composite surveillance air picture based on multiple sensor reports. This will provide missile shooters the ability to fire beyond visual range (BVR) using sensor reports from other platforms, vastly improving fleet defense. However, only sensor reports from fire control quality radars, like the Aegis system, can be used for this BVR function. The E-3 radar is not a fire control radar and would only be used as a cueing platform. The Air Force currently uses Tactical Digital Information Links TADIL A&B and is migrating to the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS). These systems provide adequate cueing of threats for CEC and other link users. The question that needs to be answered is whether CEC provides an improved cueing over the JTIDS/TADIL-A data links. If the intent is for the E-3 to only be used as CEC relay node without full integration, Air Force believes any airborne and some space platforms could provide this capability; thereby, preserving E-3 flexibility and multi-mission capability.

Mr. YOUNG. My staff advises me that they were not involved in the first test.

General SHEEHAN. We did use them in the Joint Task Force experiment.

Mr. YOUNG. But the ballistic missile test; that was a follow-on test, was it not?

General SHEEHAN. Yes, sir, but this was an evolutionary-type process. I think that is where we need to continue this evolution. Clearly, we have got to convince the system that this is important. It is just going to take time to include all that capability.

Mr. YOUNG. General, after we have spent billions of dollars on developing the cooperative engagement capabilities, as a CINC, do you think it would be wise to include Navy cooperative engagement equipment on Air Force aircraft?

General SHEEHAN. Sure. I think that if you don't integrate the systems, then it is not going to work. The further out you can look and reach, the better off you are.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Skeen, I yield to you while I go vote.

Mr. SKEEN. I yield to Mr. Bonilla. General, delighted to have you here. Did you give a good presentation?

Mr. YOUNG. Excellent.

General SHEEHAN. I defer to the Chairman, sir.

Mr. SKEEN. I do, too. Any other questions?

#### FISCAL YEAR 1995 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

Mr. BONILLA. Would my friend yield?

I think one of the points that we were talking about earlier was the Supplemental Appropriations—and Mr. Skeen may be interested to hear the testimony again because he is going to be another one of the folks out there leading the charge. I thought the Gentleman from New Mexico might appreciate hearing the comments about a failure of passing the Supplemental Appropriations.

General SHEEHAN. Sir, the bottom line is that without a Supplemental, real dollars coming down into the operating forces in the United States, and I own 80 percent of the U.S. Forces, that if we don't get the money by July, I will shut down U.S. Army Forces here in the United States. That will spill over into late July for the fleet and August for the Marines and Air Force, we will stop training and I will stop sending ships to any place except for those places that are required overseas.

#### LPD-17 SHIP PROGRAM

Mr. SKEEN. Thank you. Let me ask you a series of questions here.

Would you describe why LPD-17 is important to the Atlantic Command?

General SHEEHAN. I think it is important to the nation, not just the Atlantic Command, as part of the strategic lift equation. There was a requirement for 2.5 MEB-Marine Expeditionary Brigade lift. We are not going to get there unless you have the LPD-17 in the inventory.

When you send a three-ship Amphibious Ready Group out, it is very difficult to make the square and cube requirements without that type of a capability; so as we retire ships, without those replacement ships on-line, we won't have that kind of lift capability



we so desperately need. It is essential in terms of part of the requirement, yes.

Mr. SKEEN. Are we not one of the few nations able to give that kind of quick response?

General SHEEHAN. We are the only nation that has that kind of strategic reach.

Mr. SKEEN. Let me ask you to describe the plan to retire ships once the LPD-17 comes on-line, and how will this improve your capacity?

General SHEEHAN. I think that the retirement of ships has to be carefully dovetailed with the acquisition process. We are right now on the edge of having the 2.5 lift capability; as a matter of fact, I think we are slightly below it. So if there is a premature retirement of the LPD class of ships, for example, or the Landing Ship Dock, LSD, class of ship, that takes away from the cargo cube capability.

When you put a forward-deployed expeditionary unit and it doesn't bring 20 days of supplies that is square and cube of a ship, the premature retirement of those ships will jeopardize that lift capability. So I would look at it very carefully before I did it.

Mr. SKEEN. I understand your group has the responsibility for the Roving Sands training exercise?

General SHEEHAN. That is correct.

Mr. SKEEN. Are we pretty hospitable?

General SHEEHAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SKEEN. We have tried to improve the conditions at the old Roswell Walker Air Force Base airfield. We appreciate you being there and the troops have done an outstanding job, and I think the innovation has been very, very good.

General SHEEHAN. I think that is a great potential that we need to continue to pursue.

#### LPD-17 SHIP FUNDING

Mr. SKEEN. The CNO testified to the National Security Committee that if an additional \$1 billion were provided to the Navy in fiscal year 1996, that among other things, that is another DDG-51 and more F/A-18C's, he would build LPD-17s this year. Do you concur in the need to accelerate the funding of the LPD-17 program?

General SHEEHAN. Amphibious lift, like the strategic lift in the MPS program and the other types of strategic requirements, are there. They are very real requirements. We cannot count on prepositioned gear that is on land. This nation just cannot afford that luxury. So I am a very strong advocate, this is a maritime nation and we ought to be maritime.

Mr. SKEEN. The Committee has had a long-standing dispute with the Navy about ship self-defense, providing Navy ships with the ability to defend themselves from anti-ship cruise missile attack, and the Committee directed that LPD-17s contain equipment such as cooperative engagement capability to provide it a level of protection equal to any other Navy ship such as an Aegis destroyer or an aircraft carrier.

Do you agree that the LPD-17 is a no less valuable ship to the war-fighting CINC than any other ship?

General SHEEHAN. Yes, sir, I have already mentioned that I would also put it on the LHDs.

Mr. SKEEN. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE REQUIREMENTS

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Skeen.

General, in January of this year, you messaged the Joint Chiefs about requirements. I highlighted a couple of the programs that you mentioned: Rivet Joint, Force Expansion, the addition of two Rivet Joint aircraft, U-2 advanced defensive systems, Reef Point Aircraft, two additional ACFT, U-2 sensor upgrades, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, UAV, interoperability. Tell us what you were telling the Joint Chiefs there that we ought to know?

General SHEEHAN. Is that the April list?

Mr. YOUNG. It is dated January, airborne reconnaissance requirements.

General SHEEHAN. That was a requirement. There has been a series of studies as to what the requirements are for airborne platforms. One thing that is I think absolutely essential is that we give the Tactical Joint Task Force Commander, whether he be in Haiti or wherever we send him, a remotely piloted capability to manage his battle space UAV-type program.

There is a next tier above that that says he has to look at a battlefield battle space that is much bigger than traditionally looked at, whether it be Reef Point aircraft, U-2s et cetera. There has been, what I would call, an over reliance on space-based systems over the last couple of years.

As we go into operations in places like Bosnia and the other end of the spectrum of Operation Deny Flight, and what have you, there is a very clear requirement to downlink to the Tactical Commander fused information, and I think that is where my focus was. We need to get out of the Cold War mentality of a pure space-based system, but give the tactical commander platforms that are relevant to the theater he is fighting in.

Mr. YOUNG. This is in January. We received the budget request February 6th, and I haven't gone over each issue to see if they were included in the budget request.

Do you know whether or not they were?

General SHEEHAN. I don't know. I can take that for the record.

Mr. YOUNG. The staff tells me that they are not included in the budget request. Do you have a price tag on that list by any chance?

General SHEEHAN. No, sir. I am in the requirements business.

#### SEAWOLF SUBMARINE

Mr. YOUNG. We will take a look at the requirements and see if there is any way we can buy these tools for you. But you understand, we are having a major battle now trying to get a little better 602b number so we are able to do things like this for you.

I want to go back to the conversation about submarines and ASW. I agree that you have to look at the whole picture. However, one of the pressure points that we are going to have to look at is the third SEAWOLF. Now, when Les Aspin was Secretary of Defense, he sat here and told us that the third SEAWOLF project was strictly for industrial base preservation. My question and I think

the question of the Committee is, should we build a third SEAWOLF just for industrial base or is their actually a use for that third SEAWOLF?

General SHEEHAN. I can't speak to the industrial base argument because I have not looked into that piece of it, so I am not qualified to discuss that. Clearly, the Akula quieting problem, the Delta problem is there. We are dealing with it on a day-to-day basis. I think the question that the communities who support these programs have to at least argue their way through, is "Are the curves that are being displayed correct in terms of their prediction on whether the quieting of the Akula-type submarine or the 209 submarine presents such a clear tactical advantage that the 688-I is in harm's way?"

I also think you have to ask the question, "Is there an intent that this capability is, in fact, hostile, and can you get to where you need to go?" I think, at least it is my understanding, that the SSN-23 is a bridge to get you to SSN-X in the year 2005. So I would leave that to the technical people, because even if the decision is made to either build or not build it, I have to fight today's technology with what I have got, which is SSN-688-Is, and one submarine called an SSN-21. I have to defer to the really smart people who do the curves and graphs. If you say go to war, I go with what I have, which is SSN-688-Is and DDG-51s and maritime patrol aircraft.

#### ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE DEFICIENCIES

Mr. YOUNG. Let me ask the question another way. What are your top anti-submarine warfare deficiencies?

General SHEEHAN. It is the whole equation of how do we deal with broad ocean search with a P-3 aircraft that has been around for 25 years. We can get some more life out of it, P-3 doesn't give you the broad ocean surveillance capability. DDG-51 clearly is a class by itself and gives us that surface platform capability in the acoustic business that we are working through, not only the NATO piece, but what we are doing in the other areas, so I think that I am reasonably comfortable in that piece. What I am not quite sure about is where we need to spend our anti-submarine investments.

#### MINE WARFARE CAPABILITY

Mr. YOUNG. Let me go to a different subject, underwater warfare. How would you assess the capability today of Atlantic Command's mine warfare capability?

General SHEEHAN. This nation made an investment after the Gulf War. I had the amphibious forces in the Persian Gulf during the war and was aboard the LPH that was hit with a mine, so I understand personally what happens when you bump into things in the middle of the night.

I think that we are making an investment, but I will tell you that the Third World and second-rate nations have the capability to produce very sophisticated mines. If we don't stay ahead of it, and it isn't just a question of putting mines in the ocean to prevent Marines from coming ashore, but it is the ability to stop commerce in restricted waterways. It is an issue that I am very concerned about.

We are going to do a proof-of-concept demonstration in the fall with the Navy and take the best of the systems and try to integrate them together so we can sweep mines and identify where they are with a higher degree of confidence so that should we have to do power projection, we have that capability. As you know, we are doing a lot of work in Korean waters with the forward-deployed minesweepers, but I will tell you that the people who can produce mines and put them in water, can produce that kind of capability faster than we can sweep it.

Mr. YOUNG. We have heard the issue of the Iranians and their emplacement of new missiles near the straits of Hormuz and along some of the islands that they control. Does Iran have a very sophisticated mine-laying capability?

General SHEEHAN. Sir, the Iraqis didn't either. The Iraqis basically put some ships out in the middle of the night and pushed things over the back. Frequently, we didn't know whether they were garbage bags floating, dead sheep floating with their legs in the air, or real mines.

Mr. YOUNG. They weren't secured, they weren't stationary. They actually floated with the currents?

General SHEEHAN. They were free-floating mines.

Mr. YOUNG. And the ship that you were on, you hit a free-floating mine?

General SHEEHAN. Sure.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Murtha, Mr. Skeen, do you have further questions? Mr. Bonilla.

We have additional questions that we will submit in writing and ask that you respond for the record.

We thank you for a very excellent presentation today. We are doing the best that we can to get additional funding so that we can provide you the tools that you need to do your job.

Before we recess the meeting, is there anything further that you would like to tell us?

General SHEEHAN. First off, I truly appreciate the work that the Appropriations Committee has done. I would like only to reflect on what Congressman Murtha said when he watched the CNN piece on television the other night. Those young men and women that you saw are an investment that this Committee and other Committees made a number of years ago. We have a quality force of very bright, tough young kids.

They are well-trained and well-disciplined. If we don't continue that investment in terms of recruiting the best quality applicants we can get and train them to very high, tough standards, then should we have to do another Haiti in the future, I am not sure if we are going to have the talented pool to do that kind of stuff. That is the future of America, in kids like that.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. If there is nothing further to come before the Committee, we will stand adjourned until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow. We will see you all then.

General, thank you very much.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto follow.]

READINESS OF THE TROOPS

*Question.* Unfunded contingency operations impact operations and maintenance funding and negatively affect readiness. DoD has received supplemental funding during previous fiscal years to offset costs incurred by unfunded contingencies. In your statement, you say that the timing of supplemental funding is critical. If funding is received too late, exercises must be canceled, maintenance deferred, and contracts terminated.

How has the readiness of the troops under your Command been impacted by unfunded contingency operations?

*Answer.* Typically, unfunded contingency operations have little initial effect on deployed and "first to fight" units. However, overall force readiness is affected through missed training opportunities, deferred maintenance of equipment and reduced operations. All of these measures attempt to compensate for funding that is diverted to pay the costs of contingency operations without rapid reimbursement through supplemental funding bills.

Air Combat Command, like our other components, has maintained readiness of ACC forces by using funding from other programs until reimbursed for the unfunded contingency costs. We have seen evidence of this in the recent past with Atlantic Fleet units also when significant cuts were made in non-deployed flying hours for squadrons in the last quarter of the last fiscal year. During the same timeframe, Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic, experienced a shortfall in our flying hour program of approximately 5300 training hours due to unfunded contingency operations. While a short term resolution for contingency funding, this latter example only serves to complicate the training program that must be reconstructed when new funding is available (usually with the new fiscal year). Unfortunately, it cannot bring back lost training opportunities.

When it became obvious that appropriations would not be adequate to cover fiscal year 1994 budgeted items, FORSCOM instituted Tiered Resourcing. The objective of Tiered Resourcing was to maintain the Contingency Forces (the early deployers) at the highest readiness levels. The later deploying forces were targeted at a lower readiness level. Training events were canceled, non-mission essential maintenance was curtailed, and replenishment of some repair items was deferred. Maintenance of real property and some quality of life programs were scaled back.

The widely reported degradation in the training readiness of three FORSCOM Divisions at the end of fiscal year 1994 was largely caused by the diversion of O&M funds to contingency operations. All three Divisions remain below full mission proficiency. Two of these Divisions remain below the targeted readiness level established by the FORSCOM Commander when the Tiered Resourcing Strategy was established.

Unfunded contingency operations also impact equipment readiness of units. In fiscal year 1994, Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic (CMFL) deferred scheduled corrosion prevention maintenance on some ground vehicles to fiscal year 1995. Equipment must sometimes be left behind in the theater of operations or transferred to other units. These equipment losses are unfunded deficiencies with an impact on subsequent unit readiness. Two examples of this are Army trucks left in Rwanda and power generators left in Guantanamo after all or the majority of the personnel assigned to those units have redeployed. This has a direct impact on the ability of the unit to reconstitute for the next contingency.

*Question.* Has the Atlantic Command canceled exercises, deferred maintenance, or terminated contracts because supplemental funding was received too late?

*Answer.* Although ACOM has not canceled exercises outright, some joint and component exercises were significantly changed as a result of contingency operations. For example, JTFEX 95, a large joint exercise involving a Navy carrier battle group, Marine Corps Amphibious Ready Group, Army and Air Force units, was significantly reduced due to requirements of Operation Uphold Democracy. This modification was not due to timeliness of supplemental funding, but shows the impact of contingency operations on training and exercises.

On the other hand, ACOM has canceled contracts and deferred maintenance because of late supplemental funding. In 1994, six ship depot level maintenance availabilities were deferred into fiscal year 1995. These were: USS MOUNT BAKER (AE 34) Phased Maintenance Availability (PMA); USS ARTHUR W. RADFORD (DD 968) Extended Docking Selected Restricted Availability (EDSRA); USS UNDERWOOD (FFG 36) Selected Restricted Availability (SRA); USS ASHLAND (LSD 48) PMA; USS GUARDIAN (MCM 5) PMA; and USS PATRIOT (MCM 7) PMA. Subsequently the USS GUARDIAN and USS PATRIOT PMA's were canceled, foregoing the opportunity to do maintenance on these hulls. The remaining four ship availabilities were performed in early fiscal year 1995, using funds that had been budgeted for other

fiscal year 1995 ship availabilities, thereby "snowballing" the maintenance program. The reprogramming of those funds caused the cancellation of USS STEVEN W. GROVES (FFG 29) SRA, USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS (FFG 58) Docking Selected Restricted Availability (DSRA) and the deferral of USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CG 58) SRA. When fiscal year 1994 supplemental funds were received in fiscal year 1995, they were applied to other fiscal year 1995 availabilities that had been unfunded. This allowed payment for fiscal year 1995 contingency operations.

In summary, six ship maintenance availabilities were deferred from fiscal year 1994 to fiscal year 1995, and this was translated into four fiscal year 1995 cancellations and one deferral. Additionally, a late supplemental directly results in deferring the induction of rolling stock into the Marine Corps' Corrosion Prevention and Control Program. Because of the late supplemental, Aviation Depot Level Repairables (AVDLR) were delayed until the end of the fiscal year. This resulted in a delay in available parts because of the long lead-time involved and price increases. As an example, AVDLR costs have increased about \$3 million in fiscal year 1994 based on price increases on parts ordered late in fiscal year 1994, but paid for at a higher price when received in fiscal year 1995. As of this writing, the fiscal year 1995 supplemental funding has not been received. The uncertain fate of the fiscal year 1995 Contingency Supplemental in Congress is of great concern and it was the top issue at the recent ACOM Component Commanders' Conference. The cumulative readiness effects of these actions are considerable; worse yet is the impact on the quality of life of our people as training, promotions and facility maintenance goes unfunded. If not addressed, the bow wave of these impacts will carry over well into fiscal year 1996, and, in some cases, into subsequent fiscal years. Once lost, these individual and collective impacts will not be instantaneously regenerated with an influx of dollars.

*Question* Has the supplemental funding been sufficient to maintain required levels of training and maintenance?

*Answer.* In general, yes. However, some temporary shortfalls in required training and maintenance occurred in late fiscal year 1994. Specifically, several squadrons of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft had their flight training significantly curtailed below required levels for the month of September 1994, and three active FORSCOM Divisions reported reduced readiness at year end due to non-availability of funds. These divisions were compelled to institute constraints in the requisitioning of readiness related supplies and equipment. They were also forced to substantially reduce readiness related training from battalion level proficiency to company/platoon levels. For the Marine Corps, for example, in fiscal year 1994, the percentages of reimbursement provided Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT) for real world operations costs were 36 percent in O&M, Marine Corps (\$1.975 million funded/\$5.5 million costs) and 32 percent in O&M, Navy (\$5.4 funded/\$17.0 million costs). This low O&M reimbursement to MARFORLANT resulted in five non-deployed squadrons losing all training flight hours and five more squadrons flying less than 25 percent of their required training hours allocation in September 1994. This is the equivalent of eight squadrons grounded for one month. The ultimate impact of the funding shortfall on the MARFORLANT Flying Hour Program was 11 of 27 tactical squadrons reporting C3 or C4 in fourth quarter fiscal year 1994.

The low O&M, Marine Corps reimbursement to MARFORLANT resulted in approximately 300 additional pieces of rolling stock not being funded for the Corrosion Prevention and Control Program. Consequently, increased corrective maintenance is necessary on equipment returning from deployments. Other impacts included Table of Equipment replenishment/replacement deficiencies increasing, reduced local unit training, and increase equipment maintenance backlog.

For fiscal year 1995, the proposed House version of the emergency supplemental funding, as it currently stands, supports the Presidents request. We believe it is sufficient to maintain FORSCOMs required levels of training and maintenance. However, the version recently passed by the Senate will not cover anticipated costs and will require the use of programmed training dollars. Contingency operations are not budgeted for; we rely solely on Congressional supplemental appropriation of funds and other reimbursements or realignments to offset costs. Title III, which was added to enhance readiness by increasing base operations and training support, will provide FORSCOM a start toward lowering the huge backlog of maintenance and repair, barracks renovation and environmental bills. Without passage of a full supplemental package, FORSCOM will be forced to cover all contingency costs within programmed resources. We will be forced to reduce readiness related training beginning in April to levels insufficient to sustain readiness of units. All but the three divisional highest priority forces will be affected. Readiness of the remaining 5 1/2 divisional forces in FORSCOM will experience readiness degradation similar to those of fiscal year 1994 but of greater intensity and length. In addition to direct readi-

ness related training at home stations, Combat Training Center rotations and aviation unit internal training will be impacted. Timing of receipt of supplemental funding is of critical importance because training opportunities are extremely perishable. Effective planning of training cannot occur overnight. Unit training schedules require a minimum of 4-6 weeks to be fully integrated with other resource requirements such as ammunition and training areas use plans.

Incomplete supplemental funding will have the immediate impact to MARFORLANT of reducing the number of vehicles inducted into the Corrosion Prevention Control Program this fiscal year. The amount of O&M, Navy reimbursement for MARFORLANT from the supplemental is unknown. Without O&M, Navy supplemental reimbursement, MARFORLANT CONUS tactical aviation will be forced into a standdown in early September as in fiscal year 1994.

As of this writing, the fiscal year 1995 supplemental funding has not been received. The uncertain fate of the fiscal year 1995 Contingency Supplemental in Congress is of great concern and it was the top issue at the recent ACOM Component Commanders' Conference. As a result of this funding not being available, readiness impact will begin as early as this month and continue into fiscal year 1996. The cumulative readiness effects of these actions are considerable, worse yet is the impact on the quality of life of our people as training, promotions and facility maintenance goes underfunded. If not addressed, the bow wave of these impacts will carry over well into fiscal year 1996, and, in some cases, into subsequent fiscal years. Once lost, these individual and collective impacts will not be instantaneously regenerated with an influx of dollars.

*Question.* As you know, this Committee just passed an emergency Supplemental bill for fiscal year 1995. Do you currently have unfunded requirements that are covered in the Supplemental?

*Answer.* The House version of the emergency Supplemental recently passed includes FORSCOM's unfunded requirements. Contingency operations funding is not programmed; and therefore, pending enactment of the law, remains currently unfunded. In addition, Title III additions to the Emergency Supplemental Appropriation provide partial funding for currently unfunded requirements in barracks renovation, backlog of maintenance and repair for facilities and environmental concerns. It is critical that the House version of the emergency Supplemental be passed to cover all of CINCLANTFLT's \$321 million contingency and migrant support costs, as well as FORSCOM's incremental costs of contingency missions and to provide adequate infrastructure to sustain this command in the future.

#### TEMPO OF OPERATIONS

*Question.* The Committee has consistently received reports about certain units or mission specialties which deploy time and time again for contingencies. A prime example is the 10th Mountain Division which was deployed to Florida after Hurricane Andrew, Somalia, and Haiti. While these deployments were in the 10th Divisions' Area of Responsibility (AOR) these frequent deployments have caused strains on the 10th Division. I'm certain this has been happening with other units as well. How big a problem is this phenomenon for you?

*Answer.* As you might expect, our efforts in Haiti and Guantanamo in the past several months have significantly impacted the Operating Tempo or "OPTEMPO" rates of some units within USACOM, many of whom had been recently deployed to other theaters. Military Police (MP) companies and aerial/seaport units top the list of frequent deployers. In the case of the Atlantic Fleet surface combatants, Aegis cruisers have been most heavily tasked due to the versatility of this multi-mission platform. The aviation units most heavily impacted have been the Navy's Reef Point units and Air Combat Command's HC-130s, EC-130s, U-2s, RC-135s, and AWACs. The Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) are also high on our list due to their normal training and deployment requirements which follow close on the heels of II MEF supporting operations in Guantanamo, Haiti and Somalia.

We have recommended to the Joint Staff and are actively engaged with our components to reduce excessive OPTEMPO through a number of initiatives. We are constantly trying to address this challenge through such measures as substituting trained surrogate units to conduct security operations, contracting out work that is not actually a warfighting mission, using reserves to decrease the operational load on active duty units, and working hard to reduce tasking levels on our low density, high demand aviation units. Through careful assignment of units, elimination of duplicate requirements and substitution of other training methods, we are trying to "work smarter, not harder." Our simulation efforts, in particular, also hold great promise in reducing OPTEMPO in the near term.

**Question.** Regarding future deployments, do you intend to consider the amount of times a unit has been deployed in the past as opposed to just a unit's Area of Responsibility?

**Answer.** How many times a unit has been deployed in the past is just one of many considerations in determining force packages. Our intent, in working with our components, is to respond to National Command Authority (NCA) tasking and supported CINC requirements with appropriate forces deployed to use our full spectrum of capabilities—and, in so doing, not overtask any one unit/weapons system. For example, in the Atlantic Fleet, ships deploy in rotation based on ship type, deployment requirements, OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO, Turn Around Ratio (time between deployments relative to the length of the last deployment), maintenance schedules and unique equipment or capabilities relative to the anticipated mission. In the case of the Army's Forces Command, Military Police (MP) units to conduct missions in Haiti, Guantanamo Bay, Honduras, and Panama, were selected by first looking at when each unit was last deployed. In fact, the frequency at which FORSCOM deploys MP units is such that they simply rotate down the list of units available. Everybody gets to participate. For Marine Forces Atlantic, since July of 1994 two Combined Arms Exercises (CAX), two Mountain Warfare Training Center (MWTC) exercises, one Unit Deployment Program (UDP) to WESTPAC, and participation in Exercise Strong Resolve 95 have been reassigned to units not previously scheduled for those exercises and deployments to compensate for other unit's assignment to contingency operations.

In summary, I will work closely with our component commanders to ensure an equitable deployment rhythm is maintained that factors in all applicable issues in determining future deployment schedules. We will continue to evaluate how we make the force selections to both take advantage of a unit's capabilities and maintain an equitable balance of time away from home base/homeport.

**Question.** Increasing the personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) is an issue that affects morale, quality of life, and readiness of the troops. What has been the effect on the soldiers, airmen, and sailors in your command with the increase in PERSTEMPO because of the added contingencies? Provide for the record the normal PERSTEMPO rates in your command as compared to the current rate.

**Answer.** Certainly, the impact of contingencies, particularly with the current force structure, manifests itself in morale, quality of life and the readiness of troops. However, the exact personnel impact of these contingencies is difficult to isolate. Our forces have gone through a number of adjustments in the last few years, some related to restructuring and some to reorganization to make our forces more efficient at warfighting. Without a doubt, some service members have chosen to "vote with their feet", leaving the military for employment in the civilian sector. Others have chosen to remain in the service for the challenges, travel, educational opportunities and professional advancement. A study by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, of the effects of PERSTEMPO on retention and attrition for calendar years 1992 to 1994 concluded that, for deployable units, there is no strong correlation of PERSTEMPO to retention and first term attrition. Each of the Services and all of our components are continuing to study this problem to ensure we are addressing the needs of our people and their families. I can attest to the resilience of our men and women in meeting both the normal warfighting requirements and Operations Other Than War with across the board excellence—I see it everyday in the performance of our forces in Haiti and Guantanamo Bay.

As to the "normal" PERSTEMPO rates for USACOM personnel, our Navy component, Atlantic Fleet, uses the CNO standard of 50 percent time in homeport over a five year period for units. The five year trend for this measure, while still meeting the requirement, indicates an increase in PERSTEMPO as units are responding to operational requirements around the globe. Similarly, ACC's goal is a maximum of 120 days Temporary Duty or "TDY" per year. As expected, some low density, high demand units exceed that standard now and actions are being taken to address operational requirements, crew rations, training schedules and force structure to alleviate the impact on personnel. The Army does not use PERSTEMPO as a measure, deferring instead to Permanent Change of Station or "PCS" Turnaround Ratios of individuals to flow personnel overseas who have the longest time in CONUS. Forces Command reports that an analysis of PERSTEMPO is somewhat inconclusive in stating whether quality of life areas have been adversely impacted during the high PERSTEMPO and force reductions experienced in the recent past. For Marine Forces Atlantic PERSTEMPO increased from pre-Desert Storm levels of 38 percent for ground units to 42 percent in 1994 (138 days to 153 days/year). Aviation rates jumped from 20 to 48 percent in the 1993-1994 timeframe, exacerbated by a net decline of over 8 percent in on-hand personnel strength. However, the Marines report only a modest adverse relationship between PERSTEMPO and morale, qual-



ity of life and readiness. All of these measures are being carefully reexamined by Services, the Joint Staff and CINC staffs to ensure we are sensitive to the appropriate indications of prolonged excessive PERSTEMPO and the effects of contingencies.

*Question.* If we continue to commit to these contingency operations, what are we doing to reduce the PERSTEMPO rates? For example, will there be any changes in the normal deployments?

*Answer.* We, of course, are always evaluating how we accomplish our mission and support the other Unified Commanders and this is relevant to PERSTEMPO rates as well. Substitution of trained surrogate units/reserves, contracting out non-warfighting missions, maintaining a balance between force structure and forward presence/contingency requirements, matching unit capabilities to actual mission requirements, establishing realistic tasking levels for normal and surge operations and eliminating redundant training requirements are all being addressed on a continuing basis to help ensure we properly manage PERSTEMPO rates. An example of our efforts at the component level is the Atlantic Fleet's re-evaluation of the Navy's Tactical Training Strategy to reduce the total number of days at sea required to properly train for a deployment. While not decreasing the current forward presence deployment schedule, this review endeavors to reduce the amount of inter-deployment days away from homeport by better management of training packages.

At the broader level, we should always deploy forces on an "as required" basis instead of automatically deploying these forces under a firm and inflexible schedule. An alternative is to articulate the specific needs and corresponding capabilities of the warfighting CINCs and deploy forces to meet them. Forces should deploy for the period needed, to the area needed—when and where they can provide the most capabilities in response to a presence requirement. Identifying these specific capabilities is an ongoing effort with all the CINCs.

*Question.* What are the pluses and minuses of carrying out fewer of the regular standard deployments in order to reduce PERSTEMPO?

*Answer.* The current "standard" deployment is structured to maintain overseas presence in response to Unified Commander requirements generated in concert with the National Command Authority. With fewer forces overseas, we are much more reliant on surging forces to meet national security objectives. The pluses of fewer standard deployments include reduced PERSTEMPO/OPTempo rates with associated savings on both personnel and equipment, generally better access to training environments, and reduced operating costs. The minuses include increased response time to crises, decreased influence in allied security strategies, decreased training opportunities with foreign forces, increased difficulty in coalition building for future crises, and decreased operating familiarity in potential hot spots.

#### PRIORITIES AND DEFICIENCIES

*Question.* Describe to the Committee your role in the annual budget development process of the Department of Defense?

*Answer.* As Commanders in Chief (CINCs) do not presently have acquisition authority (with the sole exception of Special Operations Command), my principal contributions to the budget development process of the Department of Defense are through the publication of my integrated priority list (IPL) and my participation in the Expanded Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) forum.

Through these conduits, I am able to express my highest priority warfighting requirements and identify programmatic solutions which will provide the capability enhancements needed to satisfy my warfighting requirements. My IPL is provided to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), all Service Chiefs, all Unified and Specified CINCs, and to my Service components and subunified commands. The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the Services to consider CINC warfighting priorities during their budget formulation and to specifically address how well their Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) provide fiscal support to programmatic solutions. The Services detail this information as an appendix to their POMs. The Expanded JROC conducts semi-annual visits to CINCUSACOM to provide a detailed review of nine Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) areas. Those nine JWCA areas are: Command, Control and Information Warfare (C2IW); Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); Air Superiority; Strike; Overseas Presence; Ground Maneuver; Deterrence/Counterproliferation; Strategic Mobility and its Protection; and Joint Readiness. As you can see, each area is a rather broad topic which addresses many subtopics. As each area is reviewed in detail, I am able to provide my comments and recommendations directly to the Vice Chairman and Deputy Service Chiefs on which areas are most critical to my interests and which programmatic solutions I believe will best provide the

warfighting capabilities which my forces require to succeed. CINC Integrated Priority Lists and the findings of the JROC are provided to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who carefully considers CINC warfighting requirements in his Chairman's Program Recommendations (CPR) to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense strongly considers the recommendations of the CJCS and CINCs during publication of his Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The Defense Planning Guidance is then used as the "primer" document which each Service uses in preparing their next POM. During the POM review process, I am provided the opportunity to review and comment on proposed Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) which would effect changes to the Services' POMs. Through the Major Budget Issue (MBI) process, Defense Planning and Resources Board (DPRB), and my congressional testimony, I am afforded additional opportunities to voice my highest priority concerns which may be underfunded and could likely jeopardize the mission success of my combatant forces.

*Question.* Do you feel that your interests and needs are adequately addressed in the budget process?

*Answer.* Yes, I feel that appropriate avenues exist for my interests and needs to be adequately addressed in the budget process and my Service components demonstrate great interest to remain aware of my warfighting needs and are responsive in supporting them. Some of these avenues include quarterly conferences which I host for my component commanders for us to maintain an active exchange of ideas and concerns. Through this and other means (integrated priority list, program review cycle, daily staff communications), my warfighting requirements and programmatic interests remain well within their scope of view for consideration and appropriate action in their programming and budgeting efforts. Likewise, there are regularly scheduled occasions such as the semi-annual Joint Requirements Oversight Council visits, semi-annual Commander in Chief (CINC) conferences which are hosted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my congressional testimonies, and the Defense Programming Resources Board (DPRB) through which I am able to communicate my programmatic and budgetary concerns directly to the Vice Chairman and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as to members of Congress.

*Question.* General Sheehan, ACOM is somewhat unique because of the fact that units which would participate in a conflict in your area of responsibility are not under your day to day command, but would be assigned to you in case of a war.

Nevertheless, in terms of your assessment of the units that would probably be under your command in case of a war, what are the major shortfalls in: Personnel, training, equipment, and maintenance?

*Answer.* Before I address the shortfalls element of your question, I'd like to clarify the role of USACOM and my Combatant Command (COCOM) responsibilities. As part of the 1993 reorganization of the Unified Command Plan, USACOM now bridges military capabilities across the continental United States with the Air Forces' Air Combat Command, Army's Forces Command, Marine Corps' Marine Forces Atlantic and the Navy's Atlantic Fleet serving as its Service components. This gives USACOM responsibility for and COCOM of over 80 percent of the active force structure of our military. With an Area of Responsibility (AOR) that spans the Atlantic bridge to Europe, the southern hemisphere and beyond plus responsibilities as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), I have most if not all (depending on the specific scenario) of the forces that would participate in a conflict in the USACOM AOR under my command on a day-to-day basis.

Our forces are adequately manned, trained, and equipped to respond to any of the combat scenarios that might reasonably be forecast to occur in our USACOM AOR. Additionally, since our primary focus is to train U.S.-based forces for joint and combined operations outside of USACOM AOR, we maintain acute awareness about the threats facing the forward Unified CINCs. Our readiness to fight and win against a broad spectrum of threats does not mean that there aren't areas of concern that warrant our attention. In the personnel area, there are shortfalls centered on low density, specialized forces such as Military Police, Army transportation and engineer units, high demand aviation units in both the Navy and Air Force, and support personnel within Marine ground and aviation units.

Training, especially joint training, continues to improve our warfighting capabilities. However, here too there are shortfalls as a result of heavy contingency commitments that skew training/operations to address only certain proficiency requirements. For example, fighter crews flying over Bosnia are high on flight time but lack training in air to ground ordnance deliveries that are not adequately addressed in their forward deployment taskings. We realize we can't only select those situations or scenarios that optimize our training opportunities—certain commitments will adversely affect our readiness to perform selected missions. We continue to ag-

gressively address these concerns both with the Services through our components and the Joint Staff, and also through our role as the primary joint trainer for CONUS-based forces.

In the area of equipment, USACOM has endorsed a policy of modernization that responds to both near term and longer term re-capitalization requirements. In the near term, equipment shortfalls exist in strategic mobility, particularly pre-positioned forces, as addressed in the Army's Pre-positioning Afloat Program (APAP) and the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) enhancements. Likewise, we have endorsed priority funding of precision guided munitions and conventional ammunition stocks to compensate for reduced inventories of strike aircraft and replenishment of ammunition stocks, respectively. Full funding would relieve these shortfalls, dramatically increasing our capability for rapid and sustained global force projection. Global command and control demands that we fully support initiatives such as the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) to replace aging systems and maintain our technological superiority on the battlefield. Under longer term re-capitalization, strategic lift (both air and sealift), replacement of medium tactical vehicles, and amphibious shipping top our priorities and reflect the aging of current assets in these equipment categories. Finally, shortfalls in maintenance center on major end items. Currently commanders are forced to choose between making mission critical repairs for all systems or effecting complete repairs for only a limited number of systems. Over the long term, this practice will result in readiness degradation and reduced service life of mission critical systems. This practice has resulted in deferred depot maintenance on ships, aircraft, aircraft engines, and ground vehicles across all of our components. This result is especially prevalent when commanders are faced with absorbing contingency costs while awaiting passage of supplemental funding measures.

*Question.* What are the top ten items on your most recent Integrated Priority List?

*Answer.* CINCUSACOM's integrated priority list addresses two categories of issues: near-term readiness priorities and priorities to recapitalize America's combat capability. Within these two categories, 15 issues are addressed in order of priority. Our nine near-term readiness priorities include force readiness; strategic mobility; logistics support/sustainability; global command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I); joint training and exercises; theater lift; littoral warfare; chemical, nuclear, and biological protection, and electronic warfare. Our six priorities for recapitalization address mobility; theater missile defense; information warfare; amphibious lift; fighter/strike aircraft modernization, and maintaining a submarine technological advantage.

#### JOINT TRAINING

*Question.* Your statement indicates that joint training for military forces is a top priority. Since Atlantic Command now comprises over 80 percent of the entire active force structure, that is a tall order. How would you characterize the effectiveness of joint training today?

*Answer.* We train jointly today better than ever before. However, we have several initiatives in development which will continue to accelerate our training quality. First, we have now, for the first time in the history of the Armed Forces, a working source of requirements usable to define joint training requirements. Using the Universal Joint Task List as common language, we combatant commanders have conducted an analysis of our War Plans to determine our joint warfighting requirements, and we have developed our first-cut list of essential joint tasks. These joint mission essential tasks or "JMETs" are for use by our Services, Service Components and commanders at all levels to develop training plans tied to real requirements. USACOM will use a list of strategic, operational and interoperability joint tasks to train JTF and component commander's warfighting staffs and their forces. With the help of the other combatant commanders, I am developing a list of tasks with assessable conditions and standards, common to several theaters, which we in USACOM will use to train CONUS based forces for world-wide employment by supported CINCs.

Second, our recent exercise Unified Endeavor 95 (UE 95) demonstrated proof of concept to train Joint Task Force commanders and their staffs, and do so to a higher level of fidelity and standardization than we achieved in more traditional field and command post training. UE 95 accomplished exceptionally realistic training and left the participants well satisfied that their time was rewarded with personal increases in joint expertise. This was accomplished by using multiple simulations to focus the training of Service component staff members, reducing the need to move

large numbers of troops by linking staffs together from their home stations and—**packaging the training to the specific needs of the commander.**

Finally, among other initiatives, joint commanders throughout the military are working together to develop a broader range of joint training. Between my staff at USACOM and my NATO staff, among my Service component commanders, between USACOM and other US Federal Departments and between USACOM forces and other national forces, Great Britain in particular, we are training jointly, and more effectively than ever before. This is just the right time to focus such synergy within a single point management system, USACOM in its CONUS joint force trainer role.

**Question.** What are your plans to do things differently in the future?

**Answer.** We are not going to do things differently, we are quite simply going to continue to do them better. For example, I point to the huge potential of our Joint Training Analysis and Simulations Center (JTASC) in Suffolk, Virginia. Using the JTASC, we will improve our Joint Task Force commander and staff training program by providing a permanent world class opposing force cadre supported by a comprehensive state of the art distributed modeling and simulation capability for our JTF commanders to pit their skills against. In the near future we will integrate a huge variety of very promising warfighting simulations and virtual reality training tools to reinforce our current training process. This process will be tied directly to specific joint tasks, with conditions and standards, to provide commanders the requirements they need to train most effectively. If needed, we should be capable of providing a state of the art rehearsal facility to support immediate crisis planning rehearsals for those who may be required to deploy on short notice from CONUS. We can distribute all this from Tidewater, linked closely with the Joint Warfighting Center, the Service Centers of excellence, and a large number of the bases from which our forces are most likely to deploy.

**Question.** What needs to be done to the major military training ranges—such as the Army's Fort Irwin and the Air Force's Nellis AFB—to facilitate joint training?

**Answer.** These ranges have some of the greatest joint training capabilities of any ranges in the United States. They are owned and used by the Services to train their troops in Service tasks as well as joint tactical/interoperability tasks. The Services have developed continuing modification plans to enhance joint tactical/interoperability training on these ranges, and work closely with USACOM to schedule multi-Service training. Their modification plan is the correct path to follow not only for their Service training, but also for joint task training.

**Question.** Does the fiscal year 1996 budget include sufficient funds to maximize joint training opportunities next year?

**Answer.** In general, the requirements we have identified—have been adequately funded. However, the joint training program is rapidly evolving, and USACOM is currently involved with the other Warfighting CINCs and the Joint Staff to more closely define worldwide joint training requirements. As this process matures we should be able to better quantify what is required to achieve requisite levels of joint training. In the interim, USACOM should be fully staffed and funded to the requirements defined in the CJCS and Congressionally approved Implementation Plan. As a priority, the Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC) must be fully funded to realize the planned economies and maximize the leverage that emerging technologies and distributed simulation will give us. The capability and dynamic flexibility that the JTASC represents is essential to our joint training mission and has become the cornerstone of our Joint Task Force Staff training program.

Of continuing concern is the impact of contingency operations on training budgets in the execution year. Contingencies are not budgeted for and are often funded at the expense of training and maintenance budgets. If timely and adequate supplemental funding is not received, training for joint mission requirements can be directly impacted as training events are reduced and/or canceled.

USACOM's joint training mission continues to evolve as we move to execute the tasks set before us by the defense planning documents and the Unified Command Plan. If resourced according to planned levels, the JTASC continues to be fully funded and the costs of contingencies receive timely and adequate supplemental funding, we should be in good shape to continue our record of supplying fully trained and ready joint forces for any contingency.

#### STRATEGIC MOBILITY

**Question.** A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report raised questions about some of the basic assumptions of the DoD in the Bottom-Up Review. The GAO expressed doubts as to whether the force structure:

Has sufficient strategic mobility (airlift, sealift, pre-positioning) available for deploying in two near simultaneous MRCs:

Has sufficient support forces available;

Could redeploy support forces from peacekeeping operations to a major regional conflict in sufficient time to meet CINC requirements; and

Also expressed doubts that the Army National Guard Combat Brigades could be deployed within 90 days of being called.

With these criticisms in mind, I'd like to ask some questions about your perspective on the ability to conduct two near major regional conflicts.

What is your assessment of the availability of sufficient strategic mobility assets (airlift and sealift) for conducting two near simultaneous MRCs?

Answer. I would rely upon USCINCTRANS for this support and would expect that General Rutherford could provide a more detailed response to this question. ———.

*Question.* The GAO study states in part as follows:

"At the time of the Bottom-Up Review, DoD assumed that by 1999, 80 C-17s would be available."

However, under the current budget plans, only 40 C-17s will have been delivered by September 1998. How many strategic airlift aircraft are needed for the two MRC scenario? How does that requirement compare to: our current inventory and the strategic airlift inventory embodied in the Five Year Defense Plan?

Answer. The following chart provides a comparison of transportation force assumed for 2 MRCs (100 percent Active and ARC aircraft, CRAF stage I, II, and III) to the force that exists today (1995) and programmed for 1997. The Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review Update (MRS BURU) determined that airlift requirements are between 49.4 million and 51.8 million ton miles per day. Current (1995) airlift capability provides 48.88 MTM/D and 47.87 programmed in 1997.

Aircraft (PAA)	C-141	C-5	C-17	HC-135	HC-10	MDA	CRF <sup>1</sup>
2MRCs .....	88	104	55	26	37	0	243
Today 1995 .....	199	104	17	26	37	0	243
Program 1997 .....	163	104	24	26	37	0	243

<sup>1</sup> Represents total wide body aircraft (equivalent 747-100s).

#### SUPPORT FORCES

*Question.* I would like to place in the record at this point two tables from the above mentioned GAO study. These tables list various types of support units that have shortfalls.

What is your assessment of the adequate availability of support units for two near simultaneous major regional conflicts?

**Table 2.1: Army Units in Short Supply for a Single Regional Conflict and Tasked to Deploy to Two Conflicts**

Type of unit	Shortfall of units for a single regional conflict	Number of same units tasked to deploy to two conflicts
Aviation	4	40
Chemical	3	32
Engineer	33	94
Medical	84	96
Ordnance	9	32
Quartermaster	20	94
Signal	6	25
Adjutant General	1	20
Chaplain	3	0
Finance	0	9
Military police	40	45
Military law	0	1
Psychological operations	0	1
Military intelligence	2	4
Maintenance	4	22
Headquarters*	0	4
Transportation	29	135
<b>Total</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>654</b>

\*These units consist of personnel that would be assigned to augment command organizations in wartime.

**Table 2.2: Shortfall of Medical, Engineer, Quartermaster, Military Police, and Transportation Units for Two Major Regional Conflicts**

Type of unit	Shortfall of units for two conflicts
Medical	96
Engineer	59
Quartermaster	59
Military police	52
Transportation	72
<b>Total</b>	<b>338</b>

Answer. There is no doubt that given the two major regional conflict scenario, U.S. forces and, particularly, support forces would face a significant challenge in meeting all mission requirements. The current deliberate planning process is addressing this challenge and refining force lists for each of the MRCs in the most likely two MRC scenario, however these plans will not be complete until late this Fall. Moreover, the combined plan that will actually detail the scenario and forces for two simultaneous MRCs is not scheduled for completion until the Spring of 1996.

The current plans and planning effort notwithstanding, we are continuing our own efforts in conjunction with the Joint Staff and our components to determine where potential shortfalls exist across the spectrum of forces in the plans, not solely with the support forces. Our preliminary analysis leads us to believe the most critical support forces are transportation, medical, engineer and communications units and probably some low density, high demand aviation support units. Some of these potential shortfalls can be compensated with coalition forces, host nation support, contracted services, surrogate units and other resources. We are continuously examining these possibilities not only for the MRC scenarios, but also for our routine deployments. By doing so, we are leveraging the wealth of capabilities that exist in every Service to better manage operating tempo, quality of life, and, of course, our armed forces' warfighting capability.

*Question.* To what extent has Atlantic Command "war gamed" the two Major Regional Contingency scenario?

What were the results of the "war game"?

Answer. USACOM has participated each year in Service sponsored two MRC "war game" scenarios. Examples are: the Army's "General Headquarters" exercise and the Navy's "Global" exercise. USACOM also participates in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "Positive" exercise series. With these three exercises each year there has been no need for USACOM to develop our own two MRC war game. In our mission as force provider, we have provided valuable assistance during these exercises and been able to work out procedures for future real world deployments.

*Question.* Did you find that each theater of conflict may require many of the same support forces?

Answer. Yes. The current operational plans for the two MRC scenario have conflicting force allocations. The Chairman has directed that the operational plans that support both theaters be rewritten and force apportionment be deconflicted.

#### SHIFTING ASSETS BETWEEN REGIONAL CONFLICTS

*Question.* According to the Bottom-Up Review, certain specialized assets would be dual-tasked—i.e., shifted from the first regional conflict to the second. Examples of this include the F-117, airlift, sealift and air reconnaissance assets.

The General Accounting Office study states in part, "although DoD assumed that dual-tasking would occur, it did not analyze how assets would be shifted from one conflict to another."

Is that a valid criticism of the Bottom-Up Review?

Answer. I don't think so. If the GAO wanted operational level planning details, the criticism would be valid. However, the BUR was not intended as an operational planning document, but instead was focused on overall force structure planning and programming for a wide range of military operations. The actual shifting of assets from one conflict to another is highly scenario dependent. Each scenario would result in a prioritization of capability and force requirements that, in turn, would dictate which, when and how forces would flow to the second contingency.

Several initiatives including the Chairman's Readiness System, wargaming and the deliberate planning process are in the process of continually refining our understanding of the implications and risks associated with dual-tasked units. To date, these initiatives have demonstrated that the Bottom-Up Review assumptions would allow sufficient repositioning time and resources for virtually all forces required to move from one theater to the other. Additional insights into the dual tasking issue should be available as planning efforts mature over the next year.

*Question.* The GAO study also states as follows, "DoD officials explained that because a model for two near simultaneous conflicts does not exist, . . . DoD identifies the specific number of assets required for each conflict and assumed that dual-tasking would compensate for any shortfalls."

From your perspective, is the assumption that "dual-tasking would compensate for any shortfalls" a faulty assumption?

Answer. This question re-visits the issue of the purpose of the Bottom-Up Review versus the ongoing operational planning to determine specific contingency scenarios and force requirements. The nature of the BUR lends itself to force structure and programming for a variety of military missions. The detailed planning and analysis

available through the deliberate planning process, wargaming and other ongoing initiatives will evaluate specific forces, sequencing of postulated events, enemy threat scenarios and a multitude of other factors to determine courses of action available to warfighting CINCs. The result will help develop more effective and efficient use of dual-tasked forces, substitute units, and/or other resources to alleviate or minimize the impact of dual-tasked units on operational missions.

*Question.* Concern has been expressed about whether forces participating in peacekeeping operations will be available in sufficient time to meet CINC needs in case of a major regional conflict.

What is your view on the extent to which military units involved in ongoing peacekeeping operations can be redeployed to your command in a timely manner?

For example, what about transportation units that move cargo and personnel through ports? Wouldn't they be involved in the debarkation from a peacekeeping operation at the very time they would be needed in the early stages of a major regional conflict(s)?

*Answer.* We have been working this issue with the Joint Staff and other CINCs through various initiatives including wargames, logistics requirements analysis and the Chairman's Readiness System. Depending on the MRC scenario, redeployment of forces to the Atlantic Command AOR may or may not be required to respond to a major regional contingency. For example, the nature of the peacekeeping operation (dictating equipment requirements) as well as the geographic proximity of same to the MRC are factors that would influence redeployment decisions. Additionally, redeployment involves both military and political considerations which may or may not hamper our responsiveness.

I am cautiously confident that, under most of the anticipated circumstances, we can redeploy our forces in time to respond as required. Our success in mobilizing transportation resources in the Haiti peacekeeping operation is indicative of the capabilities we have and are improving upon our rapid global power projection force. However, I am concerned with some of our limitations, particularly in the transportation units that support airfield and port operations. Careful assessment of the specific requirements of each operation is required to ensure we meet operational timeliness for force arrival in theater. We are continuing to explore ways to more rapidly respond to contingencies through the use of Reserves, surrogate forces, contracted personnel and host nation support.

*Question.* Given the current projected force structure, would the occurrence of two near simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts inevitably mean that the U.S. would have to withdraw from any ongoing participation in any peacekeeping effort?

*Answer.* Given the spectrum of peacekeeping efforts in which the U.S. has been engaged in the last few years, the inevitability of withdrawal is not an absolute. However, the simultaneous risks from two nearly simultaneous MRCs would definitely put peacekeeping efforts lower on the list of military priorities if not precluding them altogether. We cannot afford to accept anything less than a total commitment to Major Regional Contingencies if we are challenging our national security interests. In any event, the specific situation with the MRCs and any ongoing peacekeeping operations must, as always, be addressed given all the relevant factors and constraints at the time the situation develops.

#### ARMY NATIONAL GUARD BRIGADES

*Question.* The Army's portion of the forces for the two-conflict scenario consists of 10 active divisions and 15 Army National Guard enhanced brigades. The 15 Guard Brigades include eight heavy brigades and seven light brigades.

Are you confident that the Bottom-Up Review's goal of the Guard enhanced brigades being ready to deploy 90 days after being called to active duty is currently realistic?

*Answer.* The goal is currently realistic and, once all enhancements are in place in fiscal year 1999, can be easily met and exceeded. The actual number of days necessary to be at a readiness level of C1 will depend on the warfighting CINC's mission for the brigade upon arrival in the theater of operations. The key is to recognize that the 90 day objective is based on a composite of various missions that the enhanced brigades could be assigned in a post mobilization scenario. Historic experience demonstrates that the 90 day objective can be met for rigorous, combat missions. The 48th Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, was certified by the Commander, US Army Forces Command, after 91 days in the absence of a "deliberate system" during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The improvements the Army is making can only better the already high probability that the 90 day objective can be achieved. Various agencies have provided differing views on this subject and have provided different estimates of the time required to be prepared to deploy at a readi-



ness rating of C1. In 1991 and 1992 studies the Director of Training for Department of the Army estimated 93-98 days; the Department of the Army Inspector General estimated 68-110 days; and RAND Corporation estimated the time at 96-154 days. However, in its 1992 analysis RAND does not account for any of the enhancements provided to the enhanced brigades and, therefore, does not take into account their potential impact on readiness preparations.

*Question.* According to GAO testimony last year in fiscal year 1992 and 1993:

Many Guard soldiers were not completely trained to do their job;

Many tank and Bradley fighting vehicle crews were not proficient in gunnery skills; and

Many commissioned and non-commissioned officers had not completed required leadership courses.

Doesn't this data make it clear that the availability of the Guard Brigades 90 days after being called up is an unrealistic assumption of the Bottom-Up Review?

How central to the two-conflict strategy is it to have the 15 Guard Brigades capable of deploying 90 days after being called up?

*Answer.* The GAO report cites findings consolidated in 1993, based on data collected immediately after the South West Asian conflict. This data reflects findings that were recognized by the Army and for which the Army initiated actions to correct over a long term. A total package of enhancements will be in place by fiscal year 1999 and will substantially increase a unit's ability to overcome similar perceived deficiencies in the future.

The Army has long recognized the impact of low Annual Training attendance on tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle crew qualification. That result is due primarily to the conflicting requirements for school attendance to qualify soldiers in certain individual skills, and professional military education for leaders. The corrective actions, which will take time to produce measurable results, include the "Select-Train-Promote-Assign" policy that improves the school selection process, and the Forces Command 1995 Annual Training guidance that directs school attendance in place of Annual Training as a last resort for soldiers who must qualify for promotion. However, soldiers will continue to pursue school training in lieu of traditional Annual Training in order to become qualified in their jobs and achieve higher levels of professional education. Other enhancements designed to address these areas include access to simulators for gunnery practice during Inactive Duty Training and funding for Additional Training Assemblies dedicated to proficiency on and maintenance of tank gunnery skills.

In answer to the second part of the question, I believe that the 15 Army National Guard enhanced brigades are essential to the two-conflict strategy. The strategy consciously and overtly relies on the presence and ability of the enhanced brigades to make the strategy succeed. They can and will fulfill a number of missions, including augmentation, backfill, reinforcement, and serving as a rotational unit base for active component forces in a protracted conflict or in a two-conflict scenario.

#### HAITI OPERATION

*Question.* Until recently, the troops in Haiti had been deployed from the 10th Mountain Division. The 10th Mountain Division troops had also been deployed to Somalia and to Florida after Hurricane Andrew.

What is the current policy on selecting which troops will deploy to contingencies? Should the policy be changed so that the same troops do not get deployed so often?

Please comment on the impact of such frequent deployments on the 10th Mountain Division troops, including morale problems and missed training opportunities.

*Answer.* Selection of units (company, battalion, and brigade) to deploy for contingencies—inside CONUS or overseas—is based on unit availability, the mission requirement, and unit readiness.

For individual requirements for staffs or augmentations, we continue to apply personnel policies designed to protect the individual soldier.

Soldiers deployed greater than 61 days are ineligible for movement for 120 days following deployment.

Soldiers deployed greater than 120 days are ineligible for CONUS reassignment for 120 days, an Overseas long tour for 6 months, and a dependent restricted tour for 12 months.

Soldiers may also receive OCONUS tour credit based on length of deployment influencing reassignment patterns when TDY 11 cumulative months in a 24 month period, TDY 11 continuous months in a 18 month tour length area or when no tour length has been established, or when with a unit TDY of two OCONUS deployments of 11 months within a 36 consecutive month period.

Currently we are doing several specific things to reduce Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) on the same soldiers. A good example is the migrant security mission at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO). Here we reduced the Military Police (MP) Operation Tempo (OPTEMPO) rate by using MP units for only those missions that require skills unique to trained MPs and substitute other type units to perform those missions (some internal and external security) that do not require those unique skills. This technique was also used in Panama during the return of Cuban migrants from Panama to GTMO where infantry and engineer units rather than MP units were used to provide security.

We want to use reserve forces whenever possible.

Another means by which we are reducing the PERSTEMPO is by contracting. We have contracted extensively in Haiti and are now going in the same direction in other places.

We continue to look at reducing or postponing the at home requirements of units returning from deployments.

Impact of frequent deployments on morale is always a commander concern.

In regards to the 10th Mountain Division, currently there are no indications in the area of reenlistment/retention, a major indicator of morale, that deployments have had an adverse impact. In an increased OOTW environment, coupled with a continuing downsizing of the force, hidden costs such as individual personnel turbulence, family stress and long term retention are often much more evasive and difficult to codify. That question will be answered with our ability to maintain a steady-state Army in the future.

Every deployment requires Army units to execute many of their go-to-war tasks. Frequently the operational environment provides the framework to practice the same skills that would have been the subject of missed training at home station. However, deployments do result in missed training opportunities because of the disruption to the short and long range training schedules of the units deploying. Upon return from deployments, units dedicate much of their available training time to addressing training shortfalls that resulted from these missed opportunities.

#### CUBA REFUGEES

**Question.** The House version of the Supplemental Appropriations bill to fund contingency operations provides \$349.1 million for Cuba. The Senate version provides \$287.7 million. The Senate cut \$52.3 million for real property maintenance and \$9.1 million for Guard and Reserve pay offsets. Please comment on the impact of these cuts.

**Answer.** U.S. Atlantic Command's components are once again financially sound to continue our record of providing fully-trained and equipped joint forces. The supplemental funding we received for our contingency operations in Cuba and Haiti replenished their Operation and Maintenance (O&M) accounts to appropriate levels. We do not foresee the cut in Reserve and Guard pay impacting U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) because support of the current Army mission does not include FORSCOM Army Guard or Reserve forces. Future use of FORSCOM Army Guard or Reserve forces is not anticipated through the end of the mission in Fiscal Year 1996.

**Question:** The Supplemental Appropriations bill assumes that 24,000 Cubans will be cared for at Guantanamo Bay during fiscal year 1995. Your statement indicates that about 20,000 Cubans will be at Guantanamo during fiscal year 1995. Could the Supplemental request be decreased to reflect fewer refugees?

**Answer.** FORSCOM received \$34 million in the supplemental appropriation for migrant support in Panama and Guantanamo Bay. Current obligations for migrant operations through 30 April are \$22.1 million. FORSCOM subsequently tasked to provide financial support for migrant operations in Panama. Therefore, FORSCOM anticipates expending the entire amount appropriated for fiscal year 1995 for migrant operations.

**Question:** What is the long-range plan for handling the Cuban refugees? How long is the U.S. going to have to pay for their care?

**Answer.** The U.S. Atlantic Command has supported the processing of an average of 500 migrants per week for parole to the United States. Since the 2 May announcement by the administration to accept the remaining migrants, we have been working with the Interagency to establish the maximum rate of migrant processing that can be supported to drawdown migrant operations as quickly as possible. DoD is committed to move the migrants as quickly as U.S. agencies can accommodate. DOJ/INS and other USG agencies estimate this to be 500 per week which means operations will continue through February 1996.

## SHIP SELF DEFENSE/COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT

*Question:* Since 1987, when 37 sailors died in the Iraq aircraft/missile attack on the USS STARK, the Committee has taken a keen interest in development of defenses against advanced anti-ship cruise missiles. "Cooperative Engagement"—where ships share radar data to mutually defend one another—has been a major emphasis.

Describe the targets used in the test and what threats they were meant to emulate.

Is it true that by using Cooperative Engagement, a ship, which could not "see" the attacking missile, was able to fire its own weapons to defend itself?

*Answer:* Targets used during the demonstration of Cooperative Engagement in the Puerto Rican Operations Area in June 1994 represented real-world threats. Low to very low altitude target presentations were employed emulating the low, fast threat posed by cruise missiles and manned aircraft. —. Yes, Cooperative Engagement's inherent ability to build and disseminate composite tracks of fire control quality data to all net participants, allows netted platforms to engage targets which the firing ship is not actively tracking with their own radars. —.

*Question:* Describe recent tests last month to expand use of cooperative engagement to defend against ballistic missiles.

How did these tests go?

*Answer:* On 24–25 February 1995, Cooperative Engagement ships from the USS EISENHOWER Battle Group and a Patriot battery in Germany participated in an exercise testing our capability to transmit near-real time target tracks from AEGIS to Patriot. This test was a technical and operational success. End-to-end connectivity between AEGIS and Patriot was demonstrated successfully —.

*Question:* How successful were you in sharing radar data between Navy ships and Army Patriot Missile Air Defense Batteries?

*Answer:* Cooperative Engagement provided a composite picture to the Patriot Battalion Tactical Operations Center via an international maritime satellite (INMARSAT). This display greatly improved Patriot's situational awareness during the exercise. Conventional cruise missile and aircraft targets were passed to Patriot on tactical data links via satellite allowing the direct cueing of Patriot for these targets. Additionally, AEGIS injected ballistic missile tracks into Cooperative Engagement which were used to exercise Theater Missile Defense procedures. —.

## SUBMARINES AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

*Question.* The direction for modernization of the Navy's attack submarine force will be a major issue before Congress this year.

Please describe Russian submarine activity in your AOR during the last year.

*Answer.* —.

*Question.* Since your command is responsible for anti-submarine warfare in the Arctic region, you would have a keen interest in submarine modernization.

Why is neither the third Seawolf or the new attack submarine mentioned in your statement to Congress?

Did either the Chairman, JCS, the Vice Chairman, or any other CINC include Seawolf or new attack submarine in their statements?

Where are the third Seawolf or new attack submarine on your annual Integrated Priority List of requirements?

*Answer.* I do not believe we currently need the third Seawolf to perform our Arctic ASW mission. While trimmed considerably from a few years ago, our submarine force is ready and maintains a technological margin over potential adversary submarine fleets. The third Seawolf or new attack submarine is proposed to maintain the delicate submarine industrial base and to lead the long-term recapitalization of our undersea forces.

I don't think the CJCS specifically addressed the third Seawolf or new attack submarine in his testimony, although I know Secretary of Defense Perry made a statement which said the current submarine requirement shows no need to build new submarines until after the turn of the century. The Seawolf program is intended to keep the industrial base active at a minimum level until replacement submarine programs will be required. As for the other CINCs, I am not sure what they have mentioned regarding submarines in their statements to Congress.

Maintaining our submarine technology advantage is the last of several USACOM recapitalization priorities on our latest Integrated Priority List. As stated there, our acoustic advantage over the best submarines in the world has atrophied such that we are now often at a tactical standoff against the newest nuclear and front line diesel submarines, both of which are at sea in numbers. We need to build submarines with improved quieting.

*Question.* How well prepared are Atlantic Command forces to perform anti-submarine warfare missions in "littoral waters"—close to the enemy shore?

*Answer.* Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is an important mission. The emphasis for ASW has shifted from open ocean to littoral waters in support of Joint Littoral Warfare. These waters, which bound enemy shores, provide acoustic conditions which in many cases are more challenging than those faced in the "blue water" environment. The undersea warfare threat faces in this environment is the diesel submarine, which while not possessing the speed nor range of its nuclear-powered counterpart, possesses the stealth and weaponry which can wreak havoc on our maritime projection forces and sea lanes of communication.

Atlantic Command forces, primarily the Navy since ASW is a uniquely Navy mission, prepare for ASW through a combination of individual unit training and Battle Force training during Joint Task Force (JTF) exercises conducted prior to overseas movement. Though the United States does not possess diesel submarines to use in a training environment, a combination of nuclear-powered submarines emulating diesel submarines and other nations' diesel submarines are used. Exercise weapon firings are also conducted to ensure proficiency in delivery and placement. It is recognized that a high level of ASW proficiency is essential for achieving the enabling capability for battlespace dominance in littoral regions.

While the nature of the threat has changed, many of the capabilities procured for the "blue water" threat are effective in the littoral environment. However, there are still areas-deficiencies which must be addressed in order to ensure success, particularly in light of the proliferation of modern and more capable diesel submarines to many Third World countries including Iran, Libya, North Korea and India. Many of the deficiencies have already been identified with viable solutions in development. Engineering Change 16 (EC-16) to AN/SQS-53A Surface Sonar System which greatly improves active sonar performance and the Light Weight Hybrid Torpedo which will provide enhance shallow water performance, are just two examples. Other initiatives are still required. However, these needs must be weighted against the back-drop of austere budgets and intense competition for resources. This requires that we learn how to better employ our current systems and identify which improvements are most needed.

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has recently directed that an ASW CNO Executive Board (CEB) be conducted to review the Navy's ASW current capability. Training, tactics, hardware and personnel are all scheduled to be examined. This should provide us the opportunity to ensure that Atlantic forces will be better able to conduct littoral operations.

I will work closely with my Naval Component Commander to ensure that our power projection forces in the littoral environment can be successfully defended from current and future threats.

*Question.* What are your top ASW deficiencies, where do these items stand on your Integrated List of Priorities, and how well does the fiscal year 1996 budget meet Atlantic Command ASW needs?

*Answer.* The top USACOM ASW deficiency is shallow water ASW, ranking seventh among the near-term readiness priorities in the Integrated Priority List (IPL). Specific enhancements which support improvements to our shallow water ASW include the Fixed Distributive System—Deployable for detection of submarines. Additionally, various enhancements including improvements to MK50 torpedoes, periscope detection, torpedo detection and countermeasures, MK46 hybrid torpedo and shallow water SONAR processing capability are required to help neutralize submarine threats once detected. Continued investment by non-allied nations in advanced diesel submarines mandates our possession of countermeasures which afford protection to our sealift capability and allow us to maintain strategic mobility.

The USACOM IPL prioritization of recapitalization issues for fiscal years 1997-2001 and beyond lists maintaining our submarine technology advantage over non-allied nations' newest nuclear and diesel submarines. This is particularly important as we restructure our forces and the submarine force and other ASW assets are reduced.

#### MINE WARFARE

*Question.* The Persian Gulf experience, where the USS ROBERTS and other ships were disabled through the use of relatively low technology mines, shows the difficulty of mine warfare.

Where does mine warfare stand on your integrated list of priorities, and what deficiencies exist?

Answer. Shallow Water Mine Countermeasures remains my first priority in Littoral Warfare, where inexpensive, easily deployable but lethal weapons threaten our strategic mobility. We need improved capability to detect and neutralize this threat.

Mine Warfare, as in all aspects of warfare, is not without an element of risk. Potential threats in a sea mine environment range from turn of the century moored contact mines to today's broad spectrum of high technology bottom influence, moored and anti-invasion mines. The low cost and increased availability of sea mines internationally has enhanced the threat potential.

The scientific and engineering communities are developing solutions to these pressing mine warfare issues. Specific areas of concentration include; Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence (C4I); Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Mine Hunting, Mine Sweeping and Mine Neutralization technologies.

The Joint Countermine, Advanced Concept Technology Development (ACTD) program, which we fully support, seeks to accelerate development, fielding, testing and fleet introduction of solutions to this pressing challenge.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 1, 1995.

## JOINT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

### WITNESS

**ADMIRAL WILLIAM A. OWENS, VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. NAVY**

### INTRODUCTION

Mr. YOUNG. The Committee will come to order.

Today the Committee welcomes Admiral William A. Owens, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral, you have had a long and distinguished career in the Navy, and I appreciate the many hours that you have spent with me as I prepared to be Chairman of this Subcommittee and we appreciate your presence here today.

Pursuant to an earlier vote, this meeting is being held in executive session. If there are any questions or testimony that you would like to present that would go beyond that, we can clear the room to a higher level of classification.

Before we begin hearing your actual presentation, Admiral, I would like to ask if you would be willing to tell the Committee briefly where we stand on the withdrawal from Somalia, which I understand is going very well at this point, and also maybe some comments about the latest incidents involving Iran in the Strait of Hormuz and that part of the world.

### WITHDRAWAL FROM SOMALIA

Admiral OWENS. Thank you very much.

I am very happy to be before this Committee. You have always been very helpful to us in many ways, especially with the Supplemental that you have facilitated in the last few days.

I would be happy to give you a few words on Somalia and on the situation in the straits near Iran, the Strait of Hormuz.

The withdrawal of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi forces from Somalia has gone very well. General Zinni is there on the ground and Admiral Redd is overseeing the operation at sea. The Americans and Italians are there together on the ground, and as of this morning the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were inside the protective cover of the U.S. and Italian forces.

We have taken a number of U.N. forces out. There are only about a thousand remaining now. There is a ship at the port which will remove the rest of them, we hope, if all goes well tomorrow. At that time, of course, the U.S. and the Italians will withdraw from the reef areas and hopefully we will be out of that Operation. That is if all goes well and we have every expectation that it will.

It has been very well controlled, the communications are complete, and there is a lot of quick reaction force coverage coming out of Mombasa. So we feel that we have a good handle on it.

#### IRAN IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ

In Iran, General Shalikashvili yesterday commented about the Iranian buildup on the islands in the Strait of Hormuz. The islands are Suri and Kesham and Toom which are in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz and in addition Qishm island is a long, larger island which is tucked up against the Iranian country right in the Strait of Hormuz.

Therefore, really three developments that I think together form a capability that could be very uncomfortable for us if the intention of the Iranians was to use the equipment. The three developments are the emplacement of the I-Hawk missiles, and this was something that General Shalikashvili mentioned yesterday, at Abumisa island. The I-Hawk batteries have a range that essentially covers the entire width of the Strait of Hormuz. We have not seen I-Hawk batteries and missiles placed on these islands before, so that is a new development that bears watching.

The second development is the continued emplacements of Seer-sucker missiles, the CSS-1 missiles. They are surface launched against ships and they have a very large explosive charge. They are quite accurate. They are a Chinese development basically and the Iranians have put a number of them off Qishm island and Suri island. So that capability against merchant ships or against Navy ships of any country could well be a significant threat.

Third, of course these Kilo submarines that the Iranians have, they have two. They are at Bandar 'Abbas and there is a third under contract under construction. We have been watching to see if it makes its way to Iran or not.

These things, taken together, form a capability that brings a lot of notice in the Gulf. It is hard to conjecture what they are trying to do with this. We believe that it is a defensive kind of emplacement, but it is also meant to make a statement about their sovereignty of the straits, and my guess is that they would very much like the GCC to notice that they are dominant in the area.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much.

Would any Member like to ask a question on Somalia or Iran at this point? If not, Admiral, again, thank you very much for being here.

Today, in addition to what you are prepared to tell us, we would like to make sure that you get into the perspective of the CINC priorities and your candid assessments of our ability to fight and win two near simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts—MRCs. We are interested in the NIMBLE DANCER exercise and I understand that you are prepared to show the Committee some of these technologies.

At this point, a copy of your biography will be placed in the record and your entire statement will be placed in the record as well. We would ask you to make your presentation any way that you like.

## SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL OWENS

Admiral OWENS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted a short statement for the record. I appreciate you including it. Thank you.

I would like to walk briefly—I hope I won't frighten you with these charts. I am going to show you a couple that are terribly complex and these are complex issues.

Mr. YOUNG. I want to tell you something about charts. The other day we had the senior enlisted advisors of all the services in for a very interesting hearing and the Marine Sergeant Major had prepared a chart that he made himself. It didn't have a real professional look about it, but it really told the story about the needs of the military today, a year from now, five years from now, 10 years from now and it was really well done and we have a copy of it. He spent a lot of time on his own time making this chart, but it really tells a story about what we need to be doing in the future or our defense capabilities.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Chairman Young exhibited the above chart.]

Admiral OWENS. We need to get him on the Joint Staff. You will see how much better his charts are than some of mine this morning.

## MAJOR CHANGES

(CHART 1) I want to just briefly tell you about where we think we are going, and the subject is change, because we think that we are faced with some significant change and we can't continue down the path as though nothing had changed.

(CHART 2) Goldwater-Nichols changed the law and made a number of changes in the way we operate, acquire and require the forces of our country. This is part of a product that has come out of that change. The world has changed, but we have to not just continue business in the Pentagon and in our military as though that world had not changed. It requires dramatic changes in the way we look at the budget. It is down, and we have to respond to that 40 to 45 percent real drop in the budget. There are big changes in emerging military technologies that I think could be a revolution in military affairs. The word revolution is used too frequently, but I think there is a revolution in military affairs that might be with us.

## GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT

(CHART 3) How we see that today, a little bit on this Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, you know about Goldwater-Nichols, but the three checked items are items that we think have been fairly well accomplished since Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. One I haven't checked is one we haven't been active in since Goldwater-Nichols was established in 1986, requirements, programs and budgets, looking across the four Services at what our military requirements are and then having understood those requirements, not just for new systems but for existing systems. Goldwater-Nichols gave the Chairman this authority to look at and provide the Secretary of Defense directly on what our recommendations were in the program and budget area, and that is really the thrust of



what we have tried to do over this last year with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the JROC. As you know, the Chairman advised the Secretary of Defense on these programs.

#### IMPLEMENTING CHANGE

(CHART 4) We have always had some role in assessing new programs. If you want to buy a new airplane, then the requirement for that new airplane has been brought to the JROC and blessed or not blessed. But the change here is requirements prioritization not only of the new systems but also the systems we already have, the airplanes, the ships, the tanks, the billions of dollars of things we already have and have a role in tying them together, and submitting budget proposals which are an alternative to the four Services and the defense agencies if they have an effect on the joint war-fighting capability of our country and we are expanding the JROC to make these changes. We have done that through these assessments.

#### JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY ASSESSMENTS

(CHART 5) We are trying to look at generic warfare capabilities across the four Services like joint strike, ground maneuver, et cetera, and we are going with a group of four stars on this, myself and the JROC, looking at these areas in complete detail: What is the frequency, what is the band width, what is the data transmission device. We have not done that at the four-star level in the military in this country, to my recollection. And then we go to the CINCs with the same products and spend about 10 hours with each on their turf with the five of us on the JROC. Many people participate in the assessments and this is really the heart of trying to understand this very complex equation of our military capability.

#### INTERACTION WITH CINCS

(CHART 6) We do have these interactions with the CINCs. We have just recently gotten back from visits to the CINCs as I show on this chart, and the goal is to look at current and future joint warfighting requirements with the basis being those assessments and the CINC inputs.

#### DOMINANT BATTLEFIELD AWARENESS

(CHART 7) I want to talk to you about something that I think is very important. Some of this is referenced in the vision documents like Army's FORCE XXI, a little bit of it in the Navy's From the Sea, the Operational Maneuver from the Sea of the Marine Corps, and Global Reach, Global Power of the Air Force, but I think that this is an element of the revolution in military affairs, Dominant Battlefield Awareness.

It is my view that if you see the vision of what is in the budget today with a few modifications that by about 2005 we will have Dominant Battlefield Awareness. If you have that, then the whole scene of military activity changes. This battlefield I think could be as much as 200 miles on a side, and with that battlefield 200 miles on a side I think with some of the systems like the high altitude SIGINT architecture, the space-based system, the Unmanned Aer-

ial Vehicles—UAVs, we will see that battlefield with enough definition to know where the radars are, where they are real time, all weather, 24 hours a day, and where the principal communications transmitters are 24 hours a day, real time, all weather. And that capability is with us. It is coming. And I am going to show you a bit of it this morning.

The bottom line is, if you know that large battlefield, and if you have the precision munitions to address those weapons, and we do—we have lists and lists of these weapons from the Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile—CLCM to the Joint Direct Attack Munition—JDAM and the Joint Stand-Off Weapons—JSOW and the Tomahawk, but we have lots of weapons that are designed to do this kind of thing if you have knowledge of the battle states. With all of this, if we can see the vision, bring the sensor-to-the-shooter connectivity, then we will do this a lot smarter. Much of this stuff is already in our budget, but we have never looked at it cross Service, to make sure the people on the battlefield have every bit of information possible to them using the dollars for systems that you have helped us buy through the years.

#### UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVS)

Let me show you—I mentioned UAVs. This a video four or five minutes long, real-time stuff. It, I think, gives you a bit of a vision of our future.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The Admiral proceeded to describe a video presentation.]

Admiral OWENS. This is a UAV, the GNAT 750. ———. You can see an armored vehicle here and watch for puffs of smoke coming out of this. You can see the men running from it. This is being real time transmitted just like this to the troops and to the CINC

See the smoke coming from the vehicle? It was shooting at the UAV. This is the first time we have seen visual evidence of the ground unit actually shooting and had real time awareness of that. They didn't hit it.

This is a relatively low technology UAV. It doesn't cost much, a couple million dollars. It is flying relatively low. They could shoot at it but the UAVs that we will have in the next few months are not as vulnerable or as low tech as that one. You can see this, there is the SCUD transporter. You can see this guy is at 9500 feet, 2.5 miles from the vehicle.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Is this daytime?

Admiral OWENS. Yes, sir, but it is not limited. This is out of Fort Huachuca on 6 February, in color, transmitted real time just like this. We watched it the other day in the JCS command center just like this.

Those UAVs are out there flying now. The difference between this Predator that I just showed you and the GNAT 750 earlier is that GNAT 750 came from a family of vehicles that required a relay aircraft. Predator doesn't require a relay aircraft. It can be controlled by satellite so you can fly it by satellite from the Pentagon or from—you can fly it from up here if you wish. And you get the information real time wherever you want it to the headquarters, or certainly to the soldier in the battlefield.

Our focus is to do that real time via satellite so that you have the best possible information.

Mr. YOUNG. You have the satellite 24 hours a day.

Admiral OWENS. Yes, sir. We have plenty of satellite capability to provide real time synergy if we are visionary about the way we look at C4I.

I will show you a bit more on communications here but the key is bandwidth. The revolution in processing is being bypassed by the revolution in bandwidth, and bandwidth in this case means the ability to transmit imagery real time, in video color. There are many technical schemes you can digitize it, you can compress it, you can have it require much less bandwidth, but the technologies come together to allow us to do this.

We showed you Medium Altitude Endurance—MAE but within the next couple of years we will have ability to put one of these vehicles at 60,000 feet, ——— with a 1500 pound payload and it will stay up there for 40 hours, so it is like a surrogate satellite and it can have it in signals intelligence, sensors or electro-optical. It can have video real time, all of it real time to the warfighter. It can have a synthetic aperture radar which gives it an all weather capability. So those sensors are readily available to us now.

The key is stay time, altitude to give you that wide area surge, and another key is the ability then to have the payload 1500 pounds which these vehicles will have in the next two or three years with the Medium Altitude Endurance/High Altitude Endurance, MAE/HAE vehicles. They are very important to us. We think they will not be expensive.

The goal of the program is to have them \$10 million or less per copy. We think there is a good chance that they will do that. So this is a very great capability for a relatively low cost and there is a lot of technology, a lot of American know-how in these programs.

Mr. YOUNG. So that no one misunderstands and believes that we have this capability totally available now, will you explain the time line when you would expect to have this type of a system operational?

Admiral OWENS. It comes in a variety of forms. We have some Pioneer UAVs that have been around for years. They have not been high in reliability. We have some companies of these in the Marine Corps and I think a couple in the Navy. We have at Fort Huachuca now a short-range UAV. It is almost ready for procurement. It has been tested. It brings tactical capabilities within a direct line of sight.

Predator will be with us in the next three or four months as an ACTD, an advanced concept technology demonstration. These have been very well handled I believe by this administration with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Technology, Mr. Larry Lynn and Dr. Paul Kaminski, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and Dr. Deutch, Under Secretary of Defense and Dr. Perry, Secretary of Defense facilitating these ACTD programs.

The Predator will be with us in the next few months. The follow-on capability at 60,000 feet, as I described, I think will have been tested by about the end of 1998. And those vehicles should start

flying in the next 6 to 12 months and we will have some pretty good idea about how they are going.

So I think this is not pie in the sky, not fantasy land. There is a progression to this capability and if we keep on track with this capability, I think we will have enormous additional leverage for our warfighting capability.

The Israelis have used these to great advantage for many years. What we have shown you today is beyond what the Israeli capability is. We just have to have the determination to make sure it happens from our standpoint and we are determined to make sure it does happen.

Mr. YOUNG. If any of the Members would like to come and actually see this in real time, is that something that could be arranged?

Admiral OWENS. Absolutely. We would be glad to do that any time you would like.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you.

#### JOINT TASK FORCE COMMAND TRANSACTIONS

(CHART 8) Admiral OWENS. A bit about Joint Task Forces and command transactions, and communications in general, not to give you a boring communications brief, but to tell you about the revolution in communications that goes along with these sensors because if you have the sensors on the one hand, not only air breathing UAVs but the space based sensors, the question is, how to get them transmitted to the battlefield. We have never focused on how you do that as a military, all four Services.

I think the doctrinal use of communications fits well with the technologies that are being developed. There is a very important development of national level-to-the-soldier in the battlefield chain of command. It is a command function, has to go directly up and down the line, rules of engagement, specific orders, Presidential, NCA level sorts of communications. The reality is it has to be there all the time for the soldier in a mobile battlefield, it has to be anti-jam, it has to be capable of being securely encrypted, and it has to be available for many, many units. This is the description of MILSTAR. MILSTAR will give us this kind of reliable communications to that mobile soldier, the marine, to the ship at sea, and MILSTAR is very important for these command transactions.

#### INFORMATION AND RESOURCE TRANSACTIONS

(CHART 9) The beginning of the wonder of the revolution is that not all information has to go up and down that pipe. There is an enormous amount of information that we want to go, many of us, outside the chain of command. It is information on intelligence, on logistics, it is the kinds of stuff that you call up on your computer in Windows and you say "logistics" and you punch the button and you get a menu, you punch the button on Mark-82 bombs and next comes up the inventory. A lot of this information needs to go to other elements of chain of command. This requires bandwidth and then a very important function is the transmission of data from those sensors direct to those shooters via satellite or by direct line.

The other players in the chain of command will want to know about that kind of thing, but the critical link here is the sensors to the shooter directly. I already mentioned the critical nature of

MILSTAR, but this kind of capability is serviced by bandwidth expansion and here direct broadcast satellites. Digital video, compressed digital video, and automatic target recognition technologies are important to allow this kind of information sharing in that new way.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. It will all be done securely?

Admiral OWENS. I think that there is a good chance that we have a capability to do this securely in the very near future. If you are familiar with the Multilevel Information System Security Initiative, MISSI cards, we have under test right now a system of multi-level security which is entered by a card about the size of my Pentagon pass, and you basically can plug it into a computer, into a laptop or in the not too distant future, a Motorola handset. Plug it in, the system will encrypt what you are sending, and the person on the other end, if he has a card which is qualified for that level of security, he will be able to receive it securely. So I think the MISSI technology is very important and we have to make it a part of this whole scheme of transferring information. NSA—the National Security Agency—has worked on these cards and this technology. I think that relatively soon we will have a pretty good answer to that question in terms of the pragmatics of getting on with the program.

Mr. MCDADE. Would you address yourself to the vulnerability of the sensor platforms?

#### TARGETING TRANSACTIONS

(CHART 10) Admiral OWENS. In discussing the communications and the sensors and the Dominant Battlefield Awareness, I have been talking in terms of systems of systems. It is important I think for us to see the revolution in military affairs in terms of systems of systems. Only America is beginning to do that. Only America has the ability to put these things together.

You may find somebody that gets a UAV or somebody who gets a precision weapon; you may find somebody who has a handset GPS—Global Positioning System transmitter—but they will not have the systems of systems that are the key for our capability in the future. So in discussing the vulnerability of these sensors, we acknowledge that some are vulnerable. However, the high-altitude endurance UAV is a low-observable sensor, so it will be relatively invulnerable ——— so it is pretty hard for most surface-to-air missile systems and for Anti-Aircraft Artillery, AAA from any land facility, to threaten it. And we have additional advantages because the UAV is unmanned, of course, the vulnerability means less to us than it would in a U-2 where you are worried about the man.

Satellite sensors are relatively invulnerable also, way up in many cases and hard to get and we don't think ASAT capability will be available in the near term to get the satellites. The keys to our success are: staying out of range of surface-to-missile systems which we do very effectively, invulnerability like the high-altitude endurance UAV and smart sensors in satellites, and it is the systems of systems that I think are relatively invulnerable because it degrades gradually.

There may be 15 UAVs up there and there are no men in them, so you are not always thinking about loss of life. I think there is

**an enormous potential to do things relatively inexpensively. In the past we have tended to say communications only up and down that stiff red line of command authority as opposed to saying no, there is a world of information that goes outside the chain of command, not one that always has to stick inside it.**

#### C2 ARCHITECTURE

**(CHART 11) So the doctrine is very important as we proceed to MILSTAR, direct broadcast satellites, bandwidth expansion and other technologies. This chart is scary, isn't it? This is to say, this JTF, joint task force, is a very complicated thing. There are many, many organizations in it, not only in the military but also many of the organizations that support this JTF from DOD, and there are many non-DOD organizations.**

**This is the mother of all viewgraphs. I want to say to you that this complicated nature of JTF is something we have to react to, we have to build our systems to react to it, but we think that these kinds of communications capabilities can dramatically simplify this, and I would be happy to give you a separate brief on that but there is real promise in making all of that come together in simple ways.**

#### SENSOR-TO-SHOOTER CONNECTIVITY

**[CLERK'S NOTE.—Classified Chart 12 removed.]**

**I want to say here if you could focus on these systems, the short-range UAV, the U-2 aircraft and its sensor, this is an aircraft surveillance system. The Navy's ES-3 that flies off of carriers is one of the world's most sophisticated electronic aircraft. These are systems for which we have spent billions of dollars. Billions of dollars. The four Services have ground command and control sites represented by Intelligence Analysis System—IAS for the Marine Corps, the JPAC and TAC for the Air Force, the ETRAC, Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlator ASAS for the Army, and JMTRS for the Navy. We have spent billions on these systems.**

**Our JROC and this new process looked at how do you transmit that surveillance data to the four Services? You spend billions on these things. The question is: Are all warriors getting the information? We have looked at these sensors to determine what is wrong. Have they gotten the information to the command centers? The red indicates they do not. The black indicates that they are okay. The red indicates they do not, but we would like to have them transmit that information.**

**With these billions of dollars of systems, if we devote about \$40 million we can make all the red lines black. And there is a difference in the way we look at these things today than what we have done in the past. We have built them Service by Service, built the data links for that Service, and we haven't shared data with the other three. These are very complex issues, but for a relatively small amount of money you can make the red lines black. It is one of the things that we think is important in this revolution of military affairs not only to look at new systems but to look at the ones we have done in the past and make sure that they transmit that data to all the warriors in the four Services.**

## COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT CAPABILITY

I want to show you a video on a very important data link that you have facilitated over the past few years, the cooperative engagement capability. We have spent a lot of time on this in the Navy, but this is a real capability to tie units together to do exciting things, land and sea. If I may show you about a five-minute video on cooperative engagement.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The Admiral proceeded to show a video.]

I think you can see that the capability now to transfer fire control data from one platform whether it is a ship at sea or a Patriot battery ashore and the follow-on video shows the Patriot-ship interface gives you the ability to launch at the full range of capability of the missile whether it is ——— the Patriot PAC III rather than waiting until you see it yourself. So you can launch the missile on the fire control data of another platform and you can launch before you see it yourself.

This is important with regard to links and sharing data for theater missile defense, cruise missile defense and air defense for the future. It is being investigated very carefully now for the Army and for the Air Force to interface in the air defense business.

## QUALITY OF LIFE ISSUES

(CHART 13) I want to talk a little bit about unchanging concerns. You certainly have been loyal to us in support for our people. Here, however, is where we have some difficulty, recapitalizing our military capabilities. How do we continue to recapitalize year by year the Bottom-Up Review forces and all the trucks and the boots for the soldiers and all of the things that matter? How do you recapitalize that on decreased modernization procurement budgets. Facilities: How do we recapitalize BOQs, the base structure facilities. The backlog is significant. I will show you something on that.

(CHART 14) We think there are three elements of keeping faith with our people that are more important than any of the others. You have been helpful to us in all of them, but the CINCs, the Service Chiefs and the JROC feel these three priorities are most important in keeping faith with our people and avoiding the hollowness that we experienced at the end of the 1970s.

We need the maximum pay raise allowed by law each year, and the steady, dependable level of medical benefits. When you send these kids to war or to sea and their 19-year-old wife is at home with those kids, it is important that they have the confidence that they are going to be cared for appropriately with the right kinds of medical treatment.

People are worried about the retirement system and what is happening to it and to have a degree of stability in that retirement is very important.

An issue which is a close fourth is housing. That is particularly true in places like Korea and Hawaii.

## PROCUREMENT TREND

(CHART 15) The second of the elements of concern that I mentioned is the recapitalization of systems. We are at a post-Cold War nadir in 1996, with only \$39 billion in procurement. If you were to

have said what is the average necessary to recapitalize the force prescribed by the Bottom-Up Review, I would let you find your own number, but it is probably in excess of \$50 billion. We need to have more money going into procurement to recapitalize.

We are always expecting a funding ramp up in the outyear projection, but when it comes time for the budget year, the projection of the previous year is not as good. You find that getting squeezed more and more as you get closer to the budget year so the outyears are somewhat conjecture.

#### REAL PROPERTY MAINTENANCE

(CHART 16) Facilities and family housing, this is the backlog. By 1997 we will be up near \$12 billion in the backlog of maintenance of real property. It starts to have affect on readiness. It is hard to say that that toilet that doesn't flush in the barracks has a direct impact on readiness, but at some point it has an impact. It is starting to be seen as we tour bases that this kind of a backlog is a significant problem for us. So recapitalizing is an issue and maintenance of real property is an issue of very high visibility to our people. It is an important element of keeping faith with them.

#### SUMMARY

(CHART 17) As my last viewgraph shows, our process continues. We are hoping that we are doing some good work for you and for us and for the country. We are looking across the Service lines, our emphasis is joint warfighting. We are trying to look in detail at these things, not just to give you whiz-bang sales pitches, but to try to look in a substantive way at how you bring this together to make a difference.

I think command and control advances, information management, these very important sensors, and precision weapons represent a revolution in military affairs. I believe that there is an opportunity visible now where we can change some of the strategic paradigms of the past, in particular, the paradigm that says there is always a fog of war. There will be a lot less fog of war 10 years from now. I don't think the deep shadow battlefield will exist then. It will be simultaneous battlefield and therefore many roles and missions issues tend to be somewhat meaningless because you will be looking at the entire chessboard of the battlefield. You may no longer be thinking about a three-to-one advantage in order to take the offense because the successful offense results from doing it smart, not in having three times as many tanks.

So these paradigms will fall as we go through what I think will be a revolution in military affairs. Not all of us in the four-star military are of that opinion, but General Shalikashvili and I are clearly focused on these kinds of smart ways of doing business.

That is all I have to show you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for taking so much of your time.

[The statement and charts of Admiral Owens follows:]



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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

STATEMENT OF  
ADMIRAL WILLIAM A. OWENS, U.S. NAVY  
VICE CHAIRMAN  
OF THE  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
BEFORE THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY  
JOINT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

MARCH 1, 1995

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

## ADMIRAL WILLIAM A. OWENS VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral William A. Owens is the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this capacity, he serves as the Nation's second highest ranking military officer.

Sworn in on March 1, 1994, Admiral Owens is the third person to be appointed by the President to serve as Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. His career includes numerous commands afloat and a variety of influential tours ashore with the Department of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations.



From July 1992 to December 1993, Admiral Owens directed the post-Cold War restructuring of the U.S. Navy, serving as the first Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments (N8). He commanded the U.S. Sixth Fleet and NATO's Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe from November 1990 to July 1992. Admiral Owens served as the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from July 1988 to August 1990. He was the Director Office of Program Appraisal in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and the first Director of the Navy's Strategic Think Tank. He served as a member of the U.S. Navy's first Strategic Studies Group and as Executive Assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. He has commanded Submarine Group SIX and Submarine Squadron FOUR. He served in four strategic nuclear powered submarines and three nuclear attack submarines, including tours as Commanding Officer, USS SAM HOUSTON (SSBN 609) and USS CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI (SSN 705).

Admiral Owens was born in Bismarck, North Dakota on May 8, 1940. A 1962 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy with a B.S. in Mathematics, he also holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in Politics, Philosophy and Economics from Oxford University, Oxford, England and a Masters Degree in Management from The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

Admiral Owens and his wife, Monika, have one son, Todd, an officer in the U.S. Navy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you know, the position I occupy was created by the Congress, in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. I believe that Act, now a part of Title X, has had the most significant organizational implications for the nation's military forces, since the original unification efforts that followed World War II. The Goldwater-Nichols Act not only created the position of Vice Chairman, it also required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assume new responsibilities in establishing requirements for the nation's armed forces.

I try to help him meet those responsibilities. And, in this effort, I chair a very interesting group, called the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, or JROC. This council, on which the Vice Chiefs of the four military services also sit, was established in the mid-1980s. It was designed to provide a senior military perspective on what the nation requires for national defense, and, in particular, to judge whether various major weapons, weapons systems, and other military systems are actually required. To make these kinds of judgments, the JROC considers underlying elements of future U.S. military functions and needs that are and will become the foundation for talking sensibly about military requirements. Since being appointed to my present position a little over a year ago, I, the Vice Chiefs of the military services, and the

Joint Staff have spent a considerable amount of time working our joint warfighting capabilities within the JROC. We have engaged the Unified Commanders in our discussions, as well as the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs. The JROC, in short, has become one of the real centers of thought, discussion, planning and debate with regard to what requirements for our nation's military forces ought to be over the foreseeable future.

Today, I'd like to share with you some of the views that have emerged over the last year from the JROC forum. Given the demise of the Soviet Union, our discussions in the JROC have been particularly interesting and far ranging. I'd suggest they've also been important so far as the character of our forces are concerned.

Let me begin by suggesting that our armed forces are involved in three great revolutions. The first stems from the revolution in world affairs, brought about by the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. These events opened up new opportunities to the United States, and, as you well know, a spate of new issues and international problems. It also altered, perhaps much more profoundly than most realize, the way we in the Pentagon think about and plan for the kind of U.S. military forces the nation needs.

We are also involved with a related revolution, namely, the reduction in the Defense budget. This began almost a decade ago, and, of course, accelerated because of the demise of the Soviet Union. One of the most revolutionary aspects of the way we think about the Defense budget today is that we do not plan on any significant, rapid increases. Let me be clear on this point. We in the military can always find ways of spending money, and there are a number of specific areas in which additional funding could be used. But, the more fundamental question we must all face is whether the funds that are available will be spent in the best way, given the profound changes in the world. Additional funding is a subsidiary issue to this more basic issue, and I have not come before you today to ask for more money. We do not plan for significant increases in our defense budget.

This is a big change. For nearly a half a century we in uniform tended to assume the opposite. Our planning was tied to the threat posed by Soviet military capabilities. Those capabilities carried a very significant threat to our nation and our national interests abroad. And because Soviet military capabilities grew steadily, if incrementally, through the decades of the Cold War, we assumed the military capabilities of the United States would have to expand and grow, also.

and that those improvements would necessarily mean the defense budget would have to rise.

The third revolution we as a nation are witnessing is what some call the revolution in military affairs, or the military technical revolution. The United States is in the middle of this phenomena. We are experiencing rapid improvements in our military capability, brought about by certain technologies and the incorporation of those technologies into military doctrine, organization and operations. The United States leads all other nations in many of these technologies. Arguably, we will be the first nation to pass through this revolution, emerging with qualitatively different strengths that can give us an edge across the entire spectrum of contingencies against which the nation may need to commit its military.

Although each of the military services is involved in this third revolution, the key to successfully managing and using the revolution lies in a joint perspective. The complete success of the American revolution in military affairs will occur through the coordinated, synergistic interactions of all the military services. One way of understanding the work of the JROC over the last year, then, is to see it as a catalyst. The JROC has worked hard to articulate a joint perspective. And it has tried to go beyond merely articulating that vision.

We have tried to hone our common vision into clear statements of military requirements.

What kinds of requirements are emerging from this? Some of them are quite familiar. The nation will continue to need high quality military personnel, and it will have to commit the resources necessary to assure the men and women who enter the military meet the high standards needed. We have established a trust with the people who serve that must be maintained.

There is another set of requirements. They come in part from realizing what is emerging from past and current investment in three general areas. The first area is what we call "ISR", an acronym drawn from "intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance". It involves sensor and reporting technologies associated with intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as the new means by which we are able to keep track of what our own forces are doing. Because of the advances in this area, we are expanding quite dramatically our capacity to maintain real time, all weather awareness of what is occurring in a wide geographical area.

The second area is in command, control, communications, computer applications and intelligence processing. We refer to this as

advanced C4I. It is the general area in which we are able to translate the awareness of what is occurring in a broad geographical arena into understanding of what is taking place there. This involves everything from automated target recognition to developing knowledge of an opponent's operational scheme and the networks he relies on to pursue that scheme. This is also the general area in which processes like target identification, assignment and allocation take place. In other words, it is the realm in which the understanding of a battlespace is converted to missions and assignments designed to alter, control, and dominate that battlespace.

The third general area is that of preferred munitions. Many tend to understand this as precision guided weaponry, and it certainly includes this category of weapons. But it also includes other ways of using force precisely, and the kind of force that can be used includes things like information warfare. This is the area in which the knowledge generated from the overlap of the first two areas leads to action.

It is easy to miss the power that is emerging from the interaction of these three broad areas. This is because we tend to see developments in each of the areas as discrete and separate. Consider the following list of some of the weapons and systems that have entered the active



inventories or will do so in the years ahead. I've used the acronyms associated with these programs to make a point.

Not everyone inside the Pentagon can quickly describe each of the systems or weapons the acronyms describe. Different offices, different services and different people can explain some of them in great detail and depth. But something about the way we plan and program in the Department keeps us in compartmented perspectives. We are more adept at seeing some of the individual trees than that vast forest of defense.

### **Weapons and Systems In or Entering US Military Inventories**

#### **ISR (sensors)**

AWACS  
RIVET JOINT  
EP-3E  
JSTARS  
HASA  
SBIR  
TIER 2 (+)  
TIER 3 (-)  
TARPS/ATARS  
MTI  
REMBAS  
MAGIC LANTERN  
ISAR  
FDS  
Etc.

#### **C4I**

GCCS  
MILSTAR  
JSIPS  
DISN  
JUDI  
C4I FTW  
TADIL J  
TRAP  
TACSAT  
JWICS  
MIDS  
SONET  
LINK-16  
DMS  
Etc.

#### **Preferred Munitions**

SFW  
JSOW  
TLAM (BLK III)  
ATACMS/BAT  
SLAM  
CALCM  
HAVE NAP  
AGM-130  
HARM  
AIR HAWK  
SADARM  
HELLFIRE II  
TLAM (BLK IV)  
JAVELIN  
Etc.

Because of this, it is easy to miss the fact that, together, these programs posit a qualitatively different military potential. What is happening, in part driven by broad conceptual architectures, in part by serendipity, is the creation of a new system of systems. This new broad capability carries the American revolution in military affairs. And it carries a new appreciation of joint military operations, for this revolution depends ultimately on contributions from all the military services, a common appreciation of what we are building, and a common military doctrine.

All nations have or can buy at least some of the technologies on which battlespace awareness, advanced C4I, and preferred munitions are founded. The United States, however, leads all other nations both in the robustness of the systems that appear on lists like the one I've sketched, and in the systematic effort to build the interactions between the systems listed. Accordingly, the United States is going to pass through the revolution in military affairs sooner than any other nation. Doing so could give our nation great leverage.

I believe this transition is inevitable. But the speed at which we complete it depends on innovative defense planning and programming decisions over the next several years, and the support of the Congress. If

we decide to accelerate the transition, it can be completed early in the next century. If we, and I mean both the executive and legislative branches, decide to take this step, we can be on the other side of this new revolution in military affairs, years, and perhaps decades, before any other nation. We will be in a far better position to shape our international environment, rather than simply react to it, than at any time since the end of World War II.

Thank you.

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***The Challenge of Change***



Briefing for  
**HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE  
NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE**  
1 March 1995


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CHART 1

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## The Motivation for Change

Four Major Changes Compel a Fresh Perspective ....



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CHART 2

# Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

## MAJOR CHANGES:

✓ ESTABLISHED CJCS AS PRINCIPAL MILITARY ADVISOR TO NCA

✓ OPERATIONAL FORCES ASSIGNED TO CINCS

✓ CHAIRMAN DEVELOPS JOINT DOCTRINE, TRAINING & EDUCATION

• CHAIRMAN ADVISES SECDEF ON REQUIREMENTS, PROGRAMS & BUDGETS

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## Implementing Change

**CHAIRMAN ADVISES SECDEF ON  
REQUIREMENTS, PROGRAMS & BUDGETS**



**ASSESS MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR  
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS**

- **ADVISE SECDEF ON REQUIREMENTS  
PRIORITIZATION**
- **SUBMIT ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM  
RECOMMENDATIONS & BUDGET PROPOSALS**


**JROC ROLE EXPANDING TO MEET THE CHANGE**

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CHART 4

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# Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments



- INCLUSIVE EXAMINATION OF JOINT WARFIGHTING AREAS
- FOUR STAR MILITARY FORUM

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## Interaction with CINCa




## EMERGING VIEW OF JOINT WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS

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CHART 6

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# Dominant Battlespace Awareness



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CHART 7

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# JTF Nodes & Command Transactions





CHART 8

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# Information & Resource Transactions



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CHART 9

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# Targeting Transactions




CHART 10

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# Unchanging Concerns




CHART 13

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**Our Most Important Resource**

- **THREE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS TO SUPPORT OUR PEOPLE:**
  - **ADEQUATE & FAIR COMPENSATION**
  - **STEADY, DEPENDABLE LEVEL OF MEDICAL BENEFITS**
  - **STABLE RETIREMENT SYSTEM**


**FOUR STAR MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN AGREEMENT**

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CHART 14




# Procurement Trend



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# Real Property Maintenance Backlog of Maintenance and Repair\*



Source: OSD O&M Overview, Published Annually  
in Support of the President's Budget

\*O&M Funded Facilities Only (Excludes DPOF, BDT&E, Family  
Housing, Prior Year Data not Normalized for DPOF Transfer)

FORM  
B-APPEND B-APPEND


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CHART 16

# The Process Continues ...

## WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES ASSESSED:

- ACROSS SERVICE LINES
- FOCUS ON JOINT WARFIGHTING
- IDENTIFY CHANGE LEVERS



A VISION FOR JOINT  
WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES IS  
EMERGING:

- DOMINANT BATTLESPACE AWARENESS
- FULLY INTEGRATED C2
- SEAMLESS, ROBUST ISR
- PRECISION WEAPONS

## CHAIRMAN'S FOCUS ... JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY

**Mr. YOUNG.** Thank you very much, Admiral. You have made an excellent presentation, and we are thankful for your visions into the future and your thoughts about what we should be doing today to be prepared for the future.

We are honored to have the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee present with us, and I would like to yield to him for any statement or questions he would like to ask.

#### RECAPITALIZING CAPABILITIES

**Mr. LIVINGSTON.** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much for an excellent overview of where we are, Admiral. I am optimistic about where we will be in the battlefield. I am particularly struck with your point about us being able to provide the comprehensive systems to do all of it.

I agree that the Qadhafis or Saddam Husseins or perhaps the Russians will never be able to match us in totality of efforts, but perhaps could make a significant development in one area or another, and that is why we need to keep the comprehensive picture.

I know that we have declined in procurement by 71 percent. We are now at a 50-year low as your chart points out in terms of procurement going back to right after World War II. That is pretty grim if we are going to continue to replenish our ability to be able to do all these wonderful things.

Add that to the fact that as Chairman Young has pointed out several times, if a set of parents drove up all loaded down with their kids' belongings anticipating to check the kid into a dormitory and they were in a condition of some of the barracks that we expect our young people to live in, that they would just keep on driving.

I see that we still have a lot to accomplish. I think that your presentation has given us the meat that we need to go forward and strive for more resources, but at the same time we are going to look to you and to your colleagues for suggestions on how we might economize as well. We can meet all the demand that you pointed out. We have to do better than we are doing now, but if there are areas in terms of efficiencies and procurement practices, in Pentagon practices, staffing and what not that can be trimmed, we need to explore those. Because, frankly, in the environment in which we live, I can tell you despite my total agreement with your whole presentation, we have got a heavy load to carry up here, and we have got to show that we are all bleeding out the fat wherever we find it.

**Admiral OWENS.** Chairman Livingston, thank you very much. I sure agree with everything you have said. I know that the burden here is very heavy. I might comment on some things that I think are relevant.

In this kind of a world we face, it may not be necessary to recapitalize ship by ship, airplane by airplane, but to recapitalize capability. Some of these are small-cost items. Much of what I have briefed you on today is in the budget already; it is just that we have never looked at it as an entity, as a system of systems. However, recapitalizing capability might mean that we can take resources from other platforms that are serving basically as trucks.

We have to be pretty sure before we proceed this way, but whether you need as many of the trucks, the airplanes, the ships, the

tanks as you did before is a great question. If you have a smarter way of using them as we go through the next few years, that method might allow us to do this at a lower cost.

In the area of procurement from the warfighter's perspective, one initiative has been very important to us, the advanced concept technology demonstration. This gives us the ability to work together with the people at OSD to say: Here is where we want to go with an ACTD. One currently being demonstrated is UAVs. So we have an ACTD that we can work warfighter to warfighter, to put together a program that satisfies us as warfighters, not just to have the money in 6.1 and 6.2 to be spent somewhere in the system, but to have four-star focus on things that matter the most.

So there are some things that I briefed you on this morning that are appropriately in the ACTD category. When we think they are satisfactory to bring to you, we can come and say we together have used these, we are satisfied with where they are going and we would like now to go into a more rapid procurement. So I think the ACTDs are very important to us. I think there are savings to be had in joint requirements. If we look at these nine areas jointly rather than each Service doing it, there are a lot of savings there.

I put together the Navy budget for the two years for 1992 and 1993. I can tell you that I put together a \$70 billion Navy recommended budget, the systems, the planes, but I didn't know much about the Army or the Air Force. I didn't know a lot about ATCMs or AFAS and B-2 and JDAM. So it is interesting to me that we can put together these budgets without knowing all of the information that pertains across the Services. I think that the general requirements business of getting us all together, making sure at the four-star level we are aware of these capabilities, gives us ability to perhaps be somewhat more efficient in the future.

#### MOBILE OFF-SHORE BASING

Mr. LIVINGSTON. One more. I do want to commend you for bringing a lot of vision to the whole planning process. I have been convinced for years that the Navy, for example, had a strong role in anti-missile defense and I think that that is progressing well, and we want to make sure that both lower tier and upper tier, THAAD, Theater High Altitude Air Defense and various other systems progress, but that we get a system on line that is deployable and that is mobile as quickly as possible. I want to urge you to go ahead with that.

Also, in other conversations I have had there is a system that I know you are interested in that I would like you just to elaborate on for perhaps other Members of the Committee that intrigues me, this oil field platform that is a deep sea platform based on the oil rig effort that utilizes component platforms that can be pieced together to give logistical support on the high seas or even pieced together to provide airstrips and the like.

I would like you to just tell me a little bit about that if you could so that others could be brought up to date on that possibility.

Admiral OWENS. I believe you are speaking of mobile sea base. Revolutions come not only in whiz-bang things but also in innovative uses of technologies that have been around for years, and I think this is a good example of them. I brought along a chart, if

I may throw it up, which shows a mobile sea base or at least one version of mobile sea base.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The chart was submitted for the Committee's files.]

As the Chairman mentioned, I think that there is an enormous advantage in the technology that American petroleum companies have put into building these platforms used by engineers for oil drilling. They are talking about fourth-generation platforms.

If I could share an experience that was interesting to me, I went to New Orleans and got on a Coast Guard helicopter and went to an oil drilling platform called Ocean America. It was named well. It was a fourth-generation oil platform, floating, not resting on the bottom. It was drilling 4,000 feet beneath and it was positioning itself with GPS and thrusters to stay over that hole.

At the end of the day they were going to pull up the drill rig and at six or seven knots, move to the next hole and drill another place 4,000 feet beneath them. If you take the derrick off that platform land put sheet metal over the top of it, it turns out to be a very stable platform from which you can do a number of different things.

I have been in the Navy 30 years. I have never seen a pool table on a ship, but Ocean America had a pool table. It was sea state four that day, with a wave height of eight or nine feet and there was no discernible pitch or roll in the platform. I think it is possible to put these things together. Ocean America is 300 by 500 feet. If you put two of them together, you might start to see that you have a mobile sea base. They are not very expensive. They are for a fourth generation oil derrick in the area of \$100 million with the derrick.

So if you have six of these, you have something that is 3,000 feet long, 300 feet wide with an enormous amount of storage space in it that has a self-propelled capability, slow speed, between 5 and 10 knots, but it will move to a new position. It could be a sovereign base for America. The President can put it where he wants it, not subject to another country's will, not subject to the political environment in the region, but in international waters anywhere around a region and give us enormous leverage.

One like this would be 3,000 feet long and 300 feet wide, inside which you could put one division of armored prepositioned equipment. You would have a platform to off-load it so stable that you might want to put some of those prepositioning ships alongside and leave them there. So when you have a crisis, you can take stuff as necessary ashore. This has enormous potential to change our logistics capabilities in the future and also to make a military difference.

The other flexibility that you have is you can separate this into six pieces or three pieces and put a battalion in one place, another battalion in another place, et cetera. You can use Patriot batteries, for example, on one section to defend Kuwait City if you chose to do that or you could put a MLRS battalion aboard it with ATCMs missiles. It is a stable platform and is able to project firepower for 200 nautical miles with the updated missile. Or you would be able to operate Apache helicopters from it. You could put a couple of these platforms together and put an Apache company aboard it

with Apache Longbow and Hellfire missiles. Locate them in two or three locations and bring pressure on an enemy with firepower inexpensively.

How much does it cost? \$100 million apiece; that would be \$600 million in the configuration shown. I don't think we will get it for that. But if you triple it, it would cost under \$2 billion and a lot of things that float cost that or more. So I don't think this is necessarily a replacement for anything, but it could well be a great element of capability for us in the future.

We have spent a lot of time thinking about it and talking to the CINCs about it. The reviews are mixed for obvious reasons, but I am very strong on this potential and we need to continue to investigate it and have a little bit of R&D money in it. When we are ready with a real concept, we will come to you and give you a recommendation.

Mr. YOUNG. I was hoping you were going to bring your model and show it to us. It is an exciting concept, no doubt about it.

At this time I would like to yield to Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. I would like for the Chairman of the Full Committee to pause just a minute. I want to thank him for bringing it up. With this elevated status, I know he is no longer interested in provincial matters, but the shipyards along the coast are interested.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I hadn't thought of that.

Mr. WILSON. Admiral, I really appreciate your leadership in this effort which I have believed in for several years. Members of the Committee need to know that if we put five of these together, which I think is the basic concept we could billet an armored division. C-17s could land and take off, in addition to all of the other functions that you named. They could be used as Patriot bases or MLRS bases and actually fire from the platforms.

I think you know that there are two different kinds of offshore rigs, both of which are applicable here. One is the semi-submersible, but it is conceivable that if you were in shallow enough water you could use a jack up to where you could have legs on the ocean floor.

According to your testimony, the probable cost of a five-section system, which could house a division, which could provide landing and take off capability for a C-17 as well as other aircraft, would be less than a billion dollars or about a third the cost of an aircraft carrier.

And I understand that the basic resistance in the service is coming from the carrier admirals because they somehow feel that this might be a threat to a carrier, but the functions are so different that it is hard for me to understand why they are worried about it. It does not function like an aircraft carrier. It couldn't be used in any sort of attack mode because it couldn't get anywhere very fast.

Would your idea be that maybe we would have two or three of these, one stationed in the Indian Ocean, one in the Pacific and one in the Atlantic?

Admiral OWENS. There is of course a lot of conjecture with this. There is a significant element of our community that is not in agreement, not only the carrier admirals but others. It is an element that I think we need to continue to talk about a lot. But there

are a number of people who do support this, so it is a process that has resulted in some adherents now that were not there a few months ago.

I think you are right; this is a very inexpensive way to bring a lot of capability. It is a joint platform, a place for Air Force, Army, Marines and Navy too. It is not an aircraft carrier. And it is the kind of thing that you might want because it is relatively slow speed, you might want to have two or three of them around the world.

I am just talking off the top of my head, but it might be nice to have one of these in the Arabian Gulf, one in the Mediterranean Sea and one in the western Pacific. Then you would have a lot of prepositioned equipment, a lot of flexibility and base capability that was at the behest of the American President, because it wouldn't be necessary to have another head of government give you permission to have access to your own equipment.

I think there is a lot of potential here. I am not sure that you would get this for anywhere near \$600 million, but even if it is three times that much, which is probably more realistic, it is still inexpensive as compared to a carrier.

#### LANDING SHIP QUAY/CAUSEWAY PROGRAM

Mr. WILSON. If the Chairman would indulge me, I want to talk about the research and development money a bit. This has also been associated as a project with the LSQ/C, the Landing Ship Quay/Causeway program. Last year I believe it was \$10 million—the year before, \$17 million, for a total of about \$27 million in research and development for the two; is that right?

Admiral OWENS. I will have to check that, sir, but that is right in the vicinity.

[The information follows:]

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) has been examining concepts that might provide alternatives to or variations on Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS). Included in the work was a study of "Portable Ports". The cost of the study was \$1.5 million. The LSQ/C was one of the concepts in the study, although it was not the only concept examined. From 1993 through 1995, ARPA will spend \$4.65 million on contracts to specifically examine the LSQ/C. 1995 is the last year ARPA will fund studies about the LSQ/C. In addition ARPA funds another study that examines high value components that may have application in other technologies. From 1993 through 1995, funding for that has been \$6.2 million, from which an undefined percentage was used to look at LSQ/C.

Mr. WILSON. Actually it may be nearer \$40 million. And I believe last year we put a little more emphasis on the LSQ/C because the Navy seemed more interested in it. But now I believe we could probably say there is more interest in the mobile offshore basing than there is in the LSQ/C, or is that wrong?

Admiral OWENS. Congressman, I think that we should continue to put a sufficient amount of R&D in both. I think LSQ/C has a nice capability, which is the ability to put a pier wherever we want it, so you can flow large amounts of equipment ashore in non-pre-determined places. It could be a very important capability also. So I think we should continue a sufficient amount of R&D in both of the capabilities.



Mr. WILSON. You have got nearly \$40 million and a lot of that is probably earmarked for, or scheduled for the LSQ/C, and I hope it is. I hope that gets moving in a way that is productive this year.

But as I read the request you only requested \$5 million this year for the mobile offshore basing R&D, and that seems like an extremely small amount. I would hope the Committee would have some interest in raising that somewhere.

Do you think \$5 million is enough?

Admiral OWENS. If you want my personal opinion, I think a little more money in that project would be useful.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. Mr. McDade.

#### SENSOR-TO-SHOOTER CONNECTIVITY

Mr. MCDADE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, thank you for an interesting and enlightening morning. Am I correct that I heard you say that you could marry up the sensors to the shooters for a sum of \$40 million?

Admiral OWENS. The concept is sensor-to-shooter, of course. When we look at marrying up sensors in the future like UAVs, HASA, High Altitude SIGINT Architecture and space-based infrared—IR, there is a lot more money involved as we conceptualize how to do that efficiently. It is essential as we look at the sensors of the future to make sure that they downlink to our warriors.

The other subject I spoke of was the systems that already exist, the AWACS, JSTARS, systems that will be around for the rest of my life. These are very important to get downlinked to all four of the Services. To make a real difference on a significant number of platforms it would cost us about \$40 million to do that kind of cross linking of those systems to the warriors.

Mr. MCDADE. Is there any way to qualify the statement by showing the increase in effectiveness if you marry up the shooters? You are talking \$40 million on some of them.

Admiral OWENS. Could you put up that chart again?

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Classified chart removed.]

What I am saying is these blocks are particular links. This is the common battle link. This is TADIL—Tactical Digital Information Link. This is the Tactical Intelligence Broadcast System, TIBS broadcast. These are networks of information.

So to get a common data link sent to each of the four Services, to get the EP-3 and Reef Point information sent to the Marines, for example, could be very important. ———. If you had the ability to downlink that to the Marines, which is what this link would do, then the Marines would have that type of capability all the time. It could be very important for them. Likewise—this is the Guard Rail system.

The Army has hundreds of C-12 aircraft which do electronic warfare. It would be very important for that capability to be able to go to the Marines. The Army has plenty of Guard Rail aircraft, doing electronic locations of communications transmitters or radars. It would be very useful to get that information to the Marines.

So this link here coupled with this link will give that information to the Marines also. To quantify, we could provide that in detail

for the record, but you can make all those red lines black with a sufficient number of platforms for about \$40 million. I would want to cost out, if you wanted to make all of the forces, all of these command centers, all of the Reef Point aircraft, all of the EP-3 capable of linking this data, it might be a little more, but not significantly more.

Mr. MCDADE. It would be double?

Admiral OWENS. I would guess double.

[The information follows:]

A recent review by the Joint Staff identified modifications that will enable us to share sensor information between the existing and programmed Service sensors shown on the chart. For approximately \$40 million in addition to the programs currently funded and coming on line we can make the sensors accessible to the Service components of a Joint Task Force that do not have access to them. The \$40 million (in 1997 dollars) will complete procurement costs for hardware required to improve interoperability of the sensors at the numbers we have programmed today. Integration, training and maintenance costs are not included in this figure. If we choose to place the capability on more platforms, a figure of about \$80 million in 1997 dollars is a fair estimate. The actual cost will be based upon the number of platforms that are upgraded. Our ongoing assessment efforts will attempt to identify the best places to put the additional capability. Many of the system improvements cannot be completed in one year, so cost could vary in the out years.

Mr. MCDADE. When you were speaking about recapitalization and the difficulties that we are having with virtually a zero procurement budget, are any of those platforms that are shown as a sensor in danger of any kind of obsolescence, where there would be a short-term decrement to ability to collect that intelligence?

Admiral OWENS. The U-2s are getting years on them but are with us for another 20 years. Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System—ATARS is new, being put together for the F-18 aircraft. It will be on the wing, real time video transmitted by a direct line of sight transmission path.

ES-3A is a modified S-3 aircraft from the decks of carriers, brand new. RC-135s have been around awhile. We will have to make sure that the RC-135s and EP-3s are handled so we can recapitalize that capability.

E-2Cs, we are still building a few so they are being recapitalized year by year. They are old, but there is a block 2 modification coming along. AWACS will be around for a number of years but the replacement for it is not apparent now.

JSTARS is new and it is not in the field yet. And the Guard Rail system has been around a long time but has many years remaining.

So, in general, these are relatively new systems. The interesting thing to me is that despite the fact that they are new systems and we have spent billions on them, the planning didn't occur to allow all the information from them to go to all four Services, and we need to make sure that that happens in the future. I am determined that we make these lines as black as we can.

Mr. MCDADE Thank you very much. All I can say to you is press on. We are going to try to be helpful.

Admiral OWENS. Thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. This Committee is proud of the fact that we have been pressing for direct downlinks for a long time and we are happy to see what is happening there.

There is an interesting story on ATARS, how it almost went away and this Committee struggled to restore it.

Mr. Hobson.

#### SATELLITE SYSTEMS

Mr. HOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I have a couple of questions for you. Are you familiar with the NAIC in Wright Patterson?

Admiral OWENS. I am not aware of it, sir.

Mr. HOBSON. The National Air Intelligence Command.

Admiral OWENS. No, I am not.

Mr. HOBSON. One of the things that is not in here is in the video there is no satellite capability or at least there doesn't appear to be with that mission that you are talking about. Is there a reason for that?

Admiral OWENS. I am just trying to give you a representative look at some relatively inexpensive technologies. If I gave you the impression that I was trying to be all inclusive in my look at surveillance sensors, I apologize.

The sensors that I mentioned are critically dependent on satellite systems. At the top of that you see HASA, and space-based IR. The high-altitude SIGINT architecture is a space-based capability.

MILSTAR satellites are clearly a very important part of our future. I haven't mentioned existing satellite systems, many of the electro-optical ——— satellite constellations that are very important. We have to tie those satellites and the UAVs and the air-breathing systems like RC-135 and EP-3 all together in a very thoughtful way. That takes an awful lot of time because the data links, the frequency, the bandwidth factors make this a very complicated business.

#### MILITARY RETIREMENT PROGRAMS

Mr. HOBSON. Two other things. If Mr. Murtha were here he would probably want to ask about one of them too, because we share a joint interest in trucks. I know that doesn't sound like much. A lot of people are interested in sophisticated stuff. General Schwarzkopf talked about trucks. When we get done, somebody has to be out there in the streets of Mogadishu or wherever you are at some point and you have to move stuff around. I don't know whether we are building any. If you are going to move these troops, you are going to have some basic things like that.

You don't have to respond to that, but I think it is a problem because I don't know whether we are building them today and the one place we are building them we have problems.

I sit on two Committees. When I got on this Committee—I am going to talk about it a little bit. I sit on the Budget Committee and when you talked about the retirement, we did look at something in the Budget Committee, and this may not be the appropriate place to ask it. One of the things that we did do, one of the things is that people retire at 20 years; 97 percent of those people, because the retirement is not large, I think get additional jobs.

We put out a trial proposal about the COLAs and that got a lot of people tense. It wasn't for anybody who is there now but it got a lot of people tense. Personally I think at some time we are going

to have to look at the retirement system, look at how people move around in commands. Every two years if you don't move up, if you look at all your careers, you move every two years, about every three years the general for awhile jumped in rank. Those are expensive. There is need for movement, but when you look at the cost of those over a period of time, it is very expensive.

Was that to what you were referring—about the retirement and the problems with it?

Admiral OWENS. I think we just want to—I am going to speak personally here and not to represent the four-star military JROC process. I think I sense from talking to the troops in the field from all the Services, the issue is really let's get settled on a retirement system so we will know where we are at.

In general, we recognize that the budget is really tight here. We have a certain element of faith we need to keep with people who have been around for a long time, but I think if changes are necessary in the future, we need to lay out the changes. Say to them this is the way it will be and it will take place in 10 years when the people who are not grandfathered come along and let people know where we are going with the retirement system. We need a system of expectations that is established that our people can live by.

I recognize that you can't just lock in what we have today for the long term and expect that that is the best way to go. I think there are a lot of deficiencies in the personnel system. We have not done well in terms of the proliferation of pay systems. All the Services have their own pay systems. The cost of that is I think not insignificant. We all have our own personnel system and our own travel system and we have civilian categories of each of these and we have active military categories and reserve categories.

So the consolidation of those kinds of activities as we get into the future can save a lot of money as well as the kinds of things that you mentioned with respect to how we move our people.

Mr. HOBSON. And we would have more money available to modernize, more housing, for instance.

Admiral OWENS. Yes, sir I think there are efficiencies.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Dicks.

#### B-2 BOMBER PROGRAM

Mr. DICKS. Welcome, Admiral.

I have read your statement. I think what you are talking about here is one of the most important issues that we face. On one of your pages, part of your testimony addresses that of preferred munitions. Many tend to understand that as precision weaponry, and it includes this category of weapons but it also includes other ways of using force precisely, and the kind of force that can be used includes things like information warfare. This is an area in which the knowledge generated from the overlap of the first two areas leads to action.

I think this is one of the most promising areas and that is why I am part of a group here that has been leading the effort to try and see if we can't continue to procure additional B-2 bombers, because I think with the B-2 you have the potential of combining stealth technology in a long-range platform and if you combine it

with smart conventional weapons, sensor fused weapons and Joint Standard Operating Procedures, JSOP, those are two potential weapons that could be used on the B-2.

I was impressed a few years ago when RAND did an initial analysis in which it used the B-2 against Saddam's invading division and the weapon of choice was the sensor fused weapon and it is something like 1,200 submunitions per bomber. They were able to interdict this division using the intelligence and the other things that you talked about with the other systems, and it knocked out in this simulation 46 percent of the mechanized vehicles moving in the field.

All of sudden you have the ability from the United States of America with one aerial refueling off the coast of Spain to literally interdict a division in the Middle East, or if you had enough notice you could sent them to Diego Garcia.

What worries us in the Congress, and this is where your responsibilities in the JROC are very important, is that we think if you have 20 bombers, you have 16 you can use and that 16 does not allow for sustained military operations. I have asked generals, can you sustain military operations with 16 B-2s, and the answer uniformly is no.

There were two very good studies done on this subject, one by RAND, and one by Jasper Welch. Both suggested that the right number was somewhere between 40 to 60. At the White House I asked Colin Powell what his recommendation was when they reduced the number of B-2s down to 20, and he said my recommendation was 50. That is a number that I think makes sense.

Admiral, as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, can you tell me the role the JROC played in establishing the original requirement for the B-2 inventory objective several years ago?

Admiral OWENS. I would like to come back on the history of that because I can't recall what the history of the JROC was at that time when the number was established, but my guess is that the force level of those bombers or the force level of any system that we have bought has not been determined by the JROC. It has been a matter of saying does this kind of platform meet the requirements we have as opposed to saying how many are required.

We are trying now to become involved in issues that deal with numbers of not only new platforms but existing platforms as well. I would like to get back to you with the specifications of that.

[The information follows:]

The JROC did not play a role in determining the number of B-2s. The 1985 Bomber Study predated the existence of the JROC.

Mr. DICKS. There is the Heavy Bomber Study by Dr. Kaminski being done. What role will the JROC play if the bomber force study concludes that more B-2 aircraft are needed?

Admiral OWENS. It has been undertaken by Paul Kaminski. We have a representative from the Joint Staff who is participating in the Bomber Study. That is General Ed Eberhart, a two star who is Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8. We are very interested in how it comes out.

I am, as you know, a bomber advocate in general. I am a precision weapons advocate. I am also well aware of the budgetary prob-

lem we face with the total procurement dollars, so I think that this study is going to be an important element in trying to determine the trades that are necessary here. Given a different set of cards on the table, it would be easy to see why we would be very anxious to procure more B-2s. We are fiscally constrained and I will be anxious to see how this Bomber Study comes out.

#### CINCS WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS

**Mr. DICKS.** As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, you are the focal point for supporting the acquisition needs of the regional CINCs so that they can successfully execute their contingency plans. Can you tell us if the planned long-range bomber force inventory of a decade from now will meet all the warfighting requirements of the regional CINC's?

**Admiral OWENS.** A decade from now, 2005, let me talk more generically about how we look at future warfighting requirements.

Our military as a joint force has never had a capability to look at the system of systems that make up the U.S. military 10 years in the future. We are pretty good at saying how it is today and we are pretty good at saying how it feels in terms of readiness and structure today to face today's threats. However, we are not very good and we don't have the models and simulations or the ability to see any kind of a representation of smart warfare, information warfare, the effect of precision weapons, the coming together of HASA and space-based IR and UAVs and data links to the troops. We don't have a modeling and simulation capability that would allow us to glimpse into the future as much as we need to do so.

We are trying to give ourselves an ability to do that, but for now other than sheer estimation I can give you no analytic basis for the numbers of platforms to address a capability 10 years from now, although we need to try very hard to be able to do that much more effectively.

#### B-2 BOMBER CAPABILITY

**Mr. DICKS.** What bothers me—and I have tremendous respect for your judgment, for your thoughtfulness, for your record as one of the most innovative thinkers in the military today—you said not enough people have spent time thinking about how you use this new technology. When I saw the chart the other day that was shown here about how many bombs it took to knock out a target in World War II, something like 9,000 to get a 90 percent kill factor, and in Vietnam it was like 94 bombs had to be dropped, and then you look at the F-117, used in the Gulf War, going in with two 2,000-pound bombs right down that chimney of the air commander's facility, now that is revolutionary capability.

I personally believe that we need to procure additional B-2's while the production line is open, because it will cost us a lot less money to step up and do the right thing now. Yes it will require trade-offs, but in my judgment you are talking about for the first time this country has the potential for a conventional deterrent.

If I am Saddam and I know that if I send out the Republican Guard and the United States can wipe it out with B-2s from Deigo Garcia or even from the United States, I would think twice about ever invading.

Yet that requires us to have enough of that capability to make it militarily credible. So I urge you to go back to the JROC and to think about this. Everybody says we have got to make it, but it is going to cost.

I said to Dr. Deutch, if the President of the United States called you and said, John, we need the B-2 and 16 isn't enough, I agree with Senator Nunn, Congressman Lewis, the appropriators, I agree with everyone who has been active in this issue, you would rearrange the defense budget in a matter of hours to make room for this requirement if it is important enough.

I don't think we have given this enough thought. I don't think we have really looked at what this capability gives us in the future, and it is that combination of high technology, stealth technology which means that the other side can't shoot you down.

The other thing I think is important is you are not talking just about money. You are talking about the lives of our kids. They have a much better chance of surviving if they are in a B-2 rather than a B-1 or B-52. The problem with that old technology is it is not stealthy and has a problem with penetration. We will lose kids and money.

I hope you have looked at what Senator Nunn shows in his chart about the cost of standoff weapons. He shows that in the first 10 days of the Iran-Iraq war, heavy combat, major regional contingencies if you used standoff weapons on the B-1 and the B-52, the cost per day for those stand-off weapons is \$2.2 billion. Compare that with what the cost of the weapons on the B-2; it is dramatically lower, like \$300 million a day. That is a difference of \$1.8 billion just in the weapons.

We don't have much of that standoff capability. If we don't make a decision on this, if this Administration lets this go by and five years from now it says, my God, we made a terrible mistake, you will have to reopen the line. I am told that the cost of reopening the line is \$6 to \$10 billion.

After spending \$44 billion, we are now in a position to get these things at a reasonable cost and we could retire some of the older bombers that are not able to penetrate. That will reduce the cost of this project.

I wanted to be here today to let you know again, I respect your judgment. I realize we have tough times, but in history there are a few times when you step up the plate and do the right thing. It was the Congress that insisted upon building the F-117. That turned out to be a good decision. I hope you will take a look at this.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Dicks for an excellent and eloquent statement.

Mr. Lewis.

#### TIER II PROGRAM

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I too would like to express, associate myself with Mr. Dicks' concern. Admiral, I have a very specific problem that really is a short time crisis and it relates to your presentation today, specifically. The video that you shared with the Committee involved, as I understand it, Tier I and Tier II essentially and we are at a crunch with Tier II.

Among the ACTDs that seem to really be flying, it is Tier II everybody is impressed with, and yet that assembly line is ready to close. In the next five or six days they will start laying people off and there is \$20 million appropriated that could be used. There is a conflict between two Committees, this Committee and the Intelligence Committee, and there is an authorization question that is outstanding. So it is very important at the highest level that this problem is addressed.

Dr. Deutch supports this program but his people need to know that it has to be resolved soon. Essentially what has to happen if we are going to preserve the line is someone has to say, Can't we take an existing authorized program, reprogram that money to this program. A transfer of an existing authorized program would solve the problem, a very esoteric and highly challengeable problem in the Intelligence Committee. It is just a matter of somebody walking it through the process.

My staff and me personally can help do that, but I would love to have you be in that mix immediately. If you are not, I don't think we will be successful.

Admiral OWENS. I frankly was not aware of the precipitous nature of the situation with Tier II. I am very high on the capability. It is very important we keep it coming along. I will certainly look into it.

Mr. LEWIS. I very much appreciate your priority in connection with this kind of procurement. In the meantime, I would appreciate your assistance.

Admiral OWENS. Thank you.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you.

#### ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR DEFENSE

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much.

Admiral, I have quite a number of questions that I wanted to ask, but I recognize the interest of the Committee in your presentation today so I end up running out of time. I will submit most of those questions for the record if you don't mind responding to them in writing.

I would like to ask you, frankly we are seeking a higher budget number for the defense function for fiscal year 1996 and if we are successful in getting any additional funding, we are going to need your advice. And I would like to ask your personal opinion on where you would invest additional funding over and above what the 1996 request is to prepare us for the future as you have described it to us today.

Admiral OWENS. Chairman Young, I am of course happy to give you my personal view on this. The areas in which I would personally be looking for ways to most efficiently use a little extra money are in general the smart warfare side of this. I addressed a few of these links problems. That is one where some money could be wisely spent. Also it is important to make sure that these UAV programs are completely funded. There could be some money for not only the UAV, but the sensor packages that go in them.

The U-2 Syers program, which is a similar kind of electro-optic sensor for the U-2, I believe, is not procuring a sufficient number of sensors. Therefore, a few more of those packages, they are a rel-



atively small cost, a few million dollars a copy, would go a long way.

In the area of precision-guided munitions, the capability to get some kind of a powered JSOW or an Air Hawk missile is important. I think that may not be far enough along actually for procurement, but there is something that could be facilitated in terms of a few million dollars for R&D for that development which might give us a standoff capability a lot cheaper.

The TADIL-J data link is an extremely important element of our situational awareness. If I had talked about it, I would have shown a video on the importance of TADIL-J. It gives us a digitized air battlefield and it is very important. If we could buy a few more systems it would enormously expand our situational awareness.

In the area of taking care of troops, housing shortfalls and that MRP backlog are very important. Some money to make sure that backlog doesn't go higher, maybe even to reduce it would be very valuable.

Of course it is important to increase the procurement dollars to the extent that we could do some limited recapitalization, whether it is buying trucks or whether it is high tech kinds of things, like procuring a few Strike Eagle aircraft. Because the F-15E line is not going to stay open forever, that by itself would be important as an element of recapitalization.

Those are just a few off the top of my head. If you would like a more formal list.

Mr. YOUNG. As we go through hearings and mark up, maybe we could meet with you again to go over the specific programs and what the dollar amounts might be. There may be some suggested rescissions that we would like to discuss before we would recommend them, maybe some non-defense type items that are in that budget.

We are hoping to establish effectively a new policy that anything that goes into this appropriations bill is going to have to do something positive for the Nation's defense, and we would like to have your help and your support in making sure that we identify those items properly.

You have given us a really good hearing today and a lot of information to think about.

Mr. Wilson wanted additional time. Mr. Wilson.

#### MOBILE OFF-SHORE BASING

Mr. WILSON. As a little footnote on the MOBS. If enough money were put in for 1996, would you foresee some actual experimentations with hardware, like actually trying to buckle together a couple of these platforms, or is it still too far away for that?

Admiral OWENS. Congressman Wilson, I am very high on this capability, as you know, but I also want to make sure that I don't get it killed in the outyears before we get enough people on board to make sure we are ready to proceed because it is such a big important capability I think. So a little more money to do R&D, to perhaps even do leasing of a couple of existing vessels and do some R&D that way I think could be useful. But for procurement, I think we are a little premature.

Mr. WILSON. I meant perhaps some experimentation with coupling the platforms or where you actually did something with steel rather than just on paper.

Admiral OWENS. It is an area of interest to me. Of course, the technical—if there is any technical risk with mobile sea base it is in the connectors. I personally don't think that challenge is that great especially in sea state five and below, which is the representative sea state for the areas in which we would operate. However, a little more work in that area to assuage the fears of those who think there are problems would be useful.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. Admiral, is there anything else you would like us to hear from you this morning?

Admiral OWENS. You have been very kind to let me show you a few toys and to indulge my discussion. Thank you very much.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you again. I have a number of questions I will submit for the record. The hearing is adjourned until 1:30 p.m. this afternoon.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Lewis and the answers thereto follow:]

#### AN/SPS-48E RADAR

*Question.* Admiral Owens, the Appropriations Committee has been including funds for upgrading the AN/SPS-48E Radar. This upgrade would help limit radar background clutter for ships operating in the littoral waters. The Navy has been resisting expending these funds. What are your views on the importance of upgrading the AN/SPS-48E Radar?

*Answer.* Navy has been upgrading/refurbishing the AN/SPS-48E radar for 38 of its ships from the "C" version to the "E". This upgrade saves Navy money because it reduces logistic support from two systems to one and improves operational reliability. From 1991 through 1994 Navy spent \$71.2 million for this upgrade and design work. Navy has budgeted in prior years to install these completed AN/SPS-48E upgrades. With the addition of the FY93-FY95 Congressional plus up money, Navy was also prepared to commence with the development of the pulse doppler upgrade (PDU) which, as you mentioned, helps limit radar background clutter for ships operating in littoral waters. During the final DoD level review of the 1996 President's budget, a decision was made to delete \$20.3 million from FY96 for AN/SPS-48E installations. Because completing the AN/SPS-48E installations was deemed a higher priority than the PDU upgrade, the money from the FY93-FY95 Appropriations Acts for the PDU was made available to finance the completion of the installations.

In addition, Navy has already started another improvement program for the AN/SPS-48E called the auxiliary detection processor (ADP). ADP is required for Cooperative Engagement Capability integration of the SPS-48E, also a very high priority within DoD. Navy has procured 3 ADP improvement kits; however, further procurement of ADP improvements kits will be deferred and installation of 2 AN/SPS-48E radars delayed to provide \$9 million in FY95 to commence with the development of PDU. We continue to juggle competing requirements within fiscally constrained resources.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Lewis. Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto follow:]

#### NEED FOR NEW PLANNING PROCESSES

*Question.* Admiral, in a recent article you authored, you wrote the following: "We have planned for almost half a century to cope with a world that no longer exists . . . Now, planning processes adopted to deal with that threat are not sufficient to shape the Joint military power which the future may require. It is here, in extending America's leading edge of military capabilities, that past experience may be the least helpful and the need to alter the old ways of doing things may be the greatest."

That sounds like a fancy way of saying the old cliché about Generals preparing to fight the last war.

Of the major wars fought by America in this century, how many have we been adequately prepared to fight?

Answer. History indicates, I think that we have not been adequately prepared for any of the major wars we have fought in this century. We have lost far too many Americans in the wars we have fought to argue that we were fully prepared when we had to fight them. This fact ought to lead us to two conclusions: First, that America never again enter conflict unprepared, and, second, that we prepare the nation's forces not for the wars of the past, but to deter, and if need be, to win—quickly, decisively and with minimum risk—the conflicts we may face in the future.

Question. Would you expand on the quote for the Committee? What are the insufficient planning processes you referred to?

Answer. I think planning organizations tend, over time, to build processes that reflect the general character of the problems those processes are designed to deal with. This happened in the Defense Department during the Cold War. The problem then was the threat posed by Soviet military capabilities. There were some aspects to that threat, and the way it increased, that conditioned the way we planned and programmed to cope with it. Soviet military capabilities improved from the late 1940's until the collapse of the USSR in the late 1980's. But the improvements were incremental, so much so that they were largely predictable.

Our planning and programming process was remarkably consistent with that kind of a problem. We worked from the assumption that the world would almost certainly be a more dangerous place in the future than at present—an assumption that was reflected, I suggest, in our tendency to build program "wedges" year after year, on the hope that when the Congress and American people realized the dangers we predicted were correct, they would provide the funds necessary to bring to fruition all the programs that each year could not be funded fully. We made incremental improvements to our forces, trying to keep ahead of Soviet improvements, but without the effort to leap ahead because of the risk of falling behind if the leap failed.

Now, those kinds of assumptions, and the planning and programming processes we built on them, should be reexamined. In the absence of a clearly defined threat, a definition accepted throughout the Defense Department, we need new ways of assuring the taxpayers money is spent rationally, new procedures to increase the synergism between Service programs, and new approaches to ensuring a joint military perspective to military requirements and operations.

I believe the Congress understood this even before the Berlin wall was pulled down, and that was one of the things that led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. As you know, that Act called for an emphasis on a joint perspective within the Department of Defense, and empowered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Vice Chairman to help develop that perspective, particularly with regard to identifying military requirements. The JROC process I've sketched today is part of our response. It is designed specifically to foster a joint perspective and to build a consensus, at the four star level, on what the nation needs, militarily. We want this consensus to be something other than the result of simply adding up the relatively parochial and narrower desires of the individual military Services which have merit in the context of their individual Service responsibilities but do not reflect cross-Service perspective. And we want it to be something other than the lowest common denominator of Service views. In short, we are trying to carry out the full intent of the Congress as expressed in the Goldwater-Nichols Act and will continue to build a planning and programming process that better implements that intent.

Question. How should we "alter the old ways" in order to extend America's leading edge of military capabilities?

Answer. I believe the path we have established with the JROC process is the right approach. This involves a concerted and extensive effort by the senior military leaders to understand what are often the most esoteric systems and capabilities in national defense—the sensors, communications links, computing capabilities, and precision weaponry that offer the United States a profound military edge. This understanding has to go beyond the individual Service purviews that have driven the debates and discussions in the past. Senior naval officers have to understand and appreciate the way the U.S. Army views warfare and the future; senior Army officers and Air Force officers need to be able to do this with regard to their sister Service departments. This is more than a truism; it will take a different kind of interaction and discussion than we are used to. And these discussions have to be founded on objective assessments—the kind we are generating through the Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessments that support JROC deliberations.

If we are successful in building this approach, I believe we will be able to offer recommendations that can move the United States rapidly through the American

revolution in military affairs to a position of great national security and diplomatic leverage.

#### REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

**Question.** Admiral Owens, the rapidly changing technology being introduced into weapons and intelligence systems has led to a school of thought that we are entering a "revolution in military affairs" which will lead to a whole new way of conducting warfare. What are the major initiatives in research and development that could lead to a radical change in how we conduct a military campaign?

**Answer.** I believe that building the force of the future requires harnessing technological leaps in surveillance, command and control, and longer range precision guided munitions. Examples of where we are trying to formulate innovative combinations of planned force structure, new operational concepts and doctrine, and leap-ahead technology are in the areas of non-lethal weapons and military operations in build-up areas.

One of the R&D initiatives moving to maturity is space-based laser weapons being developed for early boost phase kill of theater missiles. It employs the classic strategy—concentration of force—to focus lethal amounts of laser lights on targets at many thousands of miles, heating them in seconds and causing failure of the boosting rocket. They can be redirected and concentrate on another target in seconds. I am told that a constellation of \_\_\_\_\_ of the world's potential hot spots. This technology has been in development for the last eighteen years and has demonstrated each major component at or near the scale needed to kill missiles at these ranges. The components are now being integrated to show their mutual functioning at one time and at high power. These platforms could have other ancillary functions made possible by their large optics and by their space basing. These other functions include very high resolution imaging, interdiction of high flying aircraft, and space control missions.

**Question.** Do you think that the budget process is sufficiently focused so that the appropriate emphasis is placed on technologies which can make a substantial difference in conducting future battles?

**Answer.** It is always difficult in an environment of reduced budgets to protect technology investments while facing near term readiness and operational needs. On the Joint Staff we are helping focus this process by reinvigorating the requirements definition through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which I chair, which provides clear definition of objectives for near term and longer term military warfighting capabilities. As technologies mature, such as the space-based laser, we are able to evaluate them against these goals, and assist in directing the maturing technologies toward real military objectives, both evolutionary and revolutionary. In conjunction with OSD, we are able to "steer" the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrators and focus the Science and Technology efforts toward our objectives.

**Question.** An example of using new technology is in the space arena. Over the past five years, the Committee has added \$20 million above the budget for DOD and directed that it review how it might make better use of commercial space-based communications systems. To date, little progress has been made. However, in a recent speech, you discussed the potential of utilizing one of proposed low-earth-orbit communications systems that will be available in the next few years. How might DOD use this system in a cost-effective manner?

**Answer.** IRIDIUM is one of several planned commercial mobile satellite service systems. GlobalStar and Odyssey are among the other competitive systems. The present IRIDIUM plan is to place 11 satellites each in 6 different polar orbital planes for a total constellation of 66 satellites with worldwide coverage. It is a personal communications system with low data rate voice and data two-way messaging capability. The on-orbit design life is five years and the current plans call for the introduction of initial service in 1996, with full service planned for 1998.

We anticipate commercial mobile satellite service systems will complement military protected satellite communications systems. That is, we believe we can benefit from the ongoing commercial competition in this area and use commercial mobile satellite services where they are the most cost-effective approach to a segment of our overall satellite communications needs. As we firm up our satellite communications master plans, we will be able to describe the evolving significant role for commercial systems in general, and personal communications systems in particular. In this latter category, of course, will be a contribution from IRIDIUM-like systems.

**Question.** Do you have other examples of opportunities to apply commercial technology to defense needs?

**Answer.** The opportunity to explore ways for commercial technology to meet defense needs has never been greater. The entire spectrum of commercial technology

is promising. Let me highlight, however, the commercial technology base in computers, semiconductors, software, and telecommunications systems. The commercial technology base in these areas is particularly suited for exploring opportunities where this base can address the technical needs of our projected top five future warfighting capabilities.

#### JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

*Question.* The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Advocates for a joint military perspective. The law calls on the vice chairman to chair a special council on military requirements—the Joint Requirements Oversight Council—which looks at requirements from a joint perspective. While this is an evolving process, fiscal year 1996 represents the first budget to which a JROC has contributed. The fiscal year 1996 Budget represents the 11th consecutive decline in defense spending. How is the fiscal year 1996 Budget different from its previous budgets in its attempt to meet Joint Requirements? Does it represent a more Joint approach to warfighting?

*Answer.* I think we have made significant strides in this budget to meet joint requirements. This was the first year that our Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has expanded its role to ensure that joint requirements were examined and addressed throughout both the Program Review and the Budget Review, culminating in the fiscal year 1996 Budget.

Throughout this year's program and budget cycle, our Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment Teams (JWCAs) conducted an inclusive examination of Joint warfighting areas and a comprehensive view of intersecting capabilities. Examples of areas that the expanded JROC has reviewed (thru the JWCAs) are: Joint Precision Strike, Targeting Support for Stand-Off Weapons, Combat ID, Joint Readiness System, Counterproliferation Prioritization, Mil-to-Mil, Full Pay Raise, etc. JWCA issues were incorporated into the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) which helped to guide the fiscal year 1996 budget build.

Increased CINC involvement has been key to this process. Through the use of seminar war games, periodic video teleconferences, JROC visits to the CINCs, and close coordination on all Program Review issues and Program Budget Decisions, we have striven to keep the CINCs in the PPBS loop to ensure their Joint warfighting needs were resourced in this budget.

The fiscal year 1996 Budget endgame concluded with a final look at Joint warfighting issues, several of which made the final cut to include Ready Reserve Force Readiness, upgrading additional Navy-Air Force communications capabilities, and funding engineering development for composite combat ID requirements.

*Question.* During the JROC process you visited and met with all of the CINCs in face to face exchanges. To what extent did the CINCs input formulate the JROC recommendations to the Chairman?

*Answer.* The JROC took the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments and vetted their results with each of the warfighting CINCs. It was the results of these consultations with the CINCs we used in preparing the Chairman's Program Assessment and it will be the results of the JROC's most recent trip that will be used in preparing the Chairman's Program Recommendations.

*Question.* Are there substantial differences in the recommendations the CINCs have for Joint Warfighting and the recommendations of the Service Chiefs in their long range budget submissions?

*Answer.* No.

*Question.* Were there recommendations from the JROC which did not appear in the fiscal year 1996 budget? If so, can you provide specific examples or categories of such programs?

*Answer.* No.

#### TECHNOLOGY AREAS TO EMPHASIZE

*Question.* The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has identified five areas of priority to future Joint Warfighting Capabilities. I'd like to briefly get your view on the potential of these specific areas. Area 1: Maintain near perfect real-time knowledge of the enemy and communicate that to all forces near real-time. Is this a realistic objective? How affordable is this objective? What are the major programs that must come to fruition to achieve this objective? Provide for the record the major R&D efforts in this area.

*Answer.* The Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance JWCA has recommended that it is achievable — to have a dominant battlespace knowledge zone—a concentration of intelligence assets for a limited period of time upon a fo-

cused, multidimensional section of the battle space. This is achievable if the necessary sensors and communications systems developed are employed in a coherent architecture which efficiently applies these assets. The three major aspects of the battlefield information system that provide information—surveillance, information management, and communications—all require improvement. Also assured, reliable identification of friendly versus adversary forces must be developed. Detecting and classifying threats and targets remains an extraordinarily difficult problem.

Materiel and systems must be developed at lower cost, be longer-lived, and be incrementally enhanced in capability through planned upgrades. Information technologies are the basis for continual improvements in communications; intelligence gathering, and analysis and distribution; battlefield situational awareness; command and control; sensor data processing; and human performance. Applying these technologies increases the effectiveness of systems which means that more can be accomplished with less materiel, thus reducing total cost and making the systems more affordable.

Major programs include Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar (JSTARS), Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) programs, Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), Cooperative Engagement Concept (CEC), and Space Based Infrared (SBIR). The key to success of this capability is to develop the architecture to allow this to happen. We must develop the collection assets and the communications architecture to distribute the necessary information to provide near real time mission execution and combat assessment to Commanders.

**Question.** Area 2: To engage regional forces promptly in decisive combat, on a global scale. What are the major efforts underway to have sufficient resources to attain? How affordable is attaining this particular goal? Provide for the record the major R&D efforts in this area.

**Answer.** A variety of enhancements implemented during the Bottom-Up Review are designed to provide agile, effective forces capable of winning regional conflicts. Mobility of forces has been enhanced through increased pre-positioning, modernized airlift, and increased sealift. Brigade prepositioning sets in Kuwait, Qatar, and Korea will ameliorate early cargo lifts requirements, as will the Army brigade set afloat. Early arrival of rapidly deploying combat elements is further enhanced by increased numbers of high-leverage munitions. Most of the advanced munitions programs and aircraft upgrades important to the enhancement of US capabilities to fight and win future regional conflicts remain on track. These programs include: advanced anti-armor munitions, such as Sensor Fuzed Weapon and the Brilliant Anti-Armor Submunition; the Longbow system for the Apache helicopter; the Joint Direct Attack Munition and the Joint Standoff Weapon; upgrades to the heavy bomber force; and others. Further, the 1996 DoD budget includes increased procurement of existing systems such as the Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM), and Have Nap.

The current President's Budget funds a balanced, agile force capable of fighting and winning two Major Regional Conflicts. Major R&D includes:

**Precision SIGINT Targeting.**—Objectives are precision target location, rapid data dissemination, and integration of multiple sources.

**Medium Altitude Endurance Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV).**—Provides long dwell unmanned airborne vehicle near real time reconnaissance and surveillance.

**Rapid Force Protection Initiative.**—Enables light force to defend itself by extending the battlespace to 10–15 kilometers. Increase lethality and survivability for light forces beyond line of sight.

**Joint Countermine.**—Provides seamless amphibious and ground force mine countermeasure operations.

**Synthetic Theater of War 97.**—Improves joint training by simulating a "state of war" without safety, cost, and environmental restrictions.

**High Altitude Endurance UAV.**—Provides CINCs a long endurance surveillance/target acquisition capability in defended/denied areas.

**Boost Phase Intercept.**—Destroys a tactical ballistic missile in its boost phase to negate collateral damage in friendly territory.

**Low Altitude Infiltration/Exfiltration.**—Increases capability for covert penetration into and exit from hostile areas.

**Question.** Area 3: To employ a range of capabilities more suitable for actions at the lower end of the full range of military operations which allow achievement of military objectives with minimum casualties and collateral damage. Explain further what is involved in this goal? What are the major R&D programs underway to achieve this goal?

**Answer.** The changing world scene and the National Security Strategy of engagement make US involvement in lower intensity conflicts increasingly likely. Current US Armed Forces are versatile and capable. Improvements in Intelligence, Surveil-

lance and Reconnaissance, Command and Control, and personal protection of our committed forces and use of non-lethal technologies will enhance our capabilities in low intensity and peace operations. Major R&D efforts are the same ones highlighted in the previous question.

*Question.* To control the use of space. Define this objective for the Committee. What programs must become operable to ensure that this objective is achieved?

*Answer.* One of five future Joint Warfighting Capabilities most needed by the US Combatant Commands as identified by the Joint Staff and JROC. Space control has three components:

Space Surveillance: detecting, tracking, and identifying space objects.

Protection: keeping our space forces intact. ———.

Control of space allows the US to maintain information dominance through technological superiority with improved productivity and reduced costs.

Uninterrupted access to information from space provides benefits to both military and commercial industry—communications, navigation, weather monitoring, threat warning, and intelligence gathering. We must protect our space systems against an increasing diversity of threats through hardening, shielding, and both physical and communication agility. Primary programs are in space surveillance (optical, radar, and passive), communications and navigation systems.

Near-earth radars like Cavalier AS ND.

GEODDS—Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance System.

DSCS—Defense Satellite Communications System.

GPS—Global Positioning Satellites.

SBIRS—Space-Based Infrared Sensors.

EELV—Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle.

No specific programs are dedicated to protection of US and friendly space forces. DOD has consistently sought an anti-satellite capability, but Congress has historically restricted such programs.

*Question.* To counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction and future ballistic and cruise missiles to the continental United States (CONUS) and deployed forces. How affordable is this goal? Most people think only of nuclear weapons when discussing weapons of mass destruction. What is your assessment of the threat of biological and chemical weapons?

*Answer.* The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization is currently developing capabilities to defend our deployed forces with terminal phase defense systems such as Patriot Advanced Capability 3 and Theater High-Altitude Air Defense systems. It is also developing the technology for National Missile Defense of CONUS using both terminal defense systems of Ground-Based Interceptors and boost phase defense with Space-Based Lasers. Systems with significant capability range in cost from six to twenty billion dollars. Their affordability is established if they ever save American lives or one American city by their use or by their deterrent value.

Biological weapons, along with chemical weapons are seen by many nations as deterrents against regional aggression. The materials to develop biological weapons can be easily found among pharmaceutical factories, medical research facilities, and biopesticide plants. Additionally, defensive biological activities may camouflage offensive production. At least ——— countries have known or suspected biological R&D efforts. Of these, at least ——— have the capability for military production.

#### COMMANDER IN CHIEFS' PRIORITIES

*Question.* You are currently meeting with the various CINCs in preparation for the fiscal year 1997 defense proposal. We have held hearings with the CINCs and find they are deeply concerned about the modernization of forces which everyone agrees is a deficiency in the fiscal year 1996 budget.

*Answer.* While the CINCs are rightfully more concerned about current readiness and maintaining the capability to prosecute their operations plans, they are intimately aware of the need to maintain the delicate balance between force structure, current readiness and future modernization which is so vital to maintaining our Nation's technological advantages. They are very concerned that recapitalization not come at the expense of additional force structure losses. As always, trained and ready forces are key, and oftentimes training is impacted by a lack of timely reimbursement of monies used to fund contingency operations.

In their various testimony sessions with Congress, and in other fora, the CINCs have often referred to these priorities—they are usually mentioned in the same breath as the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) and Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) and subsequent MRS BUR Update enhancements.

However, I think there's more to be said. We need to continue enhancement in all mission and battlespace functional areas. We need to vigorously drive to commu-

nications interoperability at the operational and strategic level, as is provided by Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Intelligence enhancements are often related to not simply newer, better and more—but rather related to better interoperability with what we have. Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System—JDISS—and Joint World-wide Intelligence Communications System—JWICS—matter here. Force protection, especially in dealing with a myriad of Theater Air Defense issues such as Corps SAM and THAAD and Naval Force enhancements, is a growing area of concern. General Downing's top modernization concern is battlefield mobility—infiltration and extraction of Special Operations Forces.

*Question.* Are there any other major mission areas that the CINCs have identified as central to future warfighting requirements?

*Answer.* This question actually has three perspectives: things that enable you to shape the strategic environment, things you do to deter potential adversaries, and things that enable you to fight and win. Shaping has a number of critical sub elements that the CINCs strongly support. Among these key areas are a robust Security Assistance and Defense Attaché program, Coalition building activities such as Combined Training Exercises, and other Foreign Military Interaction activities.

Similarly, we should not downplay the importance of forward stationed and forward presence forces and prepositioned sets of equipment. Central Command (CENTCOM) is reevaluating its Gulf prepo requirements as a result of the vigilant Warrior operation.

In our JWCA process we mention deterrence and counterproliferation in the same breath. They are obviously quite different entities. The counterproliferation business has a number of players—but high on the list is the role played by our Special Operations Forces. When the bad guys know we have the capability to take them out selectively with little collateral damage—this contributes to deterrence.

There are a number of areas the CINCs have reported needed improvement. They are concerned about — continued upgrades for theater mobility assets like the C-130 and SOF adapted Blackhawk.

The CINCs have supported a number of Advance Concepts Technology Designs for the battlefield. For example, UAVs will play an important role. Finally, I also see Information Warfare, and those actions we take to prevent it from being used against us, as being a key emerging, functional area of the future.

#### TIME SEQUENCE AND TWO MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS

*Question.* In hearings a few weeks ago, Admiral Macke, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command made the following observations in answering a question about the capability to handle two MRC's. "There is a major question on time and getting troops there. Without sufficient lift, you are not going to get the forces to build up as fast as you want them to. Without enough precision weapons, you will not attrit the enemy as fast as you would like.

Time equates to personnel and equipment losses. The question isn't whether we can win, but can we meet a time line that will minimize our losses in the process of doing it."

Admiral Owens, would you give us your perspective on these observations of Admiral Macke?

*Answer.* Admiral Macke is right on the mark. The nature of our most dangerous MRCs are similar in that a friendly nation is invaded by an aggressive neighbor, and we, the US, must deploy forces quickly to aid in their defense. So, strategic mobility is a key to our National Military Strategy.

Because our help is needed in a matter of days, not weeks or months, the early arriving US forces must be capable of immediate, powerful combat operations. It is in this critical phase that we must ensure that the Joint Force Commander has the right combinations of ground, air, and naval forces to include preferred munitions and the requisite intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to use them.

*Question.* A past CINC witness expressed reservations about the capability of our strategic lift to conduct a single MRC in a timely manner, much less two nearly simultaneous MRC's. Please comment.

*Answer.* We are steadily improving our strategic lift capability. It is significant to note that this past year, in 1994, we fielded AR-3, the Army PREPO Afloat Brigade. The Navy's sealift program is awarding Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ship construction contracts, and the Air Force has recently fielded the first C-17 squadron. While we are not where we want to be eventually in sealift, we have momentum thanks to your support—and we need to see all these programs through to completion.

*Question.* What in your opinion, is the best additional investment of resources, should the Committee decide to provide some funds above the budget request, to



help ensure that serious bottlenecks . . . logistics or other do not emerge in carrying out a two MRC strategy?

Answer. My personal opinion is that the areas of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance advanced C4I, and precision munitions offer the best payoff for an additional investment of resources. We are the most technically advanced military in the world and we have an opportunity to leverage our advantages even further. Our goal is to dominate future battlefields—through superior technology and equipment and through superbly trained and ready personnel.

#### NIMBLE DANCER

*Question.* Recently a major wargame entitled "Nimble Dancer" was conducted to evaluate the outcome of two near simultaneous MRC's (Major Regional Conflicts). The Committee is advised that this is the first major war game since the end of the cold war. Is that accurate? Tell us about the mechanics of conducting Nimble Dancer. How realistic is it? Was Nimble Dancer waged with current inventories? In terms of equipment available to US troops for Nimble Dancer, is all of it either fielded at the present time or included in the Five Year Defense Plan?

Answer. There have been other war games but the Nimble Dancer seminar wargame and model analysis process is the first one since 1988 which includes the CJCS, CINCs, Joint Staff, CINC's Staffs, Service Chiefs, and OSD.

Nimble Dancer provided a realistic assessment of our capabilities and risks. It has been a collaborative effort from the start. The exercise took a large body of analytical and modeling work and presented this information in a seminar war game format. Throughout this process, the CINCs have provided their own views on threats, potential problem areas, and operational concepts. Nimble Dancer has helped develop the framework for recent decisions on the apportionment of forces to support CINC plans.

Nimble Dancer I looked at the \_\_\_\_\_. The exercise used programmed forces for both the 1997 and 2001 base case warfights. \_\_\_\_\_.

Nimble Dancer II is an ongoing assessment using a \_\_\_\_\_.

Nimble Dancer I was fought using 1997 fielded levels for munitions. The assessment process identified \_\_\_\_\_.

Preferred munitions were further analyzed and determined to be sufficient in the 1997 program. No further analysis was performed on other classes of supplies.

The \_\_\_\_\_ there are sufficient preferred munitions (SFW, BAT, etc.) to impact the warfight. It is also the time period when air lift centers on the C-17 and Non-Developmental Airlift Aircraft (NDAA), and most C-141s are retired.

*Question.* Is all of the prepositioned equipment you assumed to be available in Nimble Dancer in place at this time?

Answer. For Nimble Dancer I \_\_\_\_\_ the answer is yes.

For Nimble Dancer II (2001) we included the \_\_\_\_\_.

*Question.* What assumptions did you make in Nimble Dancer in terms of the availability of strategic air and sealift?

Answer. We used programmed air and sealift assets. This includes the C-17 and Non-Developmental Airlift Aircraft (NDAA) in the 2001 base case. Sealift for 2001 base case assumes fielding of LMSRs. \_\_\_\_\_.

The lift issue is very dependent on the type of operations you are engaged in. Initially peacetime lift assets were used to support peace operations. As the MRCs developed, more lift became available—CRAF is activated, commercial charters will also be available.

The competition for lift is most critical in the early phase of an MRC. Priority of lift will go to the MRC. Then, as lift becomes available, the peace support forces can be withdrawn.

*Question.* In what time frame was Nimble Dancer played?

Answer. \_\_\_\_\_.

*Question.* What assumptions were made in Nimble Dancer about US troops being involved in contingency operations at the time the first MRC began?

Answer. Nimble Dancer used 18 August 1994 as a representative (and randomly selected) snap shot of deployments around the world. This included peace support operations ranging from 9 personnel to 3000 personnel. Missions included fire fighting in California, peace keeping in the Sinai, Support Hope in Rwanda, and operations associated with Southern Watch and Provide Comfort.

Nimble Dancer I assumed that forces would be withdrawn from peace support operations to meet 2-MRC requirements. It looked at a range of peace support activities to develop a preliminary impact assessment.

*Question.* What if any initiatives are needed to address this operational requirement?

**Answer.** The answer to that and related questions is, in part, why we are examining joint warfighting capabilities. We will continue to explore capabilities from a joint perspective to get at those answers in the future.

During Desert Shield and Desert Storm we had excellent port facilities and airports available to bring massive amounts of equipment, troops, and supplies to engage the enemy. That may not be the case in the future.

We could face a contested landing.

We could face a hostile environment with no adequate ports or airfields.

We could face a chemical or biological attack when we enter the initial halt and build up stages.

#### SHIP SELF-DEFENSE/COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT

**Question.** Since 1987, when 37 sailors died in the Iraqi missile attack on the USS *Stark*, the Committee has taken a keen interest in ship self-defense. We have added over \$350 million to the Defense budget during the past four years for such programs. A major effort is "cooperative engagement", where ships share radar data to mutually protect each other from anti-ship cruise missile attack.

The Committee is encouraged by recent efforts to expand the Navy's program to address ballistic missile defense with Army Patriot batteries. However, more work needs to be done to field an effective joint system which can use both sensors and weapon systems belonging to all the military services (e.g., Air Force AWACs, Navy E-2Cs, AEGIS ship radars and missiles, etc.)

Please describe the difficulty any ship has in protecting itself from a sea-skimming, anti-ship cruise missile attack. How does "cooperative engagement" help?

**Answer.** The difficulties a ship has against this threat include the limited time between detection and reaction of the ship's self-defense weapons systems, and the horizon limited range of its own onboard, organic sensor. "Cooperative engagement" has the potential to blend the detections of various sensors, many of which are off the shooting ship, into an accurate fire control quality track that allows the ship multiple target engagement at much greater ranges.

**Question.** How many nations today possess sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles?

**Answer.** \_\_\_\_\_

**Question.** Is this threat expected to worsen as advanced stealth technologies become more widespread?

**Answer.** In general, yes. The more difficult a target is to detect, the more of a threat it is. We are working hard to match advances in stealth technologies with our own ability to detect fast-moving targets with smaller and smaller radar cross sections (RCS).

**Question.** Last summer, ship self-defense tests were conducted with the USS *Eisenhower* battle group. Please describe the tests and the results.

**Answer.** Last summer in the Puerto Rico operational areas, the Navy conducted missile firings against stealthy drone targets in a heavy electronic countermeasures environment. The "cooperative engagement concept" was successfully used by a Ticonderoga Class Aegis cruiser, a Leahy Class cruiser and a Spruance Class destroyer. Each ship engaged targets successfully using remote tracks, that is tracks generated from sensors not on its own ship. \_\_\_\_\_

**Question.** The most recent tests emphasize using cooperative engagement for theater defense against ballistic missiles. What is the JROC strategy in this regard?

**Answer.** The JROC recognizes the enhanced warfighting potential of the cooperative engagement concept against theater ballistic missiles. Currently this is a Navy acquisition and development program the test results of which have sparked the interest of the JROC and the other Services. In August 1994 \_\_\_\_\_

**Question.** Which has a higher priority to the Joint Chiefs of Staff: ship self-defense against cruise missiles or theater area defense against ballistic missiles?

**Answer.** Both are high priorities to JCS. Which missile defense system has the higher priority is a function of the situation in which these threats are faced and the CINCs' missions in their respective AORs. The key difference between the two is the maturity and depth of support already established in the ship's self-defense system development versus our expanding efforts in the area of theater ballistic missile defense.

**Question.** The Committee has been dissatisfied with the Air Force's failure to include cooperative engagement on its AWACS aircraft. What is JCS doing to fix the problem? How much is included in the fiscal year 1996 President's Budget and the accompanying Future Years Defense Plan to integrate Navy cooperative engagement equipment into Air Force AWACS aircraft?

**Answer.** Recently members of the CNO's staff briefed the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force who recognizes the strong potential of cooperative engagement. The

Air Force has agreed to consider modifying one (1) AWACS aircraft with cooperative engagement equipment to be studied for tactical integration and assessment. It is important to remember that an upgrade program to AWACS is already in progress.

The specific figures are not known. I will have to get back to you later with the figures of the test program on the one AWACS aircraft.

*Question.* The Navy has traditionally relied only on radars for its ship sensors, which becomes problematic once stealth technology becomes more commonly available. What is JCS doing to get infrared (heat sensing) sensors on Navy ships?

*Answer.* Many Navy ships now operate with simple infrared sensors and infrared suppression devices, but they are not sophisticated enough to function as a fire control radar against a stealth cruise missile. However, the technology has extreme potential and the Navy is currently staffing an Operational Requirement Document for the development of an infrared search and track system.

*Question.* If the USS *Stark* were attacked today by a similar Iraqi aircraft and missile, what equipment does it now have onboard to protect itself that it lacked in 1987?

*Answer.* It has an upgraded Close-In Weapons Systems (CIWS), the 20mm self-defense gun; it has installed — making it much more difficult to be detected by an inbound missile. Non-equipment improvements include improved tactics and clearer Rules of Engagement.

#### SUBMARINES

*Question.* How best to modernize the Navy's attack submarine force remains as a major issue before the Congress. Alternatives include: building a 3rd SEAWOLF; initiating a new attack submarine program; upgrading SSN-688 class submarines; and slowing the pace of submarine retirements. From a strictly warfighting perspective—the JROC perspective—which is the best way to go?

*Answer.* The 1992 Joint Chiefs of Staff study, updated in 1993, recommended 10–12 attack submarines having SEAWOLF level of quieting by 2012 to deal with the emerging threat.

The quality introduced to the fleet by 3 SEAWOLF submarines and the New SSN will satisfy the requirements generated by current Russian and rest of world threats.

*Question.* Is construction of the 3rd SEAWOLF submarine on any of the CINC's Integrated Priority Lists (IPL) of requirements?

*Answer.* It was not on any of the CINC's IPLs during the last budget cycle. CINC IPL's for this budget cycle are due 15 March.

#### TACTICAL AIRLIFT MODERNIZATION

*Question.* Since the time when the Secretary of Defense canceled the Navy's A-12 aircraft development program, there has been much turmoil and confusion concerning the Department's plan to develop next generation fighter/attack aircraft. The Department's main development program for addressing this issue is called JAST (Joint Advanced Strike Technology), which envisions building prototypes of follow-on aircraft to the A-6, AV-8B, F-14 and F-16. Admiral Owens, what is the JROC's military requirement for next generation fighter/attack aircraft? How will the JAST program address this requirement? Since JAST only develops a handful of prototype/demonstrator aircraft, when will DOD budget for and field a next generation fighter/attack aircraft program?

*Answer.* I think we must man, modernize and replace our fighter/attack aircraft to maintain a strong and effective fighting force. Our fighter/attack aircraft have served us well and will continue to be a vital capability for our future defense forces. The JAST program is exploring advanced technologies to meet the needs of our services for its aging A-6s, AV-8bs and F-16s.

The JAST program is fully supported in the FYDP to research and develop the strike technologies for each of the Services' needs. The objective is to exploit and position technology building blocks for affordable, successful development of one or more next-generation strike fighter programs. We have not provided funding for proceeding into an aircraft program. Actual development of the next-generation strike fighter is a follow on effort. Funding and fielding remain outside the future years defense plan. The JROC will continue to review JAST requirements and make its recommendations at the appropriate time.

*Question.* The nation will spend billions to develop the F-22. Why can JCS find no use for a naval variant of this aircraft?

**Answer.** Future naval aircraft requirements are being explored under the JAST technologies. Certainly research and development acquired in the F-22 program will be leveraged in our efforts.

**Question.** How long will the aging fleet of A-6 aircraft last until it needs replacement? Will JAST result in a timely A-6 replacement program?

**Answer.** The A-6 inventory draw down is already underway and will be completed in fiscal year 1997. Current airwings which have A-6 Strike squadrons are transitioning to the highly capable F/A-18.

#### AMMUNITION AND SMART WEAPONS

**Question.** The Committee has a long-standing track record of providing increased funds for ammunition programs, which are generally not adequately funded by the Defense Department in its budget requests to Congress. In addition, while the gulf war showed the value of having both "smart" and "dumb" munitions, it is generally thought that we do not possess the types of smart munitions we need in sufficient quantities. Admiral Owens, what is the JROC doing to ensure that our forces have adequate supplies of ammunition and munitions, and in the proper proportions?

**Answer.** The individual Services have the statutory requirement to equip their forces. The JROC directed efforts to assess the current Service munitions procurement goals and future weapons programs to meet the warfighting requirement.

**Question.** With the fiscal year 1996 budget request and the accompanying Future Years Defense Plan, in what year will this goal be achieved?

**Answer.** The Service's munition programs are under continuous review to ensure that warfighting requirements are met. The current fiscal year 1996 budget request will support those requirements.

**Question.** What is the JROC strategy for developing the next generation of smart munitions.

**Answer.** The JROC has a three part strategy. The warfighters identify their requirements, the Services develop weapons programs to satisfy the CINC's requirements, and the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment teams assess the Service programs to ensure warfighting requirements are met.

**Question.** What priority does the JROC place on developing smart weapons on more than one service?

**Answer.** The JROC requires that all future aviation weapons be interoperable between the Services.

**Question.** The Nation spent 9 years and \$3 billion on the troubled Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile, which the Secretary of Defense recently canceled. What did we get for our huge investment?

**Answer.** Some of the individual elements can be rolled into future weapons systems at low risk.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]



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